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Preface 
Small changes in an established system can result in larger changes in the overall system 
(e.g. network effects, émergence, criticality, broken Windows theory). However, in an 
immature discipline, such as computer security, such changes can be difficult to envision 
and even more difficult to amplement, as the immature discipline is likely to lack the 
scientific framework that would allow for the introduction of even minute changes. 
(Cairns, P. and Thimbleby, H, 2003) describe three of the signs of an immature discipline 
as postulated by (Kuhn, 1970): 
a. squabbles over what are legitimate tools for research 
b. disagreement over which phenomenon are legitimate to study, and 
c. inability to scope the domain of study. 
The research presented in this document demonstrates how the computer security field, at 
the time this research began, was the embodiment of thèse characteristics. It présents a 
cohesive analysis of the intentional introduction of a séries of small changes chosen to aid 
in maturation of the discipline. Summarily, it builds upon existing theory, exploring the 
combined effect of coordinated and strategie changes in an immature system and 
establishing a scientific framework by which the impact of the changes can be quantified. 
By critically examining the nature of the computer security system overall, this work 
establishes the need for both increased scientific rigor, and a multidisciplinary approach 
to the global computer security problem. In order for thèse changes to take place, many 
common assumptions related to computer security had to be questioned. However, as the 
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discipline was immature, and controlled by relatively few entities, questioning the status 
quo was not without difficultés. 
However, in order for the discipline to mature, more feedback into the overall computer 
security (and in particular, the computer mal wäre/virus) system was needed, requiring a 
shifì from a mostly closed system to one that was forced to undergo greater scrutiny from 
various other communities. The input from these communities resulted in long-term 
changes and increased maturation of the system. 
Figure 1 illustrâtes the specific areas in which the research presented herein addressed 
these needs, provides an overview of the research context, and outlines the specific 
impact of the research, specifically the development of new and significant scientific 
paradigms within the discipline. 
Computer Security 
The Generic Vims 
Writer 
Application of psychology 
and sociology to virus 
writer motivation 
Facilitated introduction of multidisciplinary 
approach to computer security dealing with 
malicious code to wider audience. Changed 
public perception of people involved in 
writing self-replicating programs. Provided 
course materials to further academic 
understanding of malicious code problem. 
Virus Analysis: What 
a Winword Concept 
Technical analysis of a 
new class of Malicious 
Mobile Code 
Demonstrated viruses can spread via e-
mail. Introduced the concept of 
upconversion. 
Virus Analysis: Excel 
Yourself! 
Technical analysis of the 
first Excel virus 
Demonstrated viruses can spread via e-
mail. 
Vims Writers: End of 
the Innocence 
Application of psychology 
and sociology to changes 
in virus writer profile 
Laws have limited effect on virus writing. 
Demonstrated issues with artificial socio-
technical divide. 
The Antivirus 
Strategy System 
Application of General 
System Theory to Virus 
Protection 
Revisited idea that technical solutions are 
insufficient to solve the whole virus 
problem. Brought scientific discourse and 
radical ideas into the antivirus mainstream. 
Demonstrated how feedback within 
organization can impact overall system 
security. 
What is Wild? Review of virus testing 
methodologies and 
certification techniques 
Documented insufficient standards and 
criteria. Defined valid and meaningful 
criteria and methodologies that were 
accepted by governments, testers, academic 
and public worldwide. 
Cyb ert errorism? Multi-disciplinary 
approach to examining the 
role of Information 
technology in Terrorism 
Vertical views of cyber-security are 
potentially dangerous, and reflect only one 
dimension of the threat. Creation of 
terrorism matrix 
A Survey of Privacy 
Attitudes 
Application of softer 
"human factors" in 
examining privacy 
problems 
Quantitatively demonstrated that echnical 
solutions will not be successful without 
considering human factors. 
Figure 1 : Research, summary, and impact. 
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Introduction 
For over a decade, I have been working in the field of computer science: 
specifically, those topics that involve the integration of other disciplines with the study of 
computer security. In this document, I propose that the body of work I have built up over 
the last eleven years is suitable for earning a PhD. based upon publication. In certain 
aspects of the discipline of computer security - in particular, within the field of computer 
viruses - the work is considered to be séminal [Lee & Harley, 2000; Rusch, 2002; 
Stucker, 1997]. 
During this time period, the work submitted and described herein has been published in 
peer-reviewed conférence proceedings and journals, cited by many différent académie 
and government entities, and included as part of university computer science curricula 
worldwide [Denning, 1999; Purdue, 2004; Kabay, 2001]. 
[Rogerson, 1996; Rogerson and Bynum, 1997] recognized the need to "build upon and 
elaborate the conceptual foundation" (of existing curricula dealing with computing 
ethics), at the same time "developing the frameworks within which practical action can 
occur, thus reducing the probability of unforeseen effects of information technology 
application". In a public letter addressing the content of a computer ethics course, 
[Bynum, 2003] called specifically for "Materials covering a représentative sampling of 
"traditional" and "new" computer ethics topics like computer security (viruses, hacking, 
terrorism, etc.)". 
The research presented herein provided such a framework in the field of computer 
security, and explored thèse 'new' computer ethics topics. Furthermore, it expanded the 
Computer Security 
existing technical worldview to encompass other areas critical to understanding computer 
security issues by approaching these areas with a multidisciplinary perspective. The 
acceptance of my research by the academic community as foundational, and its status as 
required reading in the area demonstrates its impact and as a scholarly work on the 
subject. 
In summary, this research 
• Critically examined the nature of the virus, hacking, antivirus and security 
communities at technical and social levels; 
• Established, based upon the aforementioned examination, the need for a 
multidisciplinary approach in solving the computer security problem; 
• Resulted in extensive discussion of human and technical issues of these 
communities in mainstream media, gaining worldwide attention and recognition; 
• Built upon the worldwide attention and recognition via both private and public 
discussion, facilitating introduction of the concept of a multidisciplinary approach 
to areas of computer science dealing with malicious code; 
• Facilitated the integration of a multidisciplinary approach to new computer 
security topics into the security community and into academic curricula. 
• Facilitated the introduction of new paradigms in computer security resulting in the 
maturation of the discipline, i.e. the areas represented herein are now acceptable 
within the scope of study of computer security. 
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The structure of this context document is relatively straightforward. In the General 
Overview section, the impact and scholarly validity of my research is described. This 
section may be considered to be a justification of the application, and contains a 
discussion of the scope, quality and quantity of work. Next, the context of the work is 
considered - the existing state of the art at the time of carrying out much of the research 
is given, and it is placed in relation to contrasting approaches. This is followed by an 
overview of the actual research carried out. 
Finally, further research areas identified by my work are highlighted; suggestions for 
différent approaches are given. Additionally, some personal thoughts on the expérience 
of conducting the research are shared, as well as the motivation for seeking this degree. 
Generai Overview 
When one considers the award of a PhD by publication, several important checks and 
balances are brought to mind to ensure that this mode of degree application is considered 
to be équivalent to a PhD obtained by a more traditional approach. The most important of 
thcsc are comparability with traditional degrecs, and litcrary record - that is, that the PhD 
be represented by some permanent record to which other scholars may point to in order to 
extend, compare and critique the underlying body of knowledge. 
These preconditions can be further broken down by applying more traditional measures 
of the PhD: suitability, quality, quantity and scale/scope. In this overview section, it is my 
intention to demonstrate that the work I have published to date clearly satisfies each of 
these primary criteria. 
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The main thrust of ali my work has been the integration of 'traditionaF branches of 
science with the emerging field of computer security. As computing power has grown 
exponentially, the impact of computing technology has been huge. Radical changes in 
our spoken language ('dot.com', 'slashdotted', URL, etc.) are indicative of the 
tremendous revolution in which we have unwittingly taken part. 
Due to the speed with which computing technology has developed, there has been little 
time within the computer security industry for issues aside from the raw technology itself 
to be considered [Gordon, 1994a; Yang, 2002, Yngstrom, 1996]. 
Much of the work presented here was begun at the very start of thèse changes: this 
understanding is extremely important in placing the work in its context. 
In terms of comparability, discussion is somewhat lengthier; so I instead turn to the latter 
category of literary record. Here, I demonstrate that the volume of the publicly available 
work (made available through peer-reviewed publishing and other means), coupled with 
this context document is sufficient to provide a permanent, cohérent record of this 
research. 
The volume of work is distributed throughout several médiums: journal publication, 
white papers, conférence présentations, classroom content and press (television, radio, 
and print media). Here I will discuss each of these areas in more détail. In the early days 
of computer viruses, while there were engineering and computer science journals, there 
Computer Security 
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 The set of malicious code contains replicating code (viruses) and non-replicating code. 
2
 "In the wild" viruses are those which have been found on real users computers, and that spread during the 
course of regular day-to-day operations. 
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were few opportunities for publications related to computer viruses or security and almost 
no people working in the field of computer viruses and mal ware 1. 
Elsevier Science's Computers and Security Journal was one of the earliest recognized 
specialist journals in the security field; it was fortunate to have as Senior Editors Dr. 
Harold Highland and Dr. Jon David. Highland and David were pioneers in computer 
antivirus research; thus, they were able to provide the scientific expertise to critically 
review submissions related to computer viruses. 
It was in Computers and Security Journal that my first widely acclaimed and award 
winning work 'Technologically Enabled Crime: Shifting Paradigms for the Year 2000' 
was published. That work is discussed in detail later as one of the submissions for 
consideration. A second paper, 'Cyberterrorism?' also submitted herein, was later also 
published by the peer-reviewed journal. 
Shortly after the inception of Personal Computer viruses in the wild 2, the British 
specialist journal Virus Bulletin emerged, and quickly became the only specialist virus 
publication recognized by computer anti-virus researchers; thus, publication in this 
journal was critical to gaining acceptance of the work within the relatively insular 
antivirus community. Additionally, it was the only forum in which research on computer 
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viruses was regularly shared. Finally, the review board of Virus Bulletin consisted of 
world-recognized researchers in the field of computer viruses. 
My research on virus writing and virus writers was initially published in Virus Bulletin, 
in an effort to dispel some of the myths concerning people who wrote self-replicating 
programs, and to foster relationships with others in the closed antivirus research field. 
Subsequently, I have published several technical articles in the journal, two of which 
were analyses of the first two known macro viruses and which are also submitted as part 
of this context statement. 
Prior to publication of these virus analyses, the antivirus research community, and 
subsequently the world, did not believe that viruses could be spread through documents 
or spreadsheets. My discovery and analysis proved they could. 
In addition to the published research, presentations based on the journal submissions and 
articles have been given in various venues, including: 
• The American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) Conference 
on Computer and Network Use and Abuse, Irvine, CA, 1993. 
• Special Projects for The United Nations Headquarters, NY, NY, 1994, 1995 
• Elsevier Science Compsec UK Conference, Westminster, UK, 1996, 1997, 2003 
• The National Institute of Standards and Technology Conference, Baltimore, MD, 
1996, 1997, 2000 
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• The Computer Security Institute Annua! Conference, Chicago, IL, 1994, 1995, 
1996. 2000 (Keynote), 2001. 
• Working groups hosted by International Fédération for Information Processing 
(IFIP). 1995, 1996, 2002 
• Working groups hosted by SRI International, Crystal City, VA 2003 
• Working groups hosted by FBI Behavioral Sciences Unit, Quantico, VA. 2004 
In addition, my work has been cited and I have been profiled many times by diverse types 
of international news media as a scientific and crédible source. An example of such a 
quote follows; a more complete list can be found in Appendix 3. 
• " ...she is a first rate tecchie, with impeccable credentials ...conducted research 
of a technical, educational and psychological natures she has a long 
association with computer security and technology in general "Remember the 
daughters of Daneaus — sentenced to forever draw water in a buchet of holes? To 
approach the problem from a solely technical angle is the modem day 
équivalent ". (Irish Examiner, 2003). 
Thus, technical, social and psychological aspects of my research have been published in 
numerous académie Journals, and are well cited; the research has been incorporated into 
diverse conférence proceedings and served as the basis for many présentations to a 
variety of audiences; and, the press coverage of the research forms an extensive and 
permanent electronic and print record in archive sites. Considering thèse faets in toto, 
this work is clearly integrated into the permanent record that forms our societies 'body of 
knowledge'. 
Computer Security 
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Comparability: Quality, Scale and Scope 
The more difficult issue of comparability may be broken down into two areas: quality, 
and scale/scope. What follows shows that the work satisfies each of these categories. 
Quality 
In terms of quality, the work has been awarded prizes and been presented as 'invited 
work' at scholarly conferences. Some of these are: 
• American Association for the Advancement of Science Conference on Social, 
Ethical and Legal Implications of Computer and Network Use and Abuse [AAAS, 
1993]; 
• International Federation for Information Processing Sec 94 [IFIP, 1994]; 
• IFIP World Computer Congress [IFIP, 2002]; 
• European Institute for Computer Antivirus Research [EICAR, 1998] 
As discussed previously the work has also been published in several journals, both peer 
and non-peer reviewed (e.g. Computers and Security Journal; European Institute for 
Computer Antivirus Research, Network Security and Virus Bulletin). 
Additionally, attesting to the quality of the research is that it has been presented at 
academic and governmental research institutions, conferences and workshops worldwide, 
including: 
• University of Stockholm Department of Computer Science 
Computer Security 
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• University of Hamburg Department of Computer Science 
• University of Aalborg [hosted European Institute for Computer Antivirus 
Research] 
• Purdue University Department of Computer Science 
. • Florida Institute of Technology Department of Computer Science, Center for 
Information Assurance 
• University of Notre Dame Department of Computer Science 
• Indiana University Department of Computer Science, sponsored by ACM. 
• United States Department of Justice: FBI Behavioral Sciences Unit 
• White House, Washington, D.C 
• United Nations, NY 
In addition to being of highest quality, my work on virus writers has become the seminal 
work in the field, and represents the foundation of all scientific virus writer studies 
currently conducted. Citing [Lee and Harley, 2002] from the Best Paper Proceedings of 
the European Institute for Computer Antivirus Research Conference: 
"The online Community with its relative anonymity and anarchic structure is an 
area in which personal ethics are to the fore, and the clash and mix of ideas could 
easily form the basis for many sociological and anthropological studies in the 
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area. Notable for the séminal work in this area is Sarah Gordon, whose writing 
has provided the A V research community with many rich insights into the 
workings of the virus writer 's mind. " 
In his book Software Forensics: Collecting Evidence from the Scène of a Digital Crime, 
[Slade, 2003] voices représentative sentiments: 
"Over the years, we have been able to glean ideas about the characteristics of this 
tribe. For this information, we are ail indebted to researchers such as Sarah 
Gordon..." 
My work has been integrated into required course work for students in the Computer 
Science track studying Computer Security at several institutions, including Florida 
Institute of Technology, Purdue University, Norwich University and Georgetown 
University. Based upon the preceding évidence, I believe the question of quality is 
satisfied. 
Scale and Scope 
The issues of scale and scope are somewhat more nebulous - one instinctively knows 
suitable work when one sees it, but defining how much breadth is 'enough' can be 
difficult [Draper, 2002]. Here, I believe that the length of time the work has been 
published, coupled with the wide number of différent disciplines covered provide 
évidence of sufficient scope to qualify for the degree of PhD. 
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Even though one could coherently argue that a PhD based upon just the work on virus 
writers would be acceptable, the body of work described covers technical Computing 
assets of virus writers, hackers and terrorists, mainstream andjournal articles on virus 
analysis, and the application of ethics, psychology, éducation and gênerai Systems theory 
to computer security. 
Thus, in terms of scope, the work is far broader than a single paper but instead represents 
a manifesto for application of other disciplines to computer security, and intégration of 
skill-sets to holistically address computer security issues. 
Research Context 
As outlined above, the evolving computer security industry has historically focused on 
the purely technical aspects of computers - moreover, within thèse technical aspects, 
application of holistic or multidisciplinary approaches while seen occasionally (Kephart 
and White, 1991], has been the exception [Gordon, 1995a]. 
Thus, at the time this research began, there was little or no attention given to computer 
security except at a binary-code level: the problem was primarily considered to be a 
problem of bits, bytes, and coding, no more, no less [Gordon, 1994a]. 
From a current perspective, the worldview of most computer security professionals and 
académies in the computer science field the early nineties seems narrow in the extrême: 
a mere décade and a half later it is now widely understood that the issues that are 
involved in providing for 'secure' Computing are technical, légal, ethical, psychological 
and social: in essence, systemic and holistic. 
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Citing Gene Spafford, Director of Purdue University's Center for Education and 
Research in Information Assurance and Security, upon receipt of the 2000 National 
Computer Systems Security Award: 
"...we need to rethink the research and education weperform in this área. We 
should be includingpsychology, management, economics, and sociology in what 
we do." 
This concept of security extending well beyond the technical and into other realms is an 
important aspect of the research presented herein. At the time the work began many 
security problems were seen as entirely technological in nature. However, even a cursory 
discussion of the problems of Trojan Horses sent by e-mail reveáis that the role of the 
user is paramount: no amount of technology will ever stop the user from using his/her 
privileges to the determinant of security. The ultímate example of this was the JDBMGR 
hoax - an e-mail that instructed users to delete certain (actually useful) files from their 
machines; many users complied. 
Clearly, psychology and education are vital pieces of the security puzzle. At the same 
time, psychology or technology alone will not solve security woes; the real solution 
requires working synergistically across múltiple áreas. 
Technology 
This need for a holistic approach reaches into all áreas of computer security; here it will 
be clearly demonstrated in the evolution of the computer virus problem. While the formal 
definition of a computer virus is somewhat complex [Cohén, 1986] at the most 
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fundamental level, computer viruses are simply computer programs that have the 
property of self-replication. 
While antivirus researchers continue to quibble over the exact definition of a virus 
[Highland, 1990; Websters, 2004], it is clear that self-replication is the only property that 
a computer program must have to fulfill the requirement for being a virus. 
Self-replicating programs that attach to hosts are generally called computer viruses. Self-
replicating programs that do not attach to hosts are generally referred to as worms. Self-
replicating programs may or may not contain overtly damaging code; however, they often 
contain instructions that can indirectly and unintentionally damage data or introduce 
program or system/network instability. Computer viruses exist in the wild, or in the 
collections called zoos; computer users are at most risk from those viruses found in the 
wild. 
Computer viruses fall clearly under the umbrella of 'technical' problems that suggest a 
technical solution. Thus, to approach the problem of computer viruses requires an 
understanding of how viruses work, how to defend against them at the technical level, 
and how to test that defense using scientifically sound methods and meaningful criteria. 
Non-Technical Issues 
Clearly, understanding technology is important for developing solutions; however, the 
problem is not solely technical: it is also a problem with social, psychological and ethical 
facets that introduce new questions 
Computer Security 
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Social and Psychological Issues 
A good example of the role of societal issues in computer viruses relates to how 
computer viruses are produced. Computer viruses do not appear by chance or accident; 
they are written by individuals, and sometimes, as a cooperative effort between one or 
more individuals. There are relatively small numbers of virus writers worldwide who 
choose to explicitly release computer viruses into the general computing population; 
however, many others experiment with viruses without explicitly releasing them 
[Gordon, 1994b]. 
The individuals often form groups. The formation and disintegration of these various 
virus-writing groups has been observed over time in the course of this research. Given 
that there are often just a handful of active groups and that a large percentage of the 
current 'virus problem' can be attributed to even just one person [Kotadia, 2004], gaining 
a better understanding of these individuals and groups could help us understand and 
dissuade virus writers and distributors. 
At the social and psychological level, research related to groups involved in both the 
virus and antivirus worlds have been explored, and solutions for advancing both the state 
of computer security as well as the science of antivirus research put forth. The questions 
addressed and issues examined throughout my research3 are diverse; some of the more 
notable are listed in the paragraphs below. 
Computer Security 
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Who writes self-replicating programs? Why do they décide to release them? How do 
individuals become involved in virus writing groups? What might influence a 
participant in the virus writing subculture to stop writing viruses? Thèse questions are 
explored and answered in "The Generic Virus Writer" and "The Generic Virus Writer II". 
The research dispelled the myths that virus writers were ail unethical teens living in the 
basement waiting to destroy the world, and demonstrated that at least in some cases the 
young people who chose to write and make available their viruses a homogenous group, 
within ethical norms for their âges, and who drew a mental barrier between making a 
virus available4 vs. releasing it. 
How do thèse groups share information? Do the virus writers and hackers share 
information in the same way, or are there différences? Do groups tend to be national or 
international; localized or widely distributed? How have thèse groups influenced the 
production of computer viruses and their subséquent appearance in the Computing 
population? Thèse questions were addressed, and answered in Technologically Enabled 
Crime: Shifîing Paradigms for the Year 2000. What, if any, benefit has corne from the 
experiments of people who write computer viruses? This issue is addressed in The 
Antivirus Strategy System. 
Ethical Issues 
In addition to social and psychological issues, ethical issues must be considered when 
examining the problem of computer viruses. 
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Ethics and virus writers 
For example, when considering the création and availability of self-replicating code, 
what actions can be considered 'right', and what actions are 'wrong'? It is generally not 
illegal5 to post self-replicating code in public forums provided that it is labeled as such; 
however, is it ethical? Is there any merit to the idea that such postings help secure 
Systems by increasing public awareness? An open discussion of thèse issues amongst 
computer science Professionals, and computer security professionals in particular, could 
go a long way toward arriving at answers which could be considered the standard or 
norm in terms of acceptability. 
An informed discussion of the ethical issues can help other educators impart messages 
that act to dissuade irresponsibility in thèse areas, and that encourage responsibility and 
accountability. However, as computer security is a relatively young discipline, it suffers 
from many of the problems outlined in [Kuhn, 1970]. In particular, there has been a lack 
of agreement on which areas should be "allowed" to be discussed. The need for such 
work is large; I am personally aware of a Computer Science course where students were 
encouraged to develop viruses in insecure networks as part of their leaming process 
[Gordon, 1996b]; however, this sort of activity is decreasing as awareness of the ethical 
issues increases. 
5
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Ethics and the antivirus community 
Ethical issues are not just the purview of virus writers; antivirus researchers also face 
many diffïcult décisions that are in part related to ethics. For example, what is the most 
useful model for sharing self-replicating code? What mies should antivirus researchers 
follow when exchanging or sharing samples of computer viruses? What ethical issues are 
introduced by the insular nature of the antivirus research community, and does this nature 
help increase or damage the state of scientific and académie research in the fleld? What 
ethical issues arise in the process of replicating samples, or conducting and publishing 
research on new methods of infection or distribution? How are compétitive issues related 
to not sharing samples balanced with the goal of providing protection for ail? While thèse 
questions cannot yet be fully explored, the research presented in When World Collide: 
Information Sharing in the Antivirus and Security Communities offers the first 
exploration of the issues, and documents the wide divergence in attitudes between 
antivirus researchers, security professionals, and académies. This work, while not 
submitted as part of the PhD requirements, remains one of the standard pièces of work 
discussing différences in information sharing models between the antivirus and security 
practitioner. 
Appropriate Légal Intervention 
Children in primary and secondary schools now use the Internet; virtually 100 percent of 
schools are connected in the United States, Australia, Finland, Canada, and Great Britain 
with availability increasing in schools from Scandinavia to Israël and Korea [Schofield, 
2003]. 
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Given the potential for actions that can cause hundreds of millions of dollars damage 
from the child's own classroom, or in many cases, home, crossing federai and national 
boundaries in the process, many questions related to law emerge. 
How can the virus problem be tackled from a legai perspective? What legai remédies are 
available that allow the punishment to fit the crimes? Is legai intervention even an 
effective déterrent for this type of activity? Both The Generic Virus Writer and Virus 
Writers: The End of the Innocence address thèse issues. 
The légal aspect of the computer virus problem is made more complex by the multi-
national nature of the problems faced. A particular virus may be written in a jurisdiction 
where it is légal to write, possess and make available clearly labeled computer viruses 
with subséquent damage occurring in a place where the writing, or making available of 
computer viruses is illégal. 
Clearly a significant part of the virus problem falls within the realm of actions that are 
légal, and extremely complex; however, for many years it was assumed by many in the 
computer virus fïeld that laws written to 'simply lock them ail up' or 'make virus writing 
illégal' could solve the problem. This sentiment became dangerously close to reality 
following statements by [Tippett, 2000]. Tippett, Chief Technologist of the International 
Computer Security Associations, urged Congress to make virus-writing itself a crime, 
stating "I would suggest that we make this one of those few First Amendment exceptions 
and make it illégal to create them." 
Such a statement is a dangerous oversimplification; it is outrageous to think that any and 
ail self-replicating code should be outlawed. For example, given that the définition of a 
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virus centers on the property of self-replication, an installer than copies a copy of itself to 
new media would technically be a virus and therefore outlawed under the First 
Amendment. Furthermore, there are often cases where a virus research must legitimately 
create a new virus. 
For example, periodically, virus writers create 'virus construction kits' - automatic 
systems that allow non-technical users to create 'new' viruses. While reverse engineering 
and studying these kits is one approach, a more rapid and perhaps more pragmatic 
approach is to use the kits to create a large number of self-rep I i eating programs and study 
them for similarities. Once this is done, these 'new' viruses would then be deleted. 
Should such a pragmatic solution be outlawed under the First Amendment? 
Finally, the reduction of the area protected by free speech is a last-ditch approach to 
solving the problem: it is the most serious censure that can be given. Existing laws must 
be carefully examined; for example, those concerning carelessness or reckless 
endangerment may offer other approaches that could be used in addressing computer 
crime. 
Other non-technical aspects 
Finally, even at a preventative level, an effective solution is likely to have significant 
non-technical components. [Gordon, 1997] describes the Christma.EXEC worm of 1987. 
This worm required users to cut and paste the code from an email and execute it — thus 
the worm relied on significant user action in order to spread. Similarly, the recent 
outbreak of the Novarg worm (also known as W32/MyDoom) relied on users double-
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clicking on attachments, thereby infecting their machines and continuing the spread of 
the worm. 
Some viruses have even gone a step further, compressing infected files in password-
protected archives, and sending the password to the user via email. Naïve users meekly 
follow the on-screen instructions, enter the password and thereby infect their own 
machine. In every case, the virus relies on non-technical factors to facilitate spread. 
Virus writers themselves are not ignorant of the power of social engineering6 [Gordon, 
1995b]. Mass mailing worms and viruses have used a number of différent approaches to 
increase their probability of propagation, leveraging such strong concepts as sex and 
danger. These motifs are highly memetic, and led us to consider another important aspect 
of my work. 
In [Gordon, Ford & Wells, 1997], Dawkins' même theory [Dawkins, 1989] is expanded 
upon, and the création of successful hoaxes is examined in the context of leveraging 
powerful memetic thèmes. This work, which integrated technology with psychology, was 
useful in that it indicated that widespread distribution of a 'vaccine' could significantly 
suppress the memetic nature of such hoaxes. 
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Expanding Worldviews 
These issues cannot be reduced to purely technological problems; rather, they touch on 
psychology, user intent and the human-computer interface. Therefore, to fully 
understand the problem and offer an integrated, comprehensive solution, a multi-
disciplinary approach must be taken. 
When this work was started, little prior research had been carried out into these non­
technical but related issues. Thus, in many ways there was little precedent for the areas 
that I explored. This exploration was not without challenges, related both to gender as 
well as a culture that did not wish to discuss, let alone integrate, new ideas - especially 
ideas that questioned the very premises of the culture [Gordon & Ford, 1999]. A study of 
contrasts between the security and antivirus worlds illustrates various outcomes of this 
Descartian worldview in some detail [Gordon & Ford, 1999] 1 . 
Diagram 1 provides a graphical illustration of antivirus research as a function of 
computer security prior to this research. Diagram 2 provides a graphical illustration of 
this research's impact upon malicious code research as a function of security as submitted 
in this documentation. 
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Diagram 1 : State of perceptions of the malicious code arm of computer security prior to 
my research impact. 
29 
Computer Security 
• cailler H 
«ns»tH8?atffit3t« 
. . csimpulef «s weapons cache 
- ~ , -cmpiuri! putto fce 
•Tj : 
tecfno% 
pRriîfltw 
Diagram 2: State of perceptions of computer security after impact of my contributions. 
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As illustrated by the partial overview of the research in Diagram 2, the traditional 
reductionist approach to solving computer security problems - dissecting them into their 
smallest parts and studying those parts in relative isolation - is receding into history, 
replaced with a worldview that is neither humanistic nor mechanistic, but a realistic, 
useful and ultimately appealing mix of the two. Once the sole domain of computer 
engineers, computer security is now being examined not only as a technological issue, 
but as an issue that must be addressed by law, ethics, éducation, psychology and 
sociology as well. 
An Important Caveat 
At the same time, attempting this intégration requires great care to avoid drawing 
inappropriate conclusions. A good example of confusion caused by the intégration of 
multidisciplinary techniques cornes from the area of computer viruses. Here we often 
hear of the problem of computer monoculture - that is, that the global system is 
vulnérable because of the high degree of homogeneity between Systems. 
Often, an analogue to biological Systems is cited, where a monoculture can easily lead to 
species extinction [Geer, et. al., 2003]. However, there are important différences between 
virus spread in a biological system and a computer network. Perhaps most importantly, 
the 'extinction' threshold between a living system and a computer system is very 
différent. 
While in a biological system a very large percentage of a speciès needs to be destroyed to 
threaten species survival, the Internet can be damaged beyond use by the impediment or 
death of just a handful of Systems - for example, the root DNS servers [Ford, 2004b]. 
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Thus, in this case, application of a concept borrowed from another field can lead to 
inappropriate or misleading conclusions. 
While there is risk involved in such borrowing, my work has shown is also significant 
benefit. The most important caveat is that one must appropriately consider the 
applicability of results obtained from a multi-disciplinary approach. 
Can the results be verified experimentally? Can the link between the two disciplines be 
verified using some quantitative means? Axe there any underlying assumptions that are 
not correct in the system of study? What can be done to improve the fit between the two 
différent approaches used? By carefully considering each of the preceding questions it is 
possible to improve the results obtained by multidisciplinary work. 
Furthermore, it is important to consider the limit of applicability of différent techniques. 
For example, one cannot create a virus signature with a psychology test, and one cannot 
improve data security by simply studying privacy through the years. Multidisciplinary 
techniques have very real limits and thèse must be considered when applying techniques 
to the security problem. 
Research Submission Overview 
The following papers are submitted as part of this Context Statement. 
Paper 1 : Gordon, S. 1994a. Technologically Enabled Crime: Shifîing Paradigms for the 
Year 2000. Computers and Security Journal. October. 1994. Also available from: 
http://www.research.ibm.com/antivirus/SciPapers/Gordon/Crime.html 
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Paper 2: Gordon, S. 1994b. The Generic Virus Writer. From the Proceedings of the 
Fourth International Virus Bulletin Conférence. Jersey, U.K. September 1994. 
Also available from: 
http://wvv^.research.ibm.com/antivims/SciPapers/Gordon/GenericVimsWriter.ht 
ml 
Paper 3: Gordon, S. 1995a. Virus Analysis: What a Winword Concept. Virus Bulletin. 
September 1995. Also available from: 
http://www.virusbtn.com/magazine/archives/rjdf71995/199509.PDF 
Paper 4: Gordon, S. 1996. Virus Analysis: Excel ïourself! Virus Bulletin. Also available 
from: http://www.virusbtn.com/magazine/archives/pdf/1996/199608.PDF 
Paper 5: Gordon, S. 2000. Virus Writers: End of the Innocence. From the Proceedings of 
the International Virus Bulletin Conférence. Orlando, Florida. Also available 
from: http://www.research.ibm.com/antivirus/SciPapers/VB2000SG.htm 
Paper 6: Gordon, S. 1995d. The Antivirus Strategy System. From the Proceedings of the 
International Virus Bulletin Conférence, Boston, MA. Also available from: 
http://www.research.ibm.corn/antivirus/SciPapers/Gordon/Stratcgy.html 
Paper 7: Gordon, 1997. What is Wild? From the Proceedings of the 1997 National 
Systems Security Conférence. National Institute of Standards and Technology. 
Baltimore, MD. . Available from 
http://csrc.nist.gov/nissc/1997/proceedings/177.pdf 
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Paper 8: Gordon, S. & Ford, R. 2002b. Cyberterrorism? Computers & Security 21(7): 
pp. 636-647 2002. Also available from: 
http://vv^av.compseconline.conVpremium_article/premcs.htTn#vol21 issue72, and 
from httn://securitvresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/cyberterrorism.pdf 
Paper 9: Gordon, S. 2003. À Survey of Privacy Attitudes and Operational Behaviours in 
US, UK and EU Information Security Professionals. Keynote Presentation. From 
the Proceedings of the Compsec 2003 Conference. Queen Elizabeth II Center. 
London, United Kingdom. Also available from: 
http://securitwesponse.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/privacy.attitudes.behavi 
ors.pdf 
Predicting our Future: Technologically Enabled Crime 
Paper 1 : Gordon, S. 1994a. Technologically Enabled Crime: Shifting Paradigms for the 
Year 2000. Computers and Security Journal. October. 1994. Also available from: 
http://www.research.ibm.com/antivirus/SciPapers/Gordon/Crime.html 
The first paper that I would like to put forth for considération is 'Technologically 
Enabled Crime: Shifting Paradigms for the Year 2000' [Gordon, 1994a] 8, presented at the 
IFIP See 94 Conference, and published in Computers and Security Journal. The paper 
explored the need for the integration of ethics into various aspects of technology by 
examining social and ethical factors involved in the transmission of computer viruses and 
other malicious software, as well as the Systems and technology. 
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By drawing parallels between the development of the Internet and security technology 
with the development of médical technology, the work explores the potential for harm in 
doing things 'because we can', and considers similarities between the developing Internet 
and the need for focus on ethics with the intégration of ethics with other scientific 
disciplines. 
Technologically Enabled Crime explored ways in which the nature of the technology 
côntributes to its own misuse, instability and potentially destruction, and considered the 
implications of such development. The summary concluded: "Without the proper 
interaction of laws, éducation and ethical development, there is a very real risk that this 
technology will soon become unusable and ultimately self-destructive". The paper's 
grim prophecy has been almost realized in the last year, when network-aware malware 
has shown its ability to cause Worldwide network instability in surprisingly short time 
frames [Moore, 2003], 
This paper was highly controversial at the time of publication - something that seems 
surprising given the current focus on interdisciplinary research within the security space. 
However, at the time it was written, the paper was radical in that it introduced 'soft' 
issues to the otherwise binary world of virus prévention. Current trends in virus research 
were focusing on increasingly technical solutions; this paper was really the first of its 
kind to view the problem holistically. 
By focusing on the ethical, légal, and social aspects of thèse virus-related activities, a 
broader understanding of the real factors that affect computer security and speciftcally 
virus spread could be considered for the first time. 
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There was heated debate at the conference as to whether or not there was a need for 
computer science students to be exposed to the idea of ethics; several prominent 
computer scientists felt this was solely a technical issue [Highland, 1995]. 
However, the holistic approach to security introduced by the paper prevailed, and this 
work won the conference 'Best Paper' award. This view of security is now widely 
established at the correct way of considering the security of a system as a whole. 
Virus Writers - Unraveling the Mystery 
Paper 2: Gordon, S. 1994b. The Generic Virus Writer. From the Proceedings of the 
Fourth International Virus Bulletin Conference. Jersey, U.K. September 1994. 
Also available from: 
htt^://www.research.ibm.corr^antivims/SciPapers/Gordon/GenericVirusWriter.ht 
ml 
This work [Gordon, 1994b] 'The Generic Vims Writer' 9, was first presented in 
September 1994 at The Virus Bulletin Conference in Jersey, United Kingdom. This paper 
debunked the myths surrounding virus writers, exploring their real motivations, as well as 
their ethical development. 
At the time of the research, very little was known about the individuals and groups that 
were responsible for virus writing. Speculation was that they were young, and a fairly 
homogenous group; unethical, and socially challenged. However, these opinions were 
little more than prejudices: in reality, no scientific work related to vims writers had been 
9
 http://www.research.ibm.com/antivims/SciPapets/Gordon/GenericVimsW 
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done, and the Statements that were made were generally made ad hominen rather than by 
focusing on any scientific or académie analysis of the individuals involved. In order to 
shed some light on this world, a methodologically sound course of investigation was 
employed, to search for the 'generic' virus writer. The research goal was to détermine if 
the population of active virus writers was indeed a homogenous group as purported by 
the people involved in protecting Systems from virus infection. In order to support the 
hypothesis that ail virus writers who were engaged in this activity were unethical and 
malicious, it was necessary that no exceptions to the case be found. The inductive 
analytical method was employed for the actual analyses; the instrument used was based 
on recognized methods for assessing cognitive and ethical development. 
I was uniquely qualified to carry out this research. Düring the preceding years, I had 
become well known in the computer underground as honest and trustworthy. This 
building of this trust began when I offered a communication network free for public use: 
VFR Systems Bulletin Board (BBS). 
The BBS operated initially over the FIDONET network. The FIDONET allowed 
computer users worldwide to connect to BBS globally, connected by dial-up modems. 
The users could chat with each other and/or the system Operator (SYSOP), leave 
messages in public forums called 'FIDONET Message Bases', or send personal e-mail 
using 'FIDONET Mail'. The Message Bases were focused on various topics including 
bases germane to hacking and virus writing; specifically, bases concerned with assembly 
language programming, UNIX, and computer viruses. Eventually VFR Systems 
expanded to use the Internet. 
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Within the confines of the BBS, many discussions took place amongst people who were 
active in the early Internet underground subculture. The discussions were generally 
private, technical in nature and established credibility with this growing technically 
focused population. 
Participation at hacker conférences such as DEFCON (as a regular speaker and panelist) 
and HOPE 1 0 (as a delegate) and attendance at meetings of hackers at 2600 1 1 meetings 
Worldwide, the trust which began in the early 1980s continued to build throughout the 
ensuing years. I became recognized as a technically compétent person who, while I may 
not agrée with individuals' choices of Computing behaviors, did not personally judge the 
individual (rather, only their behaviour). I was outspoken regarding my thoughts on 
ethical issues related to computer viruses and hacking, and was asked to contribute 
dialogue with an 'alternative point of view' to some of the underground journals and 
projects. A potent example can be found in [HEX, 1992], However, rather than my 
strong stance on the problems caused by viruses or hacking creating problems related to 
my trust, my honesty reinforced the fact that I had no hidden agenda. I was simply 
interested in the topic at hand. 
While other members of the antivirus industry engaged in volatile and non-productive 
dialogue with hackers and virus writers, world-renowned journalist James Hattori had 
this to say about my work: 
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"Gordon is an anomaiy in the anti-virus industry.... Sarah has spentyears 
interviewing, profûing and exchanging ideas with virus writers, and in turn, they 
taïk to her and trust her" [CNN, 2000] 
Although I was part of the security and anti-virus community, many of the virus writers 
of the time were known to me electronically, and I was well versed in the virus writer 
culture. Thus, during the early days of computer viruses when there were less than a 
hundred computer viruses circulating in the wild, I was able to interact with many people 
involved in the virus writing community. Of thèse interactions, only 3 were négative: i.e., 
refused to answer and responded with hostility. 
The study began with elicitation for participation amongst the available population. The 
request for participation was distributed electronically via the FIDONET Virus and 
Virus-Info Echo-mail 1 3 System, and by word-of-mouth. 
Potential respondents were provided with assurance of anonymity, and the opportunity to 
provide responses via e-mail or paper mail. Four of the respondents chose to respond 
anonymously via paper mail; those in-depth responses are archived along with the 
electronic responses. I also spoke subsequently in person and on the téléphone with three 
of thèse four respondents. Other respondents chose to answer electronically; thèse 
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responses were further investigated to ensure the respondents were active participants in 
the community. 
The methodology of the survey was straightforward. Various questions were given to 
assess the individuals' level of ethical development and reasoning ability. Subjects were 
ranked on the Kohlberg scale [Kohlberg, 1984] in order to détermine their level of ethical 
development; other questions explored the âge of the subject, and their peer and superior 
relationships. The population of virus writers in the community during this time was quite 
small; less than 100 active virus writers; in addition to the survey, four individuals were 
chosen for additional in-depth follow-up interviews. 1 4 
The results of the research were unexpected, and led to some surprising conclusions. 
While virus writers had been considered unethical delinquents, this research showed that 
many were in fact within ethical norms for their âges, and had normal relationships with 
their peers and parents. It is considered séminal work and is now required reading in 
many university computer security programs [Denning, 1999; Kabay, 2001; Purdue, 
2004, Ford, 2004a]. 
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The First Macro Viruses: Concept and Excel 
Paper 3: Gordon, S. 1995a. Virus Anatysis: What a WinWord Concept. Virus Bulletin. 
September 1995. Also available from: 
httn://vv^vw.vimsbtn.com/magazine/archives/pdf71995/1995Q9.PDF 
Paper 4: Gordon, S. 1996. Virus Analysis: Excel Yourself! Virus Bulletin. Also available 
from: http://wyvw.vimsbtn.com/magazine/archives/pdryi 996/199608.PDF 
Gaining access to most of the world's vims writing population was a process that took 
approximately five years, during which time technically compétent as well as 
tmstworthiness was established. This involved participating in technical discussion 
groups as outlined above, and publishing a number of technical security papers including 
[Gordon, 1995a; Gordon, 1995b; Gordon, 1996; Gordon, 1998a; Gordon, 1998b]. I 
submit two of those analyses for considération, in order to demonstrate technical 
excellence in the area of viruses. In addition, thèse two analysis represent a new chapter 
in the world of viruses. While viruses were thought to not be e-mail replicative, this 
worked proved that indeed viruses can and did spread via e-mail. It also introduced the 
issue of upconversion, which proved to be quite controversial. This is explored in the 
analysis below. 
A New Concept 
The first paper, [Gordon, 1995a] 'What a (WinWord) Concept' 1 5, published in Virus 
Bulletin is an analysis of the first Microsoft Word macro vims found in the wild. Along 
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with an analysis of the first Excel macro virus, [Gordon, 1996] 'Excel Yourself 1 6, this 
work constitutes computer security's first and foundational work in analysis of macro 
viruses. These viruses were replicated, cures created, and the viral replicants were 
shared with antivirus product developers; the original samples are stored in a secure vims 
lab. This work is particularly noteworthy as it demonstrated for the first time that viruses 
could, despite prevailing opinion, be spread via e-mail. 
New Ethical Questions 
In addition to the technical issues, the vims analyses led to the exploration of some new 
and challenging ethical issues. As described above, in the case of the Concept virus, 
whilst it was initially reported performing replication within one file format (Office 95), 
my analysis showed it was capable of replicating within another file format (Office 98). 
This process was named 'upconversion'. 
The process of upconversion is interesting, and gaining an understanding of the technical 
aspects of the process is helpful in understanding the ethical issues associated with the 
process. Early versions of Office used a different macro language from later versions -
thus, macros written for early versions of Microsoft Word would not naturally execute 
under current versions of the program. In order to preserve backward compatibility, 
Microsoft introduced the process of upconversion, whereby newer versions of office 
would automatically 'rewrite' old style macros into the new macro language. 
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This practice was very helpful for many users, as it significantly eased the migration 
costs from obsolete versions of office. However, it was not just benign macros that could 
be rewritten; old macro viruses were also upconverted. Furthermore, signature based 
virus detection was unable to detect such upconverted viruses. 
The question became whether such upconverted viruses were 'new' vimses, and if the 
process of deliberately creating upconverted vimses for the process of ensuring detection 
and remediation was 'unethical' as it constituted 'vims writing'. 
At that time (1995-8) some technologists working within the antivirus industry believed 
the act of upconversion simply resulted in a representation of the original vims in a 
different way, and that there was nothing unethical about the technical process of 
upconversion. Indeed, it could be argued that such practice was important for the 
protection of vulnerable systems, and it would be unethical not to carry out the 
upconversion process. 
For example, if a macro vims was found in the wild attached to a Word 6 file, but the 
analysis showed it could spread to and replicate on Word 7 files, developers of antivirus 
software would be remiss not to include Word 7 file protection. 
[Chess, 2002] concurs: "Upconversions of Word 6/Word 7 macro viruses clearly 
constitute a threat to the public, and anti-virus workers have a responsibility to address 
that threat. " 
Yet other technologists believed such additional replication on platforms other than the 
'original' tantamount to 'virus creation', claiming this process resulted in 'new' vimses. 
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Creation of 'new viruses' under any circumstances was unethical, according to the beliefs 
of some researchers. Because of these beliefs, anyone who advocated upconversion was 
deemed by these technologists to be 'creating new viruses' and therefore 'unethical'. 
In some cases, people who advocated or performed upconversion were verbally harassed, 
maligned, slandered, libeled, and their employers contacted regarding 'the unethical 
conduct of the upconverter'; journalists were contacted to 'expose' the 'unethical 
upconverter' [Gordon, 1998c; Bridwell, 2004; Saarinen, 1998]. In one case, a researcher 
was threatened publicly with physical assault for publicly supporting the concept of 
upconversion [Anonymous, 2004]. 1 7 
The primary ethical debate remained more of a monologue — prescriptive in nature, with 
a few individuals appearing to vociferously dictate acceptable practice for the rest of the 
community. Attempts made by colleagues to engage in a reasoned debate about the 
ethical issues were ignored. However, within the antivirus community, these seemingly 
negative events led to the development of an undercurrent of resentment toward the 
predominating prescriptive worldview. Today, replicating vims samples on any available 
platform is routine, and seen by most responsible scientists as an ethical course of action. 
However, the foundational dialogue on the acceptability of such practices was clearly laid 
with my willingness to counter prescriptivism and dogma on these issues, and with the 
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discovery and analysis of these early macro viruses, Concept and Excel, as presented in 
the two papers submitted with this Context Statement. 
End of the Innocence: Changes in the Virus Writing Population? 
Paper 5: Gordon, S. 2000. Virus writers: End of the Innocence. From the Proceedings of 
the International Vims Bulletin Conference. Orlando, Florida. Also available 
from: http://www.research.ibm.com/antivims/SciPapers/VB2000SG.htm 
When viruses are released, accidentally or purposely, into the general computing, the 
vims is considered to be 'in the wild", i.e. it can be found spreading amongst the 
computer or network of computer users in the course of normal day to day operations. 
Other times, however, viruses are made available on the via v X l 5 W W W or FTP sites. 
[Gordon, 1993] supported the hypothesis that vimses found on vX Bulletin Board 
Systems were not likely to end up in the wild; however, they remain items of interest for 
antivirus companies and end users alike, who pay the costs associated with their mere 
availability. 
In addition to technical solutions for vimses, legal intervention had sometimes been 
suggested as a remedy for the virus problem. Thus, the fifth paper I will submit, [Gordon, 
2000] 'Vims Writers: The End of The Innocence' 1 9, explores the perceptions of both the 
security community and the vims writers on the potential.deterrent effect of legal 
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intervention on virus writing. Additionally, the research analyzed the impact of various 
types of légal intervention on vims availability both on the WWW and in the wild. 
This research examined the impact of high-profile légal intervention such as police raids, 
arrests and sentencing of virus writers and distributors on the number of viruses found in 
the wild, and on the WWW. I believed initially that légal intervention had not worked for 
several reasons, from the length of time between arrest and sentencing, to the âge of the 
virus writer. This is consistent with social leaming theory [Bandura, 1969] and ethical 
development [Kohlberg, 1984]. Simply put, by the time arrests or conséquences had 
occurred within the community, the original members of the community had aged out and 
left the community; the new community members had little or no connection with the 
object of arrest/sentencing. 
To explore any potential différences in the worldview of the people proposing légal 
intervention (antivirus researchers) and those at whom the interventions were aimed 
(vims writers and vims distributors), surveys of several populations were conducted: 
known vims writers, anti-vims researchers, and the population at the well-known 
DEFCON Conférence in Las Vegas which included both vims writers and hackers. 
The surveys were distributed to the antivirus researchers, vims writers and vims 
distributor groups via e-mail, and to DEFCON attendees in-person. In-person interviews 
were conducted early in the day at DEFCON, to overcome the hurdle of participants 
being under the influence of alcohol or drugs during the administration of the survey. The 
data is archived at IBM Research. 
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The findings indicated that many people who would not ordinarily consider writing a self 
replicating program felt that if it became illégal to do so, they would be more likely to do 
it, based on a désire to protect their right to do as they wish on their own computers, in 
their own homes. This was a particularly interesting finding as the 'right to free speech' 
was cited anecdotally by participants from many countries - some of which do not have a 
constitutional right to free speech. 
The results were interesting and showed a marked différence between the communities. 
When asked how much laws and sentencing would alter behavior, the virus writers 
unanimously stated it would not, whereas anti-virus researchers were evenly split 
between yes and no. The évidence reinforced the virus writer position, as no discontinuity 
in the rate of discovery of new viruses in the wild is correlated with the arrest and 
prosecution of high-profile cases. If anything, the rate has continued to increase since the 
WildListbegan. 2 0 
Similarly, the DEFCON data showed some interesting trends. Here, hackers were 
randomly sampled during day 1 of the conférence. There was expressed a very mixed 
view of the effectiveness of new laws. Many diverse comments were received, spanning 
the gamut from "yes - laws will be effective" to expressions of support for vims writing 
should it ever become illégal in and of itself. 
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In addition to being released in Conference Proceedings, this presentation was filmed by 
CNN International and released as part of a special profile of my life and my research in 
this area. It is now a permanent part of the CNN International archive and is documented 
in Appendix 3. 
The conclusion of the work was that there is little evidence of a deterrent effect of high-
profile legislation or legal interventions. Overall, the research on vims writers resulted in 
an overturning of stereotypes, which in turn led to a deeper understanding of the 
computer vims problem. 
Numerous interviews with vims writers reaffirmed that many of them do not see the 
impact of their virtual action on people in the real world. Lack of contextual clues, 
combined with depersonalization and desensitization that occurs in the online setting 
results in young people who appear pretty-much normal in all other ways, and who would 
not create the havoc a vims can cause to people they might encounter physically. 
At the same time, young people were receiving much praise from the media for writing 
computer vimses, with their work presented as artificial life [Ludwig, 1997], art or digital 
graffiti [Dibbell, 1996]. In some cases, in addition to the praise from the media, vims 
writers received positive reinforcement such as employment [Middleton, 2001]. 
Overturning the stereotypes and doing research in previously uncharted waters afforded 
me the opportunity to speak with the media, and reinforce the fact that writing a vims is 
not 'rocket science', nor is it 'cool'; rather, it is unscientific and unethical to work with 
self-replicating programs in uncontrolled environments. 
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The impact of this study was broad. First, this work resulted in opportunities to educate 
the public, serving as a catalyst for discussion of clarification of societal views on 
acceptable behaviors in cyberspace (Appendix 3). It has led to a shift in questions asked 
by the media, and the media approach toward viruses in general. Now, there are few, if 
any, characterizations of viruses as 'digital graffiti', or 'artificial intelligence'; rather 
there are now discussions about responsibility. WWW sites that once hosted virus 
distribution now have acceptable use policies forbidding the distribution of viruses. 
Rather than accepting student proposals for research based on creation of self-replicating 
code in insecure environments, university professors are now creating secure research 
laboratories, where students take responsibility for their work [Aycock, 2004]. 
While work related to vims writers was the focus of most media attention given my 
research, the integration of other disciplines into the way we develop, use, and view 
technology was not limited to vims writers only. The next papers discuss other 
applications of the approach. 
A Holistic Strategy for Virus Prevention 
Paper 6: Gordon, S. 1995d. The Antivirus Strategy System. From the Proceedings of the 
International Vims Bulletin Conference, Boston, MA. Also available from: 
http://www.research.ibm.com/antivims/SciPapers/Gordon/Strategy.html 
The sixth paper I would like to submit is [Gordon, 1995d] 'The Antivirus Strategy 
System' 2 1. With this work, a general systems theory model was applied to the world of 
2 1
 httTJ://www.research.ibm.coiWam^ 
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computer vimses. The goal of this application was to move the community's focus from 
a narrow view of computer vims prevention — which is highly focused on detection and 
disinfection of infected objects - to examining vims spread as a more general function of 
the overall system. 
Approaches to the virus problem have been historically not only solely technical, but 
primarily reactive in nature [White, 1998]. This research offered a new way of looking at 
the interdependence between computer systems and security professionals, by examining 
causal factors rather than the traditional symptomatic relief. 
Although the paper contained many concrete suggestions for improving virus protection 
the goal of the paper was to provide readers with a way to critically reassess their own 
systems, and not rely solely on technology to solve the problem. 
Taking this broader approach allows administrators to include other issues in their anti-
vims 'system' that were often ignored by those focusing just on core technology issues. 
As the paper argued, a holistic approach must be taken to vims protection in order to be 
successful. 
Toward More Meaningful Tests of Antivirus Software 
Paper 7: Gordon, 1997. What is Wild? From the Proceedings of the 1997 National 
Systems Security Conference. National Institute of Standards and Technology. 
Baltimore, MD. Available from 
http://csrc.nist.gov/nissc/1997/proceedings/177.pdf 
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The seventh paper I submit, [Gordon 1997] What is Wild 2 2, continued earlier work to 
change the worldview of the computer security world to include scientific testing criteria 
and methodology for antivirus software tests. 
Heretofore, testing of antivirus software was done with little, if any, documentation, and 
somewhat arbitrary criteria. Detection of all samples was treated equally, even though the 
chances of infection by certain zoo viruses was almost zero. 
This paper proposed a new, scientific approach to the testing of antivims software work, 
and was conducted on behalf of IBM's Thomas J. Watson Research Center and was 
presented at the National Information Systems Security Conference. 
By querying each antivims testing body and exploring the ways testing was currently 
being done and exposing shortcomings, critical and necessary groundwork for future 
work in antivims software testing was done. By establishing a precedent for 
scientifically valid, reproducible tests, the foundation for meaningful tests using real, 
well-maintained collections of viruses was created. 
This work was furthered by establishment of The WildList Organization International , 
as well as by solicited work from the National Computer Security Center on antivims 
software testing [Gordon & Ford, 1996; Gordon & Howard, 2000]. 
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Initially while there were only a few viruses found in the wild, antivirus product 
technology was aimed at both wild and zoo viruses; the technology was marketed 
according. Tests that were performed assessed product ability to detect the huge zoo 
collections as well as the in the wild viruses. 
There was no method by which viruses actually spreading could be assessed. In 1993, 
Joseph Wells began to keep track of viruses actually seen by researchers in the wild, and 
formalized his reports in a document called The WildList. However, the reports 
represented only a small number of researchers and product developers. 
In 1995, during collaboration with Wells, the idea of forming a larger, but still 
independent, formalized organization to monitor the spread of viruses emerged. He 
agreed, and the resultant efforts led to the formation of The WildList Organization, 
International in 1996. 
In addition to tracking virus outbreaks, we wished to provide a way for researchers and 
testers to know that the viruses they had actually were the same viruses that were 
spreading in the wild. Thus, we created WildCore, the first formal set of sample 
replicants generated from vimses provided to The WildList Organization, International 
reporters. WildCore provided testers for the first time a reference set of those vimses that 
were actually likely to be found in the 'real' world. 
The WildCore sample set has become the baseline criteria for all antivims product 
certification efforts, including those developed by The University of Hamburg, The 
University of Magdeburg, The University of Tampere, Florida Institute of Technology, 
The International Computer Security Association, Vims Bulletin Certification, West 
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Coast Labs Secure Computing Checkmark, and UK ITSEC Certification. Generation of 
the sample sets was later transferred to antivirus and security expert Ian Whalley, IBM 
Research and then to antivims researcher Shane Coursen. 
The WildList Organization International operated as a non-vendor-affiliated 
collaborative effort of all major antivirus product developers, testers and independent 
researchers, until 2001 when ownership of the WildList Organization was transferred to 
Tru-Secure Corporation. 
WildCore continues to be replicated and distributed to vendors and testers. The set is 
currently the baseline detection requirement for all antivims technologies, and is used by 
testers worldwide. It is now managed by The International Computer Security 
Association (ICSA), a for-profit corporation in Carlisle Pennsylvania. 
Additionally, the testing research undertaken resulted in my significant contributs to the 
development of the UK ITSEC model for antivims software via the CESG 2 4 antivims 
working group, and on conjoint development of testing criteria for the National Computer 
Security Association with Dr. Richard Ford 2 5. Most recently, the outgrowth of this 
work [Gordon, 2002a] culminated in a joint project with a US Government organization 
dealing with vims analysis and classification.2 6 
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Cyberterrorism: Fact or Fiction? 
Paper 8: Gordon, S. & Ford, R. 2002b. Cyberterrorism? Computers & Security 21(7): 
pp. 636-647 2002. Also available from: 
http://www.compseconline.com/premium article/premcs.htm#vol21 issue72. and 
from http://securitwesponse.svmantec.com/avcenter/reference/cyberterrorism.pdf 
With research spanning 2000- 3, in work begun prior to the events of September 11 t h 
2001, the eighth paper for consideration [Gordon & Ford, 2002b] 'Cyberterrorism?' 2 7 
stressed the importance of exploring not only the role of computer as target in so-called 
cyberterrorism, but as facilitator as well. 
This work questioned the usage of the term cyberterrorism and suggested an urgent re­
examination of the way in which we consider the convergence of terrorism with the 
current virtualization of many processes. For example, computers are now central to 
many parts of the communication infrastructure, providing the mechanics for everything 
from banking to power generation. 
Thus, while damage to computers was once viewed as an entirely virtual attack, computer 
downtime now has a profound impact on the non-virtual world. 
Essentially, this research examined terrorism broken down into an underlying matrix of 
eight different elements common to all terrorist events: perpetrator, place, action, tool, 
target, affiliation, motivation and outcome. Once accomplished, the effect of adding 
'cyber' elements to each element of the matrix was considered separately. 
2 7
 http://securitwesponse.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/cvberteTTori 
Computer Security 
55 
By taking such an approach, it was possible to reduce preconceived notions about the role 
of computers in terrorism and gain an appreciation of the many different terrorist-related 
abuses of information technology. 
While the paper came to no firm conclusions with respect to cyberterrorism prevention, it 
did challenge even the validity of the term cyberterrorism, which tends to enforce a 
somewhat narrow view of the problem of terrorist equipped with computers. 
Furthermore, it argued strongly for the integration of computer expertise with more 
traditional defensive countermeasures, which should be designed horizontally (broadly) 
rather than vertically. 
For example, consider handling so-called 'cyber attacks' on the national infrastmcture. A 
vertical approach to such a problem is to create a specific organization dedicated to just 
monitoring, managing and analyzing attacks on the nation's Internet infrastmcture. The 
advantage to such an approach is that deep knowledge of a particular attacker niche. 
Compare this to a horizontal approach. In such an approach, no new agency is formed; 
rather, computer skills and knowledge are integrated across existing areas. 
Contrasting the result of these different processes, the danger of the vertical approach is 
that it tends to compartmentalize our defense mechanisms. That is, an attack may involve 
elements across many different verticals. The attacks of 9-11 are an example of a 
somewhat non-traditional attack working extremely effectively. A more holistic approach 
to defense that was more integrative may have considered this broad but simple attack 
and blunted it. 
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Finally, the paper discusseci the risks posed by large, badly managed Clusters of 
connected machines. Just as one might restrict a hostile agent's access to explosives or 
guns, one can argue that the large stockpiles of connected machines pose a danger to the 
overall cyber-security of the Internet. It is therefore possible that a legai définition of a 
minimum standard of security should be constructing, providing at least a baseline for 
those managing large computer networks. 
In addition to being selected to appear in The International Library of Essays on 
Terrorism [O'Day, 2004], this work was used by The White House staff as a tool to help 
policymakers understand the wider aspects and role of the computer in terrorism. It was 
presented at the IFIP World Computer Congress , Computer Security Institute 
Conference in Washington, D.C., and the European Institute for Computer Antivirus 
Research. 
Privacy: Do As I Say, Not As I Do 
Paper 9: Gordon, S. 2003. A Survey of Privacy Attitudes and Operational Behaviours in 
US, UK and EU Information Security Professionals. Keynote Presentation. From 
the Proceedings of the Compsec 2003 Conference. Queen Elizabeth II Conference 
Center. London, United Kingdom. Also available from: 
http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/privacy.attitudes.behavi 
ors.pdf 
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Finally, Privacy: A Study ofAttitudes and Behaviors in US, UK and EU Information 
Security Professionals [Gordon, 2003] is the ninth paper I submit. This research 
provided the first study quantifiably examining users' functional behaviors in a wide 
variety of computer security situations related to privacy and confidentiality . This 
work is important as it explores the impact of human factors on the potential efficacy of 
technology as it relates to privacy. 
The paper first examined historical and cultural aspects of privacy, before embarking 
upon a survey of technological threats to privacy online. In each case, référence was 
made to some form of technical remediation. 
With thèse éléments in place, a survey that measured the corrélation between users' 
stated desire for privacy and their knowledge and use of privacy-enhancing technologies 
and actions was designed, and a pilot study launched in The United States. However, the 
pilot study proved to be flawed, due to lack of respondents lack of familiarity with the 
term P3P (Personal Privacy Platform) and confusion between P3P, PGP (Pretty Good 
Privacy) and 'Personal Privacy Policy'. The survey was reconstructed to address this 
validity issue. 
Survey data was then gathered at UK, US and European security conférences and 
analyzed. Randornly selected IS Professionals were queried anonymously regarding their 
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desire to control the disclosure of information about themselves and/or their transactions, 
and their daily operational behaviours. 
The data proved to be fairly simple to analyze, as the results were extremely clear. Within 
each population, a statistically significant disconnect existed between desire for privacy 
and the steps required to assure it. Apart from the numerical results, conversations with 
the subjects revealed that in many cases they were completely aware of the large gap 
between desired result and action. 
According to [Festinger, 1957], when a person believes one thing but does another, a 
dissonance exists within the mind. Such dissonance is difficult to contain, and is therefore 
resolved in a number of different ways related to minimizing the negative consequences, 
focusing on the benefits of the action. 
By showing that such a conflict exists, this research made possible more direct 
measurements of how this conflict is resolved; furthermore, by being aware of the 
potential conflict, methods were proposed to encourage users to resolve the dissonance in 
ways that help rather than hinder security. 
After publication, this groundbreaking research on privacy issues was presented as the 
Keynote speech for Reed Elsevier's Compsec 2003 UK Conference; it is currently being 
used as a component of an awareness campaign for government and corporations 
worldwide. 
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Summary of Data Gathering Issues 
In this section, several often-citied problems with sampling and survey techniques are 
considered and their relevance to my research considered. 
Papers 2, 5, and 9 (The Generic Virus Writer, Virus Writers: The End of the ínnocence, 
and Privacy Cognitions and Behaviours in US, UK and EU Information Security 
Professionals) summarized above rely heavily on data gathered by either directed or 
random survey. Sampling populations that engage in deviant behaviors presents a number 
of potential challenges. Even with some assurance of relative anonymity of such 
populations, subjects may be hesitant to discuss illegal or antisocial activities. Gathering 
a statistically signifícant sample can be difficult as the target population size is often 
unknown. Additionally, survey respondents that are self-selected present problem in 
terms of generalizing findings. 
While the vims writer survey respondents in The Generic Virus Writer [Gordon, 1994b] 
were self-selected, they represented a relatively small target population; there were only 
two important vims writing groups at the time and responses were obtained from a 
statistically signifícant number of those individuáis. Thus, responses could reasonably be 
generalized to the groups that formed the very foundation of the vims writing subculture. 
While the respondents in this study were anonymous, due to my visibility in the 
community, issues with trust were overeóme, and I was able to obtain extensive written, 
verbal and electronic data that both qualified the respondents and explored their actions 
and beliefs in depth. 
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In Virus Writer: The End of the Innocence [Gordon, 2000], the population of antivirus 
researchers, being extremely small and accessible, offered an excellent opportunity to 
obtain results that were representative of that community. On the other hand, gathering 
information from DEFCON respondents presented unique challenges; however, these 
were overcome by timing of the survey. This is further discussed in [Gordon, 2000]. 
In Privacy Cognitions and Behaviours in US, UK and EU Information Security 
Professionals [Gordon, 2003], the respondents were not self-selected; rather, a 
statistically significant number of respondents were randomly selected and individually 
queried at three computer security conferences. Respondents were pre-qualified by their 
attendance at computer security conferences and screen query as to their job function, to 
ensure they were currently working in the IT Security field at a technical level. As they 
were being asked questions that could represent their behaviors in negative ways, the 
survey was administered with anonymity. 
Paper 8, Cyberterrorism? [Gordon, 2002b] presented some challenges related to 
gathering data related to terrorist activity. For example, some terrorist WWW sites forbid 
the use of their graphics or data without consent; yet, there was understandably no 
identifiable contact from which to obtain the consent. In such cases, if the information 
could be verified elsewhere, and was publicly available, it was incorporated into the 
study. 
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Reflections on Challenges 
Mentorship and Collaboration 
As this work was foundational, there were very few people with the desire or skill set to 
work collaboratively. I was fortunate to find two mentors, Dr. Harold Highland and Dr. 
Louise Yngstrom, both of whom had the skills and desire to see my work furthered; they 
provided much guidance, without which this research would not have been possible. 
Additionally, my undergraduate mentor, Dr. Josh Tenenberg, offered much 
encouragement to me, sponsoring me for a University grant in the area of developing 
ethical curricula. However, due to geographical limitations, and the fact the Internet was 
not yet sufficiently developed to allow for communication using webcasts or netmeetings, 
the first several years of my work were done in relative isolation. 
When I came to IBM's Thomas J. Watson Research Center, this limitation was 
overcome, as it is a multidisciplinary environment; however, there remained the 
limitation of the researchers' worldviews. In many (but fortunately not all) cases, while 
there were people with diverse skill-sets, they did not see the application of their skills to 
problems outside their area. Thus, worldview of researchers was a second limitation; I 
suspect this limitation exists still today, although significant progress has been made. 
Resources 
Resources were another limitation. Different resources are used, for example, when 
developing legal strategies for computer vimses than when developing solutions focused 
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on user education, or technology. Finding the information I needed was often difficult, as 
much of my early research was conducted in discipline-specific environments. 
Integrating New Ideas into Culture 
Generally, knowledge comes from within a discipline and begins to permeate culture, 
changing societal worldviews; for example, knowledge about HIV infection was 
developed by medical scientists and epidemiologists and was then integrated into 
educational outreach of public health programs; the effects of smoking were studied by 
physicians and researchers, and then integrated into elementary and high school health 
education programs. 
However, in the case of computer vimses the needed changes were impossible to make 
from within the antivirus community. Impossible to impact from within, the only way to 
affect the necessary changes was to approach the industry from the outside, by facilitating 
dialogue that shaped the views of the world around the industry forcing the industry to 
follow. Thus, in this case, the changes took place from the outside. 
Despite the challenges, it has been extremely rewarding. Since the inception of my work 
and my unrelenting focus on facilitating academic dialogue to foster considering of some 
focus on ethics and responsibility in the Computer Security field (which was the goal of 
the initial paper in 1994), the idea of ethics as part of a computer security curricula is 
gaining wide acceptance. For example, Purdue University [Purdue, 2004] established a 
multidisciplinary center in 1998, based on the recognition of the need for 
multidisciplinary approach. 
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Quoting Eugène Spafford, Director of CERIAS, 
"The whole research and éducation program in CERIAS at Purdue is 
multidisciplinary in nature. We have linguists working with psychoiogists working 
with computer scientists who are working with economists, The results so far have 
been quite exciting, although we have sometimes had difficuity finding 
présentation venues where they understood what we have done. Our students 
clearly benefit from this mix, and we're trying to find ways to share the model 
with others. I am excited about what we are doing." 
Other Universities now include this approach in their Computer Science/Computer 
Security curricula [Aycock, 2004; Holleran, 2004; Kabay, 2004; Chan, 2004; ECU, 2004; 
Ford, 2004]. 
General Approaches vs. Spécifie Approaches 
One possible criticism of the work is that it is too generalist; that is, that especialîy in 
computer-related topics that the knowledge needed to really understand the implications 
of vulnerabilities requires highly specialized knowledge. There is some truth to this, and 
it is certainly possible to take a viewpoint that is too high-level. Thus, as is often the case 
in research, there is a délicate balance to maintain when viewing security problems from 
a broader perspective. By way of response, however, I believe that it is valuable to follow 
both a granular technical approach, and a more holistic generalist approach. Results from 
both approaches should be contrasted and compared. Any discrepancies should be 
cârefully examined. 
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Another criticism of multi-disciplinary approaches to computer security is that analogies 
drawn from other áreas may be misleading due to subtle but important différences in low-
level Operation. Critics might cite some of the conclusions drawn regarding computer 
monoculture, for example, concerning how biological inferences brought in to computing 
can lead to incorrect results. 
This flaw of the interdi sc iplinary approach is entirely valid, and is something that must e 
considered when making inferences. As always, great care must be taken by the 
researcher to valídate conclusions using as many différent techniques are possible. 
To the critic who would argue the need for specialization - 1 agree. However, within that 
specialization needs to be a broader worldview, especially for those making high-level 
décisions or doing research, to understand its application. Depth of knowledge can reduce 
Problems and solve specific issues, but only by taking a step back and examining the 
system in its entirety can we ensure that researchers are actually working on the righi 
probi em. 
Summary of Research Progress and Impact 
This research demonstrates new and scholarly work in the use of non-traditional 
approaches to the computer security problem. Individually, thèse papers have laid 
groundwork that is being used to enhance understanding of computer security issues. 
Combined, they provide a solid base of peer-reviewed publications that illustrâtes the 
synthesis of computer security with other branches of science. Furthermore, their 
integration into the both the world of academia and our culture demónstrate they have 
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also gone a step further, and changed the way people Worldwide think about computer 
security. 
The initial work, Technologically Enabled Crime, set the stage for ail the later work that I 
undertook. After first beginning with the process of fusing computer security with other 
disciplines, I decided to extend the base work to a broader audience. To do this, I 
followed several distinct paths, in order to itlustrate the underlying research manifesto 
outlined in Technologically Enabled Crime. 
In one thread, the virus writer work explored the nature and motivators of the adversary, 
and applied ethics, sociology and psychology to a domain that has traditionally been the 
realm of technologists. The results were both encouraging and useful: a more solid 
understanding of non-technical remediation to the virus problem was garnered, and the 
validity of a multi-disciplinary approach proven. 
The virus analysis work performed on the first Macro virus (Concept) and the first Macro 
virus to target Excel (Laroux) continued to establish and cernent my bona fides as a 
technical virus researcher. This was important both within the 'white hat' community of 
fellow virus researchers and within the cyclical virus writer community, as well as within 
the security community. 
Continuing to emphasize the value of a broader approach, the Systems theory paper 
looked at virus protection in its wider context. Once again, by moving beyond wholly 
technical solutions, and considering ideas in context, a pragmatic and effective approach 
toward virus protection could be derived. This way of thinking about the problem also 
Computer Security 
66 
validated the underlying assumption that technology cannot solve security problems in a 
vacuum. 
The concept of pragmatism and meaning was also touched upon in my work on testing. 
This work, accepted and adopted by governments worldwide, has forever changed the 
way that anti-vims products are tested. Vendors, testers, academics and the general public 
now think differently about antivims software testing. 
Finally, my work on cyberterrorism and privacy has also focused on the broader picture, 
synthesizing technical information and solutions with other disciplines. The privacy study 
demonstrates that even when technological solutions exist, they are frequently not 
deployed for non-technological reasons. Similarly, the research on cyberterrorism shows 
when facing an attack by an adversary, it is important to view the problem holistically not 
narrowly. This concept is vital to protecting the nation from computer-assisted threats. 
Overall, the work has been well accepted, and ties together cohesively to powerfully 
demonstrate the power of examining technological problems from a far broader 
perspective. 
Topics for Future Research 
The discipline of computer security is ripe with opportunities for future research. Based 
upon the findings of my research to date, this future work should include: 
• Continued research on individuals who write self-replicating programs, or 
participate in hacking activities; in particular, crossover between the two groups 
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at a societal level and a skill-set level, and connections with more organized 
criminal activity; 
• Continued research into theoretical models for standards development, evolving 
into the areas of new uses and abuses of technology, i.e. such as spyware and 
adware; 
• Designing collège coursework focusing on holistic approaches to computer 
security issues. There is a shortage of available académie resource material in this 
area; 
• Promoting multidisciplinary approach and collaboration through various methods 
including application for research grants in this area; publication in diverse 
journals and soliciting collaborative with académies in other fields. 
• Création of material for elementary school children, in collaboration with early 
childhood educators, focusing on the impact of virtual action in the 'real world' 
• Research focused on communication methods and models used by security 
researchers, and the efficacy afforded by the various models 
Future research: a personal perspective 
Having been involved with computers for almost twenty years and having spent the last 
décade changing the way the world thinks about computer vimses and computer security, 
I want to mentor and supervise others who wish to undertake multidisciplinary research 
in thèse areas. 
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My current projects include acting as co-PI on a project with Purdue University and 
Symantec Corporation related to vims writers and hackers and co-PI on two pending 
National Science Foundation grant applications related to multidisciplinary studies of 
hacking and vims writers. This multi-disciplinary approach is beginning to be recognized 
as the only approach likely to yield long-term benefits. There is still much work to be 
done in this area, and I am actively taking part in doing it. 
Ideally, now we will see others continuing the research I have started, especially in the 
area of vims writers. Currently there is no other credible scientific source of information 
about this subject, and I am hoping to mentor one or more students with an interest in this 
area. My deepest desire is to begin a transition that will result in passing this knowledge 
on. While my work is already being referenced as 'the' work in vims writing and hacker 
areas, I want to formalize both the materials and methods of teaching them over the next 
several years that will make this transition possible. 
For this to happen there needs to be increased material available to educators. Thus, one 
area for future research is in developing curricula that explores the problem from many 
perspectives. Therefore, once I have achieved my PhD, I plan to work with others 
designing courses on malware that will, in addition to exploring technical aspect of 
malware, offer an integrated, multidisciplinary approach, teaching students not 'what' to 
think, but 'how' to think about computer security issues. Such an incorporation of my 
new work into formal curricula will continue to validate the legitimacy of the approach I 
have taken. In addition to lecturing at The University of Stockholm, The University of 
Hamburg, Indiana University, and Purdue University, I have recently been appointed to 
Computer Sec uri ty 
69 
serve on the Graduate Faculty at Florida Institute of Technology help guide students on 
projects related computer security research. 
In the ideal world, educators will begin to expand on integration of ethical aspects of 
secure computing into daily lessons and life. Research that examines the ways in which 
young children synthesize computing ethics will be of great value and should be 
encouraged. Thus, in addition to the course developments described above, I have begun 
development of a book séries for primary school students, creating educational materials 
that will instill a sense of reality in virtual interactions. The focus of séries will be 
helping young children to widerstand there are real people on the other end of their 
Internet connection, and that their actions can have real conséquences. My goal is to 
make sure this work is made available as widely as possible with the US and UK, and 
eventually, internationalized. 
Finally, as technologies continue to develop, additional research and development of 
educational material that focuses on the human factors related to security technologies 
should be encouraged. Universities and technical collèges are encouraged to critically 
examine the structure of their académie curricula, and where lacking, to develop 
programs that integrate ethics, law, éducation, psychology and ethics. I hope to work 
collaborative with people involved in such development. 
Conclusion 
The changes that have come about as a result of the research presented in this document 
have been huge. Virus writers were once beheld as the denizens of the underground, 
solely bent on destruction, and best dealt with by technology in the best case, and law in 
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the worst case. This work has shown that in fact many young people who write viruses 
are much like other young people - and explained why the technical and légal approaches 
heralded by many two décades ago not only failed to solve the problem but in fact could 
contribute to making it worse. 
Today, computer scientists who once scoffed at the idea of engaging in dialogue with 
young people who write self replicating programs are taking part in educational programs 
aimed at thèse young people. Technologists who saw no value in attending 'hacker 
conférences' such as DEFCON now appreciate and understand the tremendous 
opportunity observing such events can provide. This work has given us hope for the 
future, and a direction in which to focus our technical, législative, psychological and 
educational efforts. 
In other areas of security, such as 'cyberterrorism', my work expanded the boundaries 
commonly adhered to by organizations and individuals - boundaries that are not adhered 
to by the terrorists but which had heretofore been embraced by computer security 
professionals as 'playing by the mies'. 
Prior to the release of this research, the concept of cyberterrorism discussed at security 
conférences and in academia was overly focused on computer as target. My research 
demonstrated that this is only one aspect of the inclusion of Computing with terrorism. 
My development of a terrorism matrix provided a framework that allowed defenders to 
examine the impact of information technology as it intersected with every dimension of 
terrorist activity. By refusing to step on the 'cyberterrorism' bandwagon, but instead 
scientifically and methodically dissecting the éléments of terrorist activity, this work 
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shone light in those dark places, and set new directions for research and practice, both for 
technologist and policymakers alike. 
By scientifically and quantifiably showing that many information security professionals 
tend to adapt a 'Do as I say, not as I do' attitude about various technical issues related to 
privacy, this work has exposed the complacency and carelessness within human-
technology Systems that réside within critical infrastructures. It has opened the door for 
organizations to examine their own security cultures. It has also given technologists a 
direction for future research, finding ways to circumvent the need for 'human action' in 
some situations. 
In summary, I have demonstrated that this work of the past décade has shone the light of 
scientific scmtiny upon stéréotypes and the byproducts of prématuré consensus thinking 3 0 
in many critical areas related to computer security. By introducing increased scientific 
scmtiny, it has aided in maturation of the discipline in ways which are both desireable 
and measurable. It represents new knowledge, and séminal work, and has changed the 
way people looked at the computer security problem overall. In essence, this work has 
changed the way in which the computer security discipline has developed and is 
developing. 
Based upon the criteria of quantity, quality and scope, I have demonstrated that the body 
of work taken either in part or in whole is sufficient to eam the advanced degree. 
Specifically, in ternis of quantity, I have included both papers listed for review, and 
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additional papers in the attached bibliography. These form only a subset of my work. In 
terms of quality, some are regarded as seminal work; foundational in their field and are 
required reading at Universities, and others are required reading in University Computer 
Science programs. Finally, in terms of scope, I believe that the work is both broad and 
well integrated. 
Summarily, this research has done more than change the very way people think about 
computer security. It has provided a pathway for more integrative approaches to viewing 
security in a more holistic context. This will help prepare future generations to deal with 
the computer security problems we will face holistically, while at the same time 
contributing to the maturation of the computer security as a scientific discipline. 
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• Computer security expert Sarah Gordon is to the virus-writing underground what 
anthropologist Clifford Geertz was to the Balinese. Gordon has been quietly 
studying people who write computer viruses to understand more about their 
ethical development, perceptions of themselves and the world around them, and 
their motivations for releasing viruses into the wild, (Wired, April 1997), 
• The acknowledged authority in this area is Sarah Gordon, who has written 
extensively in this area and in related ethical areas. (Shipley, 2002). 
• Sarah Gordon's credentials as an antivirus expert, one adept at dealing with the 
lethal creations of young hackers, are impeccable. She spent years debugging her 
own personal computers while she worked as a juvenile crisis counselor. Since 
1997 she has worked at the preeminent antivirus lab in the country, IBM's 
Thomas J. Watson Research Center, in Hawthorne, New York. (Forbes, April 
1998). 
• "They need to be educated to see that viruses are having a real impact, and that 
people get hurt. They need to know that self-replication is an interesting 
computer concept, but it's not a science, and it's not cool. " (IEEE Voices, 
March 1998. 
• Sarah Gordon is the world expert in the area, but even she admits: "Ican't give 
you a simple answer to the question ' What sort ofpeople do this? ' If I could, we 
could develop a generic approach to solving the problem. The reality is that this 
is an extremely complex issue... ". Her research has made her something of a 
myth in virus circles. (The Guardian, July 1999) 
• In her definitive works on the subject, The Generic Virus Writer II, she gives a 
number of different reasons including: "relieffrom boredom, actively seeking 
fame, exploration, malice and peer pressure". (The Guardian, July 1999) 
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Gordon began her research in 1994 and updated "The Generic Virus Writer, " 
her study of four virus authors, twoyears later. She investigated about WO 
people, verifying their information through foltow-up interviews with family, 
friends and other sources ... "As ethical standards and notions of right and 
wrong mature, most of theyoung writers grow out of their misbehavior and are 
replaced by other youngsters, she said. For that reason, the community continues 
to reinvent the wheel rather than evolve. " (Government Computing News, 
August, 1999) 
"The image of the virus writer as an angry social malcontent bent on destruction 
is generally wrong, " Gordon says. "Most - especially the teenagers - code for 
thrills and are often disconnectedfrom the reality of what their créations can 
do, " she says. "They don't believe that their code can actually hurt anyone, " 
Gordon says. "It 's actually a normal level of ethical development for their age 
group, " she adds. (PC World, 2000) 
Gordon is an anomaly in the anti-virus industry... Sarah has spentyears 
interviewing, profiling and exchanging ideas with virus writers, and in turn, they 
talk to her and trust her. (CNN 2000) 
Studying the psychology of virus writers and hacker... Her research at Symantec 
includes a focus on ethics and technology. (PBS Frontline 2000) 
Through her research, Gordon has learned that virus Creators are usually not 
mean, immoral people who set out to ruin people 's days. "(They 're) mostly 
within the normal ethical range for their age. They just don 't understand the 
impact on the real world of their actions, " Gordon said. "Sometimes their 
grandfathers or parents gel a (computer) virus and (the virus writer) totally flip-
flops and immediately says, 'This is wrong, ' " she said. (San Francisco 
Chronicle, 2001) 
Contrary to populär myth, Gordon says, cyber-rebels aren 't underground loners, 
and they 're not necessarily nerdy - or even smart. She believes they join 'the 
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dark side ' of the Internet because they don 't extend the same moral code from the 
real world to the Virtual world. She blâmes teachers, journalists and parents for 
the breach. (CNET2002) 
• While thousands of researchers toil to thwart the créations of virus writers, very 
little has been done to investigate who thèse shadowy figures are and why they 
do what they do. Much of it is the work of Sarah Gordon. (USA Today, 2002) 
• "How long might it take to develop a moral code that is consistent from the 
physical to Virtual worlds? It doesn 't happen in one generation. It will take a 
long time. But we have to do something about it because the shift won't happen 
automatically. Educators can start teaching kids at a very, veryyoungage what 
things are acceptable and what aren 't" (CNET, 2002) 
• "People who study science need a multidisciplinary approach. Ifyou like 
computer code, get involved in computer science courses, but gel involved in 
something else, too: Get a degree in engineering or biology and then get an 
internship at Symantec or IBM Research. Find what you love and just do it. Find 
out what makesyour heart beat fast, and run with it. " (CNET, 2002) 
• "Teaching ethics to young children is more than just teaching then 'do 's ' and 
'don'ts '. While that is important, the crucial thing is io teach how to make 
décisions, and how to apply that décision making in various environments and 
circumstances including environments and circumstances with which some 
teachers (and many parents) have little familiarity. It is extremely complicated; 
we are still defining what is acceptable in Virtual environments and interactions, 
and until we have a clearer understanding and agreement societally, it is difficult 
to instill those principles in young children. " (RAE Internet, 2003) 
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Appendix 3: Television, radio and magazine appearances as expert 
on social and technical aspects of computer security. 
Thèse selected articles demonstrate the breadth, and depth of my multidisciplinary 
research, and illustrate the resuit of my concerted effort to shift the média perception of 
technical, social and ethical implications of technology. 
CNBC: The Street. 2004. Searchingfor Andy. Technical Forensics and the MyDoom 
virus author. Available as on-site video présentation only (copyrighted). 
BBC News, 2003. A glimpse inside the virus writer. Research on virus writers featured 
on BBC News. http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/low/technology/3240901.stm 
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Silicon, 2003. Virus writing hackers are the biggest threat. Artide referencing research 
on virus writers and hackers. 
htm://ww.silicon.com/software/securitv/0,3902465539116705.00.htm 
CSO Magazine, 2003. Don 't letyour babies grow up to be hackers. Research on virus 
writers and hackers featured in CSO Magazine. 
http://www.csoonline.coni/read/070103/bri e fin g_babies.html ' 
IDG Net, 2003. Virus Experts Debate Bug Nantes. 
httr3://enteiprisesecurity.svmantec.corn/content.cfm?articleid=2957&EID=0 Quoted on 
issue of virus naming. 
ZDNet UK, 2003. The hacker challenge. Quoted on research related to lack of 
convergence between hacking and virus writing communiti es. 
http://insight.zdnet.co.uk/communications/networks/039020427.2133479.00.htm 
Computing, 2003. Security experts pay scant attention to privacy issues. 
htrp://www.webactivemagazine.co.uk/News/l 147423 
C-NET. 2002. Deciphering the hacker myth. Profiled for research with vims writers and 
hackers, http://news.com.com/2008-l 082-829812.html?tag=pt.salon 
Microsoft B-Central. Hacking into the mina of a hacker. Research on hackers utilized by 
Microsoft publication, http://bcentral.com/articles/enbysk/164.asp 
Microsoft B-Central. 7 things to know about virus writers. Research on vims writers in 
interview with Microsoft publication, http://www.bcentral.com/articles/enbysk/160.asp 
PBS Frontline. 2002. Studying the psychology of virus writers and hackers. Feature and 
profile on PBS for research on virus writers and hackers. 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/hackers/whoare/psycho.html 
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MSN Techs and Gadgets, 2002. Hacking's not just for geeks anymore. Interviewed by 
Microsoft for research on hackers and virus writers. http://msn.com.com/2100-l 105— 
937343.html 
Financial Review. 2002. The Iure of cyber larceny crosses the gender divide. Research on 
virus writers and gender issues quoted. 
http://afr.com/specialreports/report2/2002/07/25/FFX2PSMOY3D.html 
USA Today. 2001. Hot on the trai! of virus writers. Research on virus writers featured in 
this profile. Full page feature. http://wv^.usatodav.com/tech/news/2001-05-07--virus-
tracker.htm 
Fast Company. 2001. Livin ' la vida Boca. Featured (with husband) in article on career 
paths and life-choices. . http://www.fastcompany.com/oniine/46/boca.html 
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This paper will consider the social and ethical factors involved in the transmission of 
computer viruses and other malicious software. In addition to the people, we will 
consider the part the systems and technology play in the spread of this sort of data. We 
will draw parallels with one of the more well known scientific paradigms, the medical 
one, and note the similarities with the problems we now face. We will describe the 
evolution of methods of vims distribution: vims exchange bulletin boards, vims exchange 
networks, distribution sites, robots/servers, and books. The paper will discuss viruses for 
sale and make some comparisons between distribution of computer viruses and the 
distribution methods of "hacking tools". Other issues examined in this paper include the 
characteristics of individuals involved in the distribution of these types of programs, and 
problems of legal redress, as well as possible solutions based on ethics and ethical theory. 
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Introduction 
We have available today a global system of communication technology. There also exist 
programs whose purpose is to disrupt the way this system functions. Moreover, the 
system is the perfect medium to host and transfer the very programs designed to destroy 
the functionality of the system itself. In this paper we will discuss the factors usually 
neglected in studies concerning computer vims infections. 
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1.1 Traditional Epidemiological Studies 
ep-i-de-mi-ol-o-gy \,ep-e-,deA--meA--'a'-L:l-e-je''-, -,dem-
e - - \ n 
[LL epidemia + ISV -logy] (ca. 1864) 
1: a branch of medical science chat deals with che 
incidence, distribution, 
and control of disease in a population 
2: the sum of the factors controlling the presence or 
absence of a 
disease or pathogen (Webster's) 
Abstract 
There are various factors comrnonly considered when estimating the probability of virus 
infections. We have factors such as the ability of the virus to replicate, the amount of 
contact any given machine has with the general population of computers, and the 
présence of any computers currently infected. Elaborate studies have been done to 
calcúlate the possibilities of any given population becoming infected. In one such study 
by Dr. Alan Solomon [Solomon, 1990], one conclusion is that early detection is a very 
effective way to reduce the incidence of viruses in a population of computers. In fact, 
early detection is cited as one of the crucial factors in limiting infection. One such model 
[see Footnote 1] illustrâtes how finding a virus contributes to its detection and 
eradication. 
There are cases however, where a virus being 'found' means it will spread further and 
further; the same can be said of some hacking tools. These cases are where the malicious 
programs are 'found' on computing Systems, where they have been placed for exchange 
or distribution. These are programs which will not be detected in their 'current state' by 
any virus detector or casual search méthodologies. When they are found, by people 
looking for them (and in some cases by the casual observer who just happens to see them, 
download or ftp them, and use them), they spread from user to user and their use becomes 
widespread; in some cases, epidemie. 
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1.1.2 Social aspects 
In addition to being concerned with detecting viruses which are active in computing 
Systems, we now find ourselves in the position of needing to detect and identify viruses 
and other malicious software which are non-active. We are faced today with an entire 
system of communication technology which is the perfect medium to host and transfer 
the very programs designed to destroy the functionality of the Systems. We suggest that 
technologies not only tend be created out of human endeavor and the accompanying 
social values, but to shape the values of the communities from which they arise; that they 
can take on an ethical/moral dynamic of their own. These values, as we will show, are not 
always consistent with the values of the communities which create them. 
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2. The causal connection 
In this section, we will examine the sorts of programs which are sometimes used in 
criminal and/or unethical ways. People which make use of the current technology to 
distribute the tools and information will be discussed. 
1» 
2.1 Malicious software 
By malicious program, we refer to a program designed to perform a hanriful action. This 
action could range from deliberate destruction of data, as is the case with some viruses, to 
the interception of confidential information, as is the case with programs such as the 
recently publicised sunsniffer. For the purposes of this paper, the computing technologies 
referred to are those which are affected, or which have the potential to be affected. 
While it is not required for a program to do obvious damage to classify as a vims, for the 
purpose of this paper we will stipulate a virus as a program that replicates in some 
environment, alters exécutable code and does damage by Controlling your computer 
system without your knowledge or consent; we will stipulate a trojan as a program which 
appears legitimate, but which does deliberate damage to your computer system's files. 
While vimses have for the most part been confined to personal computers running under 
MS-DOS, we are beginning to see both more interest and more vimses written for UNIX 
based Systems. 
The hacking tools discussed are computer programs including trojanized login programs, 
which capture passwords, shell scripts which exploit operating system bugs and text files 
which give instructions on how to hack computer Systems. 
Of course, thèse programs alone do no damage. They must be installed, executed or read 
and used as "instruction manuals"; this is accomplished initially by a human. It is 
interesting to note that many people insist that programs are unethical1. Other voices 
insist the programs are not capable of being ethical or unethical; they are simply code. 
Traditionally, programs were not seen as capable of being ethical or non-ethical in and of 
themselves, primarily because they were not autonomous agents. However, vimses have 
the capability to be exactly this. For this reason, if the vimses we are seeing today are in 
any way the precursors to full-scale autonomous agents, we should be concerned with 
which ethical models we will incorporate into them. Will they make their décisions based 
on the good of ali of society; will they make their décision based on unwavering moral 
principles? Will they be totally self-preservationist? There appears to be little if anything 
to indicate thèse programs with which we are concerned in this paper bear any 
relationship to artificial intelligence or artificial life despite claims to the contrary by their 
producers, and for this reason are not ethical or unethical in and of themselves. 
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2.2. Individuais 
The sort of people which play a rôle in the distribution of this malicious information vary. 
There are malicious, intentional players, as well as non-malicious accidentai players. We 
will begin with the vims writers. It would be an error to place them all in one category. 
They are as diverse as their vimses; each with his own motivation and each subscribing 
to his own choice of distribution method. The term 'his' is specifically used because there 
is no evidence of any female virus writer who participates consistently in distribution of 
computer viruses. The gender issue is one which is discussed in the paper The Generic 
Vims Writer [Gordon, 94]; it will not be disussed further at this time except to note there 
is a gender issue. 
Vims writers can come from all walks of life; they are diverse in age, location, academic 
background, and goal. In some cases, the goal is malicious in nature; in other cases, there 
appears to be no malicious intent. The same is true of the hacker. The traditional profile 
of hacker [Swanson, Chamelin and Territo, 92] as young adult male, 19-25, socially inept 
seems to be somewhat inaccurate. There are women involved in the hacker culture, not 
just as "fans' and 'hangers-on', but as contributory entities. 
Another similarity between types of the vims-involved individuals and roles of the 
individuals in their subculture and that of hackers and those involved in their subculture 
is that both may exhibit "parasitic' behaviour. Parasite in this context refers to people who 
have no skills of writing replicating code, nor any abilities related to what is commonly 
referred to as hacking. These people participate in the culture by helping distribute the 
programs, and the information in cmde, traditional ways; telephone conversations, 
bulletin board chats, uploading/downloading files on dial-up bulletin boards; use of the 
Internet in some cases to transfer files, and maintenance of huge repositories of 
information which they cannot contribute to, but which they can allow others to "benefit' 
from. They feed off of the "work* of others. For this reason, they are often referred to as 
"parasite hackers' or "parasites' by members of their social communities. 
These are not the only people involved in the epidemiology of malicious programs. 
Commercial software companies are involved. At least 64 instances of DOS-based 
commercial software have been released with infected files or infected boot sectors. 
There are increasing numbers of reports of infections on commercial and shareware CDs 
released for DOS based machines [Footnote 2]. Innocent users are sometimes carriers. 
We are all familiar with the sneaker net mode of infection, where an office worker carries 
a disk to his/her co-worker, and in transferring the files or booting from the shared disk, 
also sometimes transfers the vims. Users can also transfer viruses by not following proper 
procedures in their environments; not taking the vims threat seriously. Anti-virus 
software is often disabled by users because it is too slow or not installed at all because the 
installation is considered too complex. When this lack of provision for detection exists, 
the user can play host and distributor to vimses without ever being aware of their 
existence. Administrators also sometimes play a role in the distribution of vimses and 
other malicious programs, unknowingly. This will be discussed further under section 
3.1.3 Vims Distribution Sites-
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3. Epidemiology 
Having defined some types of programs that are used to cause disruption and criminal 
activity in our networks, aspects of Cyberspace and technologjcal development which can 
contribute to the problem and the general characteristics of some of the people involved, 
we will now look at the methods by which the people distribute the programs and 
information. 
3.1 How virus programs travel 
Viruses are exchanged and distributed via at least six methods. The first, the virus 
exchange BBS, is perhaps the most well known. We will trace the growth of viruses as a 
novelty, to the beginnings of their place in commercial ventures. To discuss the 
motivations of the persons involved in each of thèse individuai Steps is beyond the scope 
of this paper. We will answer the questions: how are the machines and the technology 
used as methods of communicating information; what kind of information is being 
communie ated? 
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3.1.1 Virus Exchange BBS 
One of the common methods utilized by intentional computer vims distributors is the 
vims exchange bulletin board. The bulletin boards are similar in most respects to 
mainstream bulletin am bulletin board Systems. The sotems. The software used by the 
indivby the individuai system Operators varies. Mrs varies. Many of the Systems 
aresystems are accessible via teliphone, and some are accessible through telnet. From a 
humble beginning in Sofia, Bulgaria (the site of the first known vims exchange system), 
vims exchange bulletin boards have grown into big operaem was operated by Todor 
Todorov in Sofia Bulgaria; it made vimses available initially on an 'exchange' basis, but 
later offered the vimses to anyone who cared to take them. In its initial stage, it 
encouraged the création of new viruses by requiring the upload of a new vims in 
exchange for access to any and ali viruses. The system had a total of 294 users and was 
used primarily by locai callers. The number of "regulär" files on this system was at least 
double the number of vimses; according to the system Operator, the non-virus files were 
the most frequently accessed. Following the popularization of this system via negative 
Publicity as well as "word of mouth advertising" by users, other Systems began to 
emerge. Currently, vims exchange bulletin boards are known to exist in North America, 
Latin America, Europe (including Switzerland where it has become a crime to offer 
vimses via a BBS; and Holland, where it is also a criminal offense); Australia, Asia and 
Africa. The Systems sometimes state they are Vims Research Bulletin Boards. Some of 
the Systems are "private"; others allow access to anyone who wishes to participate. These 
individuai Systems have led to a new development; that of the vims exchange network. 
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3.1.2 Virus Exchange Networks 
These Systems were for the most part well-publicized by word of mouth, electronic mail 
and advertising on other Systems of the same type. While hack/phreak Systems had been 
in existence for some time, the vims exchange phenomenon was a relative latecomer to 
the underground scene. Within roughly a three year period, the Operators and users of 
such Systems had formed a relatively small but tightly knit community, and the formation 
of organized networks followed. The networks provided even faster distribution of new 
viruses to network members. The majority of these Systems operated using regulär dial-
up modems and a network structure similar to the Fidonet. The networks have names 
such as vX-Net (Vims Exchange Net), NuKEnet (named after the NuKE vims writing 
group which founded the network), and MeltNet (an exclusive net which has never been 
known to release a vims outside of the network). These networks have been observed to 
overlap; often Systems will participate in more than one of the networks. In some cases, 
the networks will publicly identify themselves as "Vims Research BBS", while in another 
network they are known by their vims exchange system or vims distribution affiliated 
name. One such instance was the Virginia Institute of Vims Research, which was also 
known as the Black Axis BBS. This system was represented in the Fidonet echomail 
conférence as a vims research center; it was identified in another network as the world 
headquarters for the NuKE vims writing group, operating under the name "The Black 
Axis". This is not an isolated instance, but is perhaps the most well known. The vims 
exchange Systems as exist via regulär dial-up access are easily accessible to users. Since 
they are self-adrninistered, they are not usually subject to any form of extemal review or 
assessment. 
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3.1.3 Virus Distribution Sites 
As interest in viruses grew, the abilities and resources of the vims writers and distributors 
grew. Some of the young vims writers became college aged; access to internet facilities 
became available. Internet vims sites became more commonplace, and information about 
the ever-changing locations was transferred at the same fast rate as the viruses 
themselves. It is not uncommon to find university ftp sites used as virus distribution sites. 
This créâtes a problem for overworked administrators, who in many cases have no idea 
what is passing through their Systems. How can we detect these vimses? In some cases 
they are not directly détectable, having been encoded by some standard (or non-standard) 
utility such as uuencode; in other cases they are archived. Both these methods make their 
detection by current scanning méthodologies difficult if not impossible. They are not 
active in memory, or existing in any form which a traditional scanner may recognize. In 
many cases these are MS-DOS vimses, which are transferred using UNIX machines. 
They are often in and out of sites before most administrators know their Systems have 
been used for the purpose of holding or transferring the data. 
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3.1.4 Virus Distribution Robots and File Servers 
Use of automated distribution programs known as bots and servers is a relatively recent 
addition to the methods used to distribute viruses. By contacting one of the servers via 
electronic mail, or by asking the 'robot' for the files, a user can relatively anonymously 
retrieve viruses via the internet. The connection can of course be monitored, but they do 
not appear to be routinely monitored by the administrators or by the users themselves. 
One recently programmed file server reportedly transferred to users approximately 
15,000 to 20,000 files (viruses and text files) per week during its three months of 
operations. There were approximately 1000 files available for download/transfer from 
this server. The operator of the server learned to make and use bots during his self-taught 
experience with the Linux operating system. Following the success of the server, he 
programmed a bot which was actively distributing viruses on the Internet Relay Chat. He 
states he put the server online to do something that had never been done before ~ internet 
wide virus distribution. As the server was anonymous, there is no way to know what sort 
of users accessed the files, their intended purpose, or the result of the accessibility. 
According to the server operator, the supplier of internet service declared a breach of 
contract following the huge volume of file transfers; he was forced to remove the server. 
Such servers, and bots, can be used for distribution of any type file, not just viruses; this 
transfer of information can be accomplished with relative anonymity. 
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3.1.5 Virus Instruction Books 
Books on how to make viruses have become popular, and contests are sponsored to build 
the smallest virus; the most politically incorrect virus; the virus best able to defeat anti­
virus programs. In 1990, Mark Ludwig copyrighted The Little Black Book of Computer 
Viruses. This book contained general information about types of viruses. It contained 
computer source code for the viruses as well as an order blank readers could use to order 
the code on disk; it also contained what the book refers to as "compiled executable 
programs for all of the viruses and related programs in this book". There was a 
disclaimer, requiring the purchaser to assume full responsibility for any damage that may 
be caused by any of the programs. The viruses themselves were not particularly 
innovative. Several of them have been found in the wild since the publication of the 
book. This book created some controversy, followed by the release of a second book. The 
second book was released without much attention in the United States; however, in 
France, there was considerable controversy surrounding the release of the book. The final 
ruling of the French court on distribution of this book is not known at this time. There 
9 
have been other books published which contain computer virus source code. They have 
not achieved the notoriety of the Ludwig book. We are not suggesting any books should 
be banned. However, there are ethical considérations with which computing professionals 
need to be concemed. We will discuss thèse further later in this paper. 
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3.1.6 Viruses for Sale 
Viruses are offered for sale by individuals. Several such offers were posted in various 
Fido and Usenet newsgroups. In addition, some magazines carry advertisements for 
viruses. Magazines also offer virus source code; the sale of thèse magazines appears to be 
legai at this time in the United States. Virus writers and distributors have begun creating 
and selling new viruses to some anti-virus product developers for inclusion in the 
"scanner' programs. Government and industry sources have been said to purchase or 
obtain viruses from virus exchange Systems or virus distributors, to perform testing of the 
anti-virus software they are considering. The virus phenomenon has become big business. 
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3.2 How hacking tools travel 
Hacking tools, such as shell scripts which exploit system holes, buglists, etc. appear to 
travel via différent sorts of paths. 
In the case of thèse tools, and the people who exchange them, the scenario appears to 
alter slightly. The majority of hacking tools appear to be created after the announcement 
of a software bug. Hackers then create tools to exploit the bugs. In some cases, the 
hackers themselves find the bugs. There appears to be more creativity, individuai action, 
and intentional sharing of the information among hackers than among the virus involved 
individuals; however, the information has tended to be limited to those who are judged 
(within the subculture) of understanding and contributing to further development of the 
tools. In some case, individuals obtain one set of tools and use them to obtain others by 
simply taking them from the fïlesystems of the tool developers. 
Primarily they have been shared amongst individuals in the relatively tightly knit hacking 
community, until recently. We are now begirining to observe a shift which is cause for 
concern: 
• Hackers sharing programs —> Hackers sharing programs 
• Shared among a small group —> Shared among small groups 
• Not widely distributed —> Distributed more widely; wide-banded; 
• Not generally used maliciously —> Used maliciously; 
This shift can be observed by following the distribution of one hacking tool commonly 
know as the sunsniffer. Initially the sniffer was distributed only to a very few people. The 
source code and exécutable code for this sniffer were recently '"widebanded". 
Widebanding refers to indiscriminate intentional distribution of a program, through every 
available method. In some cases this is done to make tracing of the original distributor 
more difficult. 
The sniffer, which compromised the security of large number of Systems on the internet, 
worked by using a feature of the operating system called /dev/nit. This is the network 
interface tap, and it can read/write from/to différent interfaces. The program was 
configured to place /dev/nit in promiscuous mode, because it could then read ail traffic 
from any machine on the cable, even routed mail. Administrators who had not properly 
configured their own /dev/nit helped enable the compromise of their own Systems. 
However, this "hote" was designed into the system, making this compromise possible. It 
is not feasible to disable a machine to prevent its compromise. 
As people became more aware of the use of this program by a few individuals, the 
potential for appréhension of the individuals increased, so the tool was distributed a bit 
more widely. At the same time, other individuals began to fïnd this "sniffer" on machines 
which had been compromised; they would then take a copy of it to use elsewhere. Copies 
of the sunsniffer were placed on publicly available FTP sites, where any user with access 
to anonymous FTP could obtain the program. The shift we are observing whereby 
hackers are distributing information such as this on a much wider scale than before is 
illustrated by the speed and manner of the distribution of this sniffer. 
What has brought about this shift? As suggested earlier, technology can bring about an 
ethic of its own that is not necessarily in keeping with the ethic of the creators of the 
technology. While this can be said of virtually any technology, it appears to be 
particularly applicable in the case of computing technologies. This will be further 
discussed in section 5., Future Trend s, in which we will examine some of the reasons for 
the shifts we are observing. 
Recently, there have been more hacker voices calling for public dissémination of both 
operating system holes and fixes. There are diversified opinions in both communities 
regarding whether or not such information distribution would benefit either of the 
communities in regards to their respective goals. Whether or not this idea gains 
widespread acceptance in either community remains to be seen. 
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3.2.1 Private BBS 
While private BBS are set up, offering some tools, thèse tools tend to be of relatively 
minor significance: war-dialers, phreaking information, information easily available 
about operating Systems. Some BBS do contain more technically advanced materials, but 
access to them appears to be more exclusive than is the case with virus exchange bulletin 
board Systems. Most of the information on h/p/a/v (hacking, phreaking, anarchy and 
virus) Systems is of lower quality; most of the tools found are said to be trivial. 
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3.2.2 Nerworked BBS 
Networked Systems seem to be much less fréquent, and those that do exist do not appear 
to offer the more exclusive tools. 
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3.2.3 Usenet 
An interesting aspect of hacking tools is the use of Usenet news for their distribution. 
Source code for hacking tools appears on various Usenet groups, but usually this is after 
hackers have had access to them for some time. Such source code can be saved by 
readers, and compiled to create tools such as shell scripts to instali port hoppers, and so 
on; It has been our expérience in talking with a number of persons who have arrived 
relatively recently into the 'hacking scene' that they are not capable of using thèse tools. 
The problem usually appears to be the necessity to modify the programs for différent 
platforms; thèse people simply do not possess the ability to do it. Another problem is the 
apriori technical knowledge required. It does little good for a hacker to have a device that 
exploits a bug in kmem, for instance, if he does not know what to do once he has access 
to kmem. Simple programs for altering utmp files require modification as simple as 
directory paths; frequently, people do not have even the skills to do this. Commonly, such 
persons will access a UNIX system and enter DOS commands such as DIR, or type 
HELP. 
This is not to say that the tools are not useful in helping them to learn; however, it is clear 
that thèse tools require more than a casual knowledge of the Systems they are intended for 
use on. As the toolkits become more developed, less skill is required on the part of the 
users. However, some basic knowledge is still required. 
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3.2.4 FTP Sites 
The use of Usenet for distribution of such tools is not the only way the Internet is used to 
facilitate the travel of hacking tools. FTP sites are routinely used for drop sites. These in 
many cases require special accesses or passwords, but in some cases tools are left on 
public sites, either through oversight on the part of the individuals involved, or 
vi 
intentionally. 
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4. Social Factors 
The connection between certain aspects of current computing technology and the 
crimes/activities being facilitated will be examined, with emphasis on the paradigm shifts 
which have been proven to improve the overall health of other forms of scientific 
research. 
4.1 Cyberspace as facilitator 
We will now consider the aspect of this cyberspace environment known as 
dehumanization. Not all computing technologies are heavily influenced by the 
dehumanization and other psychological aspects of 'cyberspace' which are seen in the 
environment surrounding the "malicious computer program', but it should not surprise us 
that people who have little contact with other human beings due to their intense 
immersion in the electronic communities we have designed have lost sight of their 
humanity. It follows that the impact of their actions is often seen, at least by them, as 
impacting machines, not other human beings. 
We should also consider the aspects of cyberspace which facilitate inequality, and the 
possible results of these inequalities. This environment is no different than in any other 
aspect of society; it is normal for people to be unequal. For example, we do not all have 
access to the same quality of health care; not everyone has even a house in which to put a 
terminal. Cyberspace however, introduces a unique form of inequality in that the sort of 
information which is becoming available will provide what could be a very extreme 
advantage to those who 'have' versus those who 'have not' — indeed, this 
advantage/disadvantage could impact the electronic community in such a way that the 
community could become unable to maintain itself entirely. Unequal access to 
information puts those who do not have the access at the distinct disadvantage of ever 
being able to fulfill their potential in the electronic society. While this is inherent in most 
societies, we are in a position now which could enable us to minimalize some aspects of 
social inequality by careful planning and policy making. Unlike other areas, this structure 
is not yet intact; there is still time to integrate equalizing factors. Most importantly, we 
need to consider what sorts of information belong in cyberspace; what sort of access 
policies should governments envision; is the idea of access for everyone feasible or even 
desirable. 
At this time, cyberspace does tend to facilitate some inequality; this inequality is 
manifested in the number of 'victims'. It can be argued that there is a great equalization, 
due to lack of real world visual biases or clues inherent in net communication and 
interaction; however, it is important to consider that along with the lack of the visual 
'bïas' triggers cornes a lack of contextual clues. Without thèse dues, often people do not 
realise their behaviour is unacceptable. If it is alright to do one little thing, another little 
thing is added to it. Eventually, you can end up with a very anti-social behavior, which 
was totally acceptable every step of the way by one's peer group. This is not to suggest 
that we should find a way to take real-time, real-space clues and integrate them into net 
societies. As users are given more and more power, the potential for trickery, lies, deceit 
and abuse increases right along with the potential for "good*. It may be wise to consider 
the nature of cyber-societies and the processes of social influence within them. [Sproull, 
93] 
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4.2 Technology as enabler 
In addition to the people, we must consider the part the Systems and technology play in 
the spread of this sort of data. We can best do this by drawing a parallel with one of the 
more well known scientific paradigms, notingthe similarities with the problem we now 
face: 
Médical Science in the early 1960s: 
• We can do it 
• We should do it 
• We must do it 
Communication Technology Today: 
• We can do it 
• We should do it 
• We must do it 
The ":it" in the first case refers to advances in medicine relating to health care, and 
research; in particular fields such as genetic engineering. What occurred during this time 
was a remarkable advancement of technology which left scientists and researchers in 
somewhat of a quandary over exactly what, and how much, of this research and 
development should be put into commun usage or pursued at ail. We find a similar 
situation today, with Computing technologies not only surpassing the abilities of 
administra tors and users to understand them, but of the technologies themselves at times 
enabling their own destruction. It is perhaps wise to consider at some point what 
safeguards we should require. In the 60's, science turned to the field of ethics — a field 
which was dying according to some — and asked the question "Just what exactly should 
we do? What is -right- to do?". From this introspection, the field of bio-ethics emerged. 
[Bartels, Smith, 93] [Gustafson, 70] 
When we look at médical science, and médical research today, we find questions being 
asked: 
The Médical Science Paradigm today : 
• We can do it 
• Should we do it? 
• How should we do it? 
We can observe the shifts resulting from the interaction with ethical concems. This shift 
has meant perhaps less scientific 'advancement', but perhaps has placed médical science 
more in line with its true goals. The same could be said for integration of ethics with 
other scientific disciplines. As the technologies of computing today advance, they tend to 
focus on what the machines can do. In this assumption, we could be neglecting what we 
really need and want them to do. 
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5. Future Trends 
The technologies described to this point which have enabled the sorts of crimes we are 
now seeing in our global computing environments were surely not created or designed to 
facilitate thèse sorts of behaviours. We must, however, take a serious look at contributory 
factors. 
It could be the case that we have simply allowed technology to progress too quickly, with 
insufficient planning. This is not to suggest that we should stifle technology, but that we 
may need to begin now to pay particular attention to the ethical model that the 
technological model is generating. As an example, consider FSP and FTP applications. 
We have seen how FTP (File Transfer Protocol via connection state protocol) can in 
some cases allow files to be transferred anonymously. This is a good and necessary thing, 
and its potential for abuse or misuse could be minimized by correct configuration 
policies. FSP, or File Server Protocol (Transfers via Connection list) in which you have a 
connection only during pings, requests, etc. are an improvement in that you do not tie up 
resources during inactivity; however, use of FSP usually requires no special privilèges to 
set up and no special ports; it doesn't require separate file Systems, and anyone can set up 
this sort of 'server'. We are seeing the same sorts of problems with thèse FSP servers as 
we are seeing with the DCC (Direct Client to Client transfer services) applications and 
Bots that are being used to transfer vimses and other programs on IRC (Internet Relay 
Chat). 
The anonymity of both of thèse applications plays a rôle in the ethical models of 
behaviour that have developed around their uses. While FTP sites are used to transfer the 
sorts of programs and information with which we are concemed, there appears to be a 
much higher incidence of FSP sites being used on a regular basis to transfer this 
information and data. The controversy surrounding anonymity and pseudo-anonymity is 
one which will probably continue for a long time as we learn the effects of such 
freedoms. However, what we can see now is that these sorts of anonymous applications 
do provide almost a "Use Me for Your Own Purposes" sign. 
Other technologies which have had huge influence on society have developed relatively 
slowly, enabling us to at least somewhat predict future trends; however, in the case of 
computing technology, not only do we have few precedents on which to build our 
analysis, the technology by nature is rather esoteric. This creates an environment 
perfectly adapted to the development of pseudo-revolutionary counter culture and the 
exploitation of those who have, or are perceived to have, power. Additionally, the trends 
which we are able to predict would seem to indicate that legal methods of redress are 
inadequate at best. A proactive approach to the problems facing us as relating to hacking, 
vims writing/distribution and dissemination of information which has the deliberate 
design of being used in a harmful or malicious way would have to include ethics and 
education. The types of ethics and education will be discussed briefly in the next section, 
Solutions. 
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6. Solutions 
Both legal and ethical solutions to some of the problems discussed in this paper are worth 
considering. However, both have limitations, and need to be used in a cooperative, or 
multidisciplinary approach. We will look now at some of the methods we can use to 
address the problems. 
6.1 Laws 
Laws are one method. There are however, problems with laws addressing computer 
vimses, vims source code, and hacking "tools'. As evidenced by the recent cases 
involving members of a well known 'hacker' group, jurisdiction can be a problem. In one 
particular case, the alleged perpetrator physically resided in the United States; the system 
he reportedly attacked was located in Australia. The question of jurisdiction has, to this 
point, made prosecution impossible. [Cook, 93] 
Laws concerning vimses have problems due to their lack of enforceability, jurisdiction 
and the matter of recovery. As we have shown, the nature of the methods of exchanging 
computer vimses and hacking tools tend to hamper any real assessment of exactly how 
much information is being exchanged and by whom. While of course there are ample 
mechanisms for monitoring information exchanges, we need to be concerned with 
various policies (both legal and ethical) when we consider monitoring communications to 
ensure their "acceptability'. The vast majority of known vims writers are not capable of 
providing recovery should they actually be convicted of a crime, successmlly prosecuted, 
and found guilty. Finally, there is the international nature of vims distribution, which 
adds to the already complicated situation. 
While courts have usually found that information distributors are not strictly liable for 
damage caused by distribution of misinformation, récent décisions have held that 
distributors of products can be held strictly liable for the results of reliance on 
misinformation contained in the product (Cook, 93). The United States Commerce 
Department, in January 1990, found that International system administrators have an 
affirmative obligation to review the contents of their Systems to locate improper or illegal 
traffic, specifically traffic in programs which have controlied export under the Export 
Administration Act or the Arms Export Control Act. While laws are still evolving and no 
one knows for sure what the end result will be, it seems safe to assume that 
administrators and commercial system owners will eventually face possible liabilities for 
actions of their users, such as vims infected products, vimses distributed via networks, 
stolen credit card information transferred via their networks, users businesses disrupted 
because adequate safeguards were not in place. This however does not solve the problem. 
The administrators may have a responsibility ethically and perhaps eventually legally to 
know what is going on on their Systems; however, we cannot ignore the obvious gap 
between what a system should enforce and what it is actually expected to enforce. We 
must also be cognizant of the gap between what we can expect will be enforced the social 
policies and mores that exist in any given environment [Neumann, 93]. 
The concept of Free Speech as a Consti national Right is invoked by many proponents of 
unrestricted vims "exchange" in the United States. There are forms of speech that are not 
protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution; additionally, there 
are précédents which bring serious questions to the First Amendment defense. The vims 
problem is not confined to the United States alone, and any laws specific to any 
individuai country may not be applicable in another country. The discussion of free 
speech and/or First Amendment rights is beyond the scope of this paper; it is mentioned 
due to its large role in the defense of vims writing in the United States. 
Finally, we may wish to examine ways in which laws can be used to create positive 
ethical models in individuate and groups. First, quoting a release from the Technical and 
General Assemblies of the International Fédération for Information Processing [see 
Footnote 3]] 
In view of the potentially serious and even fatal conséquences of the 
introduction of'vims' programs into computer systems, the Technical and 
General Assemblies of IFIP urge: 
1. ali computer Professionals to recognize the disastrous potential of 
computer vimses; 
2. ali computer educators to impress upon their students the dangers 
of virus programs. 
3. all publishers to refrain from publication of the details of actual 
virus programs; 
We see a very good suggestion as to how we may begin to positively influence students 
and young people. We can observe how this has been seen to work in the past by looking 
at the issue of drinking and driving. At one point in time, drinking and driving was a 
personal issue. As we as a society began to see some of the consequences of this 
interaction, we began to pass laws which restricted the such behaviour. There was some 
resistance to this type of law initially, which people saw as an infringement on their right 
to drink alcohol and drive their vehicles. However, as the law became more widely 
accepted, people began to refuse to drink and drive on the principie that it is wrong' to 
do. Policymakers and lawmakers are very aware of this form of societal control. 
However, they are often not very aware of the societal structure of 'cyberspace', and for 
this reason there is the danger that laws they make will not créate the desired ethical 
model, but will instead créate a backlash or revolutionary movement against the society. 
By continuing to take time to develop realistic policies and effective laws, it is possible 
we can avoid such a backlash. 
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6.2 Ethical considerations 
The ethical approach to addressing these concerns is one worth further consideratioñ. 
What role does ethics currently play in our computing environments? What role, if any, 
should it play? Ethics is quite the 'in' word, and is often promoted as the be-all and end-
all solution to all the problems we face dealing with virus and malicious software 
distribution. Ethics, however, cannot and should not be seen as a 'behaviour regulator'. It 
is not a drug one can forcé down someone's throat, and cure them of their "disease". If we 
are to use ethics to help us to solve some of the problems discussed in this paper, where 
and how should we begin? There are several áreas of immediate concern. 
Commonly, ethics is promoted, if at all, in our computing environments as something 
related to individual action. While ethics certainly can be important in matters of our 
interpersonal actions and subsequently on our actions as they impact the society, we seem 
to ignore the issues of ethical evaluation of institutions (Ladd, 93). 
Questions related to distributive justice (here, I refer to rights in the sense of both 
negative and positive rights; specifically, what can I expect to do free from any 
infringement from government or individuáis, and what duty does my society have to 
provide me with access, freedoms, security, development and distribution of resources), 
and other ethics of management are worthy of consideratioñ. 
There have been voices calling for more clearly defined professional ethics and more 
involvement of professional societies in defining and promoting 'professional ethics'. 
Considering ethics is by nature a reflective, criticai field, it would seem that while ethical 
norms may be documented, to assume we can arrive at some 'ethical statement of 
principie' is somewhat unrealistic. Ethics are not laws, mies, policies or agreements. It is 
not something one can put on from the outside. Of course, ethics can and should play a 
role in création of codes of conduci. Such codes of conduci are necessary and important 
tools in imparting behavioural guidelines to others [Forrester, Morrison 94]. We must be 
careful not to confuse codes of conduci, which are based on ethical principies, with ethics 
themselves. If we do not take care, we are subject to a slippery slope where we may 
believe that we are somehow 'above' the ethical principies we apply to others. This can 
create a hypocrisy which only exacerbâtes the problems that are created by other factors, 
as outlined in this paper. The development of codes of behaviour is often looked to as one 
ethical solution. This may be a factor in showing individuáis what is acceptable, but 
cannot be viewed as a method for instilling ethical behaviour in any group. 
Another concern is what type of "ethics" should we look to for help in understanding and 
solving the problems of malicious program distribution. Is it the ethical theory itself that 
we must reintegrate into the educational system? According to the ACM/IEEE-CS 
Curriculum Task Force, undergraduate programs need to "prepare students to understand 
the field of computing both as an académie discipline and as a profession within the 
context of a larger society". One of the main goals is cited as exposing students to the 
"ethical and societal issues that are associated with the computing field." The question of 
whether this instmetion should consist of ethical theory or application is prominent. One 
school of thought is that we need to teach ethical applications now, before the problem 
gets any worse. Another view is that teaching ethical theory will allow us to develop 
ethical applications which will continue to develop as the technology develops. 
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7. Conclusion 
When a new technology emerges , a paradigm associated with that technology appears or 
is borrowed from an associated technology. As the technology develops towards 
maturity, the paradigm shapes its development. At certain points, it becomes apparent 
that the paradigm is no longer appropriate, and a paradigm shift occurs. Typically this is 
first seen as an outlandish if not heretical move by some maverick individuai. But if the 
shift is appropriate, it becomes adopted by the scientific community, and then serves to 
shape or even control the further development of the technology. Without such paradigm 
shifts, the technology may become stagnated, or even dangerously out of touch with its 
aims and the society around it. Computer science is no exception. 
I have argued above that we are now at the point where a significant paradigm shift is 
necessary in this area. The speed with which global electronic communication is 
developing has brought with it an enormous benefit to ali those fortunate enough to be 
able to exploit it. It has also brought opportunities to those who are willing to abuse it. 
The way in which it has introduced relative and absolute anonymity to its users itself may 
encourage acts which would otherwise have appeared to be too risky to the perpetrator. 
That is, its very nature may encourage various kinds of antisocial activities, ranging from 
innocent pranks through serious malicious damage to data and individuáis to downright 
criminal fraud. The speed and power of the technology itself enables these activities to 
take place, and encourages them. Since its principie users are relatively young, and may 
be impressionable or unprincipled, an ethos has developed in which it is 'cool* to be an 
outlaw. Moreover, the inherent power embodied in being able to control the "system1 is 
itself potentially irresistibly attractive. 
It is natural, given the way that societies tend to develop, that antisocial or otherwise 
undesirable activities lead to legislation against them, designed to contain or eradicate 
them. This is the point we have reached with such excesses on the Internet. This is the 
current paradigm of control, and the one that is influencing the development of the 
technology. However, legislation is notorious for not solving the problems it is designed 
to deal with. A paradigm shift is now necessary, both in the way the technology develops 
further and in the way that malicious activities associated with it are combatted. The 
problem of internet abuse carmot be solved by trying to legislate it out of existence. It is 
necessary to promote an ethical approach to computing. This itself requires there to be an 
ethical model of developing computer science. The paradigm for this technology can no 
longer be determined purely along scientifíc Unes. Introducing ethics into the way the 
technology is used will help to instill appropriate ethics in the users of the technology, 
and thus to reduce the numbers of abusers. If this program is successful, it will soon 
sound outdated and even 'lame' to say "it's ok to do it if it isn't ¡Ilegal", just as it has 
become 'uncool' to drink and drive; not merely illegal, but unethical, and not the sort of 
thing that enchances the image and status of a potential role model. 
We cannot elimínate the social aspects of malicious computer program development and 
distribution through solely legal means, or through solely technical means. We can look 
to technology for detection in some cases, and to law for prosecution or relief in some 
cases. In all cases, resources to enable us to emphasise and intégrate ethical computing 
behaviours in all áreas — not just in áreas relating to vimses and hacking may provide a 
stablizing influence. Our computing environments are very vulnerable regarding 
distribution of information — after all, it is what they were designed to do. I suggest that 
we need to focus somewhat more on what we were designed to do: to behave as rational 
self-policing beings and to impart this ethical model to people leaming the technology. 
Without the proper interaction of laws, education and ethical development, there is a very 
real risk that this technology will soon become unusable and ultimately self-destructive. 
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Footnotes 
1. Solomon model: In the Solomon model, the rate of new infections is proportional 
to the number of infected PCs, to the number of uninfected PCs and to the 
probability of infection. The rate of infections being eradicated is proportional to 
the number of infected PCs, and to the probability of detection. 
2. A list of vimses distributed with commercial software, compiled from VIRUS-L, 
RISK.S-FORUM and other public sources, identifies vims infections transmitted 
through either commercial or government entities in which the distributor would 
generally have been considered to be a "reputable source". Incidents which were 
unwilling to fully disclose, or incidents in which the source of the infection was 
unsure were omitted. This list was obtained from Wallace Haie of the PCVRF. It 
is noted that any addition information may be requested from, or forwarded to 
cmcdonal@wsnir-ernh34.arrny.mil. 
3. "The resolution was formulated by the chairman of IFIPs Technical Committee 
TC-11 'Computer Security', Professor William J. Caelli, of Queensland 
University, Brisbane/Australia, and the chairman-elect of IFIPs TC-9 "Computer 
and Society*, Prof. Klaus Bruruistein of Hamburg University. IFIP General 
assembly asked the président, Ashley Goldsworthy, to inform all member 
societies and to ask the governments to take proper actions." (Used with 
permission) 
I am grateful to Tim Martin, Jon David, and Harold Highland for their commenta on an 
earlier draft. They are not responsible for any errors or ommissions. 
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Abstract 
This paper presents four case studies of individuals involved in vims writing. The 
research was conducted by using surveys, and by conducting interviews via e-mail 
(electronic mail), electronic chat and in-person sessions. Ethnographic and demographic 
data were collected, as well as information relating to how the individuals view their 
relationships to their peers and to society in general. Some data relating to cognitive 
reasoning abilities was collected. This data was used to examine the individuals' moral 
development in light of ethical and moral developmental models based on the research of 
Lawrence Kohlberg. Gender based issues in vims writing are examined using the model 
developed by Gilligan [1]. 
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Introduction 
In any area of scientific investigation, there is the danger of overgeneralisation and 
stereotyping. In the case of virus writers, one manifestation of this danger is that of 
assuming that there is some homogeneous group of people who write viruses, and that it 
is possible to talk about the psychology of'the' virus writer. In reality, there are différent 
types of virus writers, each with his own nature, circumstances, skills and ambitions. This 
paper will not attempt to be ali-inclusive; it will exami ne three 'types' of virus writers by 
using case studies of individuate who fit into thèse catégories: 
(a) the young adolescent individuai 
(b) the college student 
(e) the adult/professionally employed individuai. 
We will try to shed some light on the différences in their make-up, and thus to assess the 
différence in the nature of any danger posed by each of them. If the virus writing 
population is not as homogeneous as some may assume it is, then monolithic solutions to 
'the problem' (such as blanket or overkill législation, certain forms of ethical solutions) 
may well be much less effective than is being assumed in certain quarters. We will 
observe différences in how they think, how they operate, and in how they view the rest of 
the world. 
We will also look at the ways in which people may progress through thèse classes. This 
progression will lead us to a fourth category: 
{d) the mature reformed ex-writer of viruses. 
While the last category is often ignored (since the apparent threat is gone) it needs to be 
considered with as much care as the other three types. Not only are people of this fourth 
category potentially very skilled technically in the defence of cyberspace against 
members of the other three catégories, but they also represent the kind of people into 
which we hope members of the other three catégories will develop. 
The virus writer has been characterized by some as a bad, evil, depraved, maniac; 
terrorist, technopathic, genius gone mad, sociopath. This image has been heightened not 
only by the media, but by the some of the actions of the virus writers themselves. Public 
communications from the writers, in the form of echo-mail messages, often seem to 
indicate they are intent on doing as much damage as humanly possible. Their electronic 
publications have in the past reinforced this, and the very fact that they release viruses 
may seem to confirm it: thèse people are bad. This paper argues that this is a gross 
oversimplification of the situation, and that the virus writing aspect of thèse individuate is 
not sufficient to characterize them into one group simply labelled 'unethical people'. 
We will show that virus writers are not all the same as each other as far as their stages of 
ethical and moral development; we will show that some virus writers are within normal 
ethical developmental model ranges as defined by Lawrence Kohlberg's model of moral 
development [2]. 
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The Generic Virus Writer 
Stereotyping is pervasive. It is especially prévalent when a new kind of entity émerges, or 
a new kind of person. As there is little reliable information about such new kinds of 
people, differentiating between them is difficult. Thus, there is a tendency to assume not 
only that there is some stéréotype, but also that anyone who can be classified as 
belonging to the newly perceived group is to ail intents and purposes like ail the other 
members of that group. This often happens when the newly émergent group is primarily 
composed of young people. 
Moreover, such stereotyping is often accompanied by generalised value judgements. In 
the case of vims writers, a common assumption is that they are ail bad. While it is 
certainly tme that the distribution of malicious software is a bad act, and that many vims 
writers are motivated by bad or even criminal intentions and desires, it is dangerous to 
assume that this is tme of every person who ever writes a program that can be classified 
as a vims. The problem of dealing with the danger posed by the distribution of malicious 
software is not simplified by failing to recognise that the people who write viruses do not 
form a homogeneous group. They are a diverse group. If we are to address the problem, 
we must first recognise its tme nature. We must discover how différent vims writers 
operate, and how they are as people. To this end, we will examine similarities and 
différences of four individuals involved in the vims writing culture. 
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Ethics is sometimes promoted as one solution to the problem of people writing viruses. 
To explore what part ethics may play in virus writing, we will examine four vims writers 
using a model of ethical/moral development as a base for comparison. We chose to use a 
model of ethical development that was universal and longitudinal. Vims writers corne 
from diverse cultures, so the use of a universal model is désirable. We chose Kohlberg's 
model for its universal characteristics. The research done by Kohlberg was not only 
cross-cultural but longitudinal; it was performed over a time period of 12 years. Based on 
this research, he designed a six-step ethical classification model, which shows a fixed 
séquence of changing responses with increasing age. It has been shown to be based on 
experimental and longitudinal évidence, and is based on 'methods of thinking' rather than 
Ethical models 
individuai actions or décisions [3]. 
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Kohlberg's model 
Kohlberg's ethical model provides age trends in three moral levels of development, with 
two stages within each level. These levels/stages of development are defined as: 
Level 1 : Pre-conventional morality. At this level, morals are extemal. 
• Stage 1 
The first stage consists of the punishment and obédience 
orientation (i.e. there are no real rules; the seriousness ofa 
*bad' act dépends on the conséquence of the act). This stage 
is sometimes referred to as the punishment orientation 
stage. 'Right' is being obedient to power and avoiding 
punishment at ali costs. 
• Stage 2 
In stage two, instrumental orientation surfaces (being good 
to get a reward or satisfy a need). In Kohlberg's study, 80 
percent of moral judgements of ten year-olds are in this 
category. This stage is sometimes called the naive reward 
orientation stage. 'Right' behaviours include taking 
responsibility for oneself, and letting others take 
responsibility for themselves. 
Level 2: Conventional morality. Parents, social groups and peers play a large role of 
influence at this level. Being 'good' is important. Rules may appear 'internaiized', but they 
may be intemalized to avoid punishment or to gain the approvai of others. 
• Stage 3 
In the third stage of development, actions are judged on the 
merit of their intent. A person has to be able to recognize 
the point of view of others to progress into this stage. This 
stage can be referred to as the good-boy/good-girl 
orientation. 'Right' is having a right motive, and a concem 
for others. 
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Stage 4 
In the fourth stage, one 'accepts authority', not only because 
of the possibility of punishment, but out of a sense of duty 
to obey rules and maintain social order. This stage 
represents authority orientation. The rules of a society are 
important in this state: 'Right' is keeping the rules of the 
society. 
Level 3: Post-conventional morality. Self-accepted moral principles are the mark of this 
level. In stage fìve and six, morals are internalized. The stages in level three involve 
development of personal codes of ethics. 
• Stage 5 
Judgements become more flexible in stage Ave. Rules must 
be impartial, and 'The Welfare of the Many' becomes 
paramount. This stage is sometimes referred to as the 
social-contract orientation stage. 'Right' is keeping the 
contract. 
• Stage 6 
In stage six, the individuai defines right and wrong on the 
basis of his/her own ethical principles. Normative ethics, 
based on self-chosen principles are applied in ali situations. 
This form of development is consistent with the ability to 
perform formal opérations (the highest level of cognitive 
development) [4]. This stage represents the morality of 
conscience. 'Right' is an obligation to the universal 
principles of equality, justice and respect for persons. 
[Stage 6 may be viewed as a hypothetical constmct as no group seems 
consistently able to fit in this slot; in fact, this state is often eliminated 
from some versions of the model. It is however, a désirable stage, and it is 
possible for some people to function at this level some of the time.] 
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Gender Issues 
While Kohlberg's model is well suited for the purposes of this study, the Gilligan model 
can be helpful in addressing gender issues of virus writing from the standpoint of ethical 
development. 
In conversations with dozens of individuate involved in the virus writing culture, we have 
found only two instances of'direct' female involvement. One was the girlfriend of a virus 
writer, and one was a woman who was involved with the virus writing group NuKE. 
However, it is uncertain as to whether or not she ever produced any viruses. According to 
Gilligan, females progress through différent states of moral reasoning. 'Females are 
socialized to equate 'goodness' with self-sacrifice more than are males' [1], Gilligan's 
three stages of moral development are described in the next section. 
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Gilligan's model 
• Stage 1 
S elf-interest. At this stage the needs of others are ignored. 
• Stage 2 
Self-s acri fi ce. At this stage, women sacrifice their own 
needs/desires for the well-being of others. 
• Stage 3 
Non-violence, mature thinking; compassion and universal 
good. 
Gilligan states that while male and female children go through stages of being subject to 
parental authority and then peer pressure (where right and wrong are determined by the 
groups they belong to), females do not progress through the utilitarian and deontological 
stages. Instead, they view moral décisions in terms of human interdependency and needs 
as well as justice and rights. Females involved in the vims writing culture are typically 
treated as inferior by a disproportionate number of members of the culture. Sexual slurs 
and harassment are common. Women in this culture do not appear to be able to pursue 
their goals independently of men. There appears to be little attention to concepts of 
equality, or even a pseudo-equali ty. 
While there are opponents to her theory [5, 6, 7], we propose it would help partially 
explain the marked absence of female vims writers. 
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Methodology 
While we had access to a varied population of virus writers, and the opportunity to draw 
a sample from the population, the measurement of the sample proved to be extremely 
complex. Rather than use computed descriptive statistics to make only inferences about 
the similarities within the population, we also chose to examine the différences by using 
case studies. 
We have adopted an inductive approach so that we can leam who the 'generic virus 
writer' might be by observing instances of actual virus writers. We believe this is a more 
sound approach than trying to produce a characteristic profile to which actual writers can 
later be matched. We wished to avoid making many assumptions about what might or 
might not be in such a characteristic profile until we had examined some real cases. 
The virus writing community is relatively small in comparison with other underground 
communities such as the hacking and phreaking communities. There is no way to define 
the population exactly; however, if we consider viruses that are known to exist, we can 
estimate there could be at most 4500 virus writers, if one person wrote each virus. We 
know that more than a few of the viruses are written by the same person. For instance, 
there are a number of viruses that are known to have been written by someone calling 
himself Dark Avenger; so, not each of the viruses we know may have an individuai 
author. 
When we look at the viruses 'in the wild' as opposed to research viruses or viruses which 
are only sent to product development companies for inclusion in virus scanners, we find 
approximately 150 examples. Of those, if we estimate 100 as by différent individuals, the 
responses we gathered would constitute response by approximately half the writers of 
viruses 'in the wild'. Of course, we have no way of knowing exactly who wrote what, or if 
ali of our respondents actually did write the viruses they claim. It is quite possible that 
there were respondents who merely wished to participate, or who in fact deliberately 
wished to bias or discredit this study. However, we do know that of our four case studies, 
every one of them has authored viruses that have appeared in the wild. 
We distributed the survey directly to 47 virus writers known to us. From those 47, we 
received 18 individuai responses to the survey, which was distributed to underground 
bulletin boards in the United States, Germany, Australia, Switzerland, Holland, and South 
America. In addition to the 18 responses we received to the survey directly, we talked to 
an additional 43 individuals involved in the virus writing culture who did not wish to 
complete the surveys, but who consented to talk about their motivations and historiés. We 
received 3 negative (hostile) responses. Total responses: 64. 
The confidential survey (Appendix 1) was comprised of questions including requests for 
information on social interactions with peers, relationships with parents and other 
authority figures, as well as exercises in cognitive reasoning. We were concemed 
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primarily with the methods of thinking used as opposed to the 'right' answers. The actual 
answers were not as important as the reasons given for the answers. Other questions 
concerned âge, employment and educational history. Questions were asked to provide us 
with data regarding the respondents relationships with parents and peers. The response to 
thèse questions enabled us to see how the individuai considers himself to 'fit in' in both 
his immediate society and society in general. We also asked questions about conflict 
resolution to enable us to see what processes the individuai uses to solve problems 
involving other people. 
In order to illustrate reasoning abilities, the following questions were asked: 
1. You have four coloured placoloured plates: Red, Blue, Yellow, ae, ease teli me ali 
possible color combinations. 
2. What number is 30 less than 3 times itself. When you answer this, please write (or 
type) for me each step of reasoning you used to arrive at your answer. 
The responses to the thèse types of questions provide a window into the reasoning 
abilities of the individuai. Reasoning abilities have been shown to related to moral 
development [4]. We asked the respondents to tell us not only the 'answer' but to describe 
for us how they obtained the answer. 
We included the classic scenario used by Kohlberg when studying the ethical 
development of individuals: 
Read and consider carefully the following scenario. 
In Europe, a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There 
was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of 
radium that a pharmacist in the same town had recently discovered. The 
drug was expensive to make, but the pharmacist was charging $2000, or 
10 times the cost of the drug, for a small possibly life-saving) dose. Heinz, 
the sick woman's husband, borrowed ali the money he could, about $1000, 
or half of what he needed. He told the pharmacist that his wife was dying 
and asked him to seil the drug cheaper, or to let him pay later. The 
pharmacist replied, *No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make 
money from it.' Heinz then became desperate and broke into the store to 
steal the drug for his wife. 
Should Heinz have done that? 
Now that you have read it, and considered it, please résolve the moral 
dilemma. That is, what are the problems in the story? What problems does 
each person have to deal with? Who is wrong, right, and why? 
When you write your response, please include the following points: 
Should Heinz be punished for stealing the drug? Did the pharmacist have 
the tight to charge so much? Would it be proper to charge the pharmacist 
with murder? If so, should his punishment be greater if the woman who 
died was an important persoti? What would you have done if you were 
Heinz? 
We intended the questionnaire to provide information directly as well as indirectly, as we 
did not want to make too many initial assumptions. 
We received very detailed responses to the questions. For example, to our question 
'Which number is 30 less than 3 times itself?' we received detailed accounts of the 
process by which the conclusion was derived. One respondent stated he arrived at this 
answer by substituting one number after another until one worked. Another respondent 
provided us with an algebraic équation. 
x = the number in question,-
x = 3x - 30 
0 = 2x -30 
-2x = -30 
x = 15 
So the answer is 15." 
Proof: 
15 x 3 = 45 
45 - 30 = 15 
15 = 15 
(reflexive property I think) 
The différences in the responses illustrate the différence in the cognitive reasoning 
abilities of the individuals which in turn correlate to the level of moral development as 
proven by Kohlberg. According to former research by Carol Tomlinson-Keasey and 
Charles Keasey [8] and Deanna Kuhn [9], individuals who demonstrate at least some 
formai operational skills on cognitive tests have necessary skills for development of 
posteonditional morality. 
To develop the case studies, we exchanged electronic mail with some of the respondents 
following collection of the survey data. Thèse interviews used both structured and 
unstructured formats. We talked with some respondents electronically using Internet 
Relay Chat, and the UNIX 'talk' command. Some of the respondents telephoned us 
directly. We conducted interviews with some subjects in person. In some cases, where the 
identity of the subject was totally unknown and he did not wish to be identified via mail 
or talk sessions where we could netstat him, we arranged for him to login to IRC via an 
anonymous host. We then talked on IRC in a private channel. 
Thèse interviews provided us a more detailed insight into the life history of the 
individuate who had consented to be case studies. 
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Virus Writers 
We will attempt to provide a broad classification of virus writers according to a number 
of parameters. Our intention is not merely to provide an abstract schema of how such a 
group might be differentiated, but to see how actual virus writers may differ. In 
particular, we are interested in trying to establish how virus writers develop and progress 
from early beginnings to whatever it is they end up doing. To this end, we will examine 
four cases studies conducted recently. These case studies are ali of people who have at 
some time written a virus. However, as will become apparent, each of these people is 
very différent from the others. By examining these différences, we hope to shed some 
tight on the notion of the 'generic' virus writer, and to ask whether or not such a concept 
is valid or useful. 
The four initial catégories we chose can be described as follows: 
• The Adolescent 
Virus writer aged 13-17; has written at least one computer 
virus; has distributed at least one computer virus into the 
wild. 
• The College Srudent 
Virus writer aged 18-24; has written at least one computer 
virus; has distributed at least one computer virus into the 
wild. Student in university or university level classes. 
• The Adult/Professionally Employed 
Post-college or adult, professionally employed; has written 
at least one vims; has distributed at least one vims into the 
wild. 
• The Ex-Vims Writer 
Vims writer who has written and distributed one or more 
computer vimses. The vimses must have been found in the 
wild; the author must have supplied sufficient proof to 
enable détermination that he did indeed write the vims; 
I o 
there must be no évidence that he has written or continued 
to write viruses for a period of at least 6 months prior to 
commencement of this research. 
The individuate who were chosen as case studies were taken from the sélection of virus 
writers in their respective groups. We note that in each group, while the ethnographie 
data varies, the responses to questions related to ethical development and cognitive 
reasoning remained constant between the individuate we selected and the others in their 
group. 
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The Adolescent 
The case study selected is a 16 year-old unemployed male high school Student. He states 
he is one of three children, and lives with both parents in what is considered an upper-
middle-class home. He describes his relationships with his friends as daily interactions. 
He does not express an interest in sports. He has no formai ethical éducation. He states 
his friends are very self-contradictory, and that they argue frequently. The arguments 
appear to be of a philosophical nature; what is worthwhile, what is valid, what is 
reasonable. He displays a strong conviction against racism, and bias. He describes his 
friends as having no morate. He states he does not play computer games other than a 
game that came with Windows. His responses to methods of conflict resolution are 
unclear. His response to ethical reasoning dilemmas fall in the range of stage 2, 
instmmental orientation/hedonism. For instance, one of his responses to whether or not it 
was OK. for Heinz to steal the dmg was 'Yes. It was for a good cause'. He states that 
destructive code is unethical, and that he has never researched a virus by his own 
définition of'research'. He still writes vimses, and his vimses have been found in the 
wild. When asked how he feit regarding his vimses that have been in the wild, he 
responded: 
Generally, I feel almost sorry for the people who are infected with my 
vimses. I believe only three or four of my twenty some odd viruses have 
been found in the wild. The rest were distributed via underground bulletin 
board Systems. 
One of the vimses, xxxxx,xxx (named by F-Prot), was found on a CD-
ROM entitled (name deleted). I'm not exactly sure how it got there, but I 
know for certain it originated on Canada Remote Systems On-line located 
in Toronto. The bait file was probably uploaded to that bulletin board by a 
local vims enthusiast. 
Conversations with this individuai indicated that he has a respect for his parents and for 
authority to some degree. He demonstrates in his communications a knowledge of what is 
\ \ 
right and what is wrong, and expresses that things that are illegal are wrong. He indicates 
that he does not favour destructive viruses, yet seems to not have any problem with his 
own position of having released viruses into the wild. He is respectftil to other people, 
and tends to be a leader in group situations. 
His responses and electronic communication were at ali times very polite, respectful and 
thoughtful. 
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The College Student 
The case study selected is that of an 18 year-old vims writer. The subject is unemployed 
and living on his own. He grew up with one sister in a moderately well-to-do family. He 
enjoys martial arts and has practised them for several years. He describes his 
relationships with his friends as close, and open. He states his relationships with women 
are good, and that he spends time daily with his girlfriend. His relationship with his 
parents is described as very good, with the normal disagreements. Conflict resolution on 
the part of this person is conciliatory and mature. He states that he values the diversities 
that his friends possess. When asked about the influence of others on his life, he 
responded, 'In vims writing, I respect such authors as Dark Angel and Masud Kafìr not 
only for their technical prograrnming skills, but also for the fact that their major vimses 
are not destructive'. He indicates that while he recognizes using pirated software is not 
right, he occasionally uses pirated software: he buys software when he can afford it. 
While he used to play computer games, he claims he now no longer has time. 
His ethical background consists of study of Kant, Mill and Aristotle. He states he feeìs he 
is most like Mill, in that one should be able to have as much freedom as possible without 
harming another. He states he knows he fails at this sometimes. His responses to ethical 
dilemma questions were at level 4, which would place him at slightly higher than average 
position according to Kohlberg's model. 
I feel that yes, Heinz should steal the drug as it will save his wife (this 
would be my first priority) if there is no other way to get it, he is in the 
wrong legally and should be punished if caught. 
He defines virus research as a search for tmth/facts, objective séries of tests. He states 
some 'researchers' are actually merely collectors who seil their viruses for profit, 
monetary or otherwise. Where and to whom the vimses go is named as one ethical issue. 
The possibility of release, as well as destruction/use appears as another issue. He cites 
money for vimses and/or anti-viral software as a grey area. 
He states he began writing viruses at the âge of approximately 15 when he found the 
Stoned vims. He became compétent at assembler and has written vimses in the past three 
years. He writes viruses for text publication as well. 
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The Adult (1) 
[ (1) Adult males are typically at stage 4 and sometimes 5 [10, 2]. The 
adults surveyed/observed did not demonstrate five or six at any time of ethical 
development, unlike some of Kohlberg's subjects. ] 
The adult case study is a single male, who describes himself as living with a ladyfriend. 
His income is listed in the middle-income range; he is professionally employed. He is one 
of four children, and has completed high school, with some college. He states the 
majority of his friends are female. He describes his relationship with his parents as very 
good. His relationships with friends are described as social interactions of a casual nature. 
Conflict resolution is addressed in terms of power issues. He indicates hypocrisy and 
unethical actions as stimuli for provoking him to anger. For instance: 
District Attorney crusades against pornography at election time, has 
bookstore operator or adult BBS operator arrested, confiscates/destroys 
merchandise/money/equipment but does not pursue the case. Gets re­
elected somehow. 
He states his friends do not care much about morals. He states he plays computer games 
perhaps 4-5 hours per week, if that much. 
He states he does not use pirated software. The responses to cognitive reasoning 
questions, and to questions regarding ethical dilemmas place him at stage four, where 
obligation to law is above special interests. He describes vims writing as a pointless 
exercise. It is not certain whether he has continued to write vimses, although he has 
stated he does not really enjoy programming. He stated he thought programming would 
get him a good job, which it did not. This individual is involved in vims distribution, 
which he states is 'not illegal'. 
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The Ex-virus Writer 
The ex-vims writer is a college student; the only child of an upper class family, raised in 
an atmosphere where academic performance was greatly valued. He has never been 
formally employed, but has worked as a volunteer at a library (shelving books), and as a 
volunteer at a hospital where his job was to help handicapped/geriatric patients. He states 
he was active in track, and describes his relationship with his girlfriend as good. 
However, he states he did not have a girlfriend until his last year of high school, as he 
was by his own définition, 'shy'. His narration of his peer relationships and interactions 
closely mirror those of the teen virus writer; he states his friends do not have morals that 
are very developed for the most part: '..most of my friends have not had a reason to 
question the morals they have been brought up with, so they have not fully examined 
their morals. Then again, neither have I, although I am trying to do so now'. His 
relationship with his parents is described as 'not good'. He described them as controlling 
individuate who were performance-motivated. 
He addresses conflict resolution logically; problems are identifìed, then solved. He does 
not tolerate hypocrisy. Throughout our conversation, which was conducted in person, he 
frequently questioned his own morals and values. He stated that he did not 'think about if 
(the morality of releasing or writing viruses) when he was actually doing it. I asked him 
specifically if his viruses were destructive. He stated 'They can't be!'. Like the teen and 
college student profiled earlier, he expressed a marked dislike for destructive code. He 
began writing viruses out of curiosity. He stated he quit because he did not have any time 
for it. He states he sees himself as somewhat 'obsessive', although his virus writing did 
not take a lot of his time. He states he does not use copyrighted software and does not 
play computer games any more (he used to play them but they became too big to run on 
his computer). He defmes research as follows: 
Doing significant work towards meaningful results in a field. Running 
scanners is not research. Compiling test results is not research. 
Disassembling viruses is not research. Writing a new scanner is not 
research. Examining the behaviour of viruses and their conséquences is 
research. Developing and implementing new techniques of detection and 
cleaning is research. Classifying viruses in a reasonable fashion is not 
research, but it is meaningful science. 
He states he cannot say virus writing is ethical, nor can he state it is unethical, as 
there is some degree of that (lack of ethics), but I usuai don't think of it as 
an ethical issue. I recognize that there is a degree of irresponsibility 
associated with most virus writing. 
He gave the following reason for deciding to stop writing viruses: 
I decided to stop primarily because I no longer have the time to write. My 
productivity in writing viruses was directly proportional to my level of 
boredom. I contend that my real-world impact is low. None of my vimses 
are common in the wild and I have given nobody any information that 
they couldn't have figured out on their own. My philosophy has always led 
me to create vimses designed to be non-destructive and I don't intend for 
anyone to be hassled with one of my vimses. It's a hobby, and I just don't 
have time for it anymore. I've also gotten bored with viruses; they're 
interesting for a while, but then there isn't much more to do with them. I 
really don't know what significantly more interesting stuff there is to do 
with viruses. 
He made the following suggestion for stopping viruses from being written/distributed: 
Demystify them. If you want people to stop, demystify them. All that will 
be left then are malicious people, and you can deal with them. 
He stated he quit because he simply had too many other things to do. He also indicated 
that he did not want to carry the 'stigma' of writing vimses, and that had he realised 
earlier (the conséquences), he would have been smarter. His feeling was that people 
could be discouraged by démystification and 'character'. He stated that responsible 
computing should be taught very early. 
He states respect for others is important. 
People who cut me off on the road used to undergo a thorough drubbing: 
bright lights, following, later cutting off and trapping. This was before I 
realised how dangerous a game it was that I was playing. 
He states he is angered by boasting that has no foundation. 
Rock Steady is an example. I wrote an expose file on him and all his code 
that I was considering giving out, in which I trashed all his code and 
traced its origins... people should not get respect by others if they have 
nothing to back it up with. 
I had approximately 4.5 hours of interview with this individuai in the naturalistic setting, 
as well as many hours of electronic interchange and téléphone conversations. I was 
impressed with his genuine openness, intelligence, and his apparent honesty and 
thoughtfulness. His response to the survey was 13 pages of text, which we discussed at 
length. 
Using the Kohlberg model, his ethical/moral development appears to be at stages 4, and 5 
- occasionally 6, in both thought and action. This is slightly déviant as he is not at the âge 
where maies normally would exhibit thèse levels/stages. However, his responses clearly 
place him there and we have no reason to doubt them. 
He states for instance that the best reason to observe a speed limit is to prevent yourself 
from losing control of the car. His responses to the Heinz dilemma question were: 
Heinz clearly should not have stolen the drug, even though it meant his 
wife's life. However, this is based upon our society assumptions of legality 
and does not reflect my own moral view... The pharmacist has a right to 
charge a high price, but he should be morally obligated to charge an 
affordable rate... Heinz should certainly be punished for stealing the drug. 
Stealing, after all, is still stealing and it is stili a crime. There can't be any 
'exceptions' to the law for such cases; otherwise, what would distinguish 
'good' stealing from *bad' stealing? And would people think theyre doing 
'good' stealing and get punished? However, the sentence should be lenient 
to reflect the cire ums tane es. 
What do thèse case studies tell us? We see that the individuate are différent in personal 
characteristics. We see that the adolescent and college student are at developmental levels 
that would be expected for their age. We see the ex-virus writer at the stage (or above) 
one would expect someone with a mature view to have, slightly above the norm for his 
age. We see the adult at an ethical/moral development stage below what Kohlberg's 
model states is the norm. 
For purposes of comparison, we solicited control subjects who never wrote vimses. They 
were also différent in personal characteristics, and their ethical development according to 
Kohlberg's model was consistent. However, the adult control subjects placed in the 
category defined by Kohlberg as normal for their age, unlike our vims writing subject. 
This does not enable us to conclude anything, but is worth further study, to see if there is 
indeed any connection. At this time, all we have proven is that not all vims writers are the 
same, and that some virus writers are normal as far as ethical development goes for their 
âges. 
While thèse individuai case studies would indicate some of the individuate had some 
évidence of a relatively high ethical developmental stage, this does not tell us how they 
will actually act in a given situation. Ethical judgements are normative in nature. Of 
course, in real life, we often make différent décisions than we do in theory [11, 12, 13, 
14, 15]. This explains why an individuai could think it is 'wrong' to write computer 
vimses, and yet write them and still have ethical standards which generally appear to be 
normal or above normal for their age groups. According to research done by Lawrence 
Walker and his team of researchers, even when people do operate at différent levels on 
hypothetical/real life dilemmas, they use reasoning at adjacent stages on the types of 
issues [16]. The responses we received agrée with Walker's work. 
Research performed by Hugh Hartshorne and Mark May [17] provides an investigation of 
the moral character of children aged 8-16 in a variety of settings. This study also showed 
that the behaviour of a person in one situation did not predict his/her willingness to 
conduci the same behaviour in another situation. Later research performed by Nelson, 
Grinder and Mutterer [18] and Roger Burton [19] found that the aspects of morality do 
indeed become more consistent as age level increases. 
What sorts of interactions and social expériences allow a person to progress to the more 
mature levels of ethical development where their actions are more conciliatory with their 
beliefs and values? In Kohlberg's study, we see that transitive interactions consistently 
resuit in change [4], Thèse interactions, which are social expériences, facilitate moral 
growth by introducing cognitive challenge. Thèse social and verbal exchanges require 
performance of mental opérations on the reasoning abilities of ones peers. We can 
observe this form of interaction in the descriptions our collège student gave concerning 
his interaction with his peers. We see further évidence of this progression when we 
review the sort of interactions described by the ex-virus writer. This sort of exchange is 
necessary for progression to the higher levels of ethical reasoning. At a higher level of 
ethical development, individuals' ethical values and actions begin to corne closer 
together. While some don't ever get there, most do. Some even progress to higher stages, 
such as stages 5 and 6. 
Further studies conducted by Kohlberg and his associâtes have shown that the majority of 
non-criminals are classifîed in stages three and four, while a majority of criminals are 
classified in stages one and two [20]. People who obey law to avoid punishment or who 
are primarily motivated by self interest appear more likely to commit crimes than those 
who see the law as bénéficiai to ail of society. Research efforts on youth have shown that 
a significant number of déviant youth were in catégories one and two, while non 
delinquents rank higher [21]. 
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Conclusion 
Based on this research, which is by no means définitive, we have observed that virus 
writers are not a homogeneous group. They have characteristics similar to many 
populations. They vary in âge, income level, location, social/peer interaction, educational 
level, likes, dislikes and manner of communication. The ethical developmental models of 
the young adolescent and collège âge virus writers are within the norms for the âge 
groups of the individuals. From the data collected, it is uncertain what prédisposes them 
to writing and releasing computer viruses. There is only one common characteristic, and 
that is that their ethical development appears to be within established norms. This is not 
the case with the adult participant in the culture. Where adults in the control group exhibit 
level 3 stage 5 of ethical development, not one of the adult virus writing respondents 
answered any of the questions in a way that would lead us to believe he/she regularly 
functions at level 5 development. What does this mean? There are other segments of the 
population that do not function at this level, and they are not judged to be ethically 
'déficient'; however, this departure from the norm would seem to be one factor worth 
further considération. We can conclude that there is no homogeneous group to which 
'The Virus Writer' conforms. There are too many observable différences to categorize 
them into a generic construct. However, we can learn from the observations. 
In our study, différent manners of thinking were observed; différent motivations were 
observed. No one seemed to target government or military as the 'subject' of their viruses. 
In fact, with the exception of anti-virus product developers, there was no direct 'targeting' 
mentioned or implied in any of the interactions. The Enemy* was virtually non-existent to 
the teen and college Student virus writers. 'The Enemy' to the adult respondents 
consistently appeared to be 'Society'. The three ex-virus writers varied in their perception 
of 'The Enemy'. One saw the enemy as society, but seemed to feel that he could not 'win' 
this battle; one stated there was never an enemy and the third stated that the enemy was 
'within' the individuai. 
Female participation in the virus writing culture appears virtually non-existent. It is 
possible that female participation may increase, following patterns similar to female 
involvement in other forms of youth déviant behavioural models. 
There are a number of social issues which are related to what is often perceived as the 
isolated act of'computer virus writing' (used here to mean, distribution to 
unwilling/unknowing persons). Environmental and social issues including abuse of 
substances, child abuse, éducation, etc., are factors to be considered when assessing any 
juvenile crime or dysfunctional behaviours. Because of this, the multi-disciplinary or 
interdisciplinary study of this phenomenon would appear to be the one that will yield the 
most effective conclusion. 
There are some similarities between the disfunctional behaviour of distribution of 
computer viruses to unknowing/unwilling persons and forms of juvenile delinquency. 
And, as with the social phenomenon of delinquency, we do not know why some persons 
involved in this subculture become chronic 'career' offenders, beginning early and 
continuing into adulthood. We do not know what factors contribute to the continuation of 
the activity, or what factors can contribute positively to the desistance or termination of 
the activity. One theory that is often advanced is the theory of ageing out, or spontaneous 
remission. In work by Michael Gottfredson and Travis Hirschi, it is proposed that age-
crime relationships are constants: not only do chronic juvenile offenders commit less 
crime as they get older, but all persons commit less crime as they age. Therefore, 
age/crime corrélations are irrelevant to the study of crime [22, 23]. Of course, there are 
opposing views which purport that the earlier a person demonstrates antisocial 
tendencies, the longer they will continue to commit thèse acts. This sort of longitudinal 
theory deals with life-cycle of delinquency/anti-social behaviour, and attempts to 
correlate age/crime. Deterrence theory proposes that the choices young people make can 
be controlied by threat of punishment: the more severe, certain and swift the punishment, 
the more the deterrence value. Proponents of such theory support laws to impose severe 
penalties on virus writers. However, it is not certain that such stratégies work, and in fact 
they may be counterproductive. According to research published in the Journal of 
Criminal Law and Criminology, 
Little reason exists to believe that crime and delinquency can be 
eliminated merely by the fear of legal punishment alone. More evidence 
exists that fear of social disapproval and informal penalties, criticisms, and 
punishments from parents and friends may actually be a greater deterrent 
to crime than legal punishments[24]. 
Sociologist Jack Katz feels the seduction of crime is a prime motivation for anti-social 
acts [25]. Research conducted in Toronto, Canada by John Hagan and Bill McCarthy 
supports this theory, which places at least part of the cause for this behaviour on 
situational inducements [26]. Cultural deviance theory maintains that certain actions are 
performed because the individuals adhere to the value system within their own 
subculture. We can consider dealing with the persons who distribute viruses maliciously 
in the same ways as we deal with others who do what we perceive to be malicious acts. 
This includes clarifying our own positions on what constitutes malicious action; 
constraint, degree, intent, knowledge, *bad tendency' and clear and present danger. 
Return to Top 
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Windows NT. How does this product compare with the 
others in this growing field? Turn to p. 18 to find out. 
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EDITORIAL 
When Techniques Jump Fences 
t í new techniques 
are few and far 
between, but, like 
buses, they travet 
in packs ) ) 
This month's Virus Bulletin is perhaps noi its usuai self. Outwardly it appears the same, but inside, 
things are différent, for it documents not one, but two new attack techniques which have appeared in 
recent weeks and months (see p.8 for an analysis of Winword.Concept, and pp. 12-14 for information 
on the Rainbow virus). 
This situation is somcwhat analogous to the famous truism of waiting two hours for a bus, and then 
having three come along at once. New techniques are few and far between, but, like buses, they 
travel in packs. 
A fairly good working définition of the expression 'new technique' is one which forces anti-virus 
manufacturéis to make some design change to their producís. A new Polymorphie file infector does 
not, thèse days, meet this criterion - the vasi majority are very similar, contain nothing new, and 
(once the producers have updated the virus databases of their products) présent no great problem. 
Both Winword.Concept and Rainbow meet this criterion, and so will (or should!) provoke some 
thought from anti-virus producers. Winword.Concept may induce concerns about whether or not to 
scan Microsoft Word files (.DOC and .DOT) - this in itself introduces a world of problems, as the 
formats of such files are non-obvious. However, Rainbow, which prevents a clean boot, appears to 
be the more awkward of the two. 
The concept of clean booting before attempting to remove viruses is so fundamental to the way the 
current Systems work that a virus which consistently prevents it reliably is bound to cause problems. 
Rainbow does this on those versions of DOS which are most 'in the wild' (at least in the Western 
World) - MS-DOS v5 and above. It is quite within the realms of possibility that a site infected with 
such a virus would not have clean boot disks of a version earlier than that. 
There is a world of différence between an anti-virus product stating that you must have a clean boot 
disk in order to clean up any infection, and that same product stating that you must have a variety of 
clean boot disks containing différent versions of DOS to suit every occasion. The former is widely 
accepted, because this is how the system works - there is no real need for a product to deactivate a 
virus in memory, as a clean boot has always been the simpler course. Although the latter is much 
more annoying, it is possible that it will be the way people have to move. 
In this, as much as in anything else, it is true to say that there is very little which is truly new. The 
concept of circular partition sectors (à la Rainbow) had already been described by the early 1990s, 
and the idea of a macro virus had been described (albeit in relation to Lotus 1-2-3) even before that. 
However, thèse techniques have now crossed the barrier dividing the world of research spéculation 
from that of real viruses. 
It is interesting to note how long such a crossing has taken - the ideas have been knocked around for 
so long, and yet have taken this many years to reach the other side of the fence. Well, yes and no: 
the théories have no doubt been known amongst the virus writers for almost exactly the same length 
of time as the researchers have known about them. 
Whether or not thèse particular techniques become prévalent in the wild (either by way of the 
viruses described here, or by other viruses, developed later, which use the same ideas) remains to be 
seen. However, it does seem highly probable that more viruses using thèse techniques will appear, 
and this will only serve to highlight the need for anti-virus developers to find ways to make their 
products deal with them. 
One thing is certain - jumping up and down and panicking about the end of the computing world as 
we know it is not going to help. Neither of thèse viruses, or their techniques speli doom for the 
anti-virus industry or modem computing; they simply mean we may have to think about some things 
slightly differently from now on. 
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N E W S 
C+P+N+A+V = ? 
Spéculation on the future of Centrai Point Anti-Virus has 
risen once again, with the imminent release of Microsoft 's 
Windows 95. Central Point Software was subsumed by the 
giant conglomerate Symantec Corporation last year, and 
ever since then, industry has been discussing whether or not 
CPA V would be incorporated into the current Symantec 
product, Norton Anti- Virus (NA V). 
Fraser Hutton, a spokesman for Symantec UK, has firmly 
denied the latest round of scuttlebutt, stating that ail extant 
platforms of CPA V would, for the foreseeable future, 
continue to be maintained and supported. He did confirm, 
however, that the new Symantec anti-virus products for 
Windows NT and for Windows 95 would go under the name 
of Norton Anti-Virus, although they would incorporate some 
features currently specific to Central Point Anti-Virus. 
'Our corporate décision has been to continue to maintain 
and support Central Point Anti-Virus,' said Hutton. 'The 
product is very populär in the market-place, and has streng 
customer support. There are absolutely no plans to discon-
tinue its production.' I 
ESaSS and Reflex Announce Alliance 
Following the May agreement between Norman Data 
Defense Systems and the Dutch anti-virus software devel-
oper £5o55SF(producers of the ThunderBYTE! anti-virus 
utilities), a further collaboration has been announced 
between the UK company Reflex Magnetics (producers of 
disknet, the security package) and ESaSS. 
With immediate effect, the two companies will integrate 
their development teams and pool their technology to build 
their next generation of anti-virus and security products. 
Each company, through the agreement, gains the righi to 
market the new products throughout the world, with the 
exception of 'home territory*. 
In a press release, John Buckle, Managing Director of 
Reflex, said: 'By combining the technologies of the two 
companies, we are set to take the market by storni... 
Through tighter integration of our joint technology, ESaSS 
and Reflex are set to become the definitive providers of PC 
security solutions.' 
Dick Gehéniau, vice-président of ESaSS BV, commented: 
'This strategie alliance will translate our technological 
excellence into increased market share. This doser working 
relationship is just the beginning. Expect great things.' 
Further information on this alliance is available from ESaSS 
SK(Dick Gehéniau) on Tel +31 889 422282, or from Reflex 
Magnetics (Rae Sutton) on Tel +44 171 372 6666 I 
Virus Prevalence Table - July 1995 
Virus Inc idents (%) Repor ts 
Form 28 18 .9% 
Parity Boot 23 15.5% 
NYB 13 8 .8% 
AnüEXE 10 6.8% 
Sampo 7 4,7% 
JackRipper 7 4,7% 
Monkey.B 6 4 . 1 % 
Ant iCMOS 5 3.4% 
One_Half 5 3,4% 
Stoned.Angelina 5 3.4% 
Junkie 4 2,7% 
Viresc 4 2,7% 
Leandro 3 2,0% 
Bupt 2 1.4% 
Stoned.Manitoba 2 1.4% 
Stoned.Standard 2 1,4% 
' Other 22 14.9% 
Tota l 148 1 0 0 % 
' * The Prevalence Table indudes one repon of each of the 
following viruses: Amse, Boot.437. SheJHas. Cascade-1701. 
ExeBug.A. Flip. Jerusalem, jimi. JosN. K-Hate. LZR. 
Monkey.A. Natas, Nolnt, Rex, Stoned. Dinamo, Tequila. 
Tremor, Trojector, Vaesina. V:5igrt, and YMP. 
VB '95: Boston on the Horizon 
From 20-22 September 1995, the Fifth Annua! Virus 
Bulletin Conference will be held at the Park Plaza Hotel in 
Boston, Massachusetts. This will be the first lime this highly 
successful gathering has been held in the United States. 
The Conference key-note speaker is the highly-acclaimed 
virus researcher, Dr Harold Highland. Many experts will 
address a wide range of issues, including the susceptibility 
of NetWare, Windows NT, Windows 95 and Unix to virus 
infection, viruses on the Internet and in a corporate environ-
ment, and heuristics. 
The two-and-a-half day conférence will consist of three 
streams graded aecording to technical content, and will also 
feature an exhibition by security soft- and hardware vendors. 
The partners' programme will feature a tour of the city, and 
visits to local sites of historical significance. 
The fee for the event is £595 (USS895), and VB subscribers 
qualify for a £50 discount. Information is available from the 
conférence manager, Petra Duffield, on: 
Tel+44 1235 555139, fax +44 1235 531889 I 
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IBM PC VIRUSES (UPDATE) 
The following is a list of updates and amendments to 
the Virus Bullelin Table of Known IBM PC Viruses as 
of 21 August 1995. Each entry consists of the virus 
name, its aliases (if any) and the virus type. This is 
followed by a short description (if available) and a 
24-byte hexadecimal search pattern to detect the 
presence of the virus with a disk utility ora dedicated 
scanner which contains a user-updatable pattern library. 
Type Codes 
c I n f e c t s C O M f i l e s M I n f e c t s M a s t e r B o o t S e c t o r 
( T r a c k 0, H e a d 0, S e c t o r 1) 
D I n f e c t s D O S B o o t S e c t o r 
( l o g i c a l s e c t o r 0 o n d i s k ) N N o t . m e m o r y - r e s i d e n t 
E I n f e c t s E X E f i l e s P C o m p a n i o n v i r u s 
L L î n k v i r u s R M e m o r y - r e s i d e n t a f t e r i n f e c t i o n 
Amazon Queen.468 
Amazon Queen.479 
Amazon Queen.500 
Baba.353 
Blue Nine 
Breeder.4026 
Diddler.91 
Diddler.190 
Etaine. 1127 
Fistik 
Forget.1203 
Human Greed.666 
Istanbul.1349 
CER: An appending, 468-byte virus which installs itself in the Interrupt Vector Table. It contains the 
plain-tcxt messages: 'Amazon Queen....vl.O', 'WHY?' and 'LoRD ZerO'. 
A m a z o n Q u e e n . 4 6 8 E 8 0 0 0 0 5 D 8 1 E D 0 3 0 0 0 E 1 F 0 6 B 4 ACCD 2 1 3 C 3 0 7 5 O B 2 E 3 B 9 E D 0 0 1 
CER: An appending, 479-byte variant with the text: 'Amazon Queen...vl.l', 'WHY?' and 'LoRD ZerO'. 
The first message may be displayed if an infected program is executed and the virus is active in memory. 
A m a z o n Queen.479 0 E 1 F E 8 0 0 O 0 5 D 8 1 E D 0 5 0 0 0 6 B 4 AC C D 2 1 3 C 3 0 7 5 1 3 2 E 3 B 9 E D B 0 1 
CER: An appending, 500-byte variant with the text: 'Amazon Queen...v2.0\ 'WHY?' and 'LoRD ZerO'. 
The first message may be displayed if an infected program is executed and the virus is active in memory. 
A m a z o n Q u e e n . 5 0 0 8 1 E D 0 5 0 0 4 4 4 4 0 6 F F 8 6 F 2 0 1 B 4 AC C D 2 1 3 C 3 0 7 5 1 3 2 E 3 B 9 E F 0 0 1 
CR: An appending, 353-byte variant, named after its 'Are you there?' call: AX=BABAh; Int 21h retums 
AX=FACCh. It contains the text '=>COMMAND.COM<='. 
B a b a . 3 5 3 B F 0 0 0 1 8 1 C 6 4 6 0 1 B 9 0 4 0 0 F C F 3 A 4 5 E B 8 B A BACD 2 1 3 D CCFA 7 5 0 3 
CR: An appending 925-byte virus with stealth capabilities, which contains the plain-text message: 'Blue 
Nine Virus by Conzouler 1994'. Of the two known minor variants, B has 'NOP' instructions in its code. 
B l u e N i n e . A 5 0 B 4 3 0 B 9 9 A 0 2 C D 2 1 8 1 F 9 B C O l 7 4 6 6 3 C 0 3 7 2 6 2 8 C C 3 4 B 8 E C 3 2 6 
B l u e N i n e . B 5 0 B 4 3 0 B 9 9 A 0 2 C D 2 1 S 1 F 9 B C 0 1 7 4 6 7 3 C 0 3 7 2 6 3 8 C C 3 4 B 8 E C 3 2 6 
PR: An encrypted, 4206-byte companion virus which contains the encrypted text: 
'FileOOOO.OOO = \RENCODES.BRE' 
B r e e d e r . 4 2 0 6 8 D 3 6 1 F 0 1 8 B F E 8 D 1 6 1 F 0 1 6 D 0 E 7 D 0 A 2 B C A F C A C D 0 C 8 AAE2 F A E 9 
CNO: A simple, overwriting, 91-byte virus which infects the first file in the current directory. It contains 
the text: '*.com Diddler95 (newbee)'. 
D i d d l e r . 9 1 0ACO 7 5 2 D B 0 0 2 B A 9 E 0 0 B 4 3DCD 2 1 9 3 B 9 5 B 0 0 B A 0 0 0 1 B 4 4 0 C D 2 1 
CN: A simple, appending, 190-byte direct infector with the text: 'DiddlerfNewbie] Evolved *.c?m'. 
D i d d l e r . 1 9 0 7 2 4 2 B 4 3 F B 9 0 3 0 0 8 D 9 6 B E 0 1 C D 2 1 3 E BOBE B E 0 1 E 9 7 4 2 F 3 E 8 B 8 6 
CER: An appending, 1127-byte virus which contains the text: 'Elaine 1.0 28 May 1994'. As a payload, 
the virus hooks Int 13h (functions 03h, OBh). When active in memory, it may comipt data in the write 
buffer (random changes to the first byte in the buffer). 
E l a i n e . 1 1 2 7 B 8 1 3 3 5 C D 2 1 8 9 9 C 1 B 0 0 8 C S 4 1 D 0 0 B 8 F E 4 B C D 2 1 3 D 1 1 1 1 7 4 4 D B 8 
CER: An appending, 1280-byte (COM files) or 1536-byte (EXE files) virus cantaining the plain-text 
message 'Dnyalar Tati', displayed when the virus is active in memory and has infected five files. 
F i s t i k C F 3 D 0 0 4 B 7 4 0 5 2 E F F 2 E 3 2 0 1 2 E 8 0 3 E 3 1 0 1 0 5 7 2 0 3 E 9 0 C 0 2 2 E 8 C 
CER: An appending, 1203-byte virus which marks all infected files by putting the byte CCh at the end of 
programs. In January 1995 it displays the (normally encrypted) message: 'Forget it, I'm lazy today!'. 
F o r g e C - 1 2 0 3 F C F 3 A 4 5 E 1 F 0 6 B 8 4 D 0 0 5 0 C B B 8 4 3 F D B B 1 2 0 0 C D 2 1 3 D 1 2 5 6 7 4 1 A 
ENO: An encrypted, overwriting, 666-byte virus which infects files on drive C. The long message 
included in the virus body begins: 'That is not dead...' and ends: '...*** HUMAN GREED *•* The 
answer of ail evil on earth! Do You Belive? Farwell!'. 
H u m a n G r e e d . 6 6 6 B E 2 F 0 1 6 B 1 6 1 6 0 1 B 9 3 3 0 1 2 E 3 1 1 4 B 3 C 6 0 2 E 8 0 3 O 0 E 2 F 5 C 3 C 3 8 6 
CER: An appending, 1349-byte virus containing the text: 'Anti-Virus??Written in the city of Istanbul (c) 
1993' and 'Installed'. 
I s t a n b u l . 1 3 4 9 3 D 2 4 4 6 7 5 0 4 B 8 3 4 3 4 C F 3 D 0 0 4 B 7 4 0 2 E B 6 E 5 1 5 6 5 7 0 S 5 0 5 3 5 2 1 E 
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John 
Maresme 
Milikk 
Ohlala.1960 
OS.840 
RiP 
SillyC.140 
SillyC.190 
SillyRC.212 
SillyRC.476 
Sofia.432 
So fi 11.518 
Taurus.562 
TeaForTwo 
VCL.279 
VCL.316 
Virogen.1535 
CN: Appending, 1962-byle, direct, fast infector. It displays at random two screens of information on John 
Buchanan (better known as Aristotle). Infected files start with the plain-text message: 'Ari is a NARC. 
J o h n 8 1 B E 6 A 0 6 4 D 5 A 7 4 3 7 8 1 B E 8 D 0 B 4 1 7 2 7 4 2 F B 8 0 2 4 2 3 3 C 9 3 3 D 2 C D 
ER: An appending, 1062-byte, encrypted virus containing the text: 'Virus Maresme Show by XUTE !!!'. 
M a r e s m e 0 0 0 3 F 3 8 B F E 8 B 9 7 1 1 0 3 B 9 E 6 0 3 A C 3 2 C 2 2 A C 2 C D 0 1 A A C D 1 C E 2 F 4 
CR: An appending, 1020-byte virus with stealth capabilities, which corrupts the MBS. The virus 
remembers how often an infected file was executed and keeps the counter inside the MBS of the first hard 
disk. After 150 infections, it overwrites the boot procedure with its own code. When the system is next 
started, the text 'M I L I K K' appears in the centre of the screen. After a keystroke, the operating system 
is loaded as usual. 
M i l i k k EBOO 0 0 5 E B 8 F 4 F F B 1 E E 4 6 0 4 C D 2 1 3 D 0 B 0 0 7 5 0 3 F 9 7 2 1 8 0 E 1 F 0 E 
CEN: An encrypted, appending, 1960-byte, direct infector which infects six files at a time (three COM, 
three EXE). It contains the encrypted text: 'Ohhhh La La! Mommmmy, they are teasing me again Shut up 
you little sonsuvbitches' and "VMS *V1R.DAT COMMAND'. 
O h l a l a . 1 9 6 0 B B 0 O 0 0 2 E 8 A 0 4 2 E 3 0 8 1 2 9 0 0 2 E 8 A 8 1 2 9 0 0 8 9 F E 2 9 C 6 4 3 4 E E 2 E B 
CR: An appending, 840-byte virus which marks all infected files with the string 'OS' placed at the end of 
programs. It contains only one ASCII string: 'c:\command.com'. 
O S . 3 4 0 8 0 F C F F 7 5 0 3 B 4 F E C F 3 D 2 1 2 5 7 5 0 1 C F 3 D 0 0 4 B 7 4 0 3 E 9 A A 0 1 5 0 5 3 
CR: An appending, 3214-byte virus with the plain-text messages: '>-[RiP]-<' and 
*RADICAL_iNVADiNG_PARASiTE (RiP)-ViRUS, iN 94/95 BY AeMISc, SAYZ Hi 2 U!'. When active 
in memory, the virus infects an executed COM file and one file in the current directory. 
R i P B 9 7 F 0 0 B E 8 0 0 0 F 3 A 4 C 3 B 8 8 5 5 2 C D 2 F 3 D 0 7 0 3 7 5 0 3 E 9 F 9 0 0 B F 3 9 
CN: A simple, appending, 140-byte, fast direct infector. Unlikely to become common in the wild, since it 
spreads only under DOS 2.11 and when the Country Specifier is set to 2Eh (Sweden). 
S i l l y C . 1 4 0 8 1 E D 0 7 0 1 6 D B 6 B C 0 1 B F 0 0 0 1 5 7 A 5 A 5 B 4 3 8 C D 2 1 3 C 2 E 7 5 1 2 B 4 1 A 
CN: A simple, appending, 190-byte virus which infects one file at a time. It contains the string: '*.COM'. 
S i l l y C . 1 9 0 A 3 0 0 0 1 8 A 4 5 F C A 2 0 2 0 1 B 4 1 A 8 1 C 7 B 2 0 0 8 B D 7 C D 2 1 B 4 4 E 3 3 C 9 8 1 
CR: A simple, appending, 212-byte virus which marks all infected files by setting the last byte to OEAh. 
S i l l y R C . 2 1 2 A 5 A 4 C 3 3 D 7 7 4 2 7 5 0 1 C F 3 D 0 0 4 B 7 5 6 C 5 0 5 3 5 1 5 2 1 E B 8 8 2 3 D C D 2 1 
CR: Appending, 476-byte vims, similar to SillyRC.212. It contains the plain-text messages: 'Subconsious 
vims - Conzouler /IR 1995' and 'Mina tankar r det sista som ni tar...'. It also hooks Int 08h and displays 
for a moment every seven seconds the text: 'LOVE LOVE LOVE LOVE LOVE LOVE LOVE LOVE'. 
S i l l y R C . 4 7 6 4 F 5 6 4 5 3 D 7 7 4 2 7 5 0 1 C F 3 D 0 0 4 B 7 5 6 C 5 0 5 3 5 1 5 2 1 E B 8 B 2 3 D C D 2 1 
CR: An appending, 432-byte virus which installs itself in the Interrupt Vector Table. It contains the 
plain-text messages: 'This Virus is named after a very nice, clever and cute girl, Sofia', 'Sweden', and 
'LoR.D ZerO'. The virus creates one hidden, 7-byte long file called 'SOFIA'. 
S o f i a . 4 3 2 9 C 8 0 F C 4 B 7 4 3 B 3DBE B E 7 4 1 D 3 D 0 3 7 8 7 5 1 2 8 0 F F 1 9 7 5 0 D 8 1 F F 4 C 
CR: An appending, 528-oyte variant of the Sofia.432. It resides in the same area, contains the same 
messages and creates an identical, hidden file. It intercepts two more functions (1 lh and 12h) of Int 21 h. 
S o f i a . 5 2 8 9 C 8 0 F C 1 1 7 4 2 C 8 0 F C 1 2 7 4 2 7 8 0 F C 4 B 7 4 7 3 3 D B E B E 7 4 5 5 3 D 0 3 7 8 
CR: An appending, 562-byte virus containing the encrypted text: 'Happy New Year !' The message is 
displayed in January, every day between 2:30pm (14:30) and 3:00pm (15:00). The virus reinfects 
already-infected programs, files growing by 562 bytes with each new infection. 
T a u r u s . 5 6 2 B 8 2 1 2 5 B A C 9 0 0 1 E 0 6 1 F C D 2 1 1 F B F 1 4 0 3 3 E 8 B 0 3 4 7 4 7 3 E 8 B 1 B 4 7 
CR: An appending, 1024-byte virus containing the plain-text message 'T42 Tea for two!' at the end of 
infected programs. It was written as a multi-partite virus infecting DOS boot sectors on floppies and files. 
The copy investigated contains a minor bug, so the virus hooks Int 13h, overwriting some sectors but 
making diskettes unbootable. The bug is easy to repair, so we will probably see a fix in the near future. 
T e a F o r T w o B 8 F F 2 5 D 1 E 0 4 0 C D 2 1 B 4 2 5 D 0 E 4 B B F F F F C D 2 1 8 1 E B B 0 0 0 B 4 2 5 D 0 
CNP: A 279-byte companion virus containing the text: '[VCL_MUT] The Pleasure 2 VinjsEver have the 
pleasure?By eMpIrE-X*. 
V C L . 2 7 9 B 9 0 3 0 0 5 1 E 8 0 8 0 0 5 9 E 2 F 9 5 8 B 4 4 C C D 2 1 B A 2 C 0 1 E 8 0 7 0 0 C 3 2 A 2 E 
CNP: A 316-byte companion virus containing the text: '[VCL_MUT] The Pleasure 6 VirusEver have the 
pleasure?By eMpIrE-X'. 
V C L . 3 1 6 B 9 0 3 0 0 5 1 E 8 0 S 0 0 5 9 E 2 F 9 5 8 B 4 4 C C D 2 1 5 5 BBEC 8 3 E C 4 0 B 4 4 7 3 2 
CER: Polymorphic, appending, minor 1535-byte variant containing the encrypted text: '(c) 1993 Virogen 
ASeXual Virus vl.00'. It can be detected in memory with the pattern for variant 1520 (see VB July 1995). 
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INSIGHT 
Igor Grebert: Carpe Diem 
Igor Grebert belongs to a family whose interest in computers 
reaches back through two generations. He was bom on the 
French Riviera, and grew up in Paris, though he travelled 
extensively in Europe and the USA. 'Most of my summers,' 
he said, 'were spent on the beaches around Cannes; sailing, 
windsurfing, or fishing for sea urchins.' 
Family involvement with computers stretches back to the 
1970s: 'My uncle and my father designed their own compu-
ter called AL VAN in the early 70s. My uncle, Alain Grebert, 
headed a team of engineers in Philadelphia: they designed a 
mini-computer around a new language they had developed. 
It was the first computer I ever programmed -1 was eight.' 
This exposure led him to the TRS80 and the Apple: games 
held no interest for Grebert; he was driven to make ma-
chines do what he wanted. Later, Grebert studied at one of 
France's famous engineering schools, L'Ecole Centrale de 
Paris, where he majored in Bio-technology. His special 
interest was brain simulation: 'In my opinion, there was 
something missing in the AI field then, and I wanted to 
understand better what it was.' 
Living in America 
Grebert fulfilled his military obligations doing research into 
pattern recognition through neural networks at Stanford 
University in the US: 'I was working with Boeing; playing 
with ideas on making planes land with an improved version 
of automatic pilots using neural network techniques.' 
A few years prior to this, he had met John McAfee, who was 
at the time working on a PC voice recognition board -
Grebert was handling the application programming of the 
boards in France. This led eventually to a job offer, address-
ing user interface issues on the McAfee anti-virus product. 
'That was fun,' reminisced Grebert, 'but after a few weeks 
there, he challenged me with the Number_of_the_Beast 
virus, asking me to write a remover for it. That was the 
beginning of my involvement with PC viruses.' 
Then came 512: 'We call it the Stealth,' he said. 'It's kind of 
interesting to play with a stealth virus at first -1 was pretty 
foolish that time; I was standing there and telling him, "No, 
John, it doesn't infect, there is nothing, look at it!". That 
experience made me learn pretty quickly, and I've been 
learning constantly ever since.' 
He still remembers his first encounter with a customer virus 
problem, a Jerusalem variant which played Frère Jacques: 
'It triggered a reaction; it was a challenge. 512 was program-
ming; stuff I played with - suddenly, it was affecting 
customers, people, companies. It was only then I understood 
that what we were doing was helping -1 mean, that company 
had nothing to do with viruses; it damaged all their backups; 
made them lose time. They didn't deserve all that.' 
The World of Viruses 
Grebert has not seen anything really new for over a year 
now: 'Every new virus we see today belongs to a category 
which already exists,' he explained. 'This is a contrast to 
previous years, which makes me think that virus authors are 
running out of ideas. I believe there will be little change for 
the next year or so. Then, probably, we will see a few new 
techniques, but I do not foresee anything radically different.' 
Grebert believes that no single anti-virus technique is 
sufficient to ensure a virus-free environment. Heuristics 
alone, he believes, will not allow for detection of existing 
viruses: 'This is why we offer multiple products, and use 
multiple technologies in our scanners. I believe that we have 
already integrated the best part of heuristics in our tools and 
in our scanner, and are now fine-tuning them constantly.' 
Heuristics, in his view, have merit, but one must be cautious 
as to how they are implemented - the inherent risk is false 
alarm. The future, he feels, is in the harmonious integration 
of techniques which allow reliable and generic detection of 
viruses. He sees the best answer to polymorphic viruses as 
improving virus-specific detection to enable their detection 
and identification: 'There are simple ways,' he stated, 'to 
handle these, which are time-effective, and reliable.' 
Ethically Speaking 
Grebert has definite opinions on virus-writing: 'There is a 
dilemma between preserving the right of expression and 
protection against crimes,' he said. 'One should be allowed 
to play with such ideas as self-replicating code, as long as 
the environment is strictly controlled, but no-one should be 
able to force me to run a program I do not want to run on my 
own machines. Between the two is a fine line which the 
legal system has yet to define satisfactorily.' 
The very thought of virus-writing is alien to Grebert - his 
only contact with virus authors is through their creations. He 
has never created a self-replicating program, feeling his time 
is better spent doing other things: 'The idea of adding the 
ability to spread has never struck me as interesting,' he said. 
'If I have a message, I can use other means to convey it.' 
He professes himself disgusted by the amount of time, 
money, and effort the world has lost over viruses, and does 
his utmost to counter this, anticipating what the next threat 
might be, and preparing programs to handle them as soon as 
possible. 'To do this I do not need to write any such code,' 
he explained. T simply explore the OS internals.' 
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I g o r G r e b e r t i s a r a r i t y f o r a v i r u s r e s e a r c h e r ; h a v i n g j u s t a s 
m a n y i n t e r e s t s o u t s i d e w o r k a s i n ! 
Professional Growth 
Since 1989, Igor Grebert has worked at McAfee Associates, 
an organisation which has recently acquired many smaller 
companies. Grebert is quick to stress that acquisition played 
a much smaller role in the deals than development: 'McAfee 
is growing out of the anti-virus business towards network 
management,' he explained. 'Most of our installed base was 
in companies with networks; people trying to implement 
anti-virus policies had other problems to address - software 
distribución, application metering, remote desktop control. 
'There are many anti-virus companies around,' he contín-
ued. 'It is no longer easy to start a company with no interna-
tional presence, but new developers can still prove them-
selves. They have to do this in concert with existing compa-
nies, though, as the industry has grown so much. Writing an 
engine is still fairly easy, and ideas can easily be imple-
mented and tested, but the package is more than the engine. 
'You have to support múltiple platforms, build interfaces, 
think network, and client/server. The same thing applies to 
people who want to write a new OS... What was possible ten 
years ago is not today - but new opportunities are available 
today that did not exist then.' 
Always, at the core of Grebert's work, are viruses: 'I wanted 
to work on detection of the "weird" viruses, and... Tve 
always been obsessed with the idea of finding something 
that would allow me not to work any more. If you're a good 
programmer, you don't want to waste time, to do things two 
or three times. One thing you try to do is to automate as 
much as you can, and to make your scanners as good as 
possible, so you just push a button to detect the latest virus. 
'The technology we had did not allow us to do that - we all 
have to change some time. What keeps me going &t McAfee 
is the opportunity to change technology, and to redesign the 
scanner from the ground up. As John worked on making the 
company grow, he allowed me to take on technical leader-
ship; managing the anti-virus researchers and programmers.' 
In the Office 
Grebert is currently Manager of Research and Development 
at McAfee: 'One of many!' he laughed. 'The anti-virus stuff 
is what Tve been focusing on, but we have network manage-
ment, we have Utilities for Windows, we have a replacement 
for the shell program, and so on...' 
Grebert's brief is to find better ways to handle viruses, or to 
automate the way in which they are processed: 'We retired 
the older versión of our product, and are moving towards a 
new, more compatible versión that goes across platforms, 
that requires less work from the programmers,' he explained. 
'We don't have to rewrite the Windows or the OS/2 parts -
it's all integrated, and makes for a very easy-to-use develop-
ment platform. That was the challenge for our team.' 
There are still challenges, however - integrating his knowl-
edge of viruses to a point where the process of detection and 
removal is almost automatic: 'It's what we have to do! The 
scanner is the ultimate holder of the technology you've put 
together. We want the amount of work that has to happen to 
look at an ordinary virus to be no more than about an hour. 
'This is inside a development scheme: you receive the file, 
someone looks at it, another answers the customer: there's a 
whole process. The amount of work (granted the virus 
infects nicely) is a few hours, including removal. When it 
starts to use techniques which are a Iittle hairier, you need a 
Httle more time - but I believe this too can be automated.' 
Inside Outside 
Though Grebert admits that he was once a 'pizza-and-coke' 
programmer who routinely worked 80 hours a week, he does 
now take time out: 'I enjoy going away. Tve just come back 
from Lake Tahoe - it's only a few hours from the Bay, so it's 
somewhere to go for the weekend. When I travel on busi-
ness, I often end up spending the weekend in various cides. 
I Iike to windsurf - there are places here where I can do that.' 
There are still times when he has to work 'from sun-up to 
sun-down', but Grebert insists that this is not a healthy 
approach in the long term: 'You cannot do this for four or 
five years running and still keep your peace of mind.' 
Of course, as a Frenchman, one of Grebert's great pleasures 
in Ufe is food, from sushi to hamburgers ('But you cannot 
eat hamburgers every day!' he insisted). He enjoys cooking 
for himself and his friends, and going out to good restau-
rants: 'There are good restaurants here,' he avowed. 'You 
just have to find them, and be ready to pay the money.' 
He does miss France, however; the good food and the 
cheese (this latter he finds difficult to obtain in the USA) -
one day, he says, he wül return, but not before his work at 
McAfee is fínished. In the meantime, between skiing at Lake 
Tahoe, and having a house which, in his words, often 
resembles an intemational hotel with friends from Australia, 
Japan, and Europe always around, Igor Grebert remains a 
man who seizes every day. 
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VIRUS ANALYSIS 1 
What a (Winword.)Concept 
Sarah Gordon 
Command Software Systems Ine 
Winword. Concept is a remarkably friendly virus, which 
happily infects across platforms. Yes, that's right, 
Macintosh, MS-DOS, Windows NT - if it runs MS Word, it 
can be infected. Thus, people using mail interfaces which 
make use of the Word application can get a virus by reading 
electronic mail. The statement 'You cannot get a virus by 
reading your mail' is no longer true. You can. 
Perhaps calling the techniques used by this virus a 'new 
concept' is not totally accurate. We knew this type of 
vulnerability in a macro language would be exploited sooner 
or later. Perhaps we can consider ourselves fortunate that the 
virus has no destructive payload: its only obvious problem is 
an inability, in some cases, to save work - it could be worse. 
Apparently non-malicious in intent, Winword.Concept 
nevertheless introduces us to a new threat. In the past, we 
have seen fast infectors, polymorphics, stealth. This virus 
merely uses incredibly simple techniques to replicate and 
hide from the user, once a file is infected. 
The appearance of this virus presents anti-virus product 
developers with a challenge in implementing detection, as, 
rather than spreading by infecting more traditional types of 
'executable' code, it adds itself as a small macro to Word 
templates. This allows the virus to infect and spread utilising 
files with any extension; as long às they are in Word format. 
An Operating System by Any Other Name 
As applications become increasingly complicated, they have 
begun to resemble mini-operating systems, supporting their 
own little file system and command set. MS Word has its 
own programming language, WordBasic, which, as the name 
implies, is reminiscent of'real' BASIC. Although program­
ming with WordBasic is not described in the Word manual, 
further information can be obtained by using the on-line 
help facilities, or by ordering the MS Word Developer's Kit. 
Thus, every document has the potential to carry code which 
represents 'executable' instructions in the Word environ­
ment. However, this still doesn't explain how these instruc­
tions come to be run. After all, even if a document contains 
a set of macros, they have to be explicitly run, right? 
Wrong. 
AutoOpen = Autoinfect 
In its default configuration, whenever Word opens a 
document, it searches for the presence of a macro named 
AutoOpen and executes its contents. This is carried out 
without asking or alerting the user, and so is usually a 
completely transparent process. The user is aware only that 
he has successfully opened another document; another 
triumph of the computer age! 
In general, the AutoOpen macro will set up the working 
environment required by the document or the user. How­
ever, Word has no concept of privilege and allows the macro 
to make permanent changes to the way it functions. This is a 
powerful and useful feature, and one which is open to a 
great deal of misuse. 
In the case of Winword.Concept, the AutoOpen macro first 
checks to see if the virus is already active on this computer, 
by searching the environment for the presence of a macro 
named 'PayLoad'. If this is present, execution aborts. 
A second check is made for the presence of a macro named 
'FileSaveAs'; if found, the virus sets an internal flag, and 
again aborts infection. The internal flag used by the vims to 
signify this is called 'TooMuchTrouble', possibly indicating 
that if the user already has a macro named 'FileSaveAs', it is 
simply too much trouble to continue and infect the system. 
If these tests are passed, the virus adds four new macros to 
the user's 'global document template'. This is stored in a file 
named NORMAL.DOT, and is a general purpose template 
for any document. 
To quote from the Word manual: 'Unless you select another 
template when you create a new document, Word will base 
the document on the Normal template.' The four new 
macros are AAAZAO, AAAZFS, PayLoad and FileSaveAs 
(the contents of the FileSaveAs macro are simply copied 
from the virus' macro AAAZFS). 
The virus displays a dialog box upon infection, containing 
what appears to be an infection counter, but which displays 
the number ' 1' no matter how many infections you generate. 
On examination of the macro code, it is observed that this is 
due to sloppy programming on the virus author's part. 
Once this message box is clicked on, the virus is resident, 
and execution of its 'bootstrap' macro finishes. Once 
resident, the virus code is activated whenever the user 
attempts to save a file using 'File/Save As', as this function 
has been 'enhanced' by the addition of a FileSaveAs macro. 
Whenever the user selects this option, the virus creates an 
AutoOpen macro in the new document, and copies the 
contents of the macro AAAZAO into it. The macros 
AAAZFS, AAAZAO and PayLoad are also created and 
copied into the new document. 
Thus, the virus code is added to all those documents which 
are stored using File/Save As, and it is ready and waiting to 
spread when that document is sent to another unsuspecting 
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user. There are two things worth noting: the macro called 
'PayLoad' is never executed, and it contains only the 
following text: 
S u b M A I N 
REM T h a t ' s e n o u g h t o p r o v e m y p o i n t 
E n d S u b 
The name of this macro is not an empty threat: examination 
of the virus code and the WordBasic language shows that it 
would require a trivial alteration to make the PayLoad macro 
active and to give it a wide variety of different functions. 
Detection and Removal 
Checking whether a copy of Word already contains the virus 
is trivial. Start the program, and select the Macro option 
under the Tools menu, choosing Macros Available in 'All 
Active Templates' option. 
This displays a list of macros currently installed on the 
computer; if AAAZAO, AAAZFS, FileSaveAs, and 
PayLoad are present, the machine is infected. Highlight each 
of the virus' macros in turn and select the Delete option. 
This removes the virus, but does not solve the problem of 
the infected files on the system. 
There are other ways to detect this virus in files. One is to 
add user-defined virus strings to anti-virus programs which 
have-this feature. The user can add '3A 41 41 41 5A 41 4F' 
and/or '3A 41 41 41 5A 46 53', scanning all files. These 
scan strings are the hex representation of the ASCII strings 
':AAAZAO' and ':AAAZFS', and will be found in any 
document containing that text. 
Since .DOT and .DOC files are not typically scanned, it is 
important to remember to add them to the list of file types to 
be scanned. If you suspect you have this virus, you may 
want to scan all files, as your users may have changed the 
filename extensions after saving the files. 
Alternatively, you can search every document on your 
system for the strings (and the rest of the virus) using a disk 
editor. This could prove a lengthy process and is not 
recommended. 
If you find these strings in a Word document, further checks 
must be made. Unfortunately, these are difficult, as the virus 
is composed entirely of plain text, making it difficult for 
someone without knowledge of Word to decide whether 
even a Word document which contains these text strings is 
the virus itself, or a message warning of the virus' presence. 
One definitive way to determine whether the document is 
infected is to open it using Word, though this is counterpro­
ductive. My suggestion is that if you find the macros listed 
above active within Word, call your anti-virus software 
vendor, who should be able to talk you through a fix. 
You can restore infected documents to their pre-infected 
state manually. To do this, with your infected document 
loaded, do the following: 
• use Edit/Select All to mark the whole document; then 
Edit/Copy to copy the document to the clipboard 
• create a new, untitled document using File/New 
• using Edit/Paste, place the contents of the clipboard into 
the new document 
• close the original document using File/Close 
• if you are certain that the new document is identical to 
the old, except for the missing virus macros, use 
File/Save {not File/Save As) to save the new document 
over the old 
• if you are not certain the new document is identical to the 
old, use File/Save to save the new document with a new 
name, keeping the infected document isolated in a safe 
place until you are sure you no longer need it 
Manual removal of the virus via other methods is best 
performed by someone experienced in Word document 
structure. 
Automated detection and removal of the virus is offered by 
several vendors, including Command Software Systems; its 
fix, Wvfix.zip is available free of charge from the Com-
mand/F-Prot library section of the NCSA Anti-Virus vendor 
forum on CompuServe, or via anonymous FTP from 
ftp.commandcom.com (questions/comments may be mailed 
to winword@commandcom.com, and will probably end up 
in my mailbox). 
The Problem; the Solution 
The techniques used by this virus are so simple that any 
idiot could use them to construct similar viruses. If history is 
an indicator, we can expect to see more of this type of virus. 
While a short-term fix is available, the ease of creation and 
modification means that we must find a long-term solution 
to this general threat. As far as I can see, the most likely way 
will be to alert the user to any changes made to his global 
settings. While this will not prevent such a virus from 
spreading, it will provide users with some warning before 
their application is reconfigured. 
Security is no longer the realm of the OS developer; 
application programmers should keep a careful eye on the 
possible misuse of the extra functionality they are providing. 
Winword. Concept 
Al iases: Word prank macro. 
Infect ion: MS Word documents. 
Se l f - recogni t ion in MS Word d o c u m e n t s : 
Searches for a macro named 'PayLoad'. 
Trigger: None. 
Remova l : See text. 
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VIRUS ANALYSIS 2 
Byway: The Return of DirJI 
Dmitry O Cryaznov 
S&S International plc 
Those people who have been interested in computer viruses 
since the early 1990s may remember the 'pancomputeria' 
caused by the DirJI virus in the autumn of 1991 - this was a 
virus which swept around the world like wildfire. 
History of the Technique 
An infection technique which was completely new at that 
time was introduced with the advent of the Dir_II virus, and 
made it the fastest infector ever. In fact, DirJI brought with 
it a completely new category of computer viruses: file 
system infectors. 
The virus installs itself as the main DOS disk driver, and 
intercepts all disk accesses to floppy or hard disks. Then, on 
any disk access, Dir_II scans the data being read or written 
for possible disk directories. 
If the data reveals a directory, the virus modifies all direc-
tory entries referring to exécutable (COM/EXE) files to 
point to one and the same Cluster chain where the virus has 
stored its body. The originai start Cluster number of an 
infected file is stored, encrypted, in the unused parts of the 
DOS directory entry. 
When the virus is memory resident, everything appears 
normal, sìnce the virus intercepts any directory accesses, 
modifying the images of directory entries in memory to their 
condition before infection. 
When there is no virus in memory, however, DOS 'sees' the 
actual state of directory entries as they are stored on the 
disk. In this case, since all the exécutable files are cross-
linked to the same Cluster, running any exécutable file 
results in the virus being loaded to memory and executed. 
Strictly speaking, DÌr_II does not infect files - the file data, 
as well as its Cluster chain, remains unchanged. The virus 
'infects' directory entries instead. cross-linking them to the 
single Cluster chain containing the virus body. So, if you 
boot a computer from a clean DOS diskette and run 
CHKDSK on an infected disk, CHKDSK will report dozens 
of files cross-linked to the same Cluster, as well as dozens of 
lost Cluster chains. 
With the virus in memory, however, everything looks fine. 
Since Dir_H intercepts disk accesses at a DOS driver level, 
presenting itself as the main DOS built-in disk driver, just 
about any disk access will enable the virus to replicate. 
Simply typing DIR is sufficient to enable the virus to infect 
ali the exécutables in the directory from which you re-
quested a listing. 
If you accidentally type WIM instead of WIN, DOS will 
look for an exécutable file named WIM.COM (or 
WIM.EXE, or WTM.BAT) not only in the current working 
directory, but in ali the directories listed in the PATH 
environment variable as well. The resuit is that ali the 
exécutable files in each of thèse directories will be infected 
by the virus. 
This infection technique enabled Dir_II to propagate with 
unparalleled speed. First released in Bulgaria, it took Dir_II 
only several weeks to become the most widespread virus in 
the world in the autumn and winter of 1991. 
Fortunately, it did not last long. Dir_II is now believed to 
have been extinct in the wild for some time, mainly because 
it appeared to be incompatible with DOS versions 5.0 and 
above. The memories of this virus survived, making Dir_II a 
sort of anti-virus 'scary legend'. Yet recently we have faced 
a 'réincarnation' of Dir_II, in the form of a virus called 
Byway or TheHnd. 
"itnlike Dir_/f, however, Byway 
opérâtes pretty well even under 
the leitest versions of DOS" 
Dir_II Reincarnate 
Byway uses the same extremely fast and effective infection 
technique which was introduced in Dir_Il. Unlike Dir_II 
however, Byway opérâtes pretty well even under the latest 
versions of DOS, a fact which might well make it the Dir_II 
nightmare of today. 
To make things even worse, Byway is a Polymorphie virus, 
changing its appearance from one infected disk to another. 
Its code is written in an extremely obfuscatory manner, with 
many self-modifying instructions and unusual addressing 
modes. All this helps make its disassembly and analysis 
anything but a piece of cake. 
Stealth Capabilities - Not Quite There 
Stili, there is a flaw in this otherwise next-to-perfect virus: 
its stealth capabilities. To protect the Cluster chain where the 
virus body is kept, Byway créâtes a 2048-byte-long file 
called CHKLISTx.MSx in the root directory of an infected 
disk. The character V in the file name represents the 
non-printable ASCII code 255 (OFFh), which is displayed 
onscreen as a space. 
The file has System, Hidden and ReadOnly attributes set, so 
it cannot be viewed by a simple DIR command. You can, 
however, use the DIR command 7ASH' to see the file. The 
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switch 7A' forces DIR to show files with particular attribute 
bits set; the switch 7SH' specifies System and Hidden 
respectively. So, if you see a file called 'CHKLISTx.MSx' 
with these attributes, your computer is likely to be infected 
with Byway! 
Text Strings and Trigger 
In other ways, the virus is functionally very similar to 
Dir_II, although, judging by its disassembly, it was an 
independent 'project'. 
The text strings: '<by:Wai-Chan,Aug94,UCV>' and 
'The-HndV are found inside the encrypted virus body. The 
former, slightly altered, gives the virus its name of Byway, 
though variations on the first (TheHnd) are also used. 
Starting in 1996, providing the day of the month is equal to 
the doubled month number plus two (i.e. 4 January, 6 
February, 26 December), the virus may trigger while 
infecting a computer. 
When triggered, Byway displays a scrolling text phrase, 
'TRABAJEMOS TODOS POR VENEZUELA!!!*, accom-
panied by a rune which might well be Venezuela's national 
anthem. The phrase itself is Spanish for 'Let us all work for 
Venezuela!!!' or something close to it -1 do not speak 
Spanish myself, alas. 
We at S&S Internationa! are currently receiving an increas-
ing number of technical support calls regarding Byway. 
Unfortunately, they prove the prediction that the virus is 
quickly becoming very widespread - exactly like its forerun-
ner, Dir_II. 
Detection and Repair 
Fortunately, several anti-virus products are already capable 
of detecting this virus. As for repair, the method used to 
remove Dir_II also works well with Byway. This is, basi-
cally: 'Let the virus disinfect itself, a strategy which works 
not only for file system infectors, but for full-stealth viruses 
as well. 
The removal method is based on the fact that a stealth virus 
effectively 'removes' itself from a file being read. The word 
'removes' is in quotes because a virus does not necessarily 
remove itself physically from the file, but rather returns the 
image of the file in memory to the condition in which it was 
before infection. 
So, if an infected file is copied to a place which a stealth 
virus cannot infect while the virus is active in memory, the 
copy will be virus-free. In the case of both Dir_II and 
Byway, it is enough to PKZIP (or ARJ, LHA, etc) all the 
files on an infected disk while the virus is active in memory, 
then boot from a clean system diskette, reformat the disk, 
and restore the files from the archive. Due to Byway's 
stealth technology, file copies which are placed within the 
archive will be disinfected. 
Also, since the virus infects at the DOS driver level, it is not 
able to infect any files on a Novell (or, for that matter, any 
other) network file server. So, it is possible simply to copy 
all the files from an infected workstation (whilst having the 
virus active in memory, mind you!) to a server, reboot the 
workstation from a clean DOS floppy disk, reformat the 
local hard disk, then restore all the files from the server to 
the workstation. 
The third possibility would be to back up the contents of an 
infected disk to a tape on a 'dirty' machine and to restore 
them to the reformatted disk in a virus-free environment. 
There are at present two slightly different variants of Byway 
known. They contain somewhat different encrypted text 
messages, but are functionally virtually identical. Therefore, 
both detection and disinfection methods described above 
will work for either of the two variants. 
Byway 
Al iases: Dir l IJheHnd, DIR2.BYWAY, 
DIR.TheHnd. 
Type: Polymorphic. memory-resideni, 
encrypted file infector with stealth 
capabilities. 
Infect ion: All executable files. 
Recogn i t ion : 
The DOS command 'DIR /ASH' shows 
a 2048-byte- long file called 
CHKLISTx.MSx, with System. 
ReadOnly, and Hidden attributes set, ¡n 
the root directory of the ¡nfected disk. 
Se l f - recogni t ion in Files: 
Compares the starting cluster number to 
that of the virus. 
Hex Pat tern in Files: 
8 B F 0 * 8 B F E * F D * 4 9 7 4 * 
A D * 3 5 * A B * E B 
(within 28h bytes of beginning of file) 
Hex Pattern in M e m o r y : 
5 0 1 E 5 6 5 7 B O F O B E 5 8 0 4 0 E 1 F F C 
0 6 C 4 7 C 1 B A 4 A 5 A 5 8 B 7 C 1 B A 4 0 7 
In tercepts: No ¡nterrupts ¡ntercepted. 
Trigger: Runníng text message displayed: 
TRABAJEMOS TODOS POR VEN-
EZUELA!!!', accompanied by tune. 
Remova l : PKZIP (or similar) all files on infected 
hard disk. boot from clean system 
floppy, restore hard disk, and restore 
files from archive. 
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VIRUS ANALYSIS 3 
Rainbow: To Envy or to Hate 
Jakub Kaminski 
Only a smal! number of the thousands of viruses written 
merit analysis. Most researchers do not have the time to go 
through even those which are 'worth' examining closely. 
Often, when a virus is detected and cleaned, it is shifted to 
the 'to-do-in-near-undefined-future' pile. Those which do 
encourage doser examination are likely to be new, unknown 
spécimens spreading quickly in the real world. 
Not long ago, I was asked to check a PC which could no 
longer run Windows, and had problems booting from a 
floppy. I expected to Find corrupted files or sectors, along 
with disabled boot from floppy, or perhaps something 
'Monkey-üke' fiddling with the partition table data. 
My investigations revealed a 2351-byte, multi-partite virus 
spreading through partitions and directories, residing in the 
boot sector and many exécutable files. Its most interesting 
characteristics are its stealth techniques, and the method by 
which it disables clean boot from system floppy without 
altering the contents of the CMOS. An attempt to start from 
a system diskette results in a system hang before a command 
prompt appears - neither drive C nor drive A is accessible. 
Infection Symptoms 
This virus, Rainbow, infects the MBS of hard disks, DOS 
boot sector of floppies, COM files, and files with EXE-type 
structure (EXE, DRV, 386, XTP). It is unencrypted, and 
named after a plain-text message inside its body: 'roy g biv' 
(an acronym of the colours of the rainbow). 
The virus attaches itself to the end of programs. All infected 
programs have their time stamp modified; the field contain-
ing the number of seconds divided by two is set to 31. On 
infecting a DOS boot sector, Rainbow changes only 25 
bytes at offset 3Eh, adding a jump instruction at the sector 
beginning. The copy of the original boot sector is kept in the 
diskette's last sector, and the remainder of the virus code 
written in the preceding five sectors. 
When the MBS is infected, only its initial 25 bytes are 
changed by the virus. The rest of the virus body is written 
into five sectors on track 0 (cylinder 0, head 0), starting 
from sector 2. Rainbow does not keep a complete copy of 
the MBS: the 25 bytes it replaces are stored in sector 6, 
offset 142h. It also modifies the MBS in a way which could 
be described as self-protection or as the payload itself. 
The information on the active partition (16 bytes) is copied 
to sector 6, offset 132h, and the contents of the original 
Partition Table replaced by this Hex byte séquence: 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 0 B 8 0 B 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 B C 0 1 0 0 0 0 
This is interpreted by the operating system as a non-active, 
extended DOS partition, starting from head 0, cylinder 0, 
sector 1 ; ending on head 0, cylinder 523, sector 56; begin-
ning one sector from the start of the disk, and containing 
444 sectors in total. The most important characteristic is that 
this partition entry points not to another partition but to the 
MBS itself (head 0, cylinder 0, sector 1). Such a case is 
often referred to as 'the recursive partition' and can be a big 
headache to someone using the latest versions of MS-DOS. 
For users of v5 or v6.x of MS-DOS, access to the system 
containing the recursive partition is no longer possible. 
Starting from a hard disk or a diskette will put the system in 
an endless loop in the middle of the boot séquence (the OS 
loader traces through the extended partition chains and locks 
itself up, investigating the same sector again and again). 
Rainbow incorporâtes a significant number of system 
control and stealth procédures. When active in memory, it 
hooks Interrupts 01h (anti-debugging), 12h (hiding 'miss-
ing' memory), 13h ('Are you there?' cali, stealth/infection of 
boot sectors), 21 h (14 functions used for stealth/infection of 
files), 24h (stealth), and 2Fh (stealth). 
Execution of Infected Files 
When an infected file is executed, the virus checks to see if 
the system is infected, and whether the virus is active in 
memory. This is done by ¡ssuing an 'Are you there?' cali 
(Int 13h, AX=lBADh). The value DEEDh retumed in the 
register AXh means the virus is in control [ 'One bad deed'. 
geddii? Ed.], in which case the originai program is restored 
in memory and its exécution follows in the usuai way. 
If the system is clean, the virus installs itself in memory. It 
takes the 3K required from the current block of memory (as 
long as it is the last one in the memory block chain), usually 
placing its code 3K below the current top of memory. Sìnce 
the virus relies on the data in the current PSP, it will instali 
itself above the 640K limit if an infected file is loaded high. 
Next, the virus hooks Int 01 h, and tries to instali its own 
Int 21 h handler. Rainbow changes not the Interrupt Vector 
Table, but the current Int 21h service routine. Installation 
takes place only if the current Int 21h procedure begins: 
C M P A H , ? ? 
J N B E ? ? 
The virus replaces thèse instructions with a FAR JUMP to 
its own code, saving the original pointers in the virus code. 
Then, ¡t hooks Int 2F and installs its Int 13h ('Are you 
there?' call, response only) handler. 
Now, the virus infects the MBS of the first physical hard 
disk. The Int 13h service routine is modified to include full 
stealth procédures. Int 12h is then intercepted and a new 
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procedure installed which hides the 'missing' memory 
occupied by the virus. Finally, the infected file is restored in 
memory, and control is passed to the original program. 
Booting from an Infected Disk 
When the code in the infected boot sector is executed, the 
virus locates the top of memory, decreases it by 3K, and 
copies all of its code into the area allocated. 
Now, Rainbow installs its Int 13h handler (with all infection 
and stealth features). This also includes the code to instali Us 
Int 21 h handler after the resi of the operating system is 
loaded. The virus relies on checking the address of the 
Int 24h service routine. If its segment is smaller than 1000h, 
the virus assumes that DOS is already loaded. 
In Memory 
When an infected file is executed, Rainbow installs itself in 
memory, intercepting all subséquent interrupts. Unlike most 
multi-partite viruses, it does not have to be loaded from an 
infected boot sector to gain full functionality. Rainbow can 
spread and infect files and floppy boot sectors even on 
Workstations with no hard disk. 
The virus infects diskettes on Read or Write access. When 
active in memory, it retums the clean, originai sector at each 
attempt to read the DOS boot sector. Files are infected on 
Execution (Int 2Ih, function 4Bh), or when opened. 
COM-type files are infected only if they are less than 63057 
bytes and their extension is COM or com. EXE-type files are 
infected when file length is as specified in the EXE header. 
Rainbow's stealth procédures include hiding the length of 
infected files and the virus signature in the file time stamp. 
As self-recognition in files is based on the time stamp, 
attempts to exécute a clean file with a time set to 62 seconds 
often results in a system crash: the stealth procedure tries to 
disinfect a clean file, but corrupts it instead. It is the only 
serious bug (minor, in comparison to the poor coding in the 
vast majority of viruses) which I found in its code. 
Booting Clean 
The safe removal of any virus from an infected system is 
always based on a clean boot from a system diskette, 
something which, in this case, is not always easy. Those still 
using MS-DOS v4 or lower can use the usuai system 
floppies, but those who upgraded to v5 or higher may find 
themselves in trouble if Rainbow infects their machines. 
To gain access to an infected/corrupted MBS, eradicating 
the recursive partition problem, either boot from an older 
version of DOS, or boot from an infected disk, then disable 
the virus in memory or avoid its stealth routines. 
If the former is chosen, a system floppy which has an older 
version of DOS is required - but how many laptop users 
have a bootable, 3.5-inch DOS 4 diskette? Diagnostic 
diskettes which boot to their own operating Systems can also 
help in gaining access to a disk which has a recursive 
partition problem. 
The latter solution requires an anti-virus product which can 
detect and disable viruses in memory, or can work properly 
when viruses are active in the system. In the case of the 
Rainbow virus, this does not appear to be a simple task. 
Conclusion 
One of the plain-text messages inside the virus body is: 
'*4U2NV*', which can be read as: 'For you to envy'. Some 
virus writers may certainly envy the author of Rainbow his 
ideas and skills, but if this virus becomes common in the 
wild, the majority of the PC community will only hate him. 
Rainbow 
Al iases: None. 
Type : Multi-partite. stealth, COM/EXE/MBS/ 
DBS infector. 
Se l f - recogni t ion : 
MBS: word 83A5 Hex at offset 15h. 
DBS: word 83A5 Hex at offset 53h. 
Files: seconds field in urne stamp = 62. 
Hex Pat tern in M B S : 
B B 0 0 7 C 8 E D 3 8 B E 3 8 E C 3 B 8 0 5 0 2 
B 9 0 2 0 0 B A 8 0 0 0 C D 1 3 9 A A 5 8 3 0 0 
Hex Pattern in DBS : 
B B 0 O 7 C 8 E D 3 8 B E 3 8 E C 3 B 8 0 5 0 2 
B 9 ? ? ? ? B A 0 0 0 1 C D 1 3 9 A A 5 8 3 0 0 
Hex Pattern in Files and M e m o r y : 
E 8 0 0 0 0 5 E 8 3 E E 0 3 B 8 A D 1 B C D 1 3 
3 D E D D E 7 5 4 5 0 E 1 F B 1 C 6 6 4 0 7 8 1 
In tercepts : Int 01 h, anti-debugging; Int 12h, hiding 
missing memory; Int 13h, boot sector 
infection/stealth; Int 21 h (functions 11 h. 
12h, 3Ch. 3Dh. 3Eh, 3Fh, 40h, 42h, 
4Bh. 4Eh. 4Fh. 57h. 5Bh. 6Ch). file 
infection/stealth: Ints 24h/2Fh, stealth. 
Trigger: Recursive partition in infected MBS. 
Remova l : MBS - boot clean from DOS 4 or lower. 
replace first 25 bytes with the bytes 
from sector 6 offset 142h, replace 
recursive-partition data with 16 bytes 
from sector 6 offset 132h. Alternatively. 
boot from infected hard disk and disable 
virus in memory before repairing MBS. 
Files - although cleaning infected files is 
relatively easy. to remove virus safely. 
repair MBS, boot clean and replace 
infected files with a clean backup copy. 
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TUTORIAL 
Circular Extended Partitions: 
Round and Round with DOS 
Mike Lambert 
On pages 12-13 of this month's VB is an analysis of Rain­
bow, a virus VB first mentioned in its July 1995 IBM PC 
Viruses (Update). The entry states: 'A system with an 
infected MBS cannot be booted from a clean system floppy 
if the machine is running any DOS version of 5.0 or higher'. 
When the virus was brought to my attention, I thought of the 
paper I co-wrote with Charlie Moore, 'Circular Extended 
Partitions: A DOS Vulnerability' (December 1992). 
Recognising the Problem 
The Symptoms of a circular extended partition can be 
described as follows: when booted, the operating system 
load hangs and the hard disk access light stays on steadily. 
The kernel is hung in a loop, reading the same block (or 
circular chain of blocks) from the hard disk. The solution is 
to boot a version of DOS without the bug in its kernel. 
In the paper mentioned, I published patches for DOS 3.3-5.X 
(a single-byte patch for each). IBM sent me each version of 
PCDOS and asked me to publish a patch for each. DRDOS 
was too complex to patch, so was omitted. MS-DOS patches 
were included in case they were needed in an emergency. 
More information on the circular extended partition prob­
lem, and a tutorial on DOS disk structures, is included in the 
paper mentioned above, 'Circular Extended Partitions: A 
DOS Vulnerability', by Mike Lambert and Charles Moore. 
The Rainbow Virus 
Rainbow implements the simplest of circular extended 
partitions. It replaces the entry describing the bootable DOS 
partition in the Partition Table with a phoney extended 
partition which points to the MBS. The virus 'stealths' the 
MBS reads so that, when the virus is resident, DOS sees the 
correct DOS partition entry and the OS comes up normally. 
When the virus is not resident, DOS versions which have the 
circular extended partition bug will hang when booted. 
The circular extended partition in Rainbow does not hang 
MS-DOS v3.3 or v4.01 - these can be used to boot today's 
Systems (Rainbow does not work on older CPUs) in the 
event that an MS-DOS v5 or v6.x system does not boot. 
To remove the virus, it is necessary to clean-boot a version 
of DOS which does not have the bug, then restore the MBS 
from a backup copy. The system should then be rebooted 
from the floppy (so that DOS will see the DOS partition), 
and infected files should be replaced. 
Circulating a Fix 
While circular extended partitions were a problem for all 
Microsoft, IBM, and DRDOS versions implementing 
extended partitions until December 1992 (v3.3-v5), the issue 
should pose no problem to the latest versions - Charlie 
Moore and I notified all three operating system developers 
in September/October 1992. 
Our paper identified a coding error which results in the 
problem (this was confirmed by IBM). IBM and DRDOS 
were happy to hear about the problem, and promised to 
correct it in the next version. 
Microsoft proved to be difficult to contact and did not return 
calls, faxes, or a message on the MS-DOS 6.0 beta test hot-
line. A subséquent article by another author brought the 
problem more directly to Microsoft technical staff via the 
Public Relations office. 
DOS Version 6.x 
Curious to explain the note in July's VB, I assembled v6 of 
MS-DOS and PCDOS products and did some testing. True 
to their word, IBM had corrected the problem in PCDOS 6.1 
(no problem with PCDOS 6.3 either). Testing the Microsoft 
version 6 séries explained the note. 
Microsoft v6.0, v6.2, v6.2I, and v6.22 all still have the same 
bug in IO.SYS, meaning that MS-DOS v3.3 to 6.22 (PCDOS 
v3.3 to 5.02, and DRDOS v6.0) will not boot in the présence 
of a circular extended partition. IBM v6.1 and v6.3 do not 
have the bug. As I have been unable to test with the latest 
version of DRDOS, I do not know if the problem has been 
corrected as yet. 
MS-DOS 6.x Patches 
The only responsible thing to do is to publish the patches for 
the MS-DOS 6 séries in case there should ever be a need to 
recover an MS-DOS system from such a problem. The patch 
is exactly the same for each version of MS-DOS 6x. Within 
IO.SYS, the procedure is: 
1. Search for bytes 07 72 03 - these are at offset 2918h. 
2. Change 03 at offset 291 Ah to 06. 
3. Write the change back to disk. 
I have tested each patch, and all work as intended. The 
décision to use the patch to bring up a system crippled with 
circular extended partitions lies with the individuai. 
If Rainbow ever makes it into the wild, it might be a good 
idea for MS-DOS users to have a disaster recovery floppy 
without the bug {IBM v6.1 and v6.3 do not have it) until 
Microsoft applies fixes to MS-DOS. 
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FEATURE 
Computer Viruses: Naming 
and Classification 
David B HulL PhD 
National University, California 
The literature of computer viruses is steeped in biologica! 
analogy. Even their choice of name, virus, is a direct 
analogy to biological organisms. The writers of this perni-
cious code also use this analogy: witness the Dark Aveng-
er's Mutation Engine. Indeed, some parts of the community 
have gone so far as to suggest the concept of artificial life 
for these and related créations [Ludwig, 1993; Stojakovic-
Celustka, 1994]. 
This paper is an extension of the analogy to the problems of 
naming and classifying computer viruses. These two issues 
are problems which are criticai to working with living and 
non-living créations. The need for precise name and classifi­
cation is rooted in the need to communicate effectively 
about the item in question. This is true regardless of whether 
the création is man-made, such as a Mozart sonata, or 
natural, such as a lemur. 
Naming 
Naming involves the development of a set of protocols for 
creating an acceptable name for any given item in the set 
under review. The more universally accepted the naming 
protocol, and the more widely it is used, the more valuable it 
will become. 
Modem zoology has benefited greatly from the adoption of 
a uniform code: The International Code of Zoologica! 
Nomenclature [ICZN. 1964]. This is a remarkable work, and 
I recommend it as a model of solutions to issues faced by 
current virus and anti-virus researchers. It dérives from the 
work of Linneaus, the 'father' of modern biological nomen­
clature, and in particular is founded on the tenth édition of 
the Sysiema Naturae published in 1758. 
The ICZN présents several underlying principals which need 
to be addressed. First, following Linneaus, it uses a binomial 
nomenclature; that is, a genus and species name together 
identify an animal. This can be supplemented as needed with 
names for Family, Order, etc. However, the Code does not 
define exactly what a species or genus is. 
Second, it establishes a protocol for creating and emending 
zoological names, which in this case are in Latin or 
pseudo-Latin and Greek or pseudo-Greek. 
Third, it uses the rule of priority (i.e. that the chronologi-
cally earliest-recorded name will take precedence) to impose 
order among conflicting claims about the correct name. The 
ICZN has developed and refined this naming framework. 
The exact requirements for a valid publication of an ICZN 
name are beyond the scope of this work, but they are 
certainly worth studying. 
Fourth, it ties the name of the species, or genus, to a type 
specimen. The code does get rather involved here, because 
this concept is criticai to the whole naming process. The 
important points to note are that the name is lied to a 
particular specimen, and that this specimen is available to 
other Professionals in the field to examine and compare with 
other material, 
The types must be deposited in a muséum or other institu­
tion: 'Every institution in which types are deposited should 
(1) ensure that all are clearly marked so that they will be 
unmistakably recognized; (2) take all necessary steps for 
their safe préservation' [ICZN, 1964]. 
Naming protocols are, however, basicaily independent of a 
commitment to an underlying organizational structure of the 
organisms being studied. Indeed, Linneaus had no particular 
underlying phüosophy about the mechanisms and organiza­
tional structures underlying what he named [Hüll, 1973]. 
Classifying 
Classification involves grouping the items in the set under 
review into catégories. In many cases, such as zoology, 
these catégories are nested hierarchically. Classification 
does involve an underlying phüosophy about the mecha­
nisms and organizational structure of the items and groups 
being classified. This philosophy is also strongly influenced 
by the purpose for which the classification is to be used. 
The division between phenetic, or structural, classification 
and phylogenetic, or evolutionary, classification has a long 
and deep history in zoology, for example [Heywood & 
Mcneill, 1964]. The classification of Shakespeare's works 
for library retrieval as contrasted with Üterary analysis to 
determine authorship provides an even starker contrast. 
Basicaily, classification approaches may be divided into 
three catégories: heuristic or morphological groupings aimed 
at simple assessments of similarity; phylogenetic groupings 
aimed at tracing evolutionary relationships; and functional 
classifications grouping by catégories of action. 
Classifying a killer whale Orcinus orca, a gray wolf Canis 
lupus, and a great white shark Carcharodon carchiaras, 
must produce very différent groupings with each approach. 
Gross morphology might group the whale and the shark 
together as torpedo-shaped sea animais, in contrast to the 
wolf. Phylogeny clearly would group the whale and the wolf 
together as mammals against the shark. Functionally, all 
three are high level carnivores! 
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Beyond the question of the philosophy underlying the 
grouping is the issue of actualization. The type of data to be 
gathered, and the means of developing groupings from the 
data, is critical to the success and usefulness of the classifi-
cation schema. Information needed for developing evolu-
tionary relationships is often not available directly and must 
be inferred from other data. Even the choice of method to 
create groups can have significant impact on the results; viz 
the differences in different mathematical clustering tech-
niques on the same similarity matrix data. These choices 
affect the usefulness of the classification system. 
Creating a field guide relies on distinctive features used in 
the grouping methodology. This holds true whether it is 
monkeys or missiles being identified. 
Current Naming and Classification of PC Viruses 
Let us start by examining how viruses are currently named, 
using the results of the naming committee of the Computer 
Anti-virus Research Organizations [CARO, ¡991]. CARO's 
classification follows a hierarchical format, based on 
structural similarity of virus code [from ftp.informatik.uni-
hamburg.de:/pub/virus/texts/tests/vtc/naming.zip - 8/20/94], 
The virus name consists of four parts (to be discussed 
further in VB, October 1995), delimited by periods. The 
underlying classification scheme is explicitly stated to be 
based on 'structural similarities of the virus' [CARO, 1991]. 
"the transplantation of... code 
from one virus to another need 
not represent an evolutionary 
relationship " 
An important component of similarity is the use of identical 
sections of computer code in similar viruses. This can come 
about either because actual sections of code have been 
copied from a previous version of a virus, or because similar 
functionality leads to similar code. The use of structural 
similarity is not absolutely enforced in the CARO scheme. 
A second major consideration is the length of active code. 
'All short (100 bytes of code or less, messages excluded) 
overwriting viruses are grouped under a FamiIy_Name, 
called Trivial. The variants in each family are named by 
their infective length' [CARO. 1991]. 
Functional criteria (resident versus non-resident) and the 
type of file infected (COM, EXE, MBS or boot sector) also 
play a part. In an effort to fit all the viruses in the scheme, 
classification categories for viruses written in high level 
languages are also represented by a separate category. 
The CARO effort is clearly aimed at providing a solid and 
stable naming system for virus-scanning software. However, 
the exact methodology used to create CARO 's classification 
has never, to my knowledge, been presented publicly. 
Naming Issues 
A major problem in the current nomenclature of computer 
viruses revolves around the lack of widely-accepted stand-
ards. This leads to many communication problems. Perhaps 
the most obvious (and also perhaps the most amusing) is 
McAfee's 'Genb' and 'Genp' virus - this is their shorthand 
notation for a generic boot sector virus and a generic hard 
disk partition virus. 
Virus names should consistently and unequivocally name a 
specific computer virus. The CARO scheme is an excellent 
discussion piece for developing such nomenclature; how-
ever, it should be based on structural similarity only. Other 
considerations, such as mode of action, or the language used 
to write the virus, are not central to identification. 
Furthermore, as Spafford rightly recognizes, the mode of 
action and programming language used will mark the 
structure of the resulting machine code strongly, in any case 
[Spafford & Weeber, 1992]. 
The second major issue in naming involves specifying 
exactly what the name represents. Unless the name of a virus 
is specifically linked to a known piece of code, it is never 
clear precisely what is being discussed. This leads to the 
type concept used by the ICZN. 
In zoology, each scientific name is directly linked to a 
museum specimen, or other known identification of the 
organism. This is called the type specimen. It is usually held 
in a museum, and is specially identified as a type, holotype, 
lectotype, etc, depending on its exact relationship to the 
name it represents. These type specimens form the key 
identifiers for a given name. A group takes its name from 
that of the type specimen with which it is classified. 
The third major issue involves establishment of a valid 
name. The ICZN establishes valid names by 'priority of 
publication'. In its simplest form, this means that the earliest 
publication of a valid type description of a previously 
undescribed organism establishes its name. 
This requires demonstration that the new specimen is 
'different' from all previously known specimens, creation of 
a valid name under the ICZN rules, designation of the type 
specimen, and publication in a responsible journal. If, on re-
examination, the specimen is found to belong in the same 
group as an organism with another valid name, the earlier of 
the two names applies to this group. 
Classification Issues 
There is also a problem of phenetic (structural) versus 
phylogenetic (evolutionary) classification. In biological 
classification, the ultimate goal is to develop an understand-
ing of evolutionary, or phylogenetic, relationships. All 
classifications still begin with phenetic or structural similari-
ties. These phenetic characteristics are weighted to reflect 
their relative importance as phylogenetic indicators 
[Jardine & Sibson, 1971], 
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There is a great deal of confusion in virus classification as to 
the goal of classification. At one extreme, CARO is concen-
trating on recognition of computer viruses - not an unreason-
able approach for an anti-virus organization. In many ways, 
it parallels the approach used by classical zoological 
taxonomists, and popular field guides to animals. 
At the opposite end of the spectrum are classifications 
focusing on the evolution of computer virus techniques, and 
on the individuals writing computer viruses. 
Bontchev's discussion of the Bulgarian and Soviet virus 
'factories' is a classic in this approach [Bonlchev, 1992]. 
Gilad Japhet's anti-virus program CORAL appears to be 
developing towards an evolutionary approach, using 
techniques which appear to be similar to analytical ap-
proaches used in this paper [Japhet, ¡994]. 
Computer viruses evolve in complex ways not usually 
encountered in nature. The transplantation of large segments 
of computer code from one virus to another need not 
represent an evolutionary relationship, for example. A newer 
virus may just represent a debugged or patched earlier 
version. The virus author may have deliberately incorpo-
rated parts of other viruses as a short cut, or because the 
plagiarized code is useful. 
If the virus incorporates code generating 'engines', similar 
code may appear in viruses with no other similarities. 
Structural similarities deriving from functional similarities 
likewise derive from several sources. 
There are only certain ways to do certain things with a PC 
running under DOS, for example. Programmers also, like 
writers in general, have a particular individual style which 
leads to coding similarities. 
Spafford uses the example of the Internet Worm, where the 
code used linked lists as the primary data structures. It seems 
that the first class on data structures and algorithms which 
Robert T Morris took as an undergraduate used LISP: the 
lesson stuck all too well [Spafford & Weeber, 1992]. This 
makes using zoological concepts such as 'parallel evolution' 
particularly tricky in analyzing computer viruses. 
A second, tricky problem involves defining the unit of 
classification. In zoology, the essential unit is the species. A 
phenetic (structural) definition of a species specifies the 
smallest statistically coherent unit [Jardine & Sibson, ¡971]. 
The phylogenetic (evolutionary) definition of a biological 
species based on the capability of interbreeding does not 
appear to have much relevance to computer viruses. 
Interestingly, a recent article has presented the idea that the 
definition of a biological species does not have much 
application to living viruses, either [Eigen, ¡993]. This 
article presents the concept of a 'quasispecies', which Eigen 
describes as: 'a multitude of distinct but related nucleic acid 
polymers. Its wild type is the consensus sequence that 
represents an average for all mutations, weighted to reflect 
their individual frequency' [Eigen, 1993 p.45]. 
Clearly, well-defined viral quasispecies will group, or 
cluster, under most classification schemes. Such a definition 
seems to be a far more useful approach for classifying 
computer viruses. 
The second and final section of this paper will be published 
in the October edition of Virus Bulletin. It will be an 
exploration of these issues using the Stoned virus; an 
explanation of the Data Set and the methods used, and a 
schematic diagram of the CARO classification of Stoned. 
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PRODUCT REVIEW 1 
InocuLAN for NT 
Jonathan Burchell 
Cheyenne Soßware is known and respected for backup and 
anti-virus producís for NetWare servers. This month we fook 
at a new produci from the company, InocuLANfor 
Windows NT. Il has three componente: a server élément 
(three 1.44 MB diskettes, one licence disk), one client for 
DOS/ Windows Workstations (three 1.44 MB diskettes) and 
one for DOS Workstations (two 1.44 MB diskettes). 
Documentation 
An Administrator guide and a Client guide were included, 
both of which are substantial, and extremely professionally 
and attractively produced. In addition to being operational 
guides, the manuals cover some basic background informa-
tion on virus Symptoms and network protection, and include 
an appendix covering the more common viruses. 
No on-line virus référence is included, but the company has 
ticensed VBASE, an electronic encyclopaedia, from Norman 
Data Defense Systems. It is available free of charge to 
registered users. A list of detected viruses is available within 
the software. 
Server Element 
Installation of the server élément requires a 486 or higher 
computer, 16MB or more of RAM, 5MB disk space and 
Windows NTv3.5 or above (workstation or server). The 
software is installed by running set-up in Windows NT. The 
licence diskette must be inserted on installation. It is not 
required again, but may be used on a re-install: I suspect it is 
separate only to ease manufacturing and Upgrade issues. 
The software has three components: server protection, 
manager or administration front-end, and alert module. The 
express set-up option installs ail components, whilst custom 
set-up allows components to be installed individually. 
The server componen! is the élément which provides the 
scanning ability, and is copy-protected via the licence disk. 
The Administrator or Manager module need not be installed 
on ail servers (they can be administered remotely) and may 
be installed any number of times, including onto Worksta-
tions which have no server service installed - this makes for 
great flexibility in server administration. The Alert compo-
nen! is installed on the nominated message centre. 
Networking Concepts 
Like many of its NetWare counterparts, InocuLAN allows 
several servers to be grouped into logicai domains. AH 
servers in a domain mus! be running InocuLANfor NT. 
The advantage of grouping servers into domains is two-fold. 
Scheduled scanning need only be set for the master server, 
propagating automatically to other servers in the domain, as 
will scanning service information. Also, the master can be 
set up as the central message centre, allowing reports and 
logs to be viewed and administered from a central location. 
Configuration and administration of all components is 
accessed via the InocuLAN for Windows NT manager icón. 
The manager consists of three separate modules: the domain 
manager, the local scanner, and the service manager. 
Domain Manager 
The domain manager controls and configures domains and 
scheduled scans. As I had only one AT server in my test 
network, I could not try domain configuration options but, 
judging from the manual, it is a simple opération to create 
domains and add servers to, or remove servers from, the 
domains created. 
Domain size may be a single server, or many. A server may 
be a member of only one domain, and each domain has a 
nominated master server. As well as domain administration, 
the domain manger controls scheduled scans, tracking up to 
2000 (or 1000 simultaneous) scan jobs. For each, the 
followìng information is recorded: 
• target drives and directories to scan (a scheduled scan 
cannot include removable media or mapped drives) 
• whether to scan sub-directories of the targets specified 
• the CPU usage level (a number from 1-10) at which the 
background scan is to run 
• a list of directories and files to be excluded from the scan 
(if these do not exist on a particular member of the 
domain, they will simply be ìgnored) 
• a date and time to start scanning (a repeat interval 
specified in terms of months, days, hours and minutes) 
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All files, or exécutables only, may be scanner! An exécut-
able is defined by file extension: the default list is APP, 
COM, EXE, DLL, DRV, OVL, OVR, PRG, and SYS (BAT 
and SCR are notable omissions) • extensions may be added 
or removed. Action to be taken on virus detection includes: 
• report only: no action is taken; a message is sent to the 
Alert module which deals with it as detailed below 
• delete file: deletes the file 
• cure file: the manual daims that InocuLAN can remove, 
and thus cure, certain infections. It recommends that, 
even after a cure, you should delete the file and reinstall 
the originai, an attitude we heartily endorse. This raises a 
question as to whether this option is of use other than if 
there is no other solution. 
• renarne file: the default extension for renamed files is 
AVB (in the event of a file with this extension already 
existing, InocuLAN automatically synthesises an exten-
sion of the type AVO, AV! etc). An option allows the 
default extension choice to be changed. 
• move file: moves an infected file to a specified quaran-
tine directory (the default is InocuLANXVirus) 
• purge file: deletes an infected file and guarantees that it 
cannot be recovered with recover Utilities 
• renarne and move file combines move/renarne options 
It is also possible to specify scan type: the options are 'fast', 
'secure', and 'reviewer'. 'Fast' checks only the beginning 
and end of a data file, whilst 'secure' checks the entire file 
and is consequently a little slower. The manual claims that 
'reviewer' detects virus-like activity within a file (a heuristic 
approach perhaps), whilst the on-disk READ.ME file claims 
that 'reviewer' uses a database of garbage virus strings. 
I suspect 'reviewer' contains signatures from test-sets which 
do not represent true viruses. The VB test-set has only 
genuine, viable infected files. The manual states that using 
'reviewer' may cause false positives -1 set the scanning to 
'reviewer' for the detection tests. Further options in this 
section allow starting, stopping and rescheduling of Jobs. 
Local Scanner 
The second component of the InocuLAN manager is the 
Locai Scanner. This module controls locai and immediate 
scans. Unlike the scheduled scanner, it can access removable 
media drives and mapped drives. 
Options for the scan are broadly similar to those outlined for 
the scheduled scan, with the exception of job start and repeat 
information. Additionally, it is possible to request that 
InocuLAN prompts the user before taking any action on an 
infected file, and that it 'beeps' the workstation speaker 
when an infected file is discovered. 
Selecting what to scan is specified via a graphical tree 
représentation of the drive, which makes it extremely easy to 
indicate specific directories and files to be included in or 
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T h e d o m a i n m a n a g e r c o n t r o l s a n d c o n f i g u r e s d o m a i n s a n d 
s c h e d u l e d s c a n s , t r a c k i n g u p t o 2 0 0 0 s c a n j o b s . 
excluded from the scan. Unfortunately, I could see no way 
of saving the choices for another session, or indeed of 
keeping a list of different types of immediate scan jobs. 
Service Manager 
The final option in the manager module allows for starting 
and stopping of the scanning service. This sets whether 
scanning service starts automatically when a Windows NT 
machine is booted, and sets various parameters affecting 
how often the service manager should scan job queues, poli 
apparently dead servers, and hold finished jobs in the queue. 
It is also possible, with the event and the scan logs, to set 
how many messages to retain in the log file (this may be set 
between 10 and 1,000), after how many days to purge 
records automatically, and the level of information to be 
stored. This can be any combination of critical, waming and 
informational messages. The event and scan logs are 
accessed directly from within the relevant program sections. 
The included Windows help files are informative, attractive 
and easy to use. They offer a dual pane mode, with contents 
in one screen and the selected entry in another, making it 
quite simple to 'read' the manual on-line. 
Alert 
Whenever an InocuLAN server or workstation client 
produces an event (such as detecting a virus), it sends a 
message to the server nominated as the domain master. 
There, it is intercepted by the Alert module, processed, and 
added to the central 'master' datábase of alerts. A received 
alert may cause any of the following actions to take place: 
• a broadcast message sent to nominated users or groups 
• a pager message (numeric or alpha-numeric) sent to a 
nominated group of recipients. Requires a modem 
connected to a server machine to access pager service. 
The message sent consists of a detection code number, a 
machine ID number and a user-defined custom code. 
• SNMP trap messages sent across the network to an 
SNMP management product such as NetWare Manage-
ment System (NMS) or HP OpenView. Either IPX or 
TCP/IP may be selected as the transport mechanism. 
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• Trouble Ticket: this option allows a list of printers to be 
defined. InocuLAN will print a Trouble Ticket automati­
cally when an alert is received. 
• Email: this option, which requires Microsoft Mail, allows 
a nominated list of recipients to be notified of alerts via 
email. It is possible to specify the 'To:, CO. and Subject:' 
parts of the header as well as to attach a specified list of 
files to the message (for example, the event log). 
The eagle-eyed among you will have spotted that none of 
the options discussed so far control real-time checking of 
file read and write. Unfortunately, the interface to the 
Windows NT file system is such a closely guarded secret that 
no anti-virus vendor has been able to provide real-time file 
checking for AT server products. Cheyenne is no exception. 
Thus, there can be no real-time protection for server-to-
server or workstation-to-server transactions when both 
systems are using Windows NT. As, at the moment, there are 
no Windows AT-specific viruses, this may not be much of an 
issue. DOS sessions within an AT (or OS/2) workstation, or 
on a DOS or DOS/Windows platform, may be protected by 
loading appropriate InocuLAN client software. 
The critical component is Immune, a TSR which provides 
real-time checking of files as they are accessed in a DOS 
session or on a DOS/Windows workstation. Immune can 
send alerts across the network to the Alert master, providing 
for centralised monitoring of real-time workstation activity. 
The Immune/Server communication relies on IPX packets 
being available as a transport mechanism, which is rather a 
shame, as many Windows 95INT networks will be NetBEUI 
or TCP/IP only. However, Cheyenne intends to provide 
support for TCT/IP in the next release of the product. 
Results 
The main problem with the virus detection provided by the 
main scanner seems to be the lack of identification of the 
SMEG and Cruncher polymorphes (plus a slight wobble on 
some of the MtE variants) and that some basic signature data 
for the 'Standard' and the 'In the Wild' test-sets is missed. 
Having said that, however, the detection ratios show the 
kind of performance which could easily be tuned to 100%. 
As is shown in the results table, there are obvious problems 
with real-time detection. This aspect, represented by the 
Immune detection figures, is not good enough to guarantee a 
good level of viral immunity. I suspect that this lower figure 
comes from the twin pressures of maintaining two code 
bases and keeping the TSR element for DOS to a reasonable 
size. Cheyenne will shortly be providing VxDs for Windows 
and Windows 95, and a similar system for Windows NT. 
Conclusions 
InocuLAN for NT brings the sophistication of big league 
NetWare products to Windows NT. It has a user interface 
which makes the most of the Windows Graphical User 
Interface, and helps ease administration of large networks. 
The inclusion of features such as domain administration, and 
sophisticated alert and messaging systems, set it above 
SWEEP for NT in terms of features and may make it more 
suitable for large sites. 
I do have a few gripes, however. The concept of domains, 
scheduled scans and local scans in the Manager module is a 
little confused. In a large network, I might also want Alert to 
function across multiple domains, rather than having to set it 
up for separate domains. 
It also seems surprising that the signature database cannot be 
automatically propagated to all domain members (or to all 
members of the visible network). This feature is planned for 
future release, according to Cheyenne. 
Having said that, the features and quality of this package are 
astounding, even more so when combined with the knowl­
edge that this is the first version. Detection ratios, except for 
some problems with the polymorphics, are good (see results, 
below), though not as good as those for SWEEP for NT. 
The good news is that Cheyenne feels it will crack the 
problems of real-time checking on the server. Once this has 
been achieved, the high detection rates, together with the 
superb user interface and server administration, mean that 
this will be a product to consider in any installation for 
Windows NT. 
InocuLAN for NT 
Detection Results 
Main Scanner: 
Standard Test-Set 1 1 1 
In the Wild Test-Set ! ? l 
Polymorphie Test-Set™ 
Immune: 
Standard Test-Set 1 1 1 
In the Wild Test-Set« 
Polymorphie Test-Set | 3 i 
229 /230 
120/126 
3732 /4796 
228 /230 
118/126 
1214 /4796 
99 .6% 
95 .2% 
77.8% 
9 9 . 1 % 
93 .7% 
25.3% 
T e c h n i c a l D e t a i l s 
P r o d u c t : InocuLAN for NT. 
D e v e l o p e r : Chevenne Software Ine, 3 E x p r e s s w a y P l a z a , R o s l y n 
H e i g h t s , N Y 1 1 5 7 7 U S A . T e l + 1 5 1 6 4 8 4 5 1 1 0 , 
f a x - H 5 1 6 6 2 9 1 8 5 3 , e m a i l c h e y e n n e @ c h e y e n n e . c o m . 
P r i c e : U S $ 8 9 5 (1 s e r v e r ) , U S $ 3 9 9 5 ( 5 s e r v e r s ) , i n c l u d i n g 
u p g r a d e s ( e v e r y t w o m o n t h s ) , a n d l i c e n c e s fo r a l l D O S , 
Windows, a n d Macintosh m a c h i n e s c o n n e c t e d t o t h e s e r v e r i s ) . 
H a r d w a r e u s e d : C l i e n t m a c h i n e - 3 3 M H z 4 8 6 , 2 0 0 M b y t e I D E 
d r i v e , 1 6 M b y t e s R A M . F i l e s e r v e r - 3 3 M H z 4 8 6 . E I S A b u s . 
3 2 - b i t c a c h i n g d i s k c o n t r o l l e r , NetWare 3.1!, 1 6 M b y t e s R A M . 
E a c h t e s t - s e t c o n t a i n s g e n u i n e i n f e c t i o n s ( i n b o t h C O M a n d E X E 
f o r m a t w h e r e a p p r o p r i a t e ) . F o r d e t a i l s o f t h e S t a n d a r d t e s t - s e t , 
s e e VB, J a n u a r y 1 9 9 4 , p . 1 9 ( f i l e i n f e c t o r s o n l y ) . F o r d e t a i l s o f I n 
t h e W i l d a n d P o l y m o r p h i c t e s t - s e t s , s e e VB, A u g u s t 1 9 9 5 p . 1 9 . 
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PRODUCT REVIEW 2 
IBM Antivirus 
Dr Keith Jackson 
IBM Antivirus has been reviewed by VB several times 
before: version I for DOS in January 1993, the OS/2 version 
in August 1993, as part of PC-DOS in January 1994, and the 
NetWare version in February 1995. 
This review is of version 2.2, which can be used with DOS, 
Windows or OS/2. It was provided for review on three 
3.5-inch, low density floppy disks. IBM claims that its anti­
virus software 'is the software that IBM uses to protect its 
own personal computers' [I should hope so! Ed.], and that it 
is 'designed to detect and remove viruses from your system 
as simply and reliably as possible'. 
Documentation 
The documentation took the form of an A4 ring binder, 
containing 101 pages about its DOS and Windows versions. 
I have no real complaints about the manual - it is readable, 
well-indexed, explains the basics well; however, it does lack 
some explanation of fine details, such as possible errors. 
The on-line documentation contains a list of 3636 viruses 
which IBM Antivirus claims to be able to detect. Another 
thousand lines of cross-reference information are provided, 
which permit searching for virus name through a common 
alias. Also included is a more detailed explanation of 153 of 
the more common viruses, a set which seems well chosen. 
Along with details of the Family/Classification of each, a 
paragraph explaining how the virus operates is provided. 
Installation 
Two different methods of installation are described in the 
documentation, one of which operates under DOS, one 
requiring Windows. Curiously, both methods install the files 
required for operating the product under Windows. 
Installation had to be done using DOS, as the Windows 
SETUP seemed to be missing from the master disks - a bad 
omen? Shortly after installation commenced, the program 
asked whether an 'Emergency Diskette' should be made. 
Being cautious, I answered yes. It proved impossible: the 
program requested that disk 3 was inserted, then failed to 
recognise it correctly. I restarted, and re-installed without 
making an emergency diskette. No matter what I did, the 
program stopped after installing 29 files (750 KB), produced 
the wonderfully vague error message: 'Error in transferring 
IBM Antivirus files', and refused to continue. 
This error was at least consistent - another set of disks sent 
to VB at the same time exhibited the same problem. So here 
1 am, for the second consecutive month with a product 
which would not install correctly. After a few tests, and 
several phone calls to the manufacturer, it was apparent that 
the second and third disks in the set (which seemed identi­
cal) contained files dated 1987 (I get all the most recent 
stuff!): they referred to mouse drivers with instructions 
provided in Swedish, French, German (and seemingly every 
conceivable European language). 
The fact that the second and third disks were identical, and 
contained nonsense, was not the source of the problems 
described above. The installation process did not even get as 
far as asking for disk 2 before it died. 
To cut a long story short, I downloaded a new version of the 
software from the IBM BBS. This worked properly, and 
installed under DOS and Windows. A plaudit is in order here 
for the Technical Support people, who did well in digging 
me out of my hole. I always received sensible advice, phone 
calls were returned promptly, and a solution did eventually 
appear. Maybe they've had a lot of practice! Just a joke... 
The new downloaded version of the product gave no 
trouble. The DOS version installed 49 files which occupied 
1.65 MB; the Windows version, 57 files in 2.99 MB. DOS 
installation takes significantly less time than that for 
Windows. IBM AntiVirus installed all its files into a person­
ally selected location, and is able to alter AUTOEXEC.BAT, 
or store the desired changes in a separate file for later 
manual insertion. 
Under both DOS and Windows, the install program offered 
to make an emergency diskette containing a stripped-down 
IBM AntiVirus, for use in extremis. I am sure that many 
users would infer from its name that the emergency diskette 
would facilitate resurrection of a PC if anything went wrong, 
i.e. that the floppy was more than a diskette-based virus 
detection system - which it is not. 
V a r i o u s o p t i o n s a r e a v a i l a b l e f o r s c a n n i n g . T h e t i m e t a k e n b y 
IBM AntiVirus t o c o m p l e t e a s c a n , a f t e r i t s i n i t i a l e x e c u t i o n , 
c o m p a r e s f a v o u r a b l y w i t h t h e m a r k e t l e a d e r s . 
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De-installation is very simple, albeit not self-evident. If the 
Windows version has been used, it is simply a matter of 
removing a line from the file WTN.INI, removing two lines 
from AUTOEXEC.BAT, and manually deleting the Win­
dows group and the associated IBM Antivirus icon. 
Disk Checking 
The first time the product executes, it says it is 'initialising 
its database', i.e. it searches through all hard disks to decide 
which files should be checked, scans each, and, if unin­
fected, calculates a checksum for each. This takes a long 
time (II minutes 2 seconds under Windows, 9 minutes 59 
seconds with DOS), but only happens on installation. All 
subsequent executions use this database to verify that files 
are unchanged, and scanning is then required only if 
something is found to be new, or altered in any way. 
Many setup options are provided: an automated check (each 
boot, daily, weekly or monthly), checking inside com­
pressed files (this is switched off by default, and adds 
considerably to the overall time taken to check a disk), 
scanning of high as well as 'normal' memory, and specifica­
tion of any desired combinations of drives/files. 
Although all options were left at their default values, the 
DOS version of the product detected 656 objects which 
required scanning, but the Windows version only found 648. 
IBM states that this is due to the fact that Windows locks 
certain files so they cannot be scanned. In both cases, 35 
seconds was spent scanning memory and counting how 
many objects should be scanned (mainly the latter) every 
time the hard disk of my test PC was checked. 
Subsequent executions of the product were much faster than 
the initial one. The Windows version checked my test PC's 
hard disk in 1 minute 40 seconds, when scanning for new or 
unchanged files. Under DOS, this took 1 minute 12 seconds. 
Using the 'scan unchanged files' option, the time taken rose 
to 7 minutes 20 seconds. This confirms the speed-up offered 
by the tactic of looking to see which files have changed, and 
scanning only those which have altered. In comparison, 
Dr Solomon's A VTK performed the same scan in 1 minute 
39 seconds, and Sophos' SWEEP in 1 minute 34 seconds. 
Accuracy 
The samples used for testing are listed in the Technical 
Details. Of the 239 parasitic viruses, 38 were detected as 
definite infections, 197 as probable. Only four parasitic 
viruses (WinVirus_14, 8888, and two copies of Starship) 
went undetected. All nine boot sector viruses were detected 
correctly, giving an overall detection rate of 98.3%. All 500 
Mutation Engine (MtE) samples were detected correctly. 
Results in all sets were identical whether the DOS or the 
Windows version was used. When a ZIP file containing 
many MtE test samples was checked, IBM Antivirus said 
only that the ZIP file was infected, and gave no indication of 
how many infected files were present. 
|"fl-Help F2=KEM5 help F3=E)clt 
T h e m e m o r y - r e s i d e n t c o m p o r t e n t o f IBM AntiVirus, D O S S h i e l d , 
c o n t a i n s f e a t u r e s a l l o w i n g fo r v a r i o n s t y p e s o f c h e c k i n g . T h e 
o p t i o n s h o w n a b o v e i s a c t i v e b y d e f a u l t . 
The viruses found by this product are split into 'definite' 
and 'probable' infections. The majority, 85%, are detected 
as 'probable', though they are viruses. The false positive 
rate was zero. As for Number_of_the_Beast, Vacsina and 
Yankee, some samples were detected as 'definite'; others, 
only 'probable'. Why? IBM's answer is that the product only 
identifies a virus as 'definite' if it is byte-for-byte identical 
with the one analysed; if similar, it is described as 'probable'. 
Memory-resident Program 
IBM AntiVirus includes a memory-resident feature called 
DOS Shield, comprising several components which are 
loaded sequentially, as desired. The separate parts claim to 
'Prevent common DOS viruses', 'Warn when viral activity 
occurs', 'Check diskette boot records', and 'Check files 
when opened'. Each component provides a concise onscreen 
explanation of its function when it loads into memory. Only 
the first and third of these components are active by default; 
the others must be explicitly selected. 
The setup screen gives an accurate indication of how much 
memory various combinations of these components will use. 
Although high memory can be used to reduce the amount of 
conventional RAM that is required, only one component 
(Prevent common DOS viruses) can use expanded memory. 
Use of high memory and/or expanded memory can be 
altered at will by the user. 
When all four components are active simultaneously, 18 KB 
of conventional (high) memory, and 16 KB of expanded 
memory is required; an eminently acceptable total. 
Memory-resident software is notoriously difficult to test 
with accuracy, but I did my best. With all the memory-
resident components active, I used Norton Commander to 
copy a test-set containing one of each of the viruses listed in 
the Technical Details section (148 viruses in total) from one 
disk to another. DOS Shield reported 28 files as infected -
not encouraging. IBM's rationale is that DOS Shield should 
focus on those viruses which the user is likely to encounter. 
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I often use 4DOS (a command interpreter which is a 
replacement for COMMAND.COM): when this was in use, 
and infected files were copied using the COPY command, 
all infected files were detected correctly. 
After 52 files had been copied, this command produced the 
onscreen error message Too many open files' for each file it 
attempted to copy. After this, the PC produced that same 
error in response to every DOS command, and a reboot was 
required. IfC0MMAND.COM was used, COPY terminated 
when the first virus-infected file was encountered, and an 
error message appeared on screen. Version 2.3 of the 
product, according to IBM, does not contain this problem. 
The memory-resident program did not detect virus-infected 
files within a compressed ZIP file. This is unsurprising, as 
such a facility would probably add a large overhead to . 
system execution. However, when I extracted virus-infected 
files from a compressed ZIP file, there was no complaint 
from the software. Given that this created many new virus-
infected files, it did seem something of an omission. 
I tested the overhead added by the memory-resident soft-
ware by copying 20 files (585 KB): the time taken to do this 
was approximately the same whether or not DOS Shield was 
installed, and no matter which component parts were active. 
Oddly, my timing measurements showed much greater 
variation when DOS Shield was installed. Given that the 
variation could be anything up to a one-second alteration in 
an 11 second file copying time, this was much larger than 
any possible measurement error which I might have made. I 
cannot think of any reason why this should happen. 
The documentation does not explain the constraints imposed 
by the behaviour blocker component (it never does!). 
Therefore I formatted a floppy disk, ran SYS, then ran 
Norton's formatting program, and even edited absolute 
sectors of a floppy disk. All to no avail -1 could not induce 
an error message. Contact with IBM revealed that the 
company has designed DOS Shield to be able to distinguish 
between viral and normal system activity. 
The Rest 
Although DOS and Windows versions of IBM AntiVirus 
were provided, I could detect no difference between the two, 
apart from some screen representation details. Even the 
selections available on the drop-down menus are almost 
identical. On my test PC it took 10.9 seconds for the DOS 
version of IBM AntiVirus to load. Given that this was a 
33 MHz 486, it is likely that loading could become turgid on 
a slow 386, and unusable on anything less powerful. 
Disinfection facilities are provided with IBM AntiVirus, but 
in common with my usual practice, I have not assessed this 
capability. Be safe, delete all infected files; you know it 
makes sense. IBM AntiVirus maintains three logs files whilst 
disks are being checked: these provide thorough details of 
what happened on the last execution, the previous execution, 
and a cumulative log of all previous checks. 
Conclusions 
Given the problems I had with the version of IBM Antivirus 
originally provided for review, the phrases 'thorough 
testing' and Mack of (in no particular order) spring to mind. 
If IBM cannot come up with software which works when 
they know it is being provided for a review, what chance do 
ordinary punters have? 
IBM Antivirus detects viruses accurately and in a timely 
fashion. By combining the features of a scanner and a 
checksummer, the time taken to perform the initial check of 
a hard disk is quite slow. However, this only happens once, 
and all consequent checks are carried out more quickly than 
would be the case if scanning alone were used. 
Indeed, using its tactic of combining a scanner and a 
checksummer, IBM Antivirus can check disks at speeds 
which are faster than most anti-virus programs. Scanners 
which blindly search rarely-accessed comers of a hard disk 
are blundering through their search process for no reason, so 
it does seem logical to try and combine scanning and 
checksumming. As long as it is done carefully. 
The memory-resident component is not very good at 
spotting virus-infected files, and does not seem to prevent a 
user carrying out harmful actions. However, it occupies very 
little memory, and does not impose a large overhead. I 
suppose we should be grateful for small mercies. 
All this takes me back to the comparative scanner review 
published in the July edition of VB. This contained the 
conclusion that IBM Antivirus was 'one of the slowest 
products tested'. I disagree. The above review has shown 
that this is only true the first time a disk check is invoked. 
On subsequent checks, IBM Antivirus's combination of a 
scanner and a checksummer makes it faster than most 
products which rely solely on scanning. 
T c u h n f c a l D é t a i l s 
P r o d û e t : IBM AntiVirus \>2.2 ( n o s e r i a l n u m b e r a v a i l a b l e ) . 
D e v e l o p e r / V e B d o r ; ( U K ) r / Ô A f UK, N o r m a n d y H o u s e , A l e n c o n 
L i n l q B a s m g s t ò k e , H a m s , R G 2 I 1 E J . T e l 0 1 2 5 6 3 1 4 5 5 8 , 
f a x 0 1 2 5 6 3 3 2 3 1 9 . 
D e v e l o p e r / V e n d o r ( U S A ) : IBM Corporation, L o n g M e a d o w 
R ò a d , S t e r l i n g F o r e s i . N Y 1 0 9 7 9 - 0 7 0 0 . T e l + 1 9 1 4 7 5 9 2 9 0 1 , 
f a x + 1 9 1 4 7 8 4 6 0 5 4 . N o t e a l s o t h a t IBM p r o v i d e s s u p p o r t f o r î t s 
AntiVirus p r o g r a m t h r o u g h i l s u s u a i o u t l e t s i n a l m o s t e v e r y 
c o u n t r y i n t h e w o r l d . T h e d o c u m e n t a t i o n c o n t a i n s a v o l u m t n o u s 
l i s t o f c o n t a c t a d d r e s s e s a n d t é l é p h o n e m i m b e r s . 
A v a i l a b i l i t y : A n y IBM PC, P S / 2 , o r 1 0 0 % c o m p a t i b l e w i t h 
6 4 0 K b y t e s o f R A M , a n d D O S v e r s i o n 3 . 3 o r a b o v e . 
P r i c e : 1 - 2 5 0 u s e r s , £ 1 0 0 0 ; 2 5 1 - 5 0 0 , £ 2 0 0 0 ; 5 0 1 - 1 0 0 0 , £ 4 0 0 0 ; 
1 0 0 1 - 2 0 0 0 , £ 6 5 0 0 ; 2 0 0 1 - 3 0 0 0 , £ 9 5 0 0 ; 3 0 0 1 - 5 0 0 0 , £ 1 2 , 5 0 0 ; 
5 0 0 0 + o n a p p l i c a t i o n o n l y . I n c l u d e s q u a r t e r l y u p d a t e s . 
H a r d w a r e u s e d : A 3 3 M H z 4 8 6 P C c l o n e w i t h 3 . 5 - t n c h 
( 1 . 4 4 M B ) f l o p p y d i s k d r i v e , 5 . 2 5 - m c h ( 1 . 2 M B ) floppy d i s k 
d r i v e , a 1 2 0 M B h a r d d i s k a n d 4 M B o f R A M , u s i n g 
MS-DOSv5.Q0, Windows v3.l a n d Stacker v2. 
N B : F o r f u i ! d é t a i l s o f v i r u s e s u s e d f o r t e s t i n g p u r p o s e s , p l e a s e 
s e e VB, M a y 1 9 9 5 , p . 2 3 . 
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Virus Bulletin Ltd, 2 1 T h e Q u a d r a n t , A b i n g d o n , O x f o r d s h i r e , 
O X I 4 3 Y S , E n g l a n d 
T e l 0 1 2 3 5 5 5 5 1 3 9 , I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l + 4 4 1 2 3 5 5 5 5 1 3 9 
F a x 0 1 2 3 5 5 3 1 8 8 9 , I n t e r n a t i o n a l F a x + 4 4 1 2 3 5 5 3 1 8 8 9 
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p l a c e a t t h e c o m p a n y ' s t r a i n i n g s u i t e i n A b i n g d o n , a n d c o s t s £ 5 9 5 f o r 
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s c r e e n fade-tn/fade-out, a u t o m a t i c e n t e r i n g o f t h e w o r d ' p i c k l e ' , o r 
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p r o d u c t s a n d s e r v i c e s , i n c l u d i n g s o f t w a r e w h i c h p r o t e c t s P C u s e r s b y 
d e t e c t i n g a n d removing m o r e t h a n 6 0 0 0 s t r a i n s o f c o m p u t e r v i r u s . T h e 
Desktop Edition, t a r g e t e d a t h o m e u s e r s a n d s m a l l b u s i n e s s e s , n u i s o n 
OS/2, D O S , a n d Windows, w i t h Windows NT a n d Windows 95 s u p p o r t 
p l a n n e d f o r l a t e 1 9 9 5 . A i m e d a t l a r g e b u s i n e s s e s a n d c l i e n t / s e r v e r 
e n v i r o n m e n t , t h e Enterprise Edition i n c l u d e s IBM AntiVirus for OS/2, 
D O S , Windows, a n d NetWare. F o r i n f o r m a t i o n , c o n t a c t A n d r e a R . 
M i n o f f a t IBM; T e l +1 9 1 4 7 5 9 4 7 1 3 , e m a i l m i n o f f @ w a t s o n . L b m . c o m . 
T h e European Security Forum Annual Congress w i l l b e h e l d in 
C a n n e s , F r a n c e , from 1 5 - 1 7 O c t o b e r 1 9 9 5 . I n f o r m a t i o n o n t h e 
c o n f é r e n c e c a n b e o b t a i n e d from J u n e C h a m b e r s a t t h e E u r o p e a n 
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IN THIS ISSUE: 
• Hold the front page! Just when you thought it was 
safe, the macros are back. This month sees the appear-
ance of Laroux, the first Excel virus, in the wild. Turn to 
p.9 for the low-down. 
• Ethics et cetera. Distribution of viruses has always 
been a thomy problem, and the ever-increasing growth in 
the use of the Internet makes this problem more real than 
ever. Sarah Gordon présents some of her findings and 
thoughts on p.14. 
• Praying for salvation... Hare Krishna is not a phrase 
which one would usually associate with computer 
viruses: this is a fact which may now have to change. 
Hare.7610 is a new virus, laden with interesting fea-
tures... and it's in the wild. See p.l 1 for an analysis. 
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EDITORIAL 
What a Wonderful World 
i i after a certaìn 
distribution of a 
given virus has 
occurred, it will 
be extremely 
diffidili to 
eliminate that 
virus from the 
wild } y 
Every so often in this business, I get a stränge feeling. It always follows a thought of the 'what 
if...?' type. Some technical détails will follow, sometimes of a viral technique, often of flaws in any 
one of more than thirty anti-virus products, possibly even of a vulnerability in UNIX or Windows 
NT. After a few minutes of mental élaboration, that stränge feeling dawns: terrible inevitability. 
Take, for example, macro viruses. In August last year, along came Concept. Shortly after this, many 
possibilities occurred to those involved, most notably the likelihood of other applications being 
affected by similar créations in the future. One word kept recurring... inévitable. 
From the massed ranks of thèse 'other applications', one primary contender emerged: another 
member of the vastly-popular Microsoft Office suite, the most over-featured spreadsheet yet to hit 
the market (presumably only to be overshadowed by subséquent versions...), Excel. Just as Word is 
the common denominator of word processing Systems, Excel is fast becoming the spreadsheet format 
of choice. As if that wasn't enough, it incorporâtes a macro-ing system ( Visual Basic for 
Applications, or VBA) orders of magnitude more powerful than Word's (WordBasic). That word 
again: inévitable. 
One year later, it has come to pass. Like an echo of Concept, Laroux raises its head above the 
parapet of conjecture and into the blinding light of reality; the first (well, the first to be discovered) 
Excel virus (see analysis, p.9). 
The similarities with Concept are marked. There is no payload. The code contains some curiosities, 
but it is starkly functional, and by and large works well. It began to circuiate in the wild before 
anyone noticed it, and although at this point the size of the distribution is not known, the fact that it 
is so firmly in the wild gives it a significant advantage. Not only is it the first of its type, it has also 
been placed (presumably intentionally, although conceivably by accident) into the wild by its author. 
We also don't know how long Laroux has been in the wild, which will have at least some hearing on 
how far it has spread - another significant factor determining the eventual spread of the virus is 
where it was introduced. Clearly, initially introducing the virus into a large multinational company 
with thousands of Excel users worldwide should result in a much wider spread than uploading one 
spreadsheet labelled 'Interesting numbers' to a bulletin board in Venezuela. 
There is, alas, only one clear distinction here - that between a virus being in the wild, and being 
only found in laboratories. Once it is out there, the question of how much it is out there is secondary 
in importance. 
It is to be expected that things will now follow the path established by Concept - we will see a 
number of rushed, and correspondingly careless, copycat attempts, and quick and dirty modifications 
by other authors; then we will see slicker, better-written follow-ups. However, by this time, 
anti-virus companies will have rushed around and come up with a range of 'fixes' for the problem. 
One hopes that they will be able to make faster headway than was possible with the Concept virus, 
as the basis of the file format of Excel spreadsheets is the same OLE format used for Word docu-
ments, and most major manufacturera have already built parsers for this into their scanners. How-
ever, there is stili plenty of complexity to go around, as Excel has its own data formats hiding 
undemeath the OLE structure. For this it's back to reverse engineering, as Microsoft is bound to be 
as récalcitrant as ever with its information. 
If the £rce/-using community is lucky, defences will be developed before the virus is able to gain 
the firm foothold in the real world that Concept has managed. The idea of 'criticai mass' has a place: 
after a certain distribution of a given virus has occurred, it will be extremely difficult to eliminate 
that virus from the wild (by wiping it out amongst the user community), regardless of the effective-
ness of the defences introduced, in much the same way as stopping a nuclear reaction becomes next 
to impossible once the neutron flood is too strong. Perhaps it's not such a wonderful world after ali... 
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NEWS 
MS Licenses AV... Again 
At the beginning of July, McAfee Associates announced that 
it has licensed 'portions of its anti-vinis technology' to 
Microsoft Corporation for use in Microsoft s Intemet 
software products. 
As readers who follow Internet trends will be aware, 
Microsoft is involved in a battle with Netscape for domina-
tion of the WWW browser market - Microsoft 's Internet 
Explorer and Netscape 's Navigator have been engaged in a 
ferocious 'features war' for several months now. 
Already, anti-virus add-ins to Navigator are available (though 
see End Notes and News for further détails). This move by 
Microsoft appears to be designed to remove Netscape's 
advantage in this area. It remains to be seen how Microsoft 
will provide virus information updates - VB is mindful of 
the long drawn-out and thoroughly painful MSA V fiasco I 
Secure Checking? 
At the end of June, Secure Computing (formerly Virus News 
International) announced the création of the Secure 
Computing Checkmark scheme. Labelled as 'security product 
certification', it will apply initially only to anti-virus products, 
although Secure Computing intends to extend the scheme to 
encompass other security products 'in due course'. 
The testing revolves around detecting those viruses in the 
wild (Joe Wells' fVildList will be used as the primary source 
for information as to which viruses are out there). A product 
must score 100% in the tests to be awarded the Checkmark. 
Once the Checkmark has been obtained, the manufacturer is 
granted the right to use a logo on its marketing material. 
Additionally, a certificate is issued for the CheckMarked 
product, stating that it has been approved by Secure Com-
puting: this may be included in product packaging. 
The scheme is superficial ly similar in nature to the NCSA 
system, but will not, one hopes, be beset by problems to the 
same extent. The costs are difficult to calcúlate, but a press 
reléase from Secure Computing places the cost between 
£2200 and £9500 per product for the first year, and £1800 
and £4500 per product in subséquent years. 
Developers already signed up (initial testing for which will 
take place later this year) include Command Software, 
DataFellows, ESaSS, Reflex Magne tics, S&S and Symantec I 
Corrections: In the July 1996 scanner comparative review, 
VB incorrectly Iisted PCVP's version number as 2.23: it should 
have been 233. For the same product, infected floppy scan time 
was Iisted as 31, but should have read 0:31; i.e. 31 seconds. 
Further, Gregg from Command Software points out that 
FDISK /MBR will not remove Boot.437 from a hard drive -
SYS C: is required (where C: is the drive in question). 
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Prevalence Table - June 1996 
Virus Type Inc idents Repor ts 
Concept Macro 67 19 .5% 
Form.A Boot 34 9.9% 
Parity_Boot Boot 28 8 . 1 % 
AntjEXE Boot 25 7.3% 
NYB Boot 17 4 .9% 
Junkie Boot 14 4 . 1 % 
AnüCMOS.A Boot 12 3.5% 
Ripper Boot 11 3.2% 
Empire. Monkey. B Boot 9 2.6% 
Sampo Boot 9 2 .6% 
Quandary Boot 8 2 .3% 
Imposter Macro 5 1.5% 
Jumper. B Boot 5 1.5% 
Stealth_Boot.C Boot 5 1.5% 
Telefonica Multi 5 1.5% 
Burglar.1150 File 4 1.2% 
Bye Boot 4 1.2% 
Empire.Monkey.A Boot 4 1.2% 
Natas.4744 Multi 4 1.2% 
Stoned .Angelina Boot 4 1.2% 
WelcomB Boot 4 1.2% 
AntiCMOS.B Boot 3 0.9% 
Feint Boot 3 0.9% 
Manzon File 3 0.9% 
Russian_Flag File 3 0.9% 
SheJHas Boot 3 0 .9% 
Stat Boot 3 0.9% 
Stoned. Stonehenge Boot 3 0 .9% 
V-Sign Boot 3 0.9% 
Barrotes File 2 0.6% 
DieHard File 2 0.6% 
EXEBug Boot 2 0 .6% 
Stoned. Nolnt Boot 2 0.6% 
TaiPan.438 File 2 0.6% 
Tentacle File 2 0.6% 
Wazzu Macro 2 0.6% 
Other" 1 28 8 . 1 % 
Total 344 1 0 0 % 
m
 The Prevalence TaWe includes one report oí each oí the 
following: Amoeba. Boot.437. BootEXE.451. Bug70. Cascade. 
Oazy_BooL Cruel, Diablo. DMV. FaLAvenger. Hkjenowt.1747. 
Int40. J&M. Lozinsky.1958 Mongolian. Naughty, Neuroquila. 
Nomenklatura. One_Hatf.3544. Screaming_Fist.696, 
StealthJ3cot.E, Stoned.LZR. Stoned.Michelangelo. 
Stoned.Spirit, Trqjector,1463, Unashamed. Vacsina. WBoot. 
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IBM PC VIRUSES (UPDATE) 
The following is a list of updates and amendments to 
the Virus Bulletin Table ofKnown IBM PC Viruses as 
of 21 July 1996. Each entry consists of the virus name, 
its aliases (if any) and the virus type. This is followed 
by a short description (if available) and a 24-byte 
hexadecimal search pattern to detect the presence of the 
virus with a disk utility or a dedicated scanner which 
contains a user-updatable pattern library. 
Type Codes 
c I n f e c t s C O M f i l e s M I n f e c t s M a s t e r B o o t S e c t o r 
( T r a c k 0 , H e a d 0 , S e c t o r I ) 
D I n f e c t s D O S B o o t S e c t o r 
( l o g i c a l s e c t o r 0 o n d i s k ) N N o t m e m o r y - r e s i d e n t 
E I n f e c t s E X E f i l e s P C o m p a h i o n v i r u s 
L L i n k v i r u s R M e m o r y - r e s i d e n t a l l e r i n f e c t i o n 
Alho.676 
AOS.863 
Blin. 1488 
Caco.2965 
Caco.3310 
Critter.1015 
Deadwin.1228 
Doll a. 1163 
Epsilon.513 
IVP.495 
HLLP.7000 
CN: An appending, 676-byte, fast, direct infector. It contains the text: 'CTRJ_,SH1FT & ALT keys are 
reserved for internal use' and, at the end of infected Files, the string 'Alho'. The virus contains a n internai 
counter: after 20 generations it hooks the interrupt Int 09h and monitors a usage of Ctrl, Shift or Alt keys. 
A l h o . 6 7 6 8 A 2 4 2 6 B 8 2 5 F 3 A 4 0 6 1 F 3 3 D 2 B 8 0 9 2 5 C D 2 1 C 3 5 0 1 E 3 3 COBE D 8 F 6 
CER: A stealth, encrypted 863-byte virus which disables VSAFE (the memory-resident component of 
Microsoft Ami-Virus). The virus contains the text: 'M*A*D,#*C*0*W*#*D*I*S*E*A*S*E', and all 
infected files have their time-stamps set to 6 seconds. 
A O S . 8 6 3 5 0 5 9 B A 0 1 F A B S 4 5 5 9 9 2 C D 1 6 9 2 9 2 9 2 9 2 9 2 9 2 9 2 B 9 A F O I B B ? ? ? ? 
ER: A n encrypted, polymorphic, 1488-byte virus containing the text: '[ Treblinka V 2.01 by Blas Pascal ] 
. Argentina . xx/06/1995 .' A H infected files have the string 'BP' located at offset 12h (checksum i n EXE 
header). The following template can be used to detect the virus i n memory. 
B l i n . 1 4 8 8 3DCA B 0 7 5 0 3 8 B F 8 C F 3 D 0 0 4 B 7 4 0 5 2 E F F 2 E 4 F 0 0 E B 8 4 0 4 0 6 9 C 6 0 
CER: A stealth, appending, 2965-byte virus containing the plain-text message: 'CACO VIRUS GENE-
101. COCO, ALDO, CHINO, OTTO. DOOM-TEAM &CREADORES DE VIRUS&'. All infected files 
have their time-stamps set to 60 seconds. 
C a c o . 2 9 6 5 3 3 D B B S 0 3 F E C D 2 1 5 E 3 3 D 2 5 6 8 1 F B 4 5 4 6 7 5 2 3 2 E 3 A A C 9 2 0 B 7 7 1 F 
CER: A stealth, appending, 3310-byte variant of the above virus. All infected files have their time-stamps 
set to 60 seconds. 
C a c o . 3 3 1 0 3 3 D B B 8 F F FDCD 2 1 5 E 3 3 D 2 5 6 8 1 F B 4 1 4 C 7 5 2 3 2 E 3 A A C E B 0 C 7 7 1 F 
CR: An appending, 1015-byte virus containing the text: '[PGa] a critter from DC has infected U ;)' which 
is visible at the end of all infected files. The virus reinfects already-infected programs. 
C r i t t e r . 1 0 1 5 B A 3 4 1 2 8 0 F C 3 0 B 4 3 0 7 4 2 0 C D 2 1 8 1 F A 1 2 3 4 B 9 ? ? ? ? 7 4 0 E 8 B D 8 8 1 
CER: An encrypted, appending, 1228-byte virus containing the text: 'Dead to Windows!' and 'hard disk 
destroyed!'. The virus payload (triggering on 13 November, 21 June and any Friday) includes the 
formatting of disks and screen effects. 
D e a d w i n . l 2 2 B B 9 4 8 0 2 2 E B B 3 C F 7 D 7 2 3 F D F 7 D 5 2 E 2 1 2 C 2 E 0 9 3 C F 7 D 5 4 6 4 6 E 2 E B 
CER: A stealth, encrypted, appending, 1163-byte vims. It contains the text: 'Good bytes from (DEL)ta 
Virus !!! Reset in 30 seconds !' and 'Brazil - 02/96'. This virus triggers on 4 November: its payload 
changes the CMOS data, disabling the hard disk and destroying the information on floppy drive types. 
The virus then reboots the system. 
D e l t a . 1 1 6 3 1 F 0 E 0 7 B E 2 3 0 0 0 3 F 5 8 B F E B 9 S 0 0 4 3 E 8 A 6 6 0 4 F C A C 3 2 C4AA E 2 F A 
EPR: A 513-byte (effective virus length) virus which contains the encrypted string: 'COMMAND' and 
the plain-text message: *<Epsilon 1.0 (C) 15.3.1995 B.T.Pir8>'. Unlike other companion viruses, it 
creates COM files that are not marked as hidden and have different lengths (the virus appends to its code a 
variable number of 'rubbish' bytes). 
E p s i l o n . 5 1 3 3 D F C 0 C 7 5 0 4 B 8 F 3 F 3 C F 6 0 3 D 0 O 4 B 7 5 0 3 E 8 0 6 0 0 6 1 2 E F F 2 E B D 0 2 
CN: An appending, 495-byte, fast, direct infector. It contains the plain-text message: 'BiATcHSiQBOY' 
and 'Hi, my name is Kevin S, and I live in you kompewtor! EyE yEWs 2 bE LeeT, SeW PHeAR mAH! 
(Fairfax, Va)'. A l l infected files are marked with the signature ' C A ' located at offset 0003h. 
I V P . 4 9 5 A 5 C 6 8 6 5 F 0 3 E 9 8 9 9 E 6 0 0 3 C 7 8 6 6 2 0 3 4 3 4 1 B 9 0 5 O 0 E 9 0 0 0 0 5 1 3 3 
CEN: A n appending vims, 7000 bytes long, which contains the text: 'Superviced by Stork Oeba 5/1/95'. 
Because it was written in high level language, other plain-text messages are visible; e.g. 'Portions 
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IVP.674 
Jorgito.730 
KorWan.1448 
Lazer.1000 
Nado.584 
Nado.602 
Nado.759 
Oktubre.1784 
Pindonga.2072 
Shoe.1904 
Ups. 1155 
V.514 
V.699 
V.768 
Copyright (c) 1983,90 Borland', 'This program cannot be executed in a Window's shell.', and 'This 
program requires Windows.' 
H L L P . 7 0 0 0 0 3 4 3 4 P 4 D 0 3 4 5 5 8 4 5 5 5 8 9 E 5 B 8 2 C 0 4 9 A 7 C 0 2 7 B 0 0 8 1 E C 2 C 0 4 C 4 
CEN: An appending, 674-byte, fast, direct infector containing the text: 'Hard Disk Failure Lady Seiler' 
and -*.com *.exe The virus contains a destructive payload; its trigger is based on the system date and 
includes formatting disks. 
I V P . 6 7 4 C D 2 1 7 2 0 7 E 8 6 2 0 0 B 4 4 F E B F 5 B 4 2ACD 2 1 8 1 F 9 C C 0 7 7 3 0 9 B 4 0 9 8 D 
ER: An appending, 730-byte virus. Once a year, on 14 March (beginning in March 1998) t h e virus 
displays the usually-encrypted message: 'Jorgite Was Here Cordoba Argentina'. 
J o r g i t o . 7 3 0 BBD7 F 9 9 3 C D 2 1 3 D 8 3 7 8 7 4 7 2 B B 4 1 5 4 4 3 8 B C 3 0 5 F E 7 5 C D 2 F 9 3 8 0 
CER: A prepending (in COM files), appending (EXE files), 1448-byte (COM) and 1518-byte (EXE) 
virus which contains the text: '[The Wanderer, June 5th,1994 Korea]'. All infected files have their time-
stamps set t o 62 seconds. 
K o r W a n . 1 4 4 6 9 0 9 C 3 D 6 2 F 0 7 5 0 4 3 3 C 0 9 D C F 8 0 F C 1 1 7 5 0 3 E 9 2 D 0 5 8 0 F C 1 2 7 4 F 8 
CN: An encrypted, appending, 1000-byte direct infector infecting one file at a time. Amongst other text, 
the virus contains: "".com', 'cAcommand.com', '*.*', and *-= =ßLA2SRs=- (c)'1994\ 
L a z e r . 1 0 0 0 2 B C F E B 0 3 9 0 ? ? ? ? 8 A A 6 4 9 0 1 A C 3 2 C 4 E B 0 3 9 0 ? ? ? ? A A E 2 F 5 E 9 A E 
CR: A stealth, appending, 584-byte virus which contains the text: '[ RedViper (c) made by TorNado in 
Denmark '95 ]'. The virus displays a red flashing cursor. All infected files have their time-stamps set t o 
58 seconds. 
N a d o . 5 8 4 B 8 1 1 7 4 C D 2 1 8 1 F B 5 6 5 2 7 4 5 3 B 4 4 A B B F F F F C D 2 1 8 3 E B 2 6 9 0 B 4 4 A 
CR: A stealth, encrypted, 602-byte virus containing the text: '[Undying Lover vl.01][by 
WarBlaDE/DC '96]'. All infected files have their time-stamps set to 58 seconds. The following is the 
longest possible témplate which can detect all infected files. 
B a d o . 6 0 2 3 1 1 4 4 6 4 6 E 2 F A C 3 3 B 8 B 9 6 3 A 0 2 8 D B 6 1 2 0 0 B 9 1 0 0 1 E B E B 
CR: A stealth, encrypted, 759-byte virus containing the text: '[ CyberBug v. 1.00 ][ made by 
TorNado DK JCyberbug.bat'. The virus créâtes a file 'cyberbug.bat' containing only one line: 'echo > 
clockS*. Executing such a file destroys current system date and time values and usually crashes the 
S y s t e m . All infected files have their time-stamps set to 2 seconds. 
N a d o . 7 5 9 E 8 0 0 0 0 C D 0 1 E 8 1 6 0 0 E 8 0 0 0 0 5 D B 1 E D 0 E 0 1 E S C E 0 2 E 8 4 5 0 2 E 8 0 D 
CER: A stealth, encrypted, 1784-byte virus containing the text: 'Feliz aniversario Digital Anarchy!!', 
'CHKLIST.MS', 'ANTI-V1R.DAT' and 'Virus OKTUBRE Ver 1.0a By Bugs Bunny [DAN] (c) 
26/12/94 Digital Anarchy'. All infected files have their time-stamps set to 40 seconds On 6 October, the 
virus overwrites the contents of the first physical hard disk. 
O k t u b r e . 1 7 8 4 E 8 0 0 0 0 B 4 F P 0 5 5 D F 8 7 2 F C 8 1 E D 0AO0 1 E 0 6 0 E 0 E 1 F 0 7 B 9 A 3 0 6 6 D 
CER: An encrypted, slightly polymorphic, 2072-byte virus which contains several destructive payloads, 
including: corrupting CMOS data, overwriting the hard disk, refusing to exécute programs from under 
Windows. On 16 and 18 September, the virus may also display the text: 'PINDONGA Virus VI.4. (Hecho 
en ARGENTINA) Programado por: OTTO (16/9/77) Saludos a: MAQ-MARIANO-SERGIO-
ERNESTRO-COSTRA PD: Alguien mate a Bill Gates (El WINDOWS SE CUELGA)'. No simple 
témplate for detecting ali infected files exists; the following string detects the virus in memory. 
P i n d o n g a . 2 0 7 2 B 4 0 3 B 1 0 2 S O C D 1 3 5 8 F E C 6 3 A 3 6 0 0 0 9 7 F 0 7 8 0 F D 1 0 7 4 OBEB E 9 3 2 
ER: A stealth, encrypted, slightly polymorphic, 1904-byte virus armoured with some anti-debugging 
procédures. It contains a destructive payload. On 1 January, the virus may overwrite first 112 sectors of a 
hard disk and display the message: 'OOPS .. Sony For help cali now: 555-SHOE or 555-RGNE No rights 
reserved by M.WEÍNHOLD'. No simple témplate to detect all infected files exists; the following string 
can be used t o find the virus in memory. 
S h o e . 1 9 0 4 3 D C E F A 7 5 0 7 B 8 A F E C 9DCA 0 2 0 0 9 D 9 C 2 E F F 1 E 7 A 0 7 C A 0 2 0 0 9 C 2 E 
CN: An encrypted, appending, 1155-byte, fast direct infector containing the text: *!\ o H iTs X - M A S / ' . 
'*.COM' and '\ThE_UpS-IsT_HiEr/'. From time to time, the virus displays the graphie image o f a skull. 
U p s . 1 1 5 5 8 B 9 4 0 8 0 1 8 9 F 3 8 1 C 3 4 5 0 1 B 9 3 E 0 4 3 1 1 7 4 3 E 2 F B 5 B C 3 5 E 8 1 E E 0 6 
CR: An appending, 514-byte virus containing the text: '*,COM' and '????????COM'. All infected files 
are marked with the byte OAAh located a t the end o f the file. 
V . 5 1 4 B 9 0 0 0 4 F 3 A 4 0 6 1 F B A F 1 0 1 B 8 2 1 2 5 C D 2 1 0 E 1 F 8 9 E B C 3 3DO0 4 B 7 4 
CER: A prepending, 699-byte virus containing the encrypted text: *7.11.V3b'. I t corrupts some infected files. 
V . 6 9 9 B 8 F D F F C D 2 1 8 1 F B 1 1 0 7 7 5 2 9 B C 0 6 0 C O 0 C 7 0 6 0 A 0 0 B 9 O 0 B 4 4 C C D 
CN: A prepending, 768-byte direct infector, which infects one file a t a time. It contains the text: '*.com' 
and does not infect COMMAND.COM. All infected files have their time-stamps set to 62 seconds. The 
V I R U S B U L L E T I N © 1 9 9 6 V i r u s B u l l e t i n L i d , T h e P e n t a g o n , A b i n g d o n , O i f o r d s h i r e , O X 1 4 3 Y P , E n g l a n d . T e l + 4 4 1 2 3 5 5 5 5 1 3 9 . / 9 6 / S 0 . 0 O + 2 . 5 0 
N o pa r i o f t h i s p u b l i c a t i o n m a y b e r e p r o d u c e d , s t o r e d in a r e t r i eva l S y s t e m , o r t r a n s m i t t e d in a n y f o r m w i i h o u t t h e p r i o r w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n of t h e p u b l i s h e r s . 
6 • VIRUS BULLETIN AUGUST 1996 
V.1097 
VCC.339 
VCC.581 
VCC.6I3 
VCC.784 
Voyager. 1134 
virus payload includes a procedure which overwrites the DOS Boot Sector of the current disk. 
V . 7 6 8 B 9 B 8 0 2 8 9 O E 9 0 0 0 A 3 9 2 0 0 A 1 0 4 0 0 2 D 8 7 0 4 7 4 1 4 2 B 0 6 4 C 0 O 3 D 3 B 
EN: An appending, 1097-byte direct infector. It contains a payload that includes deleting files with the 
extension 'zip'. The plain-text ASCII string TnTrnfsmvu2/-)v_Hitmru07Vsmsfs$' is visible at the end of 
infected files. 
V . 1 0 9 7 E 8 2 A F F 8 0 F C F F 7 4 0 A BAA7 0 4 0 3 D 5 B 4 4 1 C D 2 1 C 3 B 4 F F C 3 B 8 0 0 4 2 
CN; An encrypted, appending, 399-byte, fast direct infector containing the text: 'Marvin the paranoid 
android'. The payload, which triggers randomly, installs a new Int 21 h, which truncates the length of 
every file loaded for execution to 0 bytes. Infected files have their time-stamps set to 4 seconds. 
V C C . 3 3 9 CAES 1 6 0 0 E B 2 6 E B 1 1 0 0 8 D 9 6 0 3 0 1 B 9 5 3 0 1 B 4 4 0 C D 2 1 E 8 0 3 0 0 C 3 
CR: An encrypted, appending, 581-byte virus which contains the text 'Mary Reilly'. The virus does not 
infect files which have their time-stamps set to any of the following seconds values: 36, 38, 44, 46, 52, 
54, 60 and 62. 
V C C . 5 B 1 4 5 0 3 8 D B E 3 E 0 1 B A D I 0 0 4 7 4 7 E B 0 5 9 0 B 4 4 C C D 2 1 B 4 0 B C D 2 1 E 2 F 1 
CR: An encrypted, appending, 613-byte virus containing the text 'The Grim Reaper'. It does not infect 
files which have their time-stamps set to one of following values: 56, 58, 60 and 62 seconds. 
V C C . 6 1 3 E 5 F 7 1 5 B 1 0 5 9 E 1 6 F 7 1 5 4 7 . 4 7 E B 0 5 9 0 B 4 4 C C D 2 1 8 4 0 B C D 2 1 E 2 E 5 
CR: A stealth, encrypted, appending, 784-byte virus containing the text: '*() Mary Mai Ion = Typhoid 
Mary )(*'. All infected files have their time-stamps set to 60 or 62 seconds, but the stealth routine ignores 
the latter. 
V C C . 7 B 4 3 5 E C 8 F F E 0 5 F 7 1 5 F 7 1 5 4 7 4 7 E B 0 5 9 0 B 4 4 C C D 2 1 B 4 0 B C D 2 1 E 2 B A 
CN: An appending, 1134-byte direct infector which does not infect programs 'WI*.*' and 'CO*.*' 
(e.g. win.com, command.com). The virus contains the text: '\*.*', '\*.vom' and 'Voyager (.com) is here'. 
V o y a g e r . 1 1 3 4 8 0 B E 4 1 0 4 E 9 7 5 0 7 8 0 B E 4 4 0 4 2 1 7 4 1 3 BOBE 4 2 0 4 5 A 7 5 0 7 8 0 B E 4 1 
FEATURE 1 
Generic Decryption 
Scanners: The Problems 
Carey Nachenberg, Alex Haddox 
Anti-virus researchers strive to design their virus scanners to 
be as general as possible, so that the largest number of 
viruses can be detected without significant and continuing 
modifications to the engine itself. This strategy reduces the 
number of required changes to the anti-virus program, and 
diminishes the need for regression testing and frequent, 
expensive upgrade shipments. 
This has led to a largely data-based solution to the anti-virus 
problem. It is quite economical to post a non-executable data 
file publicly, for clients to retrieve at their leisure. Further­
more, software developers need not worry about software 
piracy since this data file is useless without the executable 
portion of the anti-virus program. 
Unfortunately, the very nature of computer viruses makes it 
impossible to design an anti-vims system that can detect 
current and future viruses without executable updates. New 
viruses are being developed constantly, and growing 
numbers use detection-resistant techniques to thwart existing 
anti-virus algorithms. 
Often, anti-virus researchers develop specialized detection 
routines to deal with these exceptional viruses. However, 
when enough of these viruses exist, they invalidate the 
current detection paradigm, and force the development of an 
entirely new technology. Consequently, the anti-virus 
software of today is a patchwork of many detection schemes 
and engines. 
Virus writers have already forced many shifts in anti-virus 
technology. For instance, when anti-virus programs first 
developed the capability to detect unchanging viruses, the 
virus authors reacted by developing polymorphic viruses. To 
detect these polymorphic viruses, anti-vims researchers 
developed the CPU emulator-based Generic Decryption 
(GD) scheme. 
Now, with the increasingly widespread use of such emulator 
technology, it is only a matter of time before the virus authors 
design insidious new viruses to invalidate the CPU emula­
tion technique. 
What is Generic Decryption? 
Current polymorphic viruses contain at least a small body of 
machine language instructions and data which is copied 
verbatim from infection to infection. For the polymorphic 
virus to avoid detection, this static portion of the virus is 
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encrypted within infected fdes. When a program infected 
with a Polymorphie virus is launched by a user, the virus 
takes control, and launches its decryption routine to decrypt 
the static portion of the virus. Once this routine finishes 
decrypting the virus body, it transfers control to the body so 
the virus can replicate. 
The GD scanner relies on this behaviour to detect Polymor-
phie viruses. Each time the GD anti-virus program scans a 
new exécutable fde, it loads it into a 'virtual computer' 
(i.e. a simulation of a PC). The program is then allowed to 
exécute in this virtual computer as if it were running on a 
real machine. 
Düring exécution, if the target fde is infected with a virus, it 
can cause no damage to the actual computer, because it 
exécutes in a completely contained, virtual environment. 
If the GD scanner émulâtes a program infected by a Poly-
morphie virus, the virus exécutes its decryption routine. This 
routine proceeds to decrypt the static portion of the virus 
within the virtual computer. 
As the virus exécutes, the Generic Decryption anti-virus 
scanner monitore the progress of its exécution. When the 
virus has decrypted enough of itself, the anti-virus scanner 
examines thèse decrypted régions and identifies the strain of 
the virus exactly. 
14the goal ofthe GD scanner is to 
emulate as few instructions as 
possible, while stili cletecting ail 
infections virus samples" 
The Generic Decryption scanner identifies the virus by 
searching for specific sequences of bytes which are certain 
to be present in the static (previously encrypted) portion of 
the virus. Of course, like other virus scanning technology, 
the GD scheme requires anti-virus researchers to analyse the 
vims, extract a virus signature and insert the signature into 
the scanner database. 
In essence, this process is like injecting a mouse with a 
serum which may or may not contain a virus, and then 
observing the mouse for adverse effects. If the mouse 
becomes ill (that is, if the virus manifests itself), researchers 
can observe the visible symptoms, match them with known 
symptoms, and identify the virus. If the mouse remains 
healthy, researchers can select another vial of serum and 
repeat the process. 
Generic Decryption systems provide accurate identification 
of polymorphic viruses and reduce dramatically the possibil-
ity of false identification or misidenufication. Such extreme 
accuracy is possible because the scanner examines the 
unchanging virus body instead of the ever-changing virus 
decryption routine. 
However, Generic Decryption anti-virus systems are not 
perfect: there are many ways in which viruses can and do 
avoid detection by GD-based scanners. The following 
sections describe several viruses, existing and theoretical, 
and discuss how they avoid detection by GD scanners. 
GD-resistant Viruses 
Most polymorphic viruses decrypt and transfer control to 
their virus body deterministically: a given infection will 
always decrypt and transfer control to the virus body in 
exactly the same manner. 
As a result, if the viral sample is emulated long enough, the 
static body will be decrypted and executed, making GD 
detection possible. However, viruses do not necessarily need 
to gain control of the computer every time an infected 
sample is executed. 
Consider a virus that uses polymorphic code to fetch a byte 
from an actively changing area of memory, such as the DOS 
disk buffers: 
• if the value of this byte is between a certain range, then 
the polymorphic code continues decryption and 
executes the virus body 
• if the value of this byte is outside the required range, the 
polymorphic code repairs the host program in memory 
and transfers control to the host program 
• every time the virus infects a new file, the location from 
which the byte is fetched and the required range is 
randomly changed 
This virus might gain control of the machine once in every 
ten executions of an infected program; however, such a 
program could still be quite infectious. Unfortunately, the 
GD scanner is simply unable to detect such a virus reliably. 
The GD would emulate the infected sample until it reached 
the random memory test. If the emulator's virtual memory 
happened to contain the appropriate value in the proper 
memory location, the polymorphic code would continue 
decrypting the virus, and the sample would be detected. If 
the emulator's virtual memory contained a different value, 
however, the virus would fail to decrypt itself and the GD 
scanner would fail to detect the virus. 
Given the number of possible memory states (well over 
28J8M08 f o r a s i m p i e [MB pQ f [i , s impossible to guarantee 
that such a virus infection would always find what it wants 
in the computer's memory and decrypt itself properly. The 
Commander_Bomber virus unknowingly employs a similar 
technique, making reliable GD-based detection impossible. 
There exists yet another technique which thwarts GD 
scanners completely. Generic Decryption requires that the 
virus gains control and decrypts itself as soon as the host 
program begins executing. Why? The GD scanner must 
decide how long to emulate each program before it stops to 
report that the file is uninfected. 
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The goal of the GD scanner is to emulate as few instructions 
as possible, while still detecting all infectious virus samples. 
To reduce the amount of time spent emulating programs, 
current GD schemes emulate the suspect program and 
examine the instructions used by the program in an attempt 
to determine whether the instructions look like those used by 
a polymorphic virus. 
If the instructions look suspicious, the GD scanner continues 
emulating the host in an attempt to get the (potential) virus 
to decrypt itself. If the instructions look like those of a 
'normal' program, the GD scanner assumes the program is 
uninfected and ceases emulation. 
Several existing viruses (such as Positron - see VB, Febru­
ary 1996, p.8) infect executable files so the virus receives 
control only after the host program has executed a number 
of its own instructions. 
Thus, when an infected program is launched, the virus may 
or may not gain control, depending on the nature of the 
infection. Even if the virus does receive control, it is most 
likely to do so after one or more instructions of the host 
program have been executed. 
"the virus-writing community is 
fully aware of GD's inherent 
weaknesses: it is only a matter of 
time before viruses which exploit 
these are constructed" 
When scanning such an infected file, a GD scanner would 
initially emulate the instructions of the host program rather 
than those of the virus. Consequently, the GD scanner 
would in many cases recognize these instructions as non-
viral and cease emulation almost immediately. The emulator 
would not emulate the file long enough to reach the virus, 
hence the virus would fail to decrypt itself, and the file 
would be reported clean. 
The emulator could be set always to emulate many thou­
sands or millions of instructions before reporting that a 
program is uninfected. However, even with this Draconian 
modification, there can be no guarantee that the emulator 
would emulate the host long enough to reach the virus 
decryption routine. 
In fact, there is no guarantee that the emulator would ever 
execute the instructions of the virus decryption routine, even 
if the emulation went on indefinitely! 
Imagine a program that merely waits for a key-press from 
the user and then terminates. This program might be infected 
by a virus such that the virus is given control just before the 
program terminates. In a typical interactive environment, 
such a virus would launch every time the infected program 
was executed by the user. 
However, given that the virtual machines used in GD 
scanners are non-interactive, the program could execute 
endlessly in the virtual machine, awaiting a key-press from a 
non-existent user. As the program would never receive a 
key-press and terminate, the virus would never have a 
chance to execute and decrypt itself. 
GD-pesky Viruses 
It is a difficult task to create a fully-compatible CPU 
emulator. Even a simple flaw that differentiates a CPU 
emulator from a real machine can be located and targeted by 
a virus writer. 
Even the 80x86 line of computers is not completely back­
wards compatible. Every processor is slightly different from 
its predecessors. For example, the pre-fetch queue on the 
80x386 chip is sixteen bytes long, but for the 486, the 
pre-fetch queue was expanded to 32 bytes, in order to 
increase performance. 
Consider an anti-virus product that uses the GD technology 
with an 80486-compatible CPU emulator. This emulator 
would be unable to execute properly a virus that employs 
polymorphic code designed to exploit the sixteen-byte pre­
fetch queue of the 80386 processor. 
Although it is true that this virus would also fail to execute 
on real 80486 machines, it might flourish on the large base 
of 80386 machines. Unless the Generic Decryption imple­
mentation applies several different emulators on each file, it 
will fail to detect this virus. Such a solution is impractical; 
even if it were implemented correctly, it would increase 
scanning time significantly. 
Conclusions 
The Generic Decryption scanning technique has so far 
proved to be the single most effective method of detecting 
polymorphic viruses. It allows anti-virus researchers to 
spend less time analysing specific polymorphic viruses, 
improves scanner performance, and reduces false positives. 
Despite these benefits, GD technology still has significant 
problems. Many different classes of polymorphic viruses 
simply cannot be detected reliably. Currently, there are a 
limited number of polymorphic viruses which employ such 
anti-detection schemes. 
However, the virus-writing community is fully aware of 
GD's inherent weaknesses: it is only a matter of time before 
viruses which exploit these are constructed. For this reason, 
the anti-virus community must remain ever-vigilant and 
never satisfied with current technology and implementation. 
The authors of this article are both anti-virus specialists 
at Symantec Corp. They can be contacted as follows: 
Carey Nachenberg: cnachenberg@symantec.com 
Alex Haddox: ahaddox@symantec.com 
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VIRUS ANALYSIS 1 
Excel Yourself! 
Sarah Gordon 
The number of macro viruses appears to increase on a 
weekly basis, although every new batch seems remarkably 
similar to the last. However, the most récent macro virus I 
have encountered requires special treatment: first, it was 
discovered in the wild; second, it infects Excel spreadsheet^, 
not Word documents. Do I have your attention yet? 
Just as we knew that many vulnerabilities existed in macro 
languages long before Winword.Concept reared its ugly (but 
persistent) head, we knew it was only a matter of lime before 
an Excel virus appeared in the wild. 
Excel spreadsheets have, in much the same way as Word 
documents, the potential to carry code which represents 
exécutable instructions in the Excel environment. And, also 
like Word, Excel does an excellent job of handling these 
macros; it usually does so flawlessly, without drawing much 
attention to itself. 
Fortunately, Laroux is less than elegant in its design, and 
Excel is liable to notify the user under certain circumstances 
that the virus' copy routine has failed. 
This otherwise unremarkable virus, ExcelMacro.Laroux, 
differs from its Worrf-based cousins in that it is written using 
Visual Basic for Applications ( VBA). [This is a much more 
powerful macro-ing language than that présent in current 
versions ofWord. Ed.] Clearly, therefore, Word users need 
not concern themselves with this particular virus, just as 
Excel users need not worry about Concept. 
The virus carries no deliberately destructive payload, and is 
only slightly more devious than the first Word macro 
viruses. It uses simple techniques to replicate and hide. 
Simple... but very effective. 
Hide and Seek 
As with all new viruses, I began testing cautiously, and opened 
the infected file I had been sent from a write-protected disk. 
Immediately, a design flaw in the virus became apparent. A 
dialog box titled 'Macro Error' popped up on my screen, 
telling me that a copy had failed, leadìng me to hope that the 
virus would prove ineffectuai. This hope was misplaced. 
[This box is only displayed when the current drive is write-
protected: if the user opens the fde by typing 'A:\INFO.XLS'. 
no error occurs. However, ifhe navigates to drive A, and 
sélects INFOJCLS. the warning is displayed. Ed.] 
Examining the virus proved easy - it could be done either 
by using Window/Unhide to reveal the hidden Worksheet, 
then selecting it from the tab display, or by using 
Tools/Macro to select a macro to edit. Either method could 
easily be subverted by future such viruses to trigger the 
virus, just as with Tools/Macro under Word. 
The first line of the virus code will be familiär to those who 
have examined Word viruses: 'Sub auto_open()\ Although 
the syntax is slightly différent from the Word équivalent, the 
purpose is the same: an Auto_Open macro (VBA is not case 
sensitive) is invoked whenever a spreadsheet is opened. 
This particular Auto_Open macro is very simple: it inserts a 
call to the second virus macro, called check_files, which is 
executed whenever a new Worksheet is activated. This is the 
virus' only other macro, and does most of the work. 
Check it Out... 
When activated, the check_files macro first obtains ExceTs 
start-up path; this was C:\MSOFFICE\EXCEL\XLSTART 
on my test computer, but will vary dépending on your 
installation. It then looks for the file PERSONAL.XLS in 
this directory. (Note: users should not assume that the 
absence of this file indicates their Systems are virus-free.) 
"ifthe macros 'auto_open' and 
'check_fìles ' exist, you are likely 
to be infected" 
This .XLS file is akin to Word's NORMAL.DOT. The MS 
Excel/Visual Basic for Windows 95 Programmers Guide says: 
In Microsoft Excel Version 7 you can stili record your 
macros in a workbook that opens each lime you start 
Microsoft Excel... this workbook is now called 
'PERSONAL.XLS' or -Personal Macro Workbook', depend-
ing on the platform (Windows or the Macintosh) ... 
Microsoft Excel Version 7.0 créâtes your new Personal 
Macro Workbook when you record your first macro. 
Due to the way Laroux searches for the PERSONAL.XLS 
file, I suspect it will not replicate on Macintosh versions of 
Excel, although no machine was available to test this theory. 
[The virus is written in VBA; thus it will also not work on 
versions of Excel earlier than 5.0. Ed.] 
Laroux next examines the number of Modules (ErceZ-speak 
for Workbook sheets that contain VBA code) in the currently 
active Workbook (referred to as 'ActiveWorkbook'). There 
are four possible cases: 
• no PERSONAL.XLS file; the ActiveWorkbook contains 
no Modules. Under normal circumstances, this should 
not occur: if there is no PERSONAL.XLS, the virus has 
not infected the host machine, or an error has occurred. 
.Given that there is no PERSONAL.XLS, the virus 
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should be running from a macro in the Active Workbook, 
which would then have to contain at least one Module. 
• no PERSONAL.XLS file; the ActiveWorkbook 
contains Modules 
• PERSONAL.XLS file present; the ActiveWorkbook 
contains no Modules 
• PERSONAL.XLS file present; the Active Workbook 
contains Modules 
If the first or last conditions are met, the virus will abort; 
this serves as an infection check. On an uninfected compu­
ter, the second condition is met, and will therefore be 
considered first. 
If the machine does not have a PERSONAL.XLS file, it is 
not yet infected. It proceeds to unhide the virus Module 
(titled 'laroux'), and copy it into the PERSONAL.XLS file. 
It sets some fields in the file properties to empty strings: 
Title, Subject, Author, Keywords and Comments (why it 
does this is not clear). This done, the virus cleans up, and 
infection is complete. 
Now, when the user opens an Excel spreadsheet, the virus 
will be activated (the third case). If PERSONAL.XLS exists, 
and the current ActiveWorkbook contains no Modules, then 
the virus knows that PERSONAL.XLS is already infected 
(as the macro is running from there), and it should now 
infect the active workbook (i.e. the one just opened). 
When running from PERSONAL.XLS, the virus watches for 
new spreadsheets using an 'OnSheetActivate' event. This is 
more powerful than an Auto_Open, as it is triggered 
whenever a Worksheet becomes active (i.e. whenever the 
user clicks on a tab to view a different Sheet within a 
Workbook). Such routines offer both the macro programmer 
and the virus writer great flexibility. 
Like Word viruses, Laroux infects the target by copying its 
macros there. Unlike Word macro viruses, this does not 
require the alteration of the file's type, but merely the 
addition of new Modules - in this case, a hidden Worksheet 
located at the beginning of the workbook. 
Once this extra Worksheet has been created, it is tagged as 
'hidden', and the user will be completely unaware that 
anything is amiss. However, there are some cases when this 
copy may fail, and the virus does not trap these errors. 
Under such circumstances, the virus will display the error 
box described above. 
Detection and Removal 
Determining whether or not your copy of Excel is infected is 
simple. Start the program and select the 'Macro...' option 
under the Tools' menu. If the macros *auto_open' and 
'check_files' exist, you are likely to be infected. 
As a second check, select one of these macros and click the 
'Edit* button (if the system states that you 'cannot edit a 
macro on a hidden workbook', unhide the workbook by 
using the Window/Unhide command). You should see the 
macros, and a Worksheet entitled 'laroux' should also be 
visible. Keep in mind that taking all these actions is only 
valid for this particular virus. Other viruses could render this 
method useless. 
The hex pattern which is given below may be used in 
conjunction with an anti-virus program to locate the virus, 
but users should remember to add .XL? to the file extension 
list. If you suspect that you have this virus, you must check 
all files, as your users may not always be using the default 
file extensions. 
Simply removing the macros from PERSONAL.XLS and all 
infected Workbooks clears the virus, although users should 
remember to remove the 'laroux' Sheet at the beginning of 
every Workbook. Clearly, both of the detection and removal 
methods mentioned here are short-term measures: it is to be 
hoped that anti-virus vendors will implement more efficient 
fixes shortly. 
The Solution 
Almost a year ago, when Winword.Concept appeared [see 
VB, September 1995. p.8], I wrote: 'The techniques used by 
this vims are so simple that any idiot could use them to 
construct similar viruses. If history is any indicator, we can 
expect to see more of this type of virus.' 
We did see more. We now see that Excel viruses are just as 
trivial; it is safe to assume that there will also be more of 
them. They will probably be equally unremarkable. 
The ease with which these macro viruses can be created and 
modified means that long-term solutions need to be found 
soon to the whole threat, rather than to individual instances. 
This problem is firmly in the domain of the application 
developer - they should also keep an eye on the possible 
misuse of all this extra functionality. It is becoming more 
and more important as macro virus production increases. 
Please, designers, pay attention! 
ExcelMacro. Laroux 
Al iases: None known. 
In fect ion: MS fxce/spreadsheets , v5.Q or 
greater. 
Se l f - recogn i t ion in Excel Spreadsheets : 
Searches for a Worksheet named 
'laroux'. 
Hex Pat tern: 
0 0 2 1 0 0 6 0 0 0 2 7 2 0 6 A 0 0 2 0 2 0 6 A 
O O A D 0 0 0 1 0 0 5 C 0 0 1 1 
Trigger; None. 
Remova l : See text. 
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VIRUS ANALYSIS 2 
Hare Krsna: ISKCON too far! 
Ian Whalley 
At the end of May, I received a virus sample. In itself, this is 
not unusual; however, it was not detected by any anti-vims 
product which the (very computer-savvy) user had, or could 
obtain. The sample was unpacked, and analysis started. 
A swift look at the code revealed that the file was definitely 
unusual, and very probably infected. Disassembly was 
complicated by the virus' anti-debugging and -emulation 
techniques. Once these had been dealt with, the virus was 
taken apart without too much effort. 
Overview 
Hare is a multi-partite virus (Master Boot Sector of hard 
drives, floppy boot sector, COM and EXE files). It is a slow 
polymorphic (see below for a detailed description), and 
contains anti-debugging routines. It is encrypted in both 
files and boot sectors (viruses which encrypt themselves in 
the boot sector are becoming increasingly common). 
The code of this sample, at 7610 bytes, is by no means the 
longest seen, but certainly makes it the largest non-Windows 
virus in the wild at the moment. This alone provided 
warning of the effort that would be involved in disassembly. 
Functionality 
Hare's code is, to say the least, tangled and complex. It uses 
many interesting techniques, including one which, in my 
opinion, is extremely dangerous, and could be used in the 
future by other viruses to greater effect. More of this later. 
When the virus receives control from an infected program, it 
decrypts itself in memory (this involves executing three 
separate decryptors). Whilst doing this, it issues an Int 21h, 
AX=FE23h: if AX=O0ODh is returned, this part of the virus 
is present in memory, and installation aborts. 
If the virus handler is not present, Hare completes 
decryption, and installs itself at the end of the MCB chain 
(using the standard technique of walking the list looking for 
the Z block). It then passes control to the new resident copy. 
Next, the resident component determines whether Windows 
is running, using Int 2Fh, AX=160Ah (Identify Windows 
Version and Type). If enhanced-mode Windows is present 
(including Windows 95), it notes the fact for future reference. 
The virus then checks a sector on the track one beyond the 
end of the hard disk. This track is sometimes called the 
Landing Zone, Engineering Cylinder or Test Cylinder, 
although these terms are somewhat old-fashioned. If this 
starts with the identifier CCDDh, it is left alone; otherwise, 
the virus attempts to write a single sector of random data. 
The routine is flawed, however, and instead of filling a 
512-byte buffer in memory with random bytes, it repeatedly 
places random data into the first word, which is then 
overwritten with the CCDDh marker anyway! 
The data is used by the polymorphic encryption routines to 
create the header for new instances of the virus; conse­
quently, replicants of Hare created on one PC will have very 
similar encryption loops. Because of the bug, the effect is 
not quite what the vims author had intended, but the 
polymorphic loops will still vary. 
This polymorphic technique can foil anti-virus researchers: 
detectors and removers they create from one infected PC are 
likely to be incomplete. When an infected program or disk is 
taken to a clean PC, the random data which Hare writes to 
the sector will be different, and that PC will create samples 
of the virus which will look different from those samples 
which were seen before. 
"attempts to remove the virus 
with TDISK /MBR ' will render 
the disk unbootahle " 
The routine that writes the random data is flawed - when 
setting the sector number to one (to write to the first sector 
on the extra track), the virus trashes the top two bits of the 
track number (which is stored at the top of CL to allow 
10-bit track values). 
If the disk in question has more than 256 tracks (very likely 
these days), the sector of random data will be placed some­
where in the middle of the disk, possibly over user data. 
Hare then tests to see if its boot sector component is already 
resident, by issuing Int I3h, AX=5445h. If AX=4554h is 
returned, it assumes that it is. If it is not resident, it checks 
the MBR to see if it is already infected, and infects it if not. 
MBR Infection 
Whilst infecting the MBR, Hare introduces several interest­
ing techniques. It attempts to use port-level access to the 
hard drive (to avoid BIOS-level boot sector protection). 
If it cannot access the hardware directly, it traces Int 13h. It 
hooks Int 16h (Keyboard) before writing to the disk using 
Int 13h - it looks as if it is attempting to replace replies to 
BIOS questions (such as 'A program is about to write to the 
MBR. Do you wish this write to proceed?') with ones which 
allow the write to occur. It has not been possible, however, 
to verify this. 
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Hare does not leave the Partition Table intact in the infected 
MBR, so attempts to remove the virus with 'FDISK /MBR' 
will render the disk unbootable. Later, it must perform 
complex gyrations (see p. 13; 'Loading from an Infected 
Boot Sector') to account for this. 
It is worth noting that Hare correctly uses the Windows 95 
call Int 21h, AX=3513h, CX=084Bh to lock the disk before 
attempting direct writes. If this is not carried out, 
Windows 95 will reject the write. The volume does not 
appear to be unlocked, but in norma) use this should cause 
no ili effects. 
Hare now directly modifies the 1VT to revector Int 21h to its 
own handler - this will enable infection and stealth, of 
which more later. Next, it checks to see if Windows 95 is 
currently running (Int 2Fh, AX=160Ah; retums BH=04h if 
Windows 95 is active): if so, it installs its Int 13h hook. 
Interestingly, it only does this in the présence of Win-
dows 95. After performing the actions described under 
'Deletion of system file', it retums control to the host 
program, which is allowed to exécute normally. 
Deletion of System Fite 
Next comes Hare's most interesting feature. It searches the 
MS-DOS environment data area for an environment variable 
starting 'V/V, which will match either WINDOWS or 
WINBOOTDIR: thèse point to the main Windows directory 
on Windows 95 Systems. When this is located, Hare takes 
the value, appends to it the string 
'\SYSTEMMOSUBSYS\HDFLOP.PDR' (thus obtaining a 
complete path to the file HDFLOP.PDR), and calls the 
original Int 21h handler to delete it (Int 21h, AH=41h). 
Why does it do this? Documentation on the area is limited, 
but the file HDFLOP.PDR contains the Windows 95 port-
level driver for floppy disk drives. Readers familiär with 
previous discussions on the impact of viruses on Win-
dows 95 will be aware that this OS does not normally 
propagate boot sector infections: it uses direct access to 
floppy disks, so Int 13h hooks installed by a virus to 
monitor and infect floppy disks are never called. 
Unfortunately, to be able to do port-level access in this way, 
Windows 95 requires the file HDFLOP.PDR. If this is not 
présent, the system uses old-style Int 13h access to floppy 
disks. This is a problem, as now any Int 13h handlers will be 
triggered, and infection can take place as before. 
Worse, Windows 95 does not warn the user of this scenario: 
browsing through the contents of the System applet in Control 
Panel does reveal that the system is not running at peak 
performance, but normal users do not look here every day. 
Thus, after the next reboot, Hare will be able to infect the 
boot sectors of floppy disks. Better yet, if the virus is 
removed, this driver file is stili missing, and any subséquent 
boot virus infection will be able to infect floppy disks in the 
same way. 
In Memory: Int 21h 
The Int 21h handler intercepts the functìons FE23h (Are 
You There?), 36h (Gel Disk Free Space), 4Ch (Exit), 31h 
(TSR), 00h (Terminate), 4B00h (Load and Exec), l lh/12h 
(Find First/Next by FCB), 4Eh/4Fh (Find First/Next by 
Name), 3Dh (Open Existing File) and 3Eh (Close File). 
The Get Disk Free Space handler is rather peculiar - when 
this function is called, the virus checks the address of the 
calling process's PSP. If it is différent from that of the last 
process which called this function, it performs a genuine Get 
Disk Free Space cali via the original Int 21 h handler, saves 
the number of free Clusters, and retums the values un-
changed. If it is the same, it stili performs the genuine cali, 
but replaces the value for the number of free Clusters with 
the saved one, and retums to the Caller. 
The reasons for this are not obvious - a couple of possible 
explanations for this have been suggested. Firstly, one 
particular anti-virus product, InVircible, periodically calls 
Int 21h, AH=36h to see if the amount of free disk space is 
dropping. If it detects a drop, it wams that a fast-infecting 
virus may be in memory. Hare's technique of retuming the 
same value every lime the process asks will foil this. 
"if the virus is removed ... any 
subséquent boot virus infection 
will be able to infect floppy disks 
in the same way" 
The second possible explanation is that Hare is again 
attempting to fool anti-virus researchers. An oft-used tech-
nique for replicating viruses is to place the virus in memory, 
do a DIR to note the lengths of the goal files and amount of 
free disk space, run the goat files, and then do another DIR. 
Even if the virus has file length stealth, the change in the 
amount of free disk space will reveal if the virus has infected 
anything. Hare will not show any change, however, as each 
DIR command will return the same value for the free space 
(each cali is issued by COMMAND.COM). 
Exit, TSR, and Terminate calls are dealt with in the same way: 
the name of the currently executing program is extracted 
from the PSP, and that file is opened, infected, and closed. 
On Load and Exécute, the virus uses a much more compli-
cated handler. After re-deleting the file HDFLOP.PDR, the 
virus hooks Ints 24h (Criticai Error) and 1 Bh (Control Break). 
It then gets, saves, and clears the file's attributes, before going 
on to examine the filename. It does not infect files whose 
names match the pattems TB*.*, F-*.*, IV*.*, CH*.*, or 
COMMAND*.*, nor those containing the letter V. 
After infection, the file's time-stamp and attributes are reset 
(the virus modifies the time-stamp of infected files to set 
their seconds field to 34), and the handler is complete. 
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On all Find First/Next calls, the virus can do limited File 
length stealth - it examines the time-stamp of files encoun­
tered and subtracts 7680 bytes from the length of files 
tagged as infected. This results in infected files appearing to 
be larger than they were before, albeit not as much so as 
they actually are. 
The Close Calls functions invoke a handler which will infect 
the file if it is deemed necessary - it first extracts the 
filename by manipulating the SFT (System File Table), 
performs the name checks described above, and then, where 
applicable, infects. 
On Open Existing File requests, if Hare determines that the 
file is infected, it is disinfected (on disk) before the call is 
allowed to proceed. This will temporarily remove the vims 
from the file in question, which will be reinfected when the 
file is closed. 
In Memory: Int 13h 
The Int I3h handler performs stealthing of infected boot 
sectors, and also infects the boot sectors of floppy disks as 
they are used. 
This latter is accomplished by first ensuring that the floppy 
in question is not already infected - the virus reads the boot 
sector (it retries three times; just what the manuals say 
should be done), and subtracts the word at offset lOOh from 
that at offset 102h. If the result is CCFFh, the boot sector is 
deemed infected. 
If the floppy is not already infected, Hare formats an extra 
track at the end of the floppy disk, encrypts the virus code, 
and writes the body to the extra track, and the loader code to 
the boot sector. 
Trigger 
On 22 August and 22 September, the virus' trigger routine is 
activated. First, it displays the message: 
"HDEuthanasia" by Demon Emperor: Hare Krsna, 
hare, hare... 
Next, it attempts to wipe all data from all hard drives on the 
system with garbage. 
Conclusion 
Despite the many new and interesting techniques displayed 
by Hare.7610, the virus has several bugs. It is generally 
unstable, and replications will sometimes not execute 
properly (this includes MBR infections), and will hang the 
machine. The destructive trigger also sometimes fails. The 
fact remains, however, that Hare is in the wild across the 
world, and appears to be spreading. So far, it has been found 
in the wild in Canada, Russia, the Netherlands, Switzerland, 
the UK, and the USA: it appears that such a wide distribu­
tion was achieved via the Internet. 
[Note: Two variants of Hare. 7610 have been discovered. 
Hare. 7750 and Hare. 7786. As well as bug fixes, they will 
occasionally (one in sixteen times the system is booted from 
an infected disk) change the random data sector. This means 
that the polymorphic algorithm will change periodically on 
any given computer. Hare. 7750 was distributed via posts on 
the Usenet groups alt.cracks, alt.crackers, alt.sex, and 
alt. comp.shareware. ] 
Hare.7610 
Al iases: Krsna. HDEuthanasia. 
Type : Stow, polymorphic, multi-partite virus. 
Se l f - recogni t ion in Files: 
Seconds field of t ime stamp set to 34. 
Se l f - recogni t ion in Boo t Sectors : 
Word at offset 102h in BS minus word 
at offset 100h equals CCFFh. 
Sel f - recogni t ion in M e m o r y ; 
Int 13h, AX=5445h. expects return of 
AX=4554h. Int 21h. AX=FE23h, 
expects return of AX=000Dh. 
Hex Pat tern: None possible. 
In tercepts : Int 13h. 16h. I B h , I C h . 21 h. 24h. 28h. 
Trigger: On 22 August/September, prints 
message and attempts to trash disks. 
Remova l : Identify and replace infected files. 
Format infected diskettes. Replace hard 
disk MBR with known clean copy 
(FDISK /MBR must not be used). 
Loading from an Infected Boot Sector 
When a computer is booted from an infected hard drive, the 
virus shuns the standard approach of immediately installing 
an Int 13h handler - this would make life much easier for it, 
as its own stealth features would allow DOS to see a valid 
partition table. 
Instead, Hare copies the partition table back into the MBR 
whilst loading; thus, when the OS loader comes to look, the 
partition table is where it is supposed to be. It then knocks 
9KB off base memory by the standard technique of modify­
ing the word at 0000:0413h, intercepts Int ICh (System 
Timer Tick), and passes execution to the code of the original 
Master Boot Record. 
Using a technique already seen in several other viruses, Hare 
monitors Int ICh to watch the operating system load. When 
it determines that it is safe to do so, it intercepts Ints 13h, 
21h, and 28h (DOS Idle Interrupt). The first time the system 
issues an Int 28h (which will happen as soon as a program 
waits for input), Hare re-corrupts the partition table (which 
was fixed to allow the OS to load). It is now in a position to 
infect files and disks as they are accessed. 
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FEATURE 2 
Viruses on the Internet 
Sarah Gordon 
Author's note: This article explores attitudes to virus 
distribution facilitated by the Internet. Our increased 
reliance on the Internet for communication, and the re-
trieval of information from untrusted Systems, can be 
expected to bring more cases of point-and-click giving users 
new viruses of many types, including those which take 
advantage of existing security hołes in insecure applications. 
The World Wide Web is a wonderful place. In June 1996,1 
decided to explore it to research this article; specifically to 
gauge the success of the 1995 'let's get rid of Internet virus 
sites!' campaign which had been sponsored by the NCSA 
and some anti-virus product developers. 
My first search brought me fifty thousand matches. After 
regaining my composure, I realised many of these must be 
related to other types of virus. Fortunately, a narrowed 
search proved I was right. Surely we are winning the battle 
to encourage responsible behaviour on the Internet! 
Or are we? With my refined search, I found 2000 matches to 
computer and virus (or vini, as virus distributors like to call 
them). The first site I came across was one that offered the 
classic 'computer virus joke' file: 
Arnold Schwarzenegger Virus. Terminâtes, stays 
resident. It'll be back. 
Freudian Virus. Computer becomes obsessed with 
marrying its own motherboard. 
Star Trek Virus. Invades your system in places 
where no virus has gone before. 
What was to corne was not so amusing. As I pointed and 
clicked, I found other 'virii' sites. Some pages were not fully 
operational, but many more were. Some were old pages I 
had run across months ago which had been taken down 
during the brief flurry of 'stop the virus sites'. 
At that time, I predicted that the sites would come back, or 
reappear under other names. I hate to say it, but... Itold you 
so. The sites have retumed, and the methods we have tried 
to use to stop them have not worked. 
Anatomy Lessons 
What exactly can be found by following the downward 
spiral of the World Wide Web? More than some people 
would have you believe, to be sure. 
I began with a site référence on university coursework. This 
was of particular interest to me, as I had just retumed from 
the IFIP Conference in Samos where I heard a Swedish 
professor explain that making viruses was part of his 
curriculum. When I mentioned that two of the virus writers 
with whom I had spoken were students at his university, he 
told me he had heard about them, but he did not seem to 
think it noteworthy. 
The following, a description of coursework from an Ameri­
can university, illustrâtes the casual attitude toward viruses 
which seems to prevail at many universities. 
Computer Virus analysis 
Take a computer virus and analyse it thoroughly. You 
will have to isolale the virus code and disassemble it... 
Once you have it disassembled, you now have a 
program listing which IS the virus. Go through it, one 
assembly language statement at a time, and figure out 
what it does and how it works. It is best to do this on a 
fairly simple virus ... I have a copy of the Natas virus if 
you want to try that one. 
This was the most responsible entry. While some would say 
using viruses as part of a leaming exercise is 'good expéri­
ence', others say it is 'poor science'. Uedding whetheror 
not Natas is a 'fairly simple virus' remains a task for the 
reader. From this site, it was all downhill. 
Under the banner 'Free Speech On-line Blue Ribbon 
Campaign', I was welcomed to The Virus Page: VIRUS 
PROGRAMMING and VIRU'. I was invited to join the Blue 
Ribbon Anti-Censorship Campaign and given access to ali 
sorts of virus tutorials. There was information on disinfect-
ing infected fites, TSR, COM infections, non-overwriting 
COM infections, infection on closing, EXE infections, 
directory stealth, memory stealth, and a memorable tutorial, 
'The Dangers of Thunderbyte'. 
Polymorphie viruses were part of the plan as well, with 
'Implementation, Detection, and Prévention'. Other instruc­
tions included infection of Windows exécutables, calling 
Windows API in assembly language from VLAD, heuristics, 
ANTI-AV Tricks (Tunnelling), Inbar Raz's Guide to Anti-
Debugging Techniques and (from our own side), 'Anticipated 
trends in Virus Writing - Some ideas from the AV folks'. 
There were also assembly language links, programming 
tools including A86 assembler v4.02, A86 debugger, a 
32-bit Windows disassembler, ViruScan for Windows 3.x, 
TBAVfor Windows 3.x, and, to my utter horror, F-PROT. 
Does anyone actually get anti-virus software from sites 
which offer the latest and greatest virus source and 
exécutables right alongside anti-virus software? You would 
hope not, but I leamed that some people do! 
Some company employées of major firms told me that they 
'trust' the virus sites because there is so much 'information' 
there. These are the people who are responsible, in some 
cases, for securing your Systems. There were links to other 
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pages, too numerous to mention, most of them virus-related. 
There was even a link to Alan Solomon's hacking and virus 
laws page. 
A trip to one of the links showed the same viewpoint, or 
possibly pseudo-viewpoint, one I saw repeated many times: 
Disclaimer: These files are for research and educational 
purposes only. I take no responsibility for any misuse 
of these programs which can result in ARREST OR 
DAMAGE TO YOUR COMPUTER. Please keep in 
mind that viruses are harmful and may destroy your 
computer: if you destroy other people's computers, you 
will be held responsible. Download at your own risk! 
That site had files. The Files were viruses, nicely catalogued. 
It also had generatore, constructors and source code files. 
The warnings are nice. But who's kidding whom? Virus 
distribution in this manner is nothing less than irresponsible. 
When I asked some of the people involved, the responses 
were generally that if the person who downloaded the 
viruses was incompétent to manage them, it would be that 
person's problem; that it is always the user's own choice to 
download. Virus sites are well and truly on the Internet, and 
they are here to stay. 
"there are real prohlems in 
becoming the censor ofuser 
communications, both from a 
légal and an ethical standpoint " 
A Problem with the American Legal System... 
... is the outcry of some anti-virus researchers. Indeed, this is a 
possibility worth considering. People may take this position 
because some American-based public Internet Service Provid-
ers (ISPs) and on-line services hide behind the whimper 'it's 
not illegal'. Does this demonstrate a terrible ethnocentricity on 
the part of these providers? After all, the Internet is global. 
An examination of one of these same providers' publicly 
available FTP logs shows computer viruses being siphoned 
to the UK just last week. Japan is another populär location 
on the receiving end of viruses from American ISP clients. 
However, is action on the part of the service provider part of 
the solution? Is 'it is not illegal' adhering to the outdated 
paradigm 'If it's not illegal ìt must be OK'? Some would 
argue that it is, and that ISPs and on-line services should 
take more responsibility for the actions of their users and for 
the welfare of the computing public. Others recognize that 
there is, in faci, no viable solution. 
There are real problems in becoming the censor of user 
communications, both from a legal and an ethical stand-
point. These problems place ISPs, on-line providers and 
bulletin board operatore in situations which may be impossi-
ble to résolve. 
In 1994, représentatives of several unnamed commercial 
ISPs and on-line services were questioned by various people 
regarding their policies on allowing viruses to be distributed 
or made available from their servers1'1. Reactions varied 
from 'it's legai' and 'we cannot become censore of our 
users', to 'we will not knowingly allow such things to be 
made available on our site'. It is interesting to note, how-
ever, that ali the sites queried stili have viruses and other 
'questionale' material available from Urne to Urne. 
Of course, service providers' views are based not only on 
the laws, but on the feelings of their customers and potential 
customers. 'Is it OK to make viruses available for public 
consumption, via the Internet?' - I have asked this question 
countless times, in public forums, on BBSs, at Conferences. 
Opinions seem to fall into two catégories: 
• it's nobody's business what anyone else does as long as 
it doesn't hurt anyone directly 
* you can't do that because I don't like it 
Defining 'directly' seems to vary from culture to culture; that 
discussion is best left for another publication. 
I thought it might be interesting to query individuai in the 
IT field and ask the same question. The responses reflect 
what I have heard from the computing community in general. 
Only two responses stated that virus distribution should be 
illegal. The first said: 
Maybe virus distribution should be illegal, but policing it 
will always be a problem. The Internet ojfers a new 
perspective on the 'Global Village ' concept. These are 
issues yet to be resolved - who knows if they ever wiil 
be? A person who makes viruses available should share 
the responsibility, but the key word is 'should'. That 
opens a new arena of conflict: we must learn to be wary 
and learn how to avoid these problems. The ideal would 
be nice; people providing only helpful, useful items on 
the Internet. There should probably be some sort of 
punishment for malicious intent, but I hesitate to invite 
excessive government régulation to the Internet. 
A similar response: 
/ don 't believe in censorship in many cases. I do 
believe in restricting the public market. If a person 
wants to write a virus, he should have the freedom io 
do so. Ifhe wants to send tt to his friends, stili bis 
business. If he would like to place it on his own FTP 
site and disiribuie it, as long as it is clearly marked as 
virus, then he should be allowed. Any distribution of 
the virus into the public should be illegai. 
It is the responsibility of the individuai ifhe is on the 
Internet to watch out for harmful code. It should be 
assumed that fìles being downloaded may be infected. 
Then, there were those who look a more casual attitude: 
Since l've never had a virus, and don 't work on 
Systems that most viruses infect, l'm just not that 
familiär with, or interested in, viruses. Ifind that most 
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people who are very interested in viruses are those 
who got one and were determined to 'out' their 
intruder, to figure out everything they could about the 
creator or the processes involved. 
I have a Macintosh at home. I am not very concerned 
about getting a virus at home, though I use Internet 
services daily (I don't use BBSs at all though). I run 
Disinfectant occasionally, but more out of a sense of 
duty, than fear. I don't have Word, or any other 
(known) macro infecting program. I think as these 
things go, based on my user habits and stuff, I have a 
low propensity for actually getting a virus. But I may 
be wrong. 
These views seem typical of most Americans I have queried, 
but, despite the claim you will often hear that the USA 
distributes all the viruses (it used to be Bulgaria - 1 suspect 
neither deserved the amount of 'credit' bestowed upon it), I 
found virus distribution on the Internet to be culturally 
diverse. The US was there, but along with Canada, Austria, 
Portugal, Germany, Sweden, Norway and the UK. Viruses 
were available via FTP, WWW, or in casual trading centres 
such as IRC: they seem to have become the POGS of the 
Information Age. 
New acquisitions are made with relative anonymity and 
virtually no interference. The logs of a real server, recorded 
1-18 June 1996, showed various viruses, including Monkey 
and variants of Stealth, being retrieved by willing users. It is 
possible, of course, to identify users who obtain viruses via 
anonymous FTP or WWW should one desire to do so. 
IRC BOTS dispensing viruses seem to have, at least for now, 
disappeared. I was pleased to hear this, but then reminded 
by a cynical friend that there was no need for VirusBOTS. 
After all, why spend the time getting limited information 
from a BOT when you can get all the viruses, source, and 
tools you want directly from the World Wide Web? 
We still have the question 'How can we prevent this sort of 
irresponsible behaviour?' The problem seems to be that we 
don't really know whom we should be asking to stop it. 
Although, for the most part, virus download areas eventually 
fall into disrepair and disappear, there is a continual influx 
of 'young blood', keeping the number of sites in some sort 
of steady state. 
The ISPs, companies, or universities which host these sites 
will not, for the most part, stop allowing such activities. For 
every site which acts responsibly, and does prevent such 
behaviour, there is a person determined to exercise his 
rights, oblivious to the concept of duty and responsibility... 
As the college has taken this page away from me, I am 
searching for a new home for this information. Please, 
if you have any suggestions, email and tell me, I'd like 
to make the page available as soon as humanly possible. 
I'm sorry about this, but don't let it discourage your 
learning, because I won 7 let it discourage mine. 
-The Demon X(a/n)*th 
Supply and Demand 
Who are the people commonly said to share in the Vx 
Internet pie? The four groups in contention for this dubious 
honour appear to be the virus writers and distributors 
themselves; the average user; the employee (who may be in 
charge of tech support or product evaluation); and Finally, 
the anti-virus product developer. 
The group with the most potential interest in VxWWW sites 
are the virus writers and distributors themselves121. Much of 
the information stored on such sites is of reasonably high 
quality, and can provide interesting pointers (in the form of 
source code or text files) to new techniques. For those who 
trade viruses, the attraction of such sites is obvious. 
How much impact these sites have among virus writers is 
questionable; however, in the same way that a frisson of fear 
went through the industry when the VxBBSs began to 
appear (though the boards had little discernible effect), it is 
entirely possible that the impact of viruses on the WWW 
will not lead to vast numbers of new viruses or variants. 
Only time will tell. 
"making viruses available via the 
Internet may be the 'right ' of 
some people in some countries, 
but it is not responsible 
behaviour " 
The second group, which encompasses the average user, is 
in the unenviable position of having the intrigue of viruses 
thrown at him by the media, the scare put into him by some 
companies, and the WWW at his disposal to get 'informa­
tion' which he may think will help him protect himself. 
What he does not realise is that this point-and-click could 
cost him his data: infected documents and Trojanised 
information abound on the Internet. The biggest risk which 
is posed to the 'average' user by these boards is that of 
accidental infection. 
The third group with an interest in VxWWW sites comprises 
those interested in obtaining viruses for product testing. 
Although some anti-virus companies have gone so far as to 
recommend this, such actions are demonstrably wrong. After 
all, without investing a significant amount of time and 
expertise, it is next to impossible to verify a virus collection 
obtained from a third party, or to remove all Trojans, joke 
programs, first generation samples, simulated viruses and 
corrupted files. 
Tests carried out on a virus collection which is not clean 
(i.e. does not contain real viruses) are meaningless at best, 
and can be completely misleading"1. Thus, these sites are of 
little use as a source of scanner fodder; the problems outstrip 
any possible benefits. 
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The final group, the anti-virus product developers, are 
presented with a unique situation. Ever since the beginning 
of 'public' virus distribution, the mainstream anti-virus 
industry has scorned those who trawl the boards for the 
latest viruses. This was done initially because many 
VxBBSs required a user to upload new viruses to gain 
connect time, and also to prevent the legitimization of 
particular boards. However, the issues are no longer as clear. 
At the recent NCSA fVPC Conference in Washington, one 
anti-virus company spokesperson publicly admitted obtain­
ing viruses from Vx sites. I am totally against irresponsible 
virus distribution and joined with the majority of vendor 
representatives who chastised the errant company. 
However, we do need to keep up with vims authors: 
accessing what they make available to the general public, to 
our customers. Knowing that people are in fact accessing 
and experimenting with these viruses may force a change of 
heart among the anti-virus community. 
1 believe much of the anti-virus community's reaction to the 
admission by the unnamed company was overreaction, 
based on our instinctive distaste for Vx sites in general. It is 
one thing to say you do not condone them while sneaking 
around giving or receiving viruses; unfortunately, some 
vendors are said to have been involved in this. 
It is another matter altogether to admit that, due to the 
proliferation of these places, we must keep up with current 
trends. The only way to do that, some say, is to see what is 
there; to access and examine the viruses. 
Unlike the VxBBSs of old, the viruses are there, free for all, 
only a point-and-click away... what are we supposed to do? 
Most anti-virus researchers do not obtain viruses from these 
places, claiming the mixed messages this would send 
outweigh the benefit of ethical behaviour related to viruses 
on the Internet. However, the issue is much less clear-cut 
than you might believe. 
Clearly, the Internet is a fabulous place to obtain viruses, no 
matter who you are or what your intentions. Granted, you 
shouldn't use them to test anti-vims software. Such tests 
have been shown many times over to be flawed, and in some 
cases dangerous to the health of your company. You should 
not spread them to the unwilling and unknowing - even 
most virus writers acknowledge this. There is nothing a user 
can 'learn' from looking at viruses which cannot be learned 
from non-replicating programs. 
Unless you are a product vendor or virus writer, the benefit 
to you from such sites is practically nil - and even if you are 
a vendor, the benefit is limited. The risks these sites provide 
to computer users in general, however, remain high. Owners 
and maintainers of such sites have no control over how the 
materials they make available are used. While this is the 
case with most FTPd or WWW materials, it is particularly 
undesirable in the case of viruses, as they are uncontrollable 
once released. 
This leaves us with the question, again: 'What is the purpose 
of allowing such irresponsible behaviour?'. Maybe you 
believe it is an exercise in free speech, or that it is a 'right'. 
Making viruses available via the Internet may be the 'right' 
of some people in some countries, but it is not responsible 
behaviour. It is also, unfortunately, not showing any signs of 
slowing down. 
Closing Thoughts 
Finding a suitable conclusion to this article has been 
difficult, because I don't think that we are even close to 
finding answers. We don't know whom we should ask such 
simple questions as 'Why do we allow this kind of irrespon­
sible behaviour on the Internet?'. 
While it is a cliché to say that the Internet causes us to re­
evaluate what we mean by censorship and freedom of 
speech, there is little doubt that the rapid development of the 
WWW has outstripped our ability as a society to control its 
contents. 
Yes, there are viruses on the Internet, accessible via the 
World Wide Web, FTP, IRC, email, Usenet and other ways 
not discussed in this article - but we must keep our perspec­
tive. There are also infinitely more threatening problems, 
like child pornography, which I was unfortunate enough to 
encounter during my research for this article. The issues to 
which the Internet gives birth are much bigger than simply 
computer security and viruses. They envelop our communi­
cations with the fabric of cultural diversity, and force us to 
change the way we, in our own hometowns, think, live and 
do business. 
There is no easy way to make us all think in the same way 
and magically solve the problem of irresponsible action on 
the Internet, be it child pornography, church-burning sound 
files, or computer viruses. We who work to fight computer 
viruses can only try to educate the public to protect itself 
from those who put the responsibility on the 'other guy'. 
It is possible that, someday, those who view it as incumbent 
upon the 'other guy' to be technically competent, responsi­
ble, and ethical will realise that individual responsibility 
begins with not distributing or writing computer viruses in 
the first place. 
Footnotes: 
Virus-L Digest, Fridrik Skulason. August 1994. 
121
 'Technologically Enabled Crime: Shifting Paradigms 
for the Year 2000.' Sarah Gordon. Computers and 
Security. November 1995. 
P J
 'Analysis and Maintenance of a Clean Virus Library.' 
Vesselin Bontchev. Virus Bulletin Conference Proceed­
ings. September 1993. 
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PRODUCT REVIEW 1 
CPAV for NetWare 
Martyn Perry 
Having recently evaluated Norton Anti Virus, this month we 
look at its stable-mate, Central Point Anti-virus for NetWare 
(CPAVNET). This supports both versión 3.x and versión 4.x 
of NetWare. 
The product is licensed on a per server basis, and the 
software for workstation protection requires sepárate 
licensing. Although perhaps more applicable to workstation 
licences than to servers, the user may have the software on a 
single home computer, provided that the software receives at 
least 80% of its use on the primary computer. 
CPA VNET comes with manuals for DOS, Macintosh, and 
NetWare. In addition, there is a manual for the alert manage-
ment software, Central Alert. 
Installation 
Installation is performed in three stages. First, the 
workstation, which is used to install the network software, is 
checked and a versión of the DOS product is copied to it. 
Next, the NLM is installed from DOS. Finally, the control 
and configuration software is installed either to the 
workstation (for local use) or onto the network for access 
(from any workstation). Both Windows and DOS versions of 
the control program can be installed into the same directory, 
\CPSNET. A nice feature is the display listing the files to be 
installed, highlighting the fde currently being copied. 
Múltiple servers can be grouped together into one or more 
'security domain'. The file servers to be grouped together 
into a domain can be selected individually, provided that 
sufficient licensed copies of the software are available. The 
domain ñame can be freely chosen. 
When the NLM is installed, its files are copied from the first 
disk to the server. These include the directories 
SYS:SYSTEM, SYS:SYSTEM\CPAVNET, 
SYS:SYSTEM\CPS, and SYS:SYSTEM\CPS\CALERT. 
The installation process next offers to add lines to 
AUTOEXEC.NCF to load the NLM at server boot time. 
There is a prompt to LOAD CPMASTER on the consolé, to 
allow the administration or configuration program to be run. 
The installation finally offers the chance to install the 
Configuration Program for DOS, Windows, or both. 
Loadíng the NLM 
If the automatic load option is not chosen, the CPA VNET 
NLM program is loaded from the server consolé prompt 
using the command 'LOAD CPA VNET .NLM'. This loads 
the main NLM plus a number of subsidiary NLMs. 
CPMASTER.NLM must also be loaded on at least one 
server in the domain, to configure the various options for the 
scanner and adivate Central Alert. 
The CPAVNET.NLM can be driven from the server console 
using the function keys to start or stop an immediate scan 
and to enable or disable the NLM. Additional function keys 
allow for keyboard locking and for the application of 
password protection. 
Administration 
The scanner administration can be managed from the DOS 
or the Windows configuration program running on a 
workstation. The CPMASTER NLM must be running on 
each server to be configured before the configuration 
program is run. 
The software allows servers to be added to a security 
domain, providing that the administrator has the necessary 
supervisor rights to those servers. The main administration 
screen provides access to view the various servers and their 
protection status. CPA VNET has the usuai three modes of 
scanner opération: immediate, real-time and scheduled. 
An immediate scan checks the server on demand, using the 
current immediate settings. Scanning on the server can be 
started either from the option on the workstation, or by using 
F6 on the server console. 
The on-access, or real-time, scan allows scanning to be 
performed when a file is copied to or from the server, or 
when a file on the server is otherwise accessed. It is not 
possible to disable this option completely; scans of incom-
ing or outgoing files, or both, must remain selected. 
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A scheduled scan provides scanning on a timed basis. An 
additional option is to have periodic scanning, which occurs 
at regular intervais; e.g. every hour between a defined start 
and stop time. It is possible to stan another NLM after a 
scheduled scan is completed - for example, a backup NLM 
could be executed here. 
Configuration Options 
For each mode of opération, various sélections can be made. 
These include the file extensions to be included in the scan: 
the defaults are EXE, COM, DLL, OV?, SYS, BIN, 386, 
FON, ICO, and CMD. Extensions may be added or removed 
as necessary. 
As well as file sélection, the product provides the ability to 
exelude files from the scan. This exclusion from on-access 
scanning is the only way in which infected files can be 
handled manually. 
A separate menu option allows the sélection of actions to be 
taken upon detection of a virus. There are three choices 
here; to delete an infected file, to move an infected file to a 
user-defined quarantine directory (the default directory is 
S YS : S YSTEMXCPA WETMNFECTED), or to do nothing 
with the file. 
An extra option is included, which Central Point defines as 
analysing for unknown viruses. This examines a file for 
'suspicious behaviour'. 
Alert Management 
Apart from the action items which occur on virus detection, 
there is a separate alert program, Central Alert. This will 
allow modification of the current security domains as well as 
the sending of alerts to various alert facilities. These are: 
• alphanumeric or numeric pager 
• NetWare broadcast to the workstation 
• flash Central Alert icon [.' Ed.] 
• log alerts to a file 
• send MHS mail 
• send SNMP traps to NetWare Management System 
Workstations 
Reports, Activity Logs and Updates 
CPA VNET keeps a record of events in an Activity log. The 
events to be logged can be chosen and include: 
• detection of known and unknown viruses 
• scanner start and end times 
• action taken 
• enabling and disabling of CPAVNET 
• loadïng and unloading of CPA VNET 
• virus signature changes 
• miscellaneous errors and wanûngs 
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With this amount of data some sort of control is needed, 
which is supplied in two ways; first, by limiting the size of 
the log file, second, by filtering the events being displayed. 
There is a problem here — the whole log file needs to be 
loaded before it can be filtered. Other information available 
includes a virus list, and domain status (down to individuai 
servers and their status). 
Updates are performed by selecting the appropriate compressed 
file (for DOS, NLM, etc), and copying it to a temporary 
directory on the workstation. From here it can be self-
extracted and résultant files copied to the correct directories. 
Detection Rates 
The scanner was checked using In the Wild, Standard and 
Polymorphie test-sets. Undetected viruses were identified by 
using the 'delete files' option and listing the files left in the 
virus directories. The tests were conducted using the default 
scanner file extensions supplied. 
The results were generally disappointing. The tests were 
initially performed using the virus signatures shipped with 
the main product (March 96), then using the latest available 
(June 96). The Standard set scored 37.2% on initial scan: the 
updated version achieved 60.4%. The In the Wild set 
managed 65.7% on both passes, which implies that no 
detection improvement was made in the three months 
between the signature updates. The Polymorphie resuit 
improved slightly, from 41.4% to 43.5%, by virtue of the 
scanner finding additional instances of the One_Half virus. 
A further scan was performed with the Virus Analyzer option 
selected. This made no différence to the results, however. 
Real-time Scanning Overhead 
To determine the impact of the scanner on the server when it 
was running, the usuai tests were executed; copying 63 files 
of 4,641,722 bytes (EXE files from SYS:PUBLIC) from one 
server directory to another using NCOPY. The directories 
used for the source and target were excluded from the virus 
scan to avoid the risk of a file being scanned while waiting 
to be copied. 
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Because of the différent processes which occur within the 
server, the time tests were run ten times for each setting and 
an average was taken. The chosen tests were executed in 
two groups, for two conditions. 
The first group was run with on-access scanning selected 
first for both incoming and outgoing files, then for incoming 
files only. The tests were first run without the Analyzer, to 
establish the effect of the scanner by itself on the server 
performance. The four tests were: 
A. NLM not loaded: this established baseline time for 
copying the files on the server 
B. NLM unloaded: this test was run after the other tests to 
check how well the server retums to its former state 
C. NLM loaded, using default setting of on-access 
scanning for incoming and outgoing files - immediate 
scanner not running. This tests the impact of on-access 
(real-time) protection. 
D. NLM loaded, on-access scanning for incoming and 
outgoing files - immediate scan running. This shows 
the full impact of running the scanner on server files. 
The tests were repeated with the Analyzer selected to judge 
its impact on performance. A separate set of tests was run 
with on-access scanning set for incoming files only. 
At first glance, the results look a little stränge. The différ-
ence in time between incoming/outgoing scan and incoming 
only scan were within the process variability of the server 
and, for practica! purposes, can be viewed as the same. 
The results with the Analyzer on appear to be better than 
those with the Analyzer off. Again, this could be attributed 
to server process variability; alternati vely, it may indicate 
that separate buffering is used to process the file under 
analysis, leading to a slightly improved performance. 
The performance overhead of checking files using the 
Analyzer does not appear to be significant. However, in 
view of the lack of additional success on the test machine, it 
is debatable whether or not this feature is useful. CPA VNET 
performs a clean unload of ali the files which were origi-
nally installed, so there is effectively no overhead. 
Conclusion 
The product is easy to install and performing Upgrades is 
straightforward. The documentation provided is clear and 
comprehensive. 
CPA VNET's scanner detection rate is, and has been for some 
time, al a leve! unacceptable for a mature product. It is sad 
to see a product, which is 'feature rich' in other aspects, fail 
so badly in this cruciai area. This product cannot be recom-
mended as a first-time purchase due to this basic weakness. 
Existing users should consider biting the bullet, and take the 
opportunity to move to a product which is better supported; 
otherwise, they leave themselves seriously exposed to new 
virus threats. 
Central Point AntiVirus for NetWare 
Detec t ion Results 
Test-set ' 1 1 Viruses Detec ted Score 
In the Wild 197 /300 65 .7% 
Standard 247 /409 60 .4% 
Polymorphie 4 1 4 1 / 1 0 0 0 0 41.4% 
Overhead of On -access Scann ing : 
Tests detail the time taken to copy 63 EXE fìles 
totalling 4 .6MB. Each test is carried out ten tirnes. and 
an average taken. 
Time Overhead 
NLM not loaded 10.7 
Incoming /Ou tgo ing ; Analyzer Off 
NLM loaded, no manual scan 16.2 
NLM loaded, manual scan 44.8 
Incoming /Ou tgo ing ; Analyzer O n 
NLM loaded, no manual scan 16.6 
NLM loaded, manual scan 43 8 
Incoming only; Analyzer Off 
NLM loaded, no manual scan 16.4 
NLM loaded, manual scan 46.0 
Incoming only; Analyzer On 
NLM loaded, no manual scan 16.3 
NLM loaded, manual scan 44.5 
n/a 
51 .0% 
319.0% 
54 .0% 
309.0% 
53.0% 
329 .0% 
52.0% 
315 .0% 
T e c h n i c a l D e t a i l s 
P r o d u c t : Central Point AntiVirus for NetWare. 
D e v e l o p e r / V e n d o r : Symantec Corporation, 1 0 2 0 1 T o r r e A v e , 
C u p e r t i n o , C A 9 5 0 1 4 , U S A T e l + 1 4 0 8 2 5 2 3 5 7 0 , 
f a x + 1 4 0 8 2 5 3 4 9 9 2 . 
D i s t r i b u t o r U K : Symantec UK Lid, S y g n u s C o u r t , M a r k e t 
S t r e e t , M a i d e n h e a d , B e r k s , S L 6 S A D . T e l + 4 4 1 6 2 8 5 9 2 2 2 2 , 
f a x + 4 4 1 6 2 8 5 9 2 3 9 3 . 
P r i c e : T h e p e r - s e r v e r p r i c e o f t h i s p r o d u c t in t h e U K is a n 
e s t i m a t e d £ 6 G 0 - £ 6 4 5 . F o r s i t e l i c e n c e s , a p p l y d i r e c t l y t o t h e 
c o m p a n y ' s c o r p o r a t e a e c o u n t s d i v i s i o n i n t h e U K : 
T e l + 4 4 1 6 2 8 5 9 2 2 2 2 . 
H a r d w a r e U s e d : S e r v e r — Compaq Prolinea 590 w i l h 1 6 M B o f 
R A M , 2 G B o F h a r d d i s k , r u n n i n g u n d e r NetWare 3.12. 
W o r k s t a t i o n - Compaq 3S6/20e w i t h 4 M B o f R A M , 2 0 7 M B 
h a r d d i s k , r u n n i n g u n d e r MS-DOS 6.22, Windows 3.1. 
l ' T e s t - s e t s : F o r a c o m p l e t e l i s t i n g o f a l l t h e v i r u s e s u s e d in t h i s 
review, s e e Virus Bulletin, J u l y 1 9 9 6 , p . 2 2 . F o r a c o m p l e t e 
e x p l a n a t i o n o f e a c h v i r u s , a n d t h e n o m e n c l a t u r e u s e d , p l e a s e 
r e f e r t o t h e l i s t o f P C v i r u s e s p u b l i s h e d r e g u l a r l y i n VB. 
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PRODUCT REVIEW 2 
Survival of the Fittest? 
Dr Keith Jackson 
The AUMicro Anti- Virus Survival KU (A VSK) claims to have 
'four levels of defense to help keep your PC virus-free and 
your data safe'. Versions of A VSK suitable for DOS, 
Windows 3.1 and Windows 95 are included, though this 
review Covers no Windows 95 features. 
Levels and Features 
The A VSK tnanuals make great play of the fact that various 
'Levels of Defense' are included. Level 1 incorporâtes a 
scanner, memory-resident software, checksummìng features, 
and facilities for disinfecting infected files. Levels 2 and 3 
are software updates, and the response of the developers to 
new viruses reported to them. Level 4 refers to data recovery 
facilities which can replace a damaged boot record and/or 
primary partition. 
Although I cannot think of many anti-virus software 
developers who do not offer software Upgrades and responses 
to new viruses, and the majority of anti-virus products 
incorporate 'data recovery' features, this is not meant to 
decry the features available within the software itself. 
Included with the version provided for review are DOS, 
Windows 3.x and Windows 95 versions of a full-featured 
menu-driven interface, a command-lìne-driven scanner, two 
distinct types of memory-resident software, a utility which 
reports on system facilities, and even a communications 
package which can be used to obtain software Upgrades and/ 
or virus signatures. There are too many components to 
discuss individually, so why dress things up by wittering on 
about 'Levels of Defense'? 
Documentation 
The printed documentation comprises a 125-page A5 Users 
Guide, and a 40-page A5 RESCUE Users Manual. A 
statement on the first page of the Users Guide reads that it 
'avoids technical détails'. This is true. Very true. 
Sad to say, I found myself unimpressed by the Users Guide. 
It has a tendency to descend into trite explanations. For 
instance, is the explanation 'Mouse Active - activâtes or 
deactivates the mouse' really helping anybody? 
The explanations of what to do if a virus is detected are 
sketchy, to say the least. This is somewhat offset by the on-
line documentation, which provides information about 
individuai viruses: short explanations of what the virus can 
do, presented as a séries of boxes, reminiscent of NAV. It is, 
however, not enough. However, hardened users need more 
detail, and new users need more explanation. 
On the plus side, the switches used by the 
command-line-driven version of A VSK are all Iisted in the 
Users Guide, along with an accompanying explanation. 
Similarly, ali available options for the memory-resident 
programs are also thoroughly explained. 
I have more time for the RESCUE Users Manual: although 
short, it provides a decent explanation of the data recovery 
facilities provided. Once again there is no index, but this 
makes less différence in a slim volume. 
Installation 
A VSK arrived on four 1.44 MB, 3.5-inch floppy disks, none 
of which were write-protected. Installation of the DOS 
version proved straightforward. After an initial waming 
message about viruses has been displayed, the installation 
offers to place the A VSK files in the default subdirectory, 
C:\AMAV - this can be altered to any desired location. The 
user's name and company must be entered to personalize 
installation; memory is then scanned: if no viruses are 
found, the A VSK files are copied across to the hard disk. 
At this point, users are asked: 'Do you wish SENTINEL to 
be run from your AUTOEXF.C?'. On-screen explanation 
would be more helpful - SENTINEL is a memory-resident 
scanner. The installation program next advises that the first 
action should be to create a SAFEDISK (for rescue pur-
poses). Installation is then complete. 
Installing the Windows program proved to be even simpler. 
The SETUP program offered a default subdirectory, allowed 
this to be altered, and then got on with things. 
Scanning 
As of 12 Aprii 1996, A VSK claims knowledge of 8420 
viruses. For reasons I could not sort out, the DOS version 
refused to access the virus test-sets stored on a magneto-
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optica! disk. Nothing I did could persuade it otherwise. This 
caused much file copying when the Polymorphie test-sets 
were encountered. For reasons which are also beyond me, 
the Windows version was quite happy to access the drive. 
The Windows version looks radically différent from its DOS 
sibling, and proved very simple to use, with half a dozen 
on-screen buttons providing easy access to the main functions. 
When used via drop-down menus, A VSK first scans memory, 
then displays the current subdirectory and its contents (in 
separate Windows) - vaguely reminiscent of CPAV. Both 
DOS and Windows versions of A VSK offer options which 
can scan the entire system, an individuai drive, a directory, a 
file, or the 'boot system'. 
Scanning Speed 
In its default state, the DOS version of A VSK scanned the 
hard disk of my test PC in 2 minutes 34 seconds (742 files in 
total, 311 files scanned, 29.9 MB). 
A VSK recognises three types of compressed files (ZIP, ARJ 
and LZEXE). The option to scan inside compressed files is 
switched on by default, which of course slows down the 
scan. When this was deactivated, the hard disk of my test PC 
was scanned in 1 minute 40 seconds. With 'minimum stealth' 
specified, scan time feil again, to 1 minute 32 seconds. In 
the other direction, a scan of ali files (including the contents 
of ali compressed files) took 5 minutes 7 seconds. 
Other methods of virus detection are included, and are even 
faster than the scanning itself. When A VSK searches for 
'Suspicious Conditions', it inspects the entire hard disk in 
37 seconds. A 'heuristic' scan takes just 2 minutes 40 seconds. 
Ail the above timings were measured using the DOS version 
of the product. To provide a fair comparison, Dr Solomon 's 
A VTK scanned the hard disk of my test PC in 4 minutes 21 
seconds; Sophos SWEEP in 7 minutes 32 seconds. 
One fact stands out, therefore: A VSK is very quick at scanning 
for viruses. A point worthy of note, however, is the slow-down 
in the other two scanners (SWEEP and Dr Solomon 's) when 
SENTINEL is active: SWEEP took 13 minutes 6 seconds; Dr 
Solomon's, 15 minutes 1 second. This slow-down, imposed by 
the présence of SENTINEL, is severe. 
Detection 
I tested the virus detection capability of A VSK against the 
test-set described in the Technical Details section below. 
Run against the In the Wild test-set, using default settings it 
detected 192 of the 286 test samples; 67%: frankly, not good 
enough. Curiously, the report file stated that A VSK had found 
200 viruses, though only 192 files were infected: this was 
because ali six samples of Jerusalem. 1244 were detected as 
infected with (using A VSK nomenclature) both the Maca and 
the 1244 viruses, and the two samples of Keypress. 1232.A 
were detected as doubly infected (Keypress and SamSoft). 
T h e p r o d u c t s h o w e d n o s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f é r e n c e in d e t e c t i o n r a t e s 
d e s p i t e t h e m e t h o d o f h e u r i s t i c s c a n n i n g c h o s e n . 
Against the Standard test-set, again using default settings, 
A VSK detected 229 of the 265 test samples (86%). Once 
again, samples (four in total) were detected as doubly 
infected (Warrier, 2 x 01d_Yankee, Vienna). The DOS and 
Windows versions of A VSK detected the same viruses from 
the two main test-sets. 
If the Standard and In the Wild test-sets are contained inside 
a ZIPped archive file, detection is slightly poorer. Only 180 
files from the In the Wild test-set (63%) were found infected, 
and only 224 files from the Standard test-set (84%). I shall 
return to scanning inside archive files below. 
Executing the 'Suspicious Conditions' option, rather than 
merely scanning, found 62 suspicious files in the In the Wild 
test-set (22%), and 51 (19%) in the Standard test-set. The 
heuristic level can be set to Minimum, Medium, or Maxi-
mum, although I could not measure a significant différence 
in detection when this parameter was varied. It was, however, 
ironie to find that 'Maximum Heuristics' found just one 
suspicious file: AVSK's own file SHIELD.COM. This was 
called an 'Unconventional Resident Program'. Ah well! 
Polymorphie Viruses 
When run against the Polymorphie virus samples, A VSK 
detected 2196 of the 5500 test samples, or 40%. Three 
Polymorphie viruses are detected only reasonably well 
(Girafe:TPE, Neuroquila.A and One_HaIf.3544), but the 
others are either not detected at ali (three in total) or only 
very poorly (the remaining five). 
When A VSK scans inside ZIP files, Polymorphie detection 
falls off alarmingly - only 1209 (22%) of the samples are 
detected as infected. Ali but four viruses are completely 
undetected, and only GÌrafe:TPE is detected reliably. I am at a 
loss to see why this should be so. Surely, once a file has been 
extracted from a decompressed archive file, the same scanner 
should be used to test whether or not an infection is présent? 
Clearly something is wrong with A VSK 's décompression. 
The product detected only fourteen of the twenty boot sector 
test samples, fading to detect EXEBug.A, IntAA, Peanut, 
Quox, She_Has and Urkel. By no Stretch of the imagination 
can this be called an impressive result. 
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Vaccination 
A VSK can create a database of checksum information about 
each executable file present on a hard disk {a process which 
it calls external vaccination), or it can add extra code to 
executable files (called internal vaccination). I am amazed 
that a manufacturer still considers changing executable files: 
use of such features is not recommended. Life is compli­
cated enough without having to track down the inevitable 
problems that tampering with executable files may cause. 
The product puts the two files which comprise the database for 
'external' vaccination in the hard disk's root directory. I wish 
programs wouldn't do this. I am happy for A VSK to maintain 
a database, but it should do so in its own subdirectory. 
When either creating or verifying external vaccination, the 
DOS version of A VSK took 3 minutes 50 seconds to work its 
way through the entire hard disk of my test PC, rising to 
Behaviour Blocking 
It is only necessary to use a PC with SHIELD active in 
memory for a few minutes to realise why the developers 
separated the two memory-resident programs. Put bluntly, 
SHIELD is a nuisance. If activated with all security options 
active, it is forever popping up and requesting confirmation. 
If some of its security features are turned off to prevent such 
intrusions (a hot-key is provided to facilitate such tailoring), 
effectively, SHIELD is doing nothing. 
SHIELD is not alone in being intrusive or useless - all 
behaviour blockers tend to be like this. As a vims is merely 
a computer program, there is no foolproof way to decide 
which actions to allow and which to prevent. The only 
solution is to keep asking the user for confirmation as to 
whether a certain action should be permitted: this fails, as 
the average user has no idea how to answer such questions. 
6 minutes 10 seconds under the Windows version. 
Memory-resident Software 
A VSK contains two distinct memory-resident anti-virus 
programs. One (SENTINEL) is a memory-resident scanner, 
the other (SHIELD) is a behaviour blocker. The documenta­
tion calls SHIELD a 'memory-resident program, whose 
mission is to prevent the damage that a known or unknown 
vims may create...': what this means is that it monitors (and 
prevents) certain actions; e.g. it can be set up so that any 
write to hard disk only takes place after user confirmation 
has been given. 
SENTINEL can be added to AUTOEXEC.BAT by the 
installation program (see above), but SHIELD must be 
invoked by the user (either manually or as an addition to 
AUTOEXEC.BAT). When installed, SENTINEL uses 
18.8 KB of conventional memory and 32 KB of expanded 
memory. SHIELD is much smaller, requiring only 3 KB. 
When SENTINEL was executed with the /AE switch to 
ensure that all file extensions were scanned, my test PC 
locked up, complaining it could not load COMMAND.COM. 
Therefore, although at first sight behaviour-blockers seem 
like a good idea, they come off the rails when the real world 
intrudes. SHIELD may have some use in constrained 
environments where users are to be allowed only a few 
actions, although I'm unconvinced. 
Memory-resident Detection 
When SENTINEL is executed, it states that it looks for only 
420 viruses. Detection capabilities were measured by copying 
the files in the In the Wild and Standard test-sets from one 
drive to another. SENTINEL detected 179 and 187 infected 
files respectively in each set. These figures are only slightly 
less than the main A VSK scanner; surprising, given the low 
number of viruses about which SENTINEL claims knowledge. 
Conclusions 
My conclusions about A VSK are simple: it is very quick at 
scanning for viruses and/or verifying that checksums are 
unchanged, but simply not very good at detecting viruses. 
The memory-resident scanner is similarly poor, although 
surprisingly close to the DOS product in terms of detection. 
However, the behaviour-blocking memory-resident compo­
nent is just plain annoying. Avoid it. 
T e c h n i c a l D e t a i l s 
P r o d u c t : Anti-Virus Survival Kit v4.0 ( n o s e r i a l n u m b e r v i s i b l e ) . 
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n e n t s r e q u i r e Windows 3JC o r h i g h e r w i t h a t l e a s t 2 M B o f R A M . 
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Testing Files before Execution 
Any memory-resident monitoring program which carries out 
tests before allowing a file to be executed must have an 
impact on system performance. I measured this by copying 
40 files ( 1.25 MB) from one subdirectory to another. With 
no memory-resident software present, it took 21.6 seconds, 
rising to only 22.1 seconds when SENTINEL was present. 
This is very impressive. The result moved, however, to 
inducing curiosity when the file copying time went down to 
21.3 seconds, with SHIELD added to SENTINEL. 
Given the lack of overhead introduced by SENTINEL and 
SHIELD, it is difficult to explain why SENTINEL had such 
a drastic effect on the speed at which other scanners execute. 
Something odd is going on. 
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Abstract 
Earlier research has empirically demonstrated the cyclic nature of virus writing activity: as virus 
writers "age out", new virus writers take their places. Enhanced Connectivity amplifies the existing 
problem and various technical factors result in new types of virus writers surfacing as the cycle 
repeats. 
However, a new variable has recently been introduced into the cycle: high profile legal 
intervention. The virus writing community now has experienced visits by concemed law 
enforcement personnel; there have been arrests and there will be sentencings. New laws are being 
considered, enacted, and acted upon. Thus, the virus writing scene is no longer a casual pastime of 
kids on local Bulletin Board Systems. 
What has been the impact, perceptually and operationally, of these visits, arrests, and sentencings? 
In other words, as the virus problem gets more and more "real world" attention, where are we 
actually going in terms of shaping acceptable behavior in our virtual communities and what, if any, 
effect are these legai interventions havìng on the impact of viruses upon users' computers? 
In order to produce a scientifica!ly meaningful answer to this question, pre and post intervention 
data on various aspects of the virus problem have been gathered. We solicited opinions on a variety 
of topics related to computer viruses and legai countermeasures via e-mail and direct survey. 
Opinions are not only interesting; they must be considered, as we know the opinions of today shape 
how people behave in the future. However, we are also concerned with immediate real-world 
impact. To this end, impact will be examined in terms of viruses found both In the Wild1 (ItW) and 
on the World Wide Web (WWW), as a function of time. The data gathered before and after various 
types of high profile intervention is considered; in particular we are interested in any decrease 
noted in the graph of virus growth both ItW and on the WWW, and in online références to legai 
concerns. 
An analysis of the data is presented and suggestions for future research are made. 
1
 Using The WildList (http://www.wildlist.org) 
l 
Introduction 
During the last eight years, a wealth of information has been gathered concerning virus writers and 
the various motivations behind their work (Gordon, 1994a; Gordon, 1994b; Gordon, 1995;Gordon, 
1996; Gordon, 1999). In this paper, that earlier research is expanded upon and updated to consider 
an increasingly important facet: intervention by legal/government bodies. 
It is natural, given the way societies tend to develop, that antisocial activities tend to lead to 
legislation designed to contain or eradicate the activities. This paradigm of control is influencing 
both technological development and societal direction (Gordon, 1994b). There is now increased 
pressure on the legislature and law enforcement to deal with a problem which purportedly costs 
corporations millions of dollars per year (Cobb, 1998). The goal of this paper is to gain insight into 
the efficacy of high-profile legal countermeasures, and assess how well they achieve the objective 
of lessening the spread of computer viruses. 
In order to accomplish this analysis, this paper is structured as follows: First, the research to date is 
summarized, in order to provide the reader with insight on the "generic" virus writer, the target of 
laws and intervention. Second, the legal countermeasures which are in place at the time of writing 
are discussed, outlining the goal of legislation, and summarizing the laws employed in past high-
profile arrests of virus writers. Next, the potential drawbacks and costs associated with this 
approach are discussed, to provide a counterpoint to the intuitively obvious application of laws and 
high profile interventions as a solution to the "problems" of virus writing. The lack of useful 
metrics as to the effectiveness of the legal approach is covered, before discussing a research 
methodology that provides scientifically valid data for assessing the result of the interventions. 
Finally, results of this research are presented, analysing the effectiveness of laws in the prevention 
of virus writing and various forms of distribution. 
Virus Writer Demographics 
Research published by (Gordon, 1994a) examined the demographics of a large number of virus 
writers. This was accomplished by the use of surveys, email interviews, online chat and in-person 
sessions. The data gathered was used to assess the ethical development2 of individual virus writers, 
with a view to understanding why they chose to write viruses, and what, if anything, was likely to 
deter them. 
The paper focused on four primary groups of people: the adolescent virus writer, the college 
student, the adult virus writer, and the ex-virus writer. The findings for each group are summarized 
below 3. 
The Adolescent 
Studies of the adolescent virus writer were remarkably consistent. The data tend to show that the 
adolescent virus writer is ethically normal and of average/above average intelligence. Responses 
from members of this group showed respect for their parents and for authority (to some degree). 
While members of the group tended to understand the difference between what is right and wrong, 
(i.e. directly damaging data that belongs to other people is wrong) they typically did not accept any 
responsibility for problems caused when their own viruses appeared in the wild. 
The College Student 
Members of this group also appeared to be ethically normal on the Kohlberg scale. Despite 
expressing that what is illegal is "wrong", members of this group were not typically concerned 
about the results of their actions related to their virus writing. 
2
 based upon the Kohlberg model (Kohlberg, 1981; Panzl & McMahon, 1989) 
3
 other models produced similar results 
The Adult 
Of the four classes studied, the adult virus writer was the smallest, and the only one which appeared 
to be ethically abnormal, appearing below the level of ethical maturity which would be considered 
normal on the Kohlberg scale. 
The ex-virus writer 
Once again, this group was ethically normal. The ex-virus writers typically cited lack of time and 
boredom with virus writing as the primary motivator for the cessation of their "hobby". Appearing 
socially well adjusted, the ex-virus writer seemed to bear no ill-will toward other virus writers, and 
was undecided concerning the ethical legitimacy of virus writing. 
These results are of particular relevance to the question of legal countermeasures. The virus writing 
adults in the study appeared to be below the norms in ethical development; adults who are below 
these norms are more likely to be motivated by fear of punishment than by respect for law. For the 
adult virus writer, therefore, it is not the laws that are important, but their perception of the 
likelihood of beingprosecuted under those laws. For the minors involved, the présence of laws is 
unlikely to be very effective for several différent reasons that will be discussed in more detail later. 
For the youngest virus writers, it tended to show that virus writing was a naturally self-limiting 
phenomenon, and that the "perpetrator" would tend to cease their activity without the need for legal 
intervention. 
The research shown above was completed in 1994. The update of the paper two years later 
(Gordon, 1996) showed some disturbing trends related to virus writers at the higher âge limits 
considered. Whereas virus writers were typically aging out as their ethical development continued, 
mixed messages from many différent sources appeared to make virus writing appear "less wrong", 
pushing up the âge of aging out, if the process occurred at ail. 
Legal and High Profile Intervention 
According to (ICSA, 1999) the median cost of virus disasters is $ 1,750, with some respondents 
reporting costs of up to 5100,000 in a single virus incident. Another study (Ernst, 1998 cited in 
Cobb, 1998) suggests that virtually every Organization in the world has experienced at least one 
virus infection, and that viruses continue to cause businesses hundreds of millions of dollars each 
year in damages and lost productivity. Given the purported high cost4 to businesses it is not 
surprising that some peopte have looked to the law for help in dealing with the problem. 
Legal intervention in the case of the Melissa virus has been highly publicized. Regarding this case, 
(Jenislawski, 1999) citing ICSA, states 
"This case, the company says, proves that virus writing is "mdeed illegal ', despite 
arguments to the contrary. [This prosecution] will be a decisive event that will tend to 
reduce the relentlessly increasing threat and résultant risk of computer viruses to society 
as a whole. By locking up perpetrator s, the cycle ofmounting numbers, rate, and virulence 
of computer viruses will get at least a pause and perhaps, a reversai. 
(Tippett, 2000), suggests that Congress look at making it illegal to write a computer virus. "Making 
a bomb is illegal but writing about how to make a bomb is not ", he noted. "But with a computer 
virus, the words are the bomb". (Kabay, 2000a) calls for a view of computer programs as "not 
speech". 5 
4
 social effects related to lack of trust are outside the scope of this paper 
5
 an in-depth discussion of viruses as speech is outside the scope of this paper 
How effective are thèse legal counter-measures likely to be in addressing problem of viruses found 
in the real world? In (Lemos, 1999) we read 
"Despite an expectedfour- to five-year sentence for admitted Melissa virus writer David 
L. Smith, the number ofnew viruses appearing on the Internet appears to be accelerating 
as the end of the millennium draws near, anti-virus firms said Friday.^ 
Laws to combat computer crime are not new. The first comprehensive proposai for computer crime 
législation was a federai Bill introduced in the US Congress by Senator Ribikoff in 1977. 
(Schjolberg , 2000). Since that time, many U.S. states have introduced various computer crime 
laws, several of which mention viruses speciftcally (Bordera, 1997). 
Some of thèse laws and Statutes even attempi to define what a virus is. For example (Bordera, 
1997) cites the revision of the State of Maine's Statute title 17-A, ßß 431 to 433 (West Supp. 1996) 
"any instruction, information, data or program that dégrades the performance of a 
computer resource; disables, damages or destroys a computer resource; or attaches itself 
to another computer resource and exécutes when the host computer program is executed." 
The State of Maine has a particular subsection dealing with viruses, ß433c, citing 
"intentional or knowing introduction orallowing the introduction ofa computer virus into 
any computer resource, having no reasonable ground to believe that the person has the 
right to do so," 
The offense is classified as a Class C crime. 
In (Froehlich, Pinter, and Witmeyer, 2000) documentation of differentiation between naivete and 
malice is made: 
"The 1994 Computer Abuse Act tries to deal differently with those who foolheartedly 
launch viral attacks and those who do so intending to wreak havoc. To do this, the Act 
deßnes two levels ofprosecution for those who create viruses. For those who intentionally 
cause damage by transmitting a virus, thepunishment can amount to ten years infederai 
prison, plus a fine. For those who transmit a virus with only "reckless disregard" to the 
damage it will cause, the maximum punishment stops at a fine and a year in prison." 
There have since been various committees formed worldwide that have attempted to deal with the 
problem from a legai perspective (Schjolberg, 2000). From some of these committees international 
laws addressing computer crime have emerged, some of which address virus issues specifically. 
For example, in 1995, the Iranian Government approved a computer crime law prepared by the 
High Council of Informatics. Program damage caused by viruses, Trojan horses, worms, and logie 
bombs are spelled out in this law. Other countries have laws that forbiti the spreading of and in 
some cases the writing of, computer viruses (Iran, 2000). How have the existing laws been used so 
far? First, we will consider three individuai cases. 
Research by (Akdeniz & Yaman, 1996) documents the case of Dr. Joseph Popp, an American who 
was apprehended and arrested by the FBI at the end of 1989. Dr. Popp had sent free computer 
diskettes to -20,000 people in London and around the world; these disks contained a program 
which supposedly assessed the user's risk of contracting the AIDS/HIV virus, but which in reality 
introduced a trojan horse to the users computer. According to Akdeniz, 
"Récipients of the disk were warned that their computers wouldstopfunctioning unless 
theypaid the licensefees of£225 to a bank account in Panama. This case is thought to be 
the world 's most ambitious computer crime. While Dr. Joseph Popp was extradited to the 
UK, his case never carne to trial due to a détérioration of Popp 's mental state; he was 
found mentally unfìt io stand trial." 
this assertion is examined later in this paper 
(Taiwan, 1999) describes how, in 1999, the Computer Crime Unit traced the CIH virus to a young 
man then serving in the miütary. He confessed he had written the virus, claiming he was motivated 
by puré research, and had not himself spread the virus. According to this report, 
"ifit were deíermined that Chen Ying-hao had maliciously disseminated the virus, he 
could be sentenced to time in jai!. However, many creators of computer viruses are 
computer jocks, most of whom write viruses to show off their computer acumen. As Chen 
Ying-hao iikely beiongs to this ilk, andsince under the article in question aprosecution 
can only be brought if a complaint is made, it has thusfar not been possible to charge 
Chen.for lack of sufftcient evidence. Prosecutors are currently reviewing the case." 
Christopher Pile, known as the "Black Barón" in the computer underground, was sentenced to 18 
months on 15 November 1995. Pile was charged with violations of Section 3 of the Computer 
Misuse Act 1990. He pled guüty to five charges of gaining unauthorized access to computers, five 
of making unauthorized modifications and one of inciting others to spread the viruses he had 
written. 
Laws - Effective? 
In order for a crime involving a virus to be prosecuted, it must first be reported. Minnesota statute 
BB 609.87 to .89 presents an amendment which clearly defines a destructive computer program, and 
which designates a máximum imprisonment or 10 years; however, no cases have been reported. 
Should we conclude there are no virus problems in Minnesota? 
In (Grable, 1996) the ineffectiveness of the laws, both Federal and New York State, as a solution to 
the virus problem are clearly spelled out: 
"Both the federal and New York state criminal statutes aimed at virus terror are 
ineffective because the methods of enforcement... The combination of the lack of reporting 
plus the inherent difficulties in apprehending virus creators leads to the presen! situation: 
unseen and unpunished virus originators doing theirdamage unencumbered and unafraid. 
Add to that the slap on the wrist afforded to even the most infamous of virus propagators, 
and the recipe is right for even greater damage from malevolent software. " 
How Iikely are laws to affect the young virus writer? We first examine legal intervention related to 
young people engaged in other antisocial activities. 
(McDowall & Loftin, 2000) analyze the success of curfew laws in controlling crime. They state 
that while several pólice departments report a decrease in youth offenses after the enforcement of 
curfew ordinances (Bilchik, 1996) claim that statistics supporting the effícacy of curfew laws in 
reducing crime rest on uncertain comparison groups, and that few evaluations have considered 
more than a single área. They conclude there is not strong evidence that the curfew laws reduce 
juvenile offending or victimization rates. However, despite this lack of evidence, these laws have 
been embraced by many communities; (Hemmens & Bennett, 1999) state that while it is unclear 
whether they are effective in reducing crime, it is clear that they are being embraced by 
communities across the country (Davidson, 1997). 
In other studies of youths living in áreas where anti-social activity is normal, some youth may 
accept confrontíng danger and being involved in these activities as features of living in such 
environments (Halliday & Graham, 2000). There is insufficient data to conclude if this 
phenomenon maps to virtual environments. 
Research by (Foglia, 1997) supports the hypothesis that while the possibility pólice involvement, or 
legal sanction does not offer significant deterrence for youths who engage in antisocial behaviours, 
they are Iikely to be influenced by parents and peers. In (Gordon, 1994a), the conclusión that the 
"common" young virus writer is not Iikely to be affected by laws is supported, citing both the non-
universality of the laws as well the mixed messages sent societally to the young people as they 
intégrate into the cyber-culture. 
Difficulty in sentencing minors is also to be considered; some research is being done in this area. 
(Simpson, 1999) examines research into state statutes in the United States that help make parents 
legally responsible for personal injury or damage to property made by their minor children. There 
are details on a case in Minnesota (the land of no viruses ©), and another in Oregon, where such 
provisions currently exist. 
Finally, we must not ignore the mixed messages sent to young people regarding virus writing. 
(ZifFDavis, 1999) reports 
"[the firm that hired the virus author]... competed with a score of high-tech rivals 
attempting to lure [the virus author]..." 
" 'Our chairman felt he [the virus author] was a rare computer professional and we 
decided to accept him with an open heart,' said Wahoo spokeswoman Vivi Wang. " 
Contrast that to the alleged writer of the Melissa virus, David L. Smith. Apprehended at the 
beginning of April, Smith is looking at a maximum sentence of 40 years if convicted in New Jersey 
State Court. The immense differences in punishment illustrate a large rift in perceptions over the 
seriousness of computer viruses. 
Lack of Metrics 
Perhaps one of the reasons that there are so many different opinions on the effectiveness of 
legislation is that little quantitative data has been gathered. How does one go about measuring the 
effectiveness of a law? While it is tempting to simply measure the number of arrests as a function 
of time and law, this is not a good approach given the small number of virus writers who have been 
arrested and tried. Indeed, this lack of arrests is one of the primary indicators used by some to argue 
that laws are not a good deterrent. 
One of the ways in which we can judge the efficacy of law as a deterrent is the overall view of 
society toward the acts which have been criminalized (Bagaric, 1999). However, we must be 
careful not to impose our view of the act on others when attempting to use the criminalization as a 
"proof that the act is "wrong". For example, the use of marijuana is a criminal offense in some 
places/situations; in others, it is a misdemeanor, and in yet others, it is an acceptable act. 
New Metrics and Research Techniques 
As virus writing is a relatively infrequent "crime", a better measure of efficacy might be to study 
the number of times this "crime" has resulted in viruses let loose into the user community. 
However, how shall we define this output of "crime"? While it is true that in practical terms, a 
measure of the virus problem can be derived from the infection rate per 1000 PCs, this figure is 
affected by far more than just the number or activity of virus writers. New types of virus, a virus 
"getting lucky", or simply press coverage for a well-known virus can skew this number. Similarly, 
the total number of known viruses is not necessarily a good indicator, as this number is somewhat 
artificial in its creation. Thus, we propose the following new metrics for measuring, albeit 
indirectly, the efficacy of legislation with respect to the virus "problem". 
One possible way of measuring the prophylactic effect of laws is obvious: ask! Based upon 
previous research, we have built a reliable and open dialogue with many of today's more visible 
virus writers. 
As this "known" population is relatively small (but has a large impact on many developments in the 
virus world) a directed survey was created and administered. Questions (shown in the results 
section) were initially distributed via electronic mail and in-person sessions to virus writers in 
North and South America, Asia, Europe and Australia. The questionnaire was also posted to the 
Usenet News Group alt.comp.virus. The theory is that by re-administering the questionnaire after a 
high-profile criminal case concerning viruses, any suppression in the tendency to write viruses 
could be documented. 
Unfortunately, the sentencing of David Smith has been delayed several times, so at this time the 
administration of the post-test questions and analysis of that data is not possible. Following the 
sentencing of David Smith, the post-test will be administered and the results posted on the online 
version of this paper7. One drawback with this approach is that we expect some virus writers to 
become more socially aware as they "âge out"; thus a signiftcant delay between administering the 
two tests could make the results difficult to interpret for individuai subjects. However, the average 
population should remain reasonably static, making the test a possible metric for évaluation of 
effectiveness of laws. 
As intimated above, the full measure of the scope of the virus "problem" itself is extremely hard to 
measure. How "bad" is the "problem"? Can it be measured by the number of known viruses on a 
particular date? The number of viruses encountered "In the Wild"? The infection rate per 1000 
PCs? 
The answer to this question dépends partly on perspective and partly on the need for the 
measurement. For example, from the perspective of the anti-virus researcher working in a non-
automated environment, the scope of the problem is probably based upon the sheer number of 
viruses, as he must deal daily with ali incoming virus, analyzing, meticulously naming and 
prioritizing them, creating cures, etc. For the researcher in an automated environment, the 
measurement is likely to be those viruses which cannot be handled automatically and which she 
must deal with manually. For the end user, the infection rate per 1000 PCs in environments which 
are représentative of his or her own is a vital statistic. However, from the perspective of the 
legislator, the scope of the problem is probably related to the sheer number of problematic viruses-
viruses which are highly publicized and brought to his attention - as this is a direct measure of the 
number of "illégal" or "undesirable" acts occurring (not allowing for naturai corruption of existing 
viruses etc 8). 
As it seems unlikely that writing a virus that never ever is distributed would be made illégal in The 
United States, we propose that a suitable measure of the problem for a legislator is the number of 
viruses found "in the wild". Thus, it might be interesting to correlate the rate of change of the 
number of new viruses in the wild with high-profile prosecutions of virus writers. To this end, we 
have charted viruses "in the wild" as a function of time. If a noticeable decrease in the number of 
new ITW viruses is observed following an arrest/sentencing, the case could be made that the trials 
were helping the overall computer user population. 
Another metric for the effìcacy of laws is the availability of viruses on the WWW. We performed 
an in-depth analysis using one popular search engine, with the keyword of "virii", as a way of 
locating web sites that appeared to have content hearing further analysis. Once again, if the number 
of "virus exchange" web sites (sites containing live viruses or viral source code) could be shown to 
decrease with new legislation/prosecution, there would be évidence for the effectiveness of the 
current legislative attempts at controlling the spread of computer viruses. 
Finally, there is the question of a possible backlash against législation outlawing the development 
and distribution of computer viruses. As tracing a virus author is extremely difficult //the virus 
writer takes adequate précautions against a possible investigation, there is a possibility of a 
backlash against any législation which a person or group deems unconstitutional or as an 
infringement.9 
http://www.av.ibm.com, http://www.badguys.org 
8
 Liabilities and législation related to naturally occurring software or hardware induced corruptions 
are beyond the scope of this paper. 
9
 further discussion on cyber-activism or civil disobedience is outside the scope of this paper 
1 
To this end, a survey was conducted al the 2000 DEFCON conférence held in Las Vegas. The 
conférence, attended by many "white hat and biack hat hackers" represents an important part of the 
computer security "counter culture", and in many ways attracts the exact group that Iaws against 
virus writing would be aimed at. We selected people randomly as they entered the conférence 
foyer 1 0. To help ensure people could understand the survey questions, and answer coherently, the 
sélection was done on the first day of the Conference, early in the day, in order to sample people 
before they were intoxicated. 
Results 
The results from direct interviews provide an entirely subjective (but collectively représentative) 
vie w of ho w people said they felt about the follo wing four questions: 
1. What (if any) impact do you believe the arrest of David Smith has had on virus writing and 
virus distribution to date? 
2. What (if any) do you believe is a fair and just sentence for David Smith? 
3. What do you believe his sentence will actually be? 
4. What (if any) impact do you think the sentencing of David Smith will have on virus writing 
and virus distribution post-facto? 
We shall now consider each question in turn, and show data from several differently classified 
sources. 
The Impact of the Arrest of Smith 
The following results are broken down into those involved in the vi rus writing/virus exchange 
scene, and those who are not (primarily, but not exclusively, virus researchers) 
Virus writers and exchangers: 
"ì'm not sure/'ve seen any change in virus distribution. There's as little interesting code 
being released as there was, and as much crap as ever. More to the point, those who are 
clueful knew that someone was going to be 'tracked down'and 'busted' soon. Those who 
are clueful aren 't releasing code anyway (at least, not to the public). Those who aren 't 
clueful don't understand how David Smith got busted and are probably stili doing what 
they were doing before Smith got busted. 
Ifanything, the effect was on virus writing. There were probably people out there who 
thought about writing viruses forfun, but got scared out ofitforfear of'getting busted'. I 
don 7 think we 'Il see it making a big impact on the quantity or quality of viruses out there— 
but it probably stopped a few kids from 'turning to the dark side'. :) " (Anonymous, 
2000a) 
"His arrest has made some authors more cautious about handing out their work to just 
anybody, or even putting their nume on it. However at the same lime, it has outraged 
many other authors who are now using it as an excuse [and justification] to speak out 
about the ills of our society, and dare Isay "justice" system. 
I'd say that overall it has balanced things out, and had no real long term effect in the 
minds of authors, it's only set a legai précèdent. " (Anonymous, 2000b) 
161 subjects, 90% confidence level, 6.0 confidence interval 
V 
On the writers side, none. Foui things can happen when you code such programs, and 
most writers know that already. The thoughtof a guygettingscrewedby media hype is not 
going to stop mostpeoplefrom coding what they think is interesting. 
The distribution side is a bit différent. Alothas changea since the shitstorm (pardon me, 
but there is no nicer way to describe it) of aprii 99. The loss of the sourceofkaos server 
was a big deal to us. The vx scene had a voice, and was stripped away due to the incident. 
The guy who hosted (we knew him as jtr) it was running the machine at his place of 
business. He was placed on paid leavefor a few weeks, and was let go. Im sure the fbi had 
a field day sorting through that box. Media, the av industry, government organizations 
wouldconnect to the ire which didnt help much, duetokids that didnt really know the half 
of what was going on a spreading rumors and publicly discussing things that they 
shouldnt have. Ugh, it was a mess. Those were some stressful days. This has changed alot 
on the distribution side. People are afraid to release information. I was the first one to 
come forward and give the source of iworm.zippedfiles to the public because i had to. 
After the minimal heat it created, a handful of news articles and such on how the fbi was 
in search of its author, nobody (well, only a handful had the source in the first place) 
wanted to corneforward with it. Posting source code is not breaking the law in most of the 
world. People should be afraid. (Anonymous, 2000c) 
Antivirus researchers: 
"It has had the impact that many very active virus writers have "retired" (seen anything 
from the Internal guy anytimer-ecently?), others have become less productive, and many 
have refrained from releasing their viruses into the wild. I think that if Smith wasn 't 
arrested so swiftly, we would have seen much more Melissa variants and many more from 
them would have been released into the wild in a similar fashion. 
Of course, sooner or later this beneficiai effect will wear off. People tend to forget, and 
young people, like most virus writers are, tend to forget even faster. That's why the law 
enforcement must not "sleep on their laures" (sic) but mustprosecute similarly swiftly 
offenders like Mr. Smith in the future, foo. "(Bontchev, 2000) 
"/ would hope that maybe it has scared away few would-be writers or discourage some 
from distributing their créations but I have seen no clear évidence of this. I'd say there 
would have tobe atleast *some* positive effect from this (Ijust don't have any évidence 
for that though.)"(Stiì\er, 2000a) 
"It did not have any and will not have any. Virus writer wrote, write and will go on 
writing viruses, whether one of them folks was, is or will be sentenced or not None. We 
do not saw a change after Black Baron was arrested and I do not saw a decrease of new 
viruses... "(Marx, 2000a) 
Two other responses are worth fiirther examination. First, from the ever-scientifte (and correct!) 
Mich Kabay (Kabay, 2000b) 
"Don 't know without research. What I hope is that it will discourage some of the virus 
writers, but that'spure conjecture." 
The second sums up a practical point of view with good évidence behind it: 
"Very minimal. Most virus writers (in my opinion) think that it was a fluke that he got 
caught. Very little, I thing that a one off situation will not change the ways ofvirus writers. 
Only if a lot of writers - distributors where caught would this make a impact." (Pineda, 
2000). 
Fair and just sentence for David Smith: 
Virus writers had mixed opinions. 
"Hardto call. I don't really know thefacts of the case. If he was maliciously distributing 
the code, I don 't have much in the way of sympathy. " (Anonymous, 2000d) 
"An apology for ruining his Ufe ojfuture employment in the computer industry, a smile, 
and a handshake from every person that has cursed him. And perhaps a job. That's 
righi ". (Anonymous, 2000e) 
"To be honest, I really haven 't been following the David L Smith case. But l'd say approx. 
JOyears max. As I once studied the law andjail sentances in an assignment about the 
meaning ofUfe imprisonment (my best bit ofschool work that was) - and Life is oniy about 
¡5-20years. Computer data isfarless important than human Ufe, andshould bejudged 
accordingly"(Anonymous, 2000f) 
"A slap on the wrist. Im not saying it was righi to post a virus to a newsgroup from a 
stolen aol account. What he has already hadto deal with shouldbe enough though. Idon't 
think anyone wouldgo the same route twice. Being held at gunpoint and treated as a 
terrorist is a bit disturbing im sure. Jail time or fines wont help, nor will locfdnghim away 
tryingto set an example to others. Look at kevin mitnick, doing almost 5 years withouta 
trial and denied bail hearings. Havepeople stopped or even cut back on cracking 
machines? Of course not. " (Anonymous, 2000g) 
Antivirus researchers expressed a variety of opinions: 
"Me certainly deserves substantial jail time andfines." (Stiller, 2000b) 
"That's for the judges to decide. He has to be punished. Something like a year in prison 
and a BIG fine would do." (Gryaznov, 2000) 
"/personally believe that David was stupid, rather than malicious, and I therefore think 
the sentence should be similar to the one handed out to the author of thefamous 'Internet 
Worm' (whatever that was - Vm not sure) " (Shipp, 2000b) 
"... a suspended prison sentence (or time already served), some community service that 
will mean nothing to him, afine he won'tbe able topay, all resulting in an extremely high 
payingjob in thefield of computer security for an obscure consultingfirm who will brag 
about theirproven expertise in computer viruses. " (Pichnarczyk, 2000) 
What will the sentence will actually be. 
Virus writers were uncertain; a typical response is shown here: 
"It willprobably begin by looking insanely harsh, and corne out to something that is soft 
on prison time, and nasty for his future. Some of that 'unable to be within 500yards ofa 
computer' bullshit, probably. "(Anonymous, 2000h) 
Antivirus researchers opinions were diverse: 
"Probably a small amount of jail time ". (Stiller, 2000c) 
"/ think he will get a large fine, and 10 years." (Shipp, 2000) 
"Some years arresi... maybe much too long, even if the virus clean-up etc. costs very 
much"(Mane, 2000b) 
"Suspended sentence, probation fora couple of years, specific interdiction offurther 
computer-virus writing, and a fine of a few thousand dollars." (Kabay, 2000c) 
What (if any) impact do you think the sentencing of David Smith will have on virus writing 
and virus distribution post-facto. 
Virus writers were consistent within their grouping: 
"None. It is thefear of being caught that is more important to an author, than the results 
that occur after. For example, even ifthis particular case was set lied in David's favour, 
he would still be ruined in the computer industry. That's enough. " (Anonymous, 2000i) 
"None. Things like this only effect people when its in the spotlight. Its all said and done, 
its old news, the media wont rave about it, the end. It wont be forgotten, but it wont effect 
the future. Nothing changed from the black baron did it? " (Anonymous, 2000J) 
Antivirus researchers: 
"Marginals will stop. Hard-core will continue. After the Next One (tm) goes down, more 
will stop ". (Thompson, 2000b) 
"It depends upon the amount of media exposure and the severity of his sentence. I expect 
it would discourage some virus writers from distributing their creations. " (Stiller, 2000d) 
"Future arrests so as to make them commonplace will have such an effect. The precursor 
to that is "interest" from the authorities. As David Smith is responsible for creating the 
"interest," he will have had a tremendous impact on the future of such. But only if the 
authorities maintain the vigilance"(Kuo, 2000) 
"An overly harsh sentence / treatment could make him into a martyr (cf. Kevin Mitnick). 
Too light a sentence would reduce the deterrent effect. 
Overall, not a great deal, I strongly believe that the probability of getting caught is as 
important as the severity of the sentence in deterring potential criminals. For example, it 
is illegal to smoke in lifts (sorry, elevators in American translation) in HK, and lifts have 
signs saying the penalty is HKS5000. However, I often enter a lift and smell cigarette 
smoke, and I have never seen or heard of someone being fined. The chance of getting 
caught is (virtually) nil, so the heavy fine is no deterrent. If the fine was HKSI00. but 
offenders were caught 50%+ of the time, the practice would quickly stop. Very few virus 
writers or distributors have been caught, so the severity of punishment is small deterrent." 
(Dyer, 2000) 
"It's a mixed message. On the deterrent side, it's the classic "they'll think twice because 
they might go to jail" (if my desired sentence is carried out). On the flip side, it also 
shows virus writers how hard it is to prosecute & convict, as well as suggesting new 
methods for not getting caught. Ultimately, the impact will be low until the conviction 
volume increases. " (Renert, 2000) 
Survey Results and Analysis 
This data shows an interesting cross section of views from both the anti-virus community and the 
Virus Writer/vX community. Interestingly, the vX community seems less convinced that laws will 
help the situation. This position does not appear to be based upon a vested interest in the 
unsuitability of laws, but a genuine feeling within the community that legislation will not be an 
effective preventative. 
Perhaps the most cogent summary of this logic comes from (Dyer, 2000) quoted in response to 
Question 4, "Will the arrest and sentencing of David Smith have any long-term impact?": if the law 
will not be enforced or is unenforceable, it has little effect regardless of the penalties. 
Table 1 shows a summary of the results from our survey: 
Yes No Maybe 
Virus Writers 
Has the arrest of Smith had any impact in the virus writing 
community? 
0 11 0 
WHl it have any long-term impact? 0 11 0 
AntiVirus Researchers 
Has the arrest of Smith bad any impact in the virus writing 
community? 
8 7 1 
Will it have any long-term impact? 7 6 3 
*NB: Incidental comments include (1 ) too harsh sentences would be bad (2) more computer 
ethics classes would help and (1) requires more research 
T a b l e 1 : S u r v e y d a t a . A q u e s t i o n n a i r e c o n c c m i n g t h e i m p a c t o f t h e a r r e s t o f D a v i d S m i t h w a s p r e s e n t e d t o t w o d i f f é r e n t 
g r o u p s : t h o s e ¡ n v o l v e d o r in s o m e w a y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h v i r u s w r i t i n g , a n d t h o s e a c t i v e in t h e a n t i - v i r u s c o m m u n i t y . N o t e t h e 
s t r o n g r e a c t i o n f r o m t h e v i r u s w r i t e r s , w h o w e r e e m p h a t i c t h a t n e h h e r S m i t h ' s a r r e s t n o r a n y c o n v i c t i o n / s e n t e n c i n g w o u l d 
i n f l u e n c e t h e m o r t h e v i r u s w r i t i n g c o m m u n i t y in g e n e r a l . 
Interestingly, the data is reasonably similar to a comparable survey conducted in (Briney, 2000). In 
the Briney survey, an informal poli was conducted among 25 well-known information security 
professionals, asking "will the sentencing of David Smith reduce virus writing". Of the 25 
respondents, 11 said, "No", the Smith conviction will not deter others, while 9 said, "Maybe". Only 
5 said "Yes". 
The Number of Virases In The Wild 
r M I I I M I I I I I I I I I I i l 7 0 0 
F i g u r e 1 : T h e N u m b e r o f V i m s e s o n t h e W U d U s t a s a f u n c t i o n o f time. T h i s g r a p h s h o w s t h e n u m b e r o f v i r a s e s 
r e p o n e d o n t h e W i l d L i s t a s a f u n c t i o n o f t i m e . T h e t o p ( r e d ) l i n e s h o w s t h e t o t a l n u m b e r o f v i r a s e s in t h e w i l d , t h e m i d d l e 
( g r e e n ) l i n e i n d i c a t e s j u s t t h o s e v i r a s e s t h a t a r e o n t h e t o p p o r t i o n o f t h e W i l d L i s t . F i n a l l y , t h e b o t t o m ( b l u e ) l i n e s h o w s t h e 
n u m b e r o f n e w v i r a s e s a d d e d t o t h e t o p p a r t o f t h e l i s t p e r m o n t h . 
As described above in the section New Metrics and Research Techniques, the total number of 
viruses In The Wild could be used as a metric of the efficacy of laws. In particular, we are 
interested in any discontinuity noted in the graph of viruses both newly ItW and also on the total 
number of viruses. 
Before analysis can take place, the following descriptors should be made clear. The x-axis on the 
graph represents months of the WildList. The top (red) line represents the total number of viruses 
on the WildList, and the middle (green) line is those viruses reported by two or more reporters. 
Finally, the bottom (blue) line represents the rate of addition of new viruses per month. [Note that 
this information was only tracked from month January 1996, and so before this time the value is set 
to zero.] 
The large discontinuity in the first two lines around January 1999 is an artifact of the change in 
methodology in the reporting structure of the Wildlist which resulted in a significant cleaning of the 
Wildlist data; rules concerning how long a virus must go unreported before being dropped from the 
list were enforced, leading to a significant drop in the total number of viruses listed. Note no 
iorresponding discontinuity in the lower line; this is due to the fact that the corrections were not elated to the rate of addition of new viruses, merely the renormalization of those already reported. 
F i g u r e 2: D e t a i l e d v i e w o f t h e n u m b e r o f n e w v i r u s e s a d d e d t o t h e t o p p o r t i o n o f t h e W i l d L i s t p e r c a l e n d a r m o n t h . 
T h e r e d l i n e s h o w s t h e n u m b e r o f n e w v i r u s e s a d d e d t o t h e W i l d L i s t p e r m o n t h . T h e r e d s t a r s i n d i c a t e h i g h - p r o f i l e 
i n t e r v e n t i o n s . N o t e t h a t t h e r e i s n o o b v i o u s d r o p in t h e r a t e o f n e w v i r u s e s a f t e r t h e s e i n t e r v e n t i o n s . 
As the most interesting, and arguably most relevant, data is the rate of new viruses becoming 
prevalent ItW, Figure 2 shows a detail of this data: On this graph, we have added stars to note 
prominent virus/trojan interventions or prosecutions1 1. As can be seen, the graph presents no clear 
evidence of any suppression in the rate new viruses were added to the Wildlist. While it can be 
argued that the data is (a) noisy (b) made up of more than one factor (that is, perhaps if there were 
no prosecutions, the graph would show a much-increased gradient) (c) lagging behind of real-world 
events due to the time it takes for a newly-released virus to spread and reporting cycles, one must 
also agree that the Wildlist data provides no evidence to indicate that these high profile cases and 
1 1
 Popp, Pile, Ing-hau, Smith 
prosecutions have helped depress the virusprobiem as measured by the rate of addition of new 
viruses in the wild. 
As this paper represents a snapshot of ongoing research and data gathering, not ali the résulte have 
yet been gathered. One important metric proposed in the proceeding section was to measure the 
availability of computer viruses on the WWW. In order to do this, we measured the number of hits 
generated upon searching for the word "vini", using the Google™ search engine 1 2. We examined 
each site to see if it offered viruses. The following results were noted: 
On March 15,2000 Google results nerted 5080 for "vini". A manual examination of the first 1000 
hits netted 65 sites with viruses (in exécutable or source code form) available for download. This 
means that approximately 6.5% of those sites surveyed contained live viruses or source code. 
On August 18, 2000, Google results netted 20,600 results for "virii". An examination of the first 
360 hits showed 102 sites with viruses (in exécutable or source form). This means that 28% of the 
sites surveyed contained viruses; a significant increase over the first data set. 
It should be noted that the interesting figure in this experiment is not the total number of hits, but 
the percentage of those hits which contain viruses. As can be seen from the results, the percentage 
of sites which contain the word "virii" that also have live viruses has increased. While some 
optimization in search ordering may be responsible for this increase, this change in percentage is 
not likely to be due to a simple increase in the number of sites surveyed. Thus, this test does not 
show any convincing évidence for a decrease in the availability of computer viruses - if anything, 
viruses are more readily available now than ever before. After the sentencing of Smith, it will be 
interesting to note any effect on thèse figures. 
One interesting by-product of the research was that some web authors noted that laws (or more 
correctly, fear of légal conséquences) have certainly suppressed the dissémination of virus samples 
from some of the sites. Here are some examples of verbiage used on some of the sites: 
26-08-99 
Beginning to re-open the website. This will happen in sections. 
Due to complications stifferd durine "Melissa Virus" incident 
therc will be no ll/P/V/C/A material altowed. 
Figure 3: Screen shot from a vX site on August 8,1999 
January Ist. 1999 
We'i'c surry. but vu-'ve not bearti from DaTa TIIk-F for over th.ree ycurs, and most 
(îf not al!) of tht-links litre h;ive biokcn. 
Wc thereiore assume ht-'s fîniiUy betn jailed and/or gone insane so will not be 
maintainhi" f hest pitres, and wc bave now taUen them down. 
Figure 4: Screen shot from a vX site on January 1,1999 
1 2
 Google displays web sites based on page-rank. Thus, it retrieves pages based on the number of 
other pages which point to it. Therefore, the more highly visited pages are ranked first, with new 
pages being added as they become more popular 
However, new sites have taken their places, including this one in The Netherlands, where such 
activity is illegal. 
ABOUT DVC 
We are a new viri! group. We just started and we are learning to write virii. We are 
from (he Net her lands ;ind we hope that 
wc will shine inside the virii comrminitv soinedav. 
Figure 5: Screen shot from a vX site in August, 2000. 
DEFCON Survey Data 
A survey regarding reactions to proposed virus-writing legislation was also conducted. In this 
portion of the study, we chose the population of attendees at DEFCON (www.defcon.org), and 
asked two questions (The exact questionnaire is reproduced in Appendix A; however, the questions 
were posed verbally using the document as a reference): 
• If virus writing were to be made illegal, would that make you less likely to write a virus (noted 
as Group 1); more likely to write a virus (noted as Group 3); or make no difference to your 
likelihood of writing a virus (noted as Group 2)? 
• Given that what a person thinks is generally viewed as their own business, and that 
intentionally going out to cause someone problems with a virus by intentionally infecting their 
computer is viewed as "not ok", where on this scale of "how far would you go" do you 
personally draw the line at acceptable behaviour? 
Then, we presented ordinally scaled actions ranging from those that would be almost universally 
accepted as right/okay, to an action that was almost universally accepted as wrong 1 3. The resulting 
data is presented below as a set of histograms. 
There are several different levels of analysis that can be performed on these data. At the simplest 
level, we can examine the data related to the first question: what was the stated effect of proposed 
laws. Interestingly, it seems that there is a significant set of people who claim that the 
criminalization of virus writing would encourage them to write computer viruses. Based upon 
verbal comments by the respondents, this was primarily due to their feeling that such a law would 
unfairly restrict their free speech. 
Next, one can examine whether there is any correlation between the first answer and the second; 
that is, if we group the sample set based upon their reaction to laws, does one group appear more 
ethically developed than the other? Calculating the sample mean and standard deviation from each 
of the groups, we see that it is difficult to show any significant differences on the samples answers 
to question II based upon group. This is partly due to the fact that the data is clearly not normally 
distributed, although a visual analysis of the data does also tend to show a strong relation between 
the different groups. 
1 3
 Time did not allow the preparation of a true Likert scale; this would be an interesting project for 
future research. 
Bar C h a r t C: \WINKS\GROUPS.DBF 
G R O U P _ 0 1 
G R O U P _ 0 2 
G R O U P _ 0 3 
F i g u r e 6: T h e efTect o f l a w s . R e s p o n d e n t s w e r e g r o u p e d d é p e n d i n g o n a n s w e r : [ h o s e w h o w o u l d b e d e i e r r e d b y l a w s 
( G r o u p _ 0 1 ) , t h o s e fo r w h o m l a w s m a d e n o d i f f é r e n c e ( G r o u p _ 0 2 ) , a n d t h o s e w h o w o u l d b e i n c i t e d t o w ri t e v i r u s e s b y a n e w 
l a w ( G r o u p _ 0 3 ) . T h u s , n e w l a w s m a y c a u s e a n i n c r e a s e in t h e n u m b e r o f c o m p u t e r v i r u s w r i t e r s . 
The fact that individuate with a low tolérance for virus exchange in general expressed that proposed 
législation against viruswriting would make it more likely they would write a virus is interesting. 
It would be interesting to compare this data with that fxom students in a computer science course, in 
order to get some measure of the another population. However, in ad hoc studies conducted by the 
author within such environments, at least the reaction to proposed new laws appears to be similar. 
Finally, it is interesting to note that some individuals mentioned that letting a virus you have 
written out of your own personal control accidentally was much more wrong than giving that virus 
to a friend; "stupidity" was cited as more wrong than intentional distribution. 
Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Research 
The focus of this research has been to gauge the impact of legai and high-profïle intervention to the 
problem of damage caused by computer viruses. The data has shown that laws are of some limited 
effect in certain sections of the population, but that there could be a backlash in the United States to 
a law that was viewed to be a violation of an individual's rights to speech. While the free speech 
question as it pertains to computer viruses is unclear, this is immaterial: the key issue is that there 
are certain segments of the computing population within the United States who would view such a 
law to be unconstitutional, and state they would act accordingly. Further research on the likelihood 
of follow-through on electronic civil disobedience would appear to be an important next step in 
assessing the impact of législation directly aimed at virus writing. Additionally, as the virus writing 
subculture is an international population, civil-disobedience and activism crossover between 
populations with laws and without laws bears further investigation. 
A comparison of the number of viruses in the wild to high-profile virus writer cases/actions does 
not show any clear corrélation with a decrease in the création of new viruses. Indeed, despite much 
effort, the rate of addition of new viruses to the WildList appears to be increasing. 
Tests and assessments should never be interpreted in isolation; thus, considering the strength of the 
responses can be as important in seeing the overall picture as the considération of the Statistical 
data. Additionally, this "strength of conviction" must be considered alongside the worldview of the 
Ilo 
population. Consider that any laws created/enforced are aimed at a very small, but active virus 
writing community; the strength of conviction related to the DEFCON data seems to indicate that 
the creation of such laws would actually create more new virus writers than deter existing ones. 
This, coupled with the relative unenforceability of such laws could lead to a situation that is 
actually worse than the one we have currently. 
Thus, examining all the data currently available, we are unable to show that the aggressive 
legislation directed toward, or intervention related to, virus writers will have any positive impact on 
the virus "problem" as defined by a number of different metrics. 
We await the outcome of the post-sentencing interviews with interest. If the interviews show a 
significant change from their pre-sentencing results, proponents of thorough police follow-up of 
virus writers will have some hard data with which to back up their position. Conversely, if there is 
no appreciable difference in the data, we must, as a judiciary, re-evaluate the costs associated with 
pursuing legal remedies and high-profile "legal" interventions to a primarily sociological 
phenomenon. 
Perhaps instead of attempting to raise support for making virus writing illegal, the energy and 
associated funds currently being expended would be better spent on education, with legal action or 
high profile intervention reserved for cases where an individual's clear and direct intent to damage 
could be shown. 
An obvious objection to the lack of interventions is, quite simply, that the virus author should be 
held responsible for the results of his creation. After all, whether an infection occurs as the result of 
direct action from the virus writer (i.e. the virus is written, and uploaded to a Usenet News Group, 
masquerading as a legitimate utility) or is put into circulation via the WWW (i.e. clearly labeled as 
a virus on a virus exchange WWW site), the fact remains: someone created the virus that is 
responsible for the infection. The question is what, if any, responsibility does the creator of the 
virus hold? 
In cases where a direct relationship between the virus author and a crime involving his virus can be 
shown, adequate existing legal measures can be applied. However, in cases where a virus author 
claims a "right" to make his or her virus freely available, or gives the virus away to knowing and 
willing recipients, but does not directly cause an infection, should we assume the question of 
responsibility dissipates? Opinions on the degree of responsibility vary, but one respondent's 
comments on this issue bear further examination: 
"Shouldn't they really know by now that these things can cause problems whether they 
mean for them to or not!?" 
Unfortunately, in many cases we continue to see a typical pattern of older virus writers "aging out", 
while a new, inexperienced batch is still being birthed. By the time a virus writer is of age to know 
better, and to recognize the impact of these actions on others, they are already beginning to 
disassociate with their virus writing activities. Thus, while in some ways there is an "end of 
innocence" by those who realize their mistake, and exit the field, there is a complete pipeline of 
new authors just beginning their exploration. For this reason, it is flawed to simply assume that 
there is no innocent in the virus writing world; far from it: there are many. 
This innocence and naivete, combined with the rapidly accelerating growth and evolution of 
technology, create a problem that is far more complex than socio-technological problems of the 
past. Other technologies that have been hugely influential on our societies have developed 
relatively slowly, thus enabling us to keep pace, predict future trends, and impart values related to 
those technologies to our young people. Now, however, the technology upon which we are 
attempting to base our projections is evolving rapidly. As the virus writing subculture continues to 
evolve, we are likely to see an exacerbation of problems relating to the technologies we are 
developing. The real question is how to best deploy our resources to protect us from this learning 
process, in which we are all participants. 
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Appendix A 
These questions were presented verbally to a random sampling of attendees of the 
DEFCON Conference. 
Some people want the writing of self-replicating computer code to be illegal. If 
this were to become a reality, wouid you be: 
(a) Less likely to write self-replicating code 
(b) Not influenced one way or the other (makes no différence) 
(c) More likely to write self-replicating code 
Given that what a person thinks is generally viewed as their own business, and that 
intentionally going out to cause someone problems with a virus by intentionally 
infecting their computer is viewed as not ok, where on this scale of "how far would 
you go" do you personally draw the line at acceptable behaviour? 
1. Thinking about writing the virus 
2 . Talking on a BBS about how you might write the virus 
3. Writing the virus on your own computer, but never giving it to anyone. 
4. Writing the virus on your own computer and having it escape accidentally 
5. Writing the virus on your own computer and giving it to one or two friends 
6. Writing the virus and uploading it to a VX site, labeled as a new virus. 
7. Writing the virus and posting it to Usenet labeled as a usefùl application 
8. Writing the virus and deliberately infecting other people's computers with it. 
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Abstract 
Anti-virus protection is, or should be, an integral part of any Information Systems opération, 
be it personal or professional. However, our observation shows that the design of the actual 
anti-virus system, as well as its implementation and maintenance, can range from haphazard 
and sketchy to almost totally nonfunctional. 
While Systems theory in sociological disciplines has come under much attack, it has much to 
offer in the management of integration of technological applications into daily opérations. 
We will examine the 'anti-virus' strategy (Policy, Procedure, Software [sélection, 
implementation, maintenance]), focusing on areas where the 'system' can fail. We will 
address this interaction from a business, rather than a personal computing, point of view. 
The Anti-Virus Strategy System will examine anti-virus stratégies from a Holistic General 
Systems Theory perspective. By this, we mean that we will concern ourselves with the 
individual parts of the system, their functionality, and their interaction. We will draw from 
various IT models specifically designed to provide a holistic, forward-thinking approach to 
the problem, and show that for our strategy to flourish, we must concern ourselves with the 
system as a whole, not merely with its individual components. 
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Introduction 
Computer virus. System failure. These words bring to mind a computer system brought to its 
knees - data corrupted and time wasted. Is this an accurate picture? We hear arguments 
against investing in virus protection: 'Viruses are mythical. Your chances of getting hit by 
one are pretty rare.' Others tell us anti-virus software is a necessity: 'Viruses can cost your 
company a lot of money. Better safe than sorry.' What are we to believe? 
Let's assume that you don't have any anti-virus software. If you are 'hit' by a virus, the cost 
will be proportional to the value of your data and the value of your time. Independen! studies 
[1] have shown that this cost can be quite high, depending on thèse factors as well as 
environmental factors such as how many computers you have (Note: If your data is of little 
or no value, and if your time is worthless, then you can well afford not to have an anti-virus 
strategy). 
We will assume here that your data is worth something to your company, and that your time 
also has a significant value. In this case, you will want to protect your computer system from 
viruses. We will concede for the purists among us that not all viruses are intentionally 
harmful, but stipulate that intentional härm is not requisite for actual harm. For our purposes, 
allocating disk space and CPU time and/or modification of files without knowledge and 
consent (implied or otherwise) constitutes damage, as do deliberate or unintentional 
disruption of work, corruption of data and the lost time mentioned earlier. Basically, we are 
saying viruses are bad and we want to protect against them (there may be some wonderful 
new virus out there in development that can help us, but that is beyond the scope of this 
paper). 
Fortunately, we are in luck. The very thing we need already exists: software, which will 
detect 100 percent of viruses listed by the Wildlist [2] as being known to be in the wild. In 
tests run against a library matched with the Wildlist, several programs were capable of 
detecting all such viruses. The necessity of detection of'lab' viruses is another matter, and 
will not be covered at this time, although it is addressed in [3]. 
Since we have such software, we should have no problems. However, there are problems. 
Something is wrong. Before examining the sources of the problem, a few comments on 
définitions we will be using are in order. 
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Définitions 
The définitions used here are pretty generic, and are adapted for use in an interdisciplinary 
approach to the problems addressed. Some among us would argue that the Systems 
movement was born out of science's failures [4], but in this paper, we take the view that 
General System theory is a child of successftil science, and as most children, it sees things 
through optimistic eyes. We have specifically avoided in-depth discussion of categorical 
schemes, generalizations, and other commonly used 'tools' of General Systems thought, and 
have focused instead on the simplest of the simple. The ideas in this paper are drawn heavily 
from very basic works in Systems theory. They are not new ideas, but it is our hope that their 
application to the management of security and computer viruses will help us identify some of 
the problems we may be overlooking. 
Return to Top 
General Systems Theory 
A system is a set, or group, of related éléments existing in an environment and forming a 
whole. Systems can be made up of objects (computers), subjects (your employées) and 
concepts (language and communication); they can be made up of any one or more of these 
éléments. There are 'real Systems' (those which exist independent of an observer), and 
'conceptual Systems' (those which are symbolic constructs). Our system, 'The anti-virus 
strategy system", is not so différent from many others, in that it is composed of ali three 
éléments: computers (objects), people (subjects) and concepts (policies and ideas). Each of 
these Systems has its own Subsystems. For example, your system of networked computers 
consists of individuai computers. These computers are comprised of yet more Subsystems; 
microprocessors, resistors, disk drives, etc. Our system consists of both real and conceptual 
Subsystems. A system can also be said to be a way of looking at the world, or a point of view 
[5]. 
Concepts, laws, and models often appear in widely différent fields [6] based upon totally 
différent facts. This appears to be at least in part due to problems of Organization, phenomena 
which cannot be resolved into locai events, and dynamic interactions manifested in the 
différence of behaviour of parts when isolated or in higher configurations. The resuit is, of 
course, a system which is not understandable by investigating their respective parts in 
isolation. One reason these identical principles have been discovered in entirely différent 
fields is because people are unaware of what those in other disciplines are doing. General 
Systems theory attempts to avoid this overlap in research efforts. 
There are two main méthodologies of General Systems research; the empirico-intuitive and 
the deductive theory. The first is empirical, drawing upon the things which regularly exist in 
a set of Systems. It can be illustrated fairly easily, but lacks mathematical précision and can 
appear to the 'scientist' to be na<ve. However, the main principles which have been offered by 
this method include differentiation, compétition, closed and open Systems, and wholeness -
hardly na<ve or worthless principles. The second method, basically, can be described as 'the 
machine with input', defined by a set 'S' of internai states, a set T of input and a mapping 'f 
of the produci I x S into S (organisation is defined by specifying states and conditions). Self-
organising Systems (those progressing from lower to higher states of complexity, as in many 
social organisations) are not well suited to this approach, as their change cornes from an 
outside agent. Our anti-virus strategy system is such a system and for this reason we will use 
the empirico-intuitive methodology. 
Classical system theory uses classical mathematics to define principles which apply to 
Systems in general or to subclasses. General System theory can be called the doctrine of 
principles applying to defined classes of Systems. It is our hope that we can stimulate thought 
on how already-known principles can help us in managing our anti-virus protection by 
examining the system as a whole. 
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Holism 
Our définition of holism, drawing where appropriate from the medicai profession, is health-
oriented, and focuses on maintaining and improving the existing health of the system. It does 
not focus on disease and illness. It is interesting to note that, while we have many terms that 
relate to compromised and infected Systems, we do not seem to have many terms relating to 
'weir computers. Holism operates under the assumption that the open system possesses an 
innate organising principle, with the interdependence of the parts having an effect on the total 
system health. Holism views symptoms of distress as signalling disharmonic conditions, 
from which we can team how to adjust the system (feedback); it is open to a variety of 
approaches for attaining balance. The focus of holism is heavily slanted toward the correction 
of causai factors, not symptomatic relief. Thus, the role of the holistic practitioner is to 
facilitate the potential for healing [7]. 
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Where do our anti-virus strategy Systems fit in this picture? We hope to explore some 
answers to that question by first examining the components of our model system. Keep in 
mind, however, that the goal of this paper is not to provide you with answers, but rather to 
stimulate new ways of thinking about the problems we face daily. 
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Components 
Each of the components in Diagram 1 contributes to the overall health of the system. 
Conversely, each can contribute to the illness of the system. For instance, our computer can 
contribute to the health of the system by functioning properly. If the hard drive crashes, a 
disharmonic condition is introduced. Our managers contribute to the overall well-being of the 
system, as long as they perform correctly. However, if one of them intentionally or 
unintentionally infects a computer with a virus, he or she contributes to the illness of the 
system. Our software contributes to the Wellness by keeping employées reassured, and by 
keeping virases out. If it is disabled by an employée desirous of more speed upon boot, or if 
it does not do its job in virus detection, it contributes to the illness or chaos in the system. 
There are other factors not shown, as the anti-virus strategy system model does not stop at 
the boundary of the company. The model includes your Internet service provider, virus 
writers, makers of electronic mail front-ends, anti-virus product tech support people and 
more. For the purposes of this paper, we must draw an artificial boundary. We mention the 
rest to give you food for thought, and to illustrate that boundaries are not static. 
Figure 1. Anti-virus Strategy System - The Environment 
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Programs Policy and Procédures 
(Sélection, Implementation and Maintenance) 
Where do we begin in examining the interaction of our chosen system éléments? Let's start 
with the software sélection. Anti-virus software is selected based on a wide number of 
criteria (8). While some of these criteria are beneficiai, several are counterproductive at best 
(9). We need to be aware of exactly how our company's software is being chosen, and not 
leave this vital aspect of software sélection up to people who do not have the expérience or 
expertise to make a sélection that will maximize your organisation's protection against 
virases. 
Anti-Virus Strategy Systems 
Does your anti-virus software detect ali of the viruses which are a real threat to your 
organisation? Before you glibly answer yes, you should recognise that ail products are far 
from created equal, and that even the best products will not achieve this goal if not properly 
maintained. Consider the following: 
When asked what happens to two blocks of copper initially at différent 
températures left alone together in an insulated container, students will reply that 
the blocks will come to the same temperature. Of course, if asked how they 
know, they usually say "Because it is a law of nature"...the opposite is t ruc . i t is 
a law of nature because it happens.[10] 
Apply this to your anti-virus software. Does it catch viruses because it is anti-virus software? 
If so, you can dépend on it, as its name defines what it is. But, if you even loosely apply this 
concept, you will see that it is anti-virus software because it catches viruses - and if it does 
not, then what does that make it? 
Remember the following quote: 
'If you cali a tail a leg, how many legs has a dog?' 
'Five?' 
'No, Four. Calling a tail a leg doesn't make it a leg' [11] 
Maintenance of your software is another criticai issue. Maintenance refers not to the upgrade, 
but to the maintaining of the software on a daily basis. What does it require to run? Are you 
supplying what it needs to live? Or is it merely surviving? Does it have adequate memory, 
power, disk space to run optimally and lessen the chance your employées will disable it? Is it 
in an environment free from other programs which may hinder its performance? If you 
cannot answer yes to thèse questions, you are not providing an environment for this élément 
of your strategy system which will allow it to remain viable. It will not survive. Like living 
Systems, the anti-virus strategy system requires a favorable environment, else the system will 
adapt. Unfortunately, in the case of this system, adaptation can mean software becoming 
disabled by the user component of the system, or overridden by a competing software 
component. Ail this, and we have not even added viruses which by design cause a problem to 
the system by the introduction of instability. 
Even if you have the best anti-virus software, and are running it optimally, there can stili be 
problems. Software is just one part of the strategy system. Policies and procédures play an 
important rôle in the overall strategy. Even the viruses we mentioned earlier play a part in 
this system. Then there are the least predictable aspects of the system, the human beings. 
How complex is this system? How much should we expect the people involved to 
understand? 
Ackoff defines an abstract system as one in which ali of the éléments are concepts, whereas a 
concrete system is one in which at least two of the éléments are objects [12]. As you can see, 
our system is concrete. It is also by design an open system, one into which new components 
may be introduced. Some of these components are by nature 'unknown' (i.e. actions of 
people, how software may react, viruses which may appear). 
When these components are introduced, we have to consider first how they behave on their 
own. Next, we have to consider how they would behave in combination with any and/or ali 
of the other éléments. Finally, we have to consider how 'things' in general will be if neither of 
the objects are présent. In its most simple form, a two-part system would require four 
équations, but of course, you can see that as the number of éléments increases, the number of 
interactive équations grows by leaps and bounds [Table 1]. 
Linear Equations Nonlinear Equations 
Equation One Equation 
Several 
Equations 
Many 
Equations 
One 
Equation 
Several 
Equations 
Many 
Equations 
Algebraic Trivial Easy Essentially Impossible 
Very 
Difficult 
Very 
Difficult Impossible 
Ordinary 
differential Easy Difficult 
Essentially 
Impossible 
Very 
Difficult Impossible Impossible 
Partial 
Differential Difficult 
Essentially 
Impossible Impossible Impossible Impossible Impossible 
Table 1. [From [5]] - Introduction of Elements 
One of the Systems theory approaches we can draw from here to help illustrate the problem 
cornes from what is sometimes called the Square Law of Computation. This means basically 
that unless you can introduce some simplifications, the amount of computation involved in 
figuring something out will increase at least as fast as the square of the number of équations. 
Consider ali of the interactions between humans, computers, and software, and you will see 
why it is impossible to precisely calculate what the results of ail of those interactions will be. 
We cannot even measure them. In other words, you cannot possibly anticipate all of the 
Problems you will encounter in trying to keep your company's data safe from viruses, 
because you cannot possibly calculate the interactions which will occur once you begin 
trying to formulate a strategy. Needless to say, thèse interactions create 'problems'. 
If we examine our anti-virus strategy in various ways, we may be able to see things more 
clearly. Another helpful way in which we can view our system is as an expression, such as 
the terms of a set. For instance, the notation: 
Let x stand for marriage Let y stand for carnage Let z stand for bicycle 
The set [x,y,z] is simple enough for anyone to understand. Using names in sets takes us to the 
more complex:[The look on your face when you saw your first child, a proof that Vesselin 
Bontchev is not the Dark Avenger, an atom of plutonium]; wherein the first no longer exists 
(or possibly never did); the second has not yet existed, and the third is out of reach of the 
common man. 
If you were to be asked for the meaning of the ... in the set [Alan, Dmitry, Fridrik...] would 
you say the ... represented men's names? Names of programmers? Names of programmers 
who make anti-virus software? Names of people not from the United States?What is the rule 
for determining the meaning of what is unstated? Is there some unwritten heuristic of which 
your employées are not aware? What is the meaning of the three dots in our set? 
This has a particular application to policy. Users can easily understand, 'Do not turn the 
computer off if you find a virus'. Can they as easily understand, 'Do not reset the computer if 
you find a virus'? Can they understand, 'In the event of a suspected virus, cali the 
administrator or take appropriate action'? What is a suspected virus? Is it any time the 
computer S y s t e m seems to act strangely? Is it only when the letters fall off? After ail, that's 
what viruses do, right? What is appropriate action? [Turn off the computer, Call your 
supervisor, Reboot the computer,...] What is the meaning of the ... in this set? 
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Variations on a thème 
How w e l l are our stratégies doing? As pointed out early on, not very well. Why not? To help 
answer that question, next we will examine the problems of our strategy using the concept of 
variation. We recognise the duality of variables as they relate to information processing; the 
significant values which variables acquire at the two extrêmes of their respective spectra. 
Specifically, in order for a System to continue to thrive, information must be processed. 
Disorder, uncertainty, variety - ail must shift from high to low [Table 2]. 
Disorder, Uncertainty and Variety: 
Entropy and the Amount of Information Processed 
High Disorder Low 
High Uncertainty Low 
High Variety Low 
Large Number of Alternatives Small 
Small Probability of an Event Large 
Low Regulation and Control High 
Table 2 - Predictable Output 
The probability of particular events follows by decreasing from small to large. The amount of 
regulation and control increases from low to high. We become increasingly sure of the output 
of our systems [13]. However, viruses introduce a form of disorder with which the human 
components of our systems are not intimately familiar. While the probability of infection can 
be calculated mathematically [14], we are unable to calculate the probability of other events 
related to viral infections[15]. In what ways does this introduced unfamiliarity manifest 
itself? One manifestation is the appearance of problems. 
We typically try to solve most of these problems deductively, to determine the reason for a 
variation between design and operation or design and implementation. This approach is 
doomed to failure because it places the blame on the subsystems. We attempt to 'restore to 
normal' instead of redesigning our system. We formulate plans based on incorrect, 
incomplete or obsolete assumptions. We neglect to factor in spillover effect, that is, the 
unwanted effect which actions in one system can have in another. Improving an isolated 
system may seem the epitome of system integrity. You can have your pure clean computer. 
Of course, it is virtually useless, unconnected to the rest of the world. Or, perhaps it is the 
solution. Isolated perfect machines. This would probably create a dissatisfied workforce, 
however, which would ultimately impact business negatively. In the case of anti-virus 
strategy, 'spillover' takes on many new dimensions - as many as the human beings with 
which our machines interface. Can you control all of the aspects of this system? You cannot. 
1 
Another factor to consider is the size and extent of our system. Further insight may be gained 
by considering what is sometimes referred to as the generalised thermodynamic law, which 
states that the probable state is more likely to be observed than the less probable. While this 
may incite the physicists among us, it has two parts which correspond to the first and second 
law of thermodynamics. The first law is hardly worth mentioning (physical reason), but the 
second is of interest to us. We should be concerned with the limited power of observers when 
viewing large systems. In other words, we cannot expect our managers to be in every place at 
once, knowing what is going on with every system, every employee. The concept of 
boundaries can be used to help solve this problem, but their definition is beyond the scope of 
this paper [16]. 
Return to Top 
System Failure and Measurement 
We say the system is failing for three reasons. It is not performing as intended. It is 
producing results other than expected. It is not meeting its goal. The objective is NO 
VIRUSES. However, in addition to often neglecting to define what 'no viruses' actually 
means, we are frequently unaware of how 'no viruses' can mean different things to different 
people. Not performing as intended could mean it finds some viruses but not all, or it finds 
all but only removes some. Unexpected results could mean it crashes 1 out of every 6000 
machines, or produces system degradation you did not anticipate (if this is the case, does the 
fault really lie with the product for producing the degradation or you for not anticipating?) 
Not meeting its goal most likely means failing to keep out viruses. However, to some people, 
this is a different goal from 'no viruses'. 
How is this possible? Isn't 'no viruses' a simple concept? In a word, no. When there is a 
malfunction, i.e. a virus is found, the natural tendency is to look for the cause within the 
system. We tend to blame the problem on the variation of the system from its 'desired' 
behaviour. It could be the fault of the program, the employee, the policy. We tend to blame 
the program as it is the part of the system most closely identified with the failure as 
immediately perceived. However, consider for a moment that, to your employee, 'no viruses' 
means simply that. No viruses are found. Following that line of thought, finding 'no viruses' 
would be a system success - that is, until it brought your operation to a halt. You see, to some 
people, 'no viruses' means that none are seen or observed, and not that none are actually 
operational in the system. We plan grandiose policies and procedures around finding a virus 
and make no space for 'no viruses' as a possible failed variation. If you find 'no virus', you 
need to be very sure it is not due to your employees disabling your software, or your software 
not finding the virus. 
Many system 'improvements' are possible which in reality doom the system. Faulty 
assumptions and goals are often at the root of this problem. For instance, it is obvious that all 
of your computer workers must, under dire penalty, refrain from bringing disks from home 
into your office. You implement this policy. You assume they will comply. Your goal is 
compliance, not 'no viruses'. If the goal was 'no viruses', you would be forced to be more 
realistic.Consider the following two statements: 
We have clean, working computers and by not bringing in software, we can keep 
them that way. It will save us all a lot of time, and effort! 
If you bring in disks, you will probably infect our office computers. It will cost 
us all a lot of money. 
In the first instance, the focus is on the well machine. Everyone wants well machines. People 
like to be part of winning teams, and participate in things that are nice. 
In the second, the focus is on the sick machine. None of your people would have viruses on 
their home computers. So, this must not apply to them. And if they do break the rule, you 
have already set them up to be afraid to teli you. After ali, they don't want to cost you a lot of 
money and they certainly don't want to be known as the culprit for infecting the office 
computers. 
How do we measure the performance of our anti-virus strategy system? Not very well. If we 
find some viruses, we say it's working. If we don't find any viruses, we say it's working. In 
some cases, you can apply 'we say it's not working' to thèse same sentences. There is no 
standard way in which we measure the success of the entire system. Only in the act of being 
out of control will the system be able to detect and bring back the control. 
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Conclusion 
The Systems approach proposed here is a 'whole system' optimization. Think of it as the 
configuration of a system which will facilitate optimal performance. There exists, of course, 
a dilemma, in that at some time suboptimization may be necessary, or even the only possible 
approach. An approximation which is used may be a great deal better than an exact solution 
which is not [17]. Nevertheless, our model will attempt to show ways to optimize system 
performance. Models are how we express things we want to understand and possibly change, 
designed in terms of something we think we already understand. Models sometimes présent 
Problems when you try to translate them into real world activities. With this in mind, I would 
like to suggest a simple model which may help us begin to find ways to find a solution to the 
problem of designing a workable anti-virus strategy. 
'Models should not so much explain and predict as to polarize thinking and pose 
sharp questions.' [18] 
Using a holistically modelled approach, we would strive to maintain the existing health of the 
system. This assumes we have a healthy system to begin with. This requires you not dépend 
on your belief that your software is correctly installed and operational, and that your 
employées know how to use it and are using it, and that your equipment is functional, and 
that your policies are correct and being followed... It requires that you actually take it upon 
yourselves to designate people to ensure that your system is optimal to begin with. If you are 
not Willing to do this, you cannot expect to restore the system to health. The focus should 
shift from 'blame' to 'responsibility'. This may require investment on your part. You may 
need to update equipment. You may need to train employées. You may need to purchase 
software. You may need to subscribe to publications which can keep your employées up to 
date on trends in virus and security matters. 
You will need to monitor feedback between various aspects of your anti-virus strategy 
system. We have not discussed feedback at any great length in this paper, due to the number 
of éléments of the system and the complexity of the feedback. However, using the empirico-
intuitive General Systems theoretical approach defined earlier in this paper, you should be 
able to determine the sorts of feedback which are required to keep your system fùnctioning 
optimally. If there is NO feedback, you can rest assured your system will fail. Lack of 
feedback produces entropy. In simple terms, entropy can be called the steady dégradation or 
disorganization of a society or a system. This is not what you want for your system. You 
want to move the system into organisation and order, high rates of probability and certainty. 
As we discussed earlier, this happens when information is processed. The information can be 
communication of any type between any éléments of the system. 
Our current focus seems to be on the existing illnesses in our S y s t e m s . If open Systems 
indeed, as suggested, possess an innate organising principle, perhaps we should be paying 
more attention to what the éléments of our Systems are telling us. We could leam the sorts of 
information required to maintain organised reliability. We could learn the amount and t y p e s 
of feedback required to process information optimally, and to keep the system both desirably 
adaptive and from adapting negatively. We must examine our Systems as a whole, including 
ali of the parts, as best we can, to determine what the éléments and the system are telling us. 
In the case of our anti-virus strategy Systems, we have yet to determine what that message is. 
Many of us have not even yet defined the éléments of the system, the system boundaries, or 
the goal of the system. 
It is clear that there are disharmonie conditions in the 'Anti-virus strategy Systems' of most 
companies; if there were not, no one would be attending this conférence or reading this 
paper. It is also clear that the way we traditionally approach these problems is not working. 
We have been using these approaches for a long time, and the problems are not going away. 
Drawing from the holism model, one thing we can do is examine causal factors, instead of 
focusing on symptomatic relief. We need to examine more closely the interdependence of the 
parts of our system, and as security Professionals, should facilitate the potential for healing 
our Systems. It is hoped that some of the ideas mentioned in this paper can provide a starting 
point for this. 
The author would like to thank Louise Yngstrom, University of Stockholm, for late night 
chats on System Theory, above and beyond the cali of even académie duty. 
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Abstract 
"In the Wild" virus detection is part of the criteria of National Computer Security Association (NCSA) Anti-virus 
Product Certification, SECURE COMPUTING Checkmark Certification, the proposed UK IT Security Evaluation 
and Certification (ITSEC) anti-virus product certification and other product review and évaluation schemes. 
' However, companies which use "certified" producís, based on "In the Wild" (ITW) detection continue to suffer the 
effects of viruses. This paper considers the various définitions of "In the Wild", as well as how well the "In the 
Wild" criteria as defined by the individual testing organizations measure the ability of producís to deliver adequate 
protection. Inhérent problems with such approaches are discussed from both a development and user perspective. 
Some alternative testing, development and protection stratégies are offered. 
Introduction 
There are currently over 10,000 computer viruses in existence. Most of these have little likelihood of spreading and 
exist only in collections; they are known as "Zoo" viruses. Even an anti-virus virus researcher would be hard 
pressed to list a significant percentage of these viruses, let alone provide detailed information on how they operate. 
Most users have only even heard of a handful of them. Yet when a virus is encountered within a company, it is 
usually the case that a cali to an anti-virus vendor, or a search through a virus encyclopedia will provide further 
information on that particular virus. This is because vendors, researchers and testers have begun to focus their 
attention on those viruses "In the Wild". 
The concept of "In the Wild" is an important one. Tests of anti-virus software have, until recently, focused on Zoo 
detection figures. These tests did not necessarily measure the ability of a product to meetthe real world threat [1]. 
Consider two producís tested against a corpus of infected files: by simply measuring which product detects more 
infected samples, we would be given no information concerning how well the product detects and repairs those 
viruses which are known to pose an active threat to a real world PC. A meaningful test of the efficacy of a product 
would be to measure the product's ability to detect and remove those viruses that the user is likely to encounter: 
that is, those viruses that are "In the Wild". 
In order to understand the issues surrounding "in the Wild", we will examine a history of the term. As far as we can 
determine, the actual phrase "in the wild" was first used informally to describe real-world virus incidents by Dave 
Chess, of IBM's TJ Watson Research facility, in 1990/91 [2]. Around this time, Alan Solomon remembers using 
the term in téléphone conversations in the UK [3]. The phrase subsequently cropped up in Virus Bulletin in 1992, 
in a message from Roger Riordan [4], where he referred to real-world incidents: "As Dave Chess pointed out on 
Virus-L (May 8*, 1991), fewof your spécimens have ever been seen in the wild..." [5]. It formally appeared in 
1992, in "Measuring Computer Virus Prevalence"[6] where it was shown that a small number of viruses accounted 
for most actual virus incidents, i.e. were "in the wild". Early Virus Bulletin tests featured an "In the Wild test-set", 
a collection of viruses designed to measure real-world performance. The contents of this list were gamered from 
virus reports sent to Virus Bulletin, along with those viruses which researchers believed to be spreading, as 
opposed to those which were known to exist but which were not observed to be spreading (Zoo samples). While 
this was not entirely scientific, it is the first test of which we are aware that made a reasoned and logicai attempi to 
move away from Zoo testing. During this time period, most new viruses were not initially discovered spreading in 
the wild and the vast majority of Zoo viruses were not considered to be an active threat. At the same time, Zoo 
testing remained prévalent [7] and users tended to judge producís based on how many viruses the product could 
detect. 
There were some obvious problems with this approach. As the number of viruses "In the Wild" continued to rise, 
the need for a better définition of "In the Wild" led to the création of The WildList by Joe Wells [8]. Wells' idea 
f 
was to take the concept of "In the Wild" used by Virus Bulletin and expand it intemationally. To this end, he 
culled virus reports from virus researchers Worldwide. Any virus that was reponed by two or more researchers was 
considered to be spreading in the wild. In some cases, virases were reported by only one contríbutor. Those virases 
were placed into their own section of The WildList. (This supplemental list provides some idea of which virases 
might be moving onto or off of the main section of The WildList and tends to be a more regional reporting 
mechanism.) A supplemental frequency table has been recently added. It does not show how common each viras is. 
Rather, it is The WildList sorted by the number of participants that report each viras. It gives the ñames, types, and 
aliases of the most frequently reported virases. Thèse virases have been reported by at least one third of The 
WildList participants. They are sorted with the most frequently reported first. The WildList clearly states it should 
not be considered a list of the most common viruses, as no commonness factor is provided; however, it can serve 
to help determine which viruses are spreading. 
The WildList represents the most organized effort to catalogue those virases which are spreading, yet it would be 
wrong to define "In the Wild" as those viruses which are Usted in The WildList. Rather, The WildList should be 
considered to be a subset of this set - a core set of viruses that every product must be able to detect. Making this 
subset more complete is fraught with problems, and falls prey to différent définitions of what "In the Wild" actually 
means. Before considering the impact of tests based on The WildList, we shall examine some of thèse problems. 
• The WildList lags behind viruses spreading in the wild. 
Time delay is by far the most commonly reported complaint against using The WildList as a complete set of viruses 
"In the Wild". Put simply, the logistics of compiling reports from more that 45 contributors Worldwide, who in tum 
have to compile their own list of Wild viruses based upon their technical support calis, can quickly date the 
contents of The WildList. In practical terms, a virus may make it onto The WildList two or even three months after 
it is first discovered at a user's site. At présent, this is difficult to improve upon, though streamlining analysis of 
submissions may help. Procédures to facilitate this have now been implemented, by way of automatically 
distributed, standardized reporting forms for participants, which will decrease the time required to process 
incoming submissions. Thèse new forms should make reporting much simpler for the volunteer reporters, and it is 
hoped this may help aid in getting submissions in faster. 
• The viruses on The WildList are those viruses reported, not necessarily those viruses which are in the 
wild. 
As The WildList contributors are mostly made of those working within the anti-virus industry, it is not unreasonable 
to assume that The WildList represents those virus infections which are reported directly to developers/resellers. 
However, this group of viruses is not necessarily a complete list of viruses "In the Wild". Consider the case of a 
hypothetical viras named Foo, spreading in the wild. This virus is detected and removed perfectly by ail anti-virus 
products. Also, consider another viras spreading, called Bar. When a certain product detects Bar and attempts to 
removc it, it corrupts the file. It is entirely believable that anti-virus companies will received far more reports of the 
Bar viras than the Foo virus, even if they have equal prevalence. Thus, researchers may preferenti al ly receive 
reports of those viruses which are not adequately dealt with by anti-virus products. 
One apparently obvious solution to this bias this would be to include businesses (as opposed to solely developers, 
resellers and researchers) in WildList reporting. However, although many companies require that ail virus incidents 
are reported to a central body, some studies of computer viras epidemiology strongly suggest there are other 
problems with organizational reporting. Indeed, it is possible that problems with corporate statistics can refiect the 
inclusion of wild guesses, reporters being unaware of viras incidents and reporting bias toward problematic viruses 
[9]-
• The samples named in The WildList may not be the same viruses actually spreading in the wild 
This question highlights one of the áreas which is actively being improved within The WildList; correlating reports 
of viruses by name with actually binary samples of infected files. It is believable that discrepancies over viras 
naming could both lead to viruses being inadvertently added to The WildList, as well as viruses being omitted. 
Consider the case of a single virus, Foo, which is identified by product A as Foo.A, and identified by Product B as 
Foo.B. In such a case, if researchers simply correlated reports from the field with their own viras collections, both 
Foo.A and .B might be placed on The WildList. Next, consider two viruses, Foo and Bar, which are both identified 
by products A and B as Foobar. In such a circumstance, only one virus name would be added to the list of those 
viruses known to be "In the Wild", where in actuality, there should be two différent entries. 
To help solve this problem, Wells has added additional criteria to those contributing to The WildList: if a sample is 
being reported for the first time, the reporter must supply a sample of that virus along with his report. This allows 
submissions of the same virus reported by different name to be caught, and similarly allows one to discriminate 
between two different viruses inadvertently identified by the same name. The WildList Organization has begun 
distributing the responsibilities associated with WildList sample replication and identification of the viruses 
amongst The WildList board members, and is including a peer review process for samples. It is hoped this will 
significantly decrease the workload and increase the naming accuracy. 
*Note that even though we have outlined a number of shortfalls in The WildList, the author still believes that it is 
currently by far the best resource for tracking those viruses which are believed to be in the wild. 
Tests Based Upon The WildList 
Using confirmed samples of every virus on the list as a test suite for testing anti-virus software can tell you whether 
or not a product detects the viruses on the list. While this is clearly only a minimal test, by monitoring the tests 
over time we should theoretically be able to determine whether or not a vendor continually meets the test 
conditions. The problems with practical aspects of doing this will be addressed later in this paper. Also, it is 
important to remember that while The WildList clearly defines what is meant by "In the Wild" for the purposes of 
the list and for tests which use the list, it is not a definitive measure of viruses that are causing incidents. For 
example, certain viruses have been found spreading in isolated areas of the world. While they are definitely in the 
wild causing incidents, the fact that they are reported by only one person keeps them from being included in the 
main section of The WildList. This creates a problem for users who rely on ITW-based certifications as the only 
measure of a product's effectiveness, because current certification schemes, as will be shown later, do not test 
against even the upper portion (viruses in the wild, reported by 2 or more contributors) of the most current release 
of The WildList. 
In this section, we will briefly examine three testing/certification schemes, before discussing how much assurance 
each gives to the user that his/her product will truly detect those viruses which are known to be spreading. 
Interestingly, each scheme uses a slightly different definition of "In the Wild" for the purposes of its tests. With 
this in mind, we will then re-examine The WildList as the baseline measure used by several certification bodies. 
NCSA Criteria 
Founded in 1989, the NCSA is a for-profit organization based in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Its anti-virus product 
certification began in 1992. The main thrust of the criteria currently is to provide a way to measure the 
effectiveness of detection capabilities of virus scanners. The scheme requires that the scanner components of 
certified products detect 100 per cent of viruses found on the upper portion of The WildList, using a WildList that is 
two months old at the time of testing. This is said to allow for development time. We will now briefly examine 
relevant aspects of the scheme. 
According to documentation published on the NCSA World Wide Web site, "NCSA tests and certifies that anti­
virus scanners pass a number of stringent tests." As our own tests have shown that some NCSA certified products 
should not pass the documented certification criteria, we asked NCSA for information regarding their virus test 
suite, to see if we could determine the cause of the discrepancy. At NCSA's invitation we visited its' virus lab where 
several virus test suite related problems were noted. One problem we noted was related to the replication of 
polymorphic viruses. Some viruses attempt to hide from virus scanning programs by keeping most of their code 
garbled in some way, and changing the garbling each time they spread. When these viruses run, a small header 
"de-garbles" the body of the virus and then branches to it. A polymorphic virus' de-garbling header changes each 
time the virus spreads. The polymorphic test-set had not been fully replicated; only 6 viruses had been replicated. 
As some products may have unreliable polymorphic detection, a more complete polymorphic test suite is desirable. 
Ideally, all polymorphic viruses "In the Wild" should be replicated onto appropriate hosts, but this is a difficult and 
time-consuming task. Additionally, some viruses are multi-partite, which means they are capable, for example, of 
infecting not only files, but Master Boot Records of hard disks, or floppy disk boot sectors. These types of viruses 
should be replicated onto all appropriate media; we observed that this is not being done in NCSA tests at this time. 
Again, this replication presents some unique problems and will take some time to sort out. The macro virus test-set 
consisted of two replications of each macro virus except for ExcelMacro.Laroux, of which there was only one 
sample. This number of replicants is insufficient to allow for measurement of the reliable detection of macro 
viruses. There were not any macro viruses replicated onto Office97 documents. As some of the macro viruses will 
replicate upwardly into Office97 documents, inclusion of such documents is required in order to measure the level 
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of protection afforded the user. Nine of the boot sector viruses had not yet been replicated; work is currently in 
progress to rectify this. It can be difficult to replicate some of the viruses, requiring special expertise and in some 
cases, additional equipment. Plans are underway to initiate testing of master boot records of hard disks; however 
NCSA is some time away from this type of test. NCSA has demonstrated its commitment to fully expanding its test 
suite. NCSA virus lab technicians are currently in the process of solving these virus related problems by replicating 
the macro and polymorphic viruses into a larger suite, and by replicating the multipartite viruses onto appropriate 
media. According to NCSA spokesperson Jon Wheat, these issues are a "top priority". 
Some administrative problems should be noted. Here, we are concerned with the timeliness of the tests and 
consistency of the scheme. On March 17 th, 1997, the NCSA Web Site listed F-PROTProfessional 223a as a 
certified product. Version 2.23a was released in August 1996. Similarly, Eliashim s ViruSafe version 7.1 was 
shown as certified; however, the most current version of ViruSafe on March 17 lh was 7.3. Two Intel products 
(LanDesk for NT and LanDeskfor NetWare) were shown as last being tested in December 1996. Dr. Solomon's 
software versions 7.65 were the most current tested versions; their current release on March 17 t h was 7.69. When 
asked about the discrepancies, NCSA stated these products would be retested. As documented in [10], the scheme 
has not been without problems; however, at the time of the completion of this paper, these problems appear to be in 
the process of being resolved, and products appear to be tested on a regular basis. 
NCSA is working hard to make the tests of the scanners complete, thorough and accurate and to keep the 
administrative aspects of the scheme functioning smoothly. 
SECURE COMPUTING Checkmark 
SECURE COMPUTING magazine, published by Westcoast Publishing, regularly reviews and evaluates anti-virus 
software, provides a venue for marketing of various security software products, and offers security-related articles 
for its subscribers. A recent addition to these services is the SECURE COMPUTING Checkmark scheme, which is 
designed to establish a standard for computer security products, test them against that standard and produce a 
certificate which shows that they meet the standard. They claim this is similar to governmental standards that seek 
to indicate to a buying public whether they can have faith in certain products. According to the SECURE 
COMPUTING Web page: 
"Whatever your needs, you should know that the products you are buying are worth the money and give you a 
sensible level of security....It shows that the product has been tested and approved to an industry-recognized 
standard by an independent organization... .There are also one or two other schemes run by private companies or 
by students in universities but in our opinion these are not worth bothering with.".. ."To obtain a Checkmark an 
anti-virus product has to detect all the viruses that are in-the-wild; that is those which are actually out in the real 
world causing infections (not held in the private collections of anti-virus researchers). The Checkmark in-the-
wild list is updated on a monthly basis. Products are tested on the basis of the in-the-wild list current three 
months previously and there are a number of practical reasons for doing this. It is a fairly typical approach and in 
the real world gives a high standard for the anti-virus developers to achieve." 
As with the NCSA library, not all multi-partite samples have been replicated onto both files and boot sectors; this 
process is underway. Tests of boot sector infections are done on real infected floppies; there are as yet inadequate 
resources for testing of Master Boot Records of virus infected hard disks. There are a thousand replicants for each 
polymorphic virus which has been replicated so far. Secure Computing will be including Office 97 capable Word 
viruses now that some have appeared on 77ie WildList; they are not testing any of the upwardly mobile Office 95 
viruses on Office 97 Word goat documents until these viruses are explicitly reported on The WildList. 
This scheme could attempt to address the problem of The WildList lagging behind the current threat as it retains the 
option to add viruses at the discretion of the test administrator [11]. It remains to be seen if this results in tests 
which provide a good measure the protection provided; however, all indications are that the tests should be 
thoroughly and competently performed. Westcoast Publishing is well positioned to promote the scheme in both the 
United States and Europe, using SECURE COMPUTING magazine as well as its' recently purchased InfoSecurity 
News. 
ITSEC Certification 
The proposed UK IT Security Evaluation and Certification (ITSEC) model of anti-virus software certification 
consists of several criteria, all of which are designed to measure how the product meets the dynamic real world 
threat. Several anti-virus product vendors have been involved in helping draft guidelines, and the specialty 
magazines Virus Bulletin and SECURE COMPUTING have also sent representatives to the Anti- Vims Working 
Group meetings. The evaluation process is in the developmental phase although significant progress has been made 
in the past year, particularly in the area of formalization of criteria. The main areas with which the process is 
concerned are Standard, Threat Assessment, Virus Attack Techniques, Anti-Virus Working Group Virus 
Collection, Comprehensive Virus Collection, "Advice Documentation", and Certificate Maintenance Scheme. 
With the ITSEC scheme, an increasing level of stringency would be applied and associated with the commonality 
of the virus or observed technique, i.e. weighted testing. The current plan is to perform tests with common and 
wild viruses (note that ITSEC's definition of "In the Wild" is not the same as that used by The WildLisi) listed 
concurrently and cumulatively and to require a 100% score to pass. Common viruses are defined by the ITSEC 
scheme as those which are frequently reported as causing attacks; it defines "In the Wild" viruses are as having 
been recorded as responsible for attacks. Determination of which are common and which are "In the Wild" is to be 
made by a national authority that monitors the changing situation reported from worldwide centers of virus 
expertise. The current strategy for Zoo testing is detection of at least 90% of the different named viruses in an 
approved collection for a passing score. The Anti-Virus Working Group recently announced that the University of 
Hamburg has agreed to act cooperatively with the ITSEC evaluation scheme and do Zoo testing on-site at the 
University, as part of the evaluation process. Other collections may be used, providing they meet certain 
requirements, yet to be determined. In addition to this detection criterion, a number of other proposed criteria are 
put forth in the formal documentation provided by the ITSEC Anti-Virus Working Group drafts for Standard 
Functionality Class for Anti-Virus Products. These criteria include, but are not limited to, areas including recovery 
means, false positive levels, common compression, self-checking, logging and naming. Discussion of these is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
A Virus Attack Techniques Encyclopedia has been developed (under contract) by the Anti-Virus Working Group. 
This document is intended to detail all known techniques used by viruses, and currently includes the following: 
boot record infectors, parasitic viruses, multipartite viruses, companion viruses, stored code modification, 
environmental format considerations, stealth, execution infectors, system infectors, interception of system services, 
defense mechanisms, payloads, permanent configuration changes, hardware/software specific viruses and macro 
viruses. It is a dynamic document. The encyclopedia will be used to help in formulating ways to more fully analyze 
and test products; for security reasons, it is a limited distribution document. 
By attempting to measure a product's performance against the threat by scanning a comprehensive large collection 
of all viruses, testing extensively against those viruses which are known to be "In the Wild" according to 
designated reporting authorities, and measuring product abilities against a range of different attack strategies, the 
ITSEC scheme is focusing on the current and future "In the Wild" threat. By evaluating the product's ability to 
defend against the different techniques used by viruses, they hope to provide a measure of a developer's ability to 
track a rapidly changing threat. The CLEF would maintain close contact with the developer of the product 
currently under evaluation, with developers being required to demonstrate that not only are they up to date with the 
current threat, but that they have in place sufficient procedures to monitor the threat as a function of time and 
update the software to meet this threat. This would be documented through the use of the Certificate Maintenance 
Scheme, which includes extensive paperwork on the part of the developer to document their resources and plans in 
various areas including intelligence activities related to monitoring the threat, threat analysis and countermeasures. 
This "vendor evaluation" is something that almost no other evaluations of anti-virus software includes, and is one 
of the biggest benefits of the proposed ITSEC approach. It is also one of the areas which appears to meet with the 
most resistance within the USA. One concern which has been cited is the sharing of information between CLEFs: 
"Even though the UK requires that all techniques and lessons learnt from evaluations be documented at the end of 
an evaluation and made available to the UK evaluation community, it is felt that CLEFs prepare this information 
from a position of non-disclosure of information which is of a proprietary interest to them. There is some concern 
UK based evaluations, by virtue of their commercial nature, do not encourage the sharing of evaluation techniques 
amongst the evaluation community" [12]. 
There is another potential problem with this type of approach. As documented in [1], this solution can lead to 
possible problems as new threat types may be as yet unanalyzed, and the virus itself is not in the wild. There is no 
guarantee as to the time sequence that a virus may be found to exist, be found in the wild, be obtained and analyzed 
by an evaluation or certification service, and its threat type documented. This is illustrated by the recent spate of 
macro viruses, where initially there was a noticeable lag between the knowledge of the threat type by anti-virus 
researchers, the discovery of the first in the wild Word macro virus[13] and the first in the wild Excel macro virus 
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[14], and the implementation of detection and prévention for thèse virus threat types on the part of some 
developers. 
Finally, there are problems with issues of legal liability. Whereas Germán law demands someone be liable for 
failure in 1TSEC certified products, the United States makes spécifie disclaimers assuming no responsibility. 
Drawing again from Borrett [12], we find "the politicai implications of legal liability for Europe and North 
America merits further investigation. In the interim, it may suffice to place an appropriate caveat alongside any US 
evaluated products which appear in UK Certified Product List publications." 
Future Trends: New Paradi2ms and Epidemiologica! Shifts 
While each of thèse schemes use 771e WildList as a basis for wild virus detection only one (ITSEC) represents more 
than a series of snapshots of particular product's detection. We see several dangers associated with the current 
situation. In order to better illustrate thèse dangers, let us first build a perfect set of review criteria. Note that here 
we shall attempi to address only those aspects required for virus detection; properties such as virus removal, 
product usability and technical support are beyond the scope of this paper. 
The shift from Zoo to "In the Wild" testing marked the beginning of a move towards measuring the protection 
provided by a product. However, this shift is only the beginning of a true measure of protection provided. A 
cursory examihation of The WildList shows us that a particular computer is more "at risk" of infection by certain 
viruses on the list than certain others [15]. For example, Ping_Pong.B and Wazzu are both on The WildList, yet 
few would argue that for the average computer, the probability of infection with Wazzu is considerably higher. 
However, in most tests carried out against the set of viruses catalogued in The WildList, each sample is equally 
weighted. Clearly, this is not a complete approach; in a "perfect" world, we would weight each virus by the actual 
probability one had of encountering it and it effecting one's work. Extrapolating onward, we would include ail Zoo 
viruses in this weighting; for example, those viruses which are difficult to replicate would have a low rating (not in 
the wild, and not likely to spread even if released), whereas those viruses which have been actively circulated in 
newsgroups and which are highly viable in the wild would have a higher rating. However, even this approach is not 
complete. It is easy to argue that while the overall features of such a weighting scheme for viruses would vary 
relatively slowly as a function of time, its détails may fluctuate rapidly. Consider, for example, a situation where a 
certain virus is distributed widely on a set of mass-produced CDs. The threat posed by this virus (that is, the 
probability that you will encounter it) has increased somewhat, even though it may have only actually infected one 
PC at this time. Another layer of complexity which we will not address here is that such a weighting scheme would 
vary depending on whom the review was being carried out for; Word macro viruses, for example, pose little threat 
to those who do not use Microsoft Word. 
Initially, we believed that testing based on criteria that involved this type of weighting was impossible. We have 
since determined that the tests could be done using data gathered from IBM studies. However, problems with 
formalizing such a scheme remain. While using the data to formulate test criteria that could measure threats on a 
global scale is feasible, we believe certification using thèse methods is not practical at this time, due to the need for 
the certification body to independently gather the necessary comprehensive data. Other methods of measuring real 
world virus prévention provided by a scanner need to be compared to this model. Making such a comparison, we 
observe that for each of the certification bodies we have examined, ali fall short in ternis of the currency of the 
viruses used for testing. At one time, we believed that this was not a serious problem [16]; however, récent shifts in 
the way viruses appear in the wild are rapidly altering this perspective. 
The most serious change in the ways viruses spread since perhaps the beginning of the .virus problem is posed by 
macro viruses. Thèse viruses attach themselves to data items that are frequently shared. Moreover, this sharing is 
often done via the LAN or Email, making such macro viruses highly virulent. Indeed, macro viruses have been so 
successili] in the wild that the two most reported viruses to Virus Bulletin in January 1997 were both macro viruses: 
Concept and Npad. We have observed that once a virus begins to spread rapidly, it can reach epidemie proportions 
within an organization very quickly. It is the combination of large spread rate and lag in WildList testing times of 
WìldList-baszd certification schemes which poses the biggest problem to those relying on 77ie WildList for 
certifications. Since a virus must be reported by two or more WildList contributors, it is possible for a virus to be 
rampant within one organization and stili be observed by only one WildList reporter. By the time a virus discovered 
in the wild is actually observed by two reporters and included in the certifying body's test-set, the virus may have 
already been spreading within any given organization for several months. A good illustration of this is the Concept 
virus. Discovered in July 1995, the virus first appeared on 777^  WildList on Sept lOth, 1995. Thus, by the rules of a 
certification body using the criteria of detection of a collection based upon a two month old WildList compliancy, a 
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product which was certified would only be required to detect this virus by Nov lOth, by which time it was already 
spreading rapidly in the wild. 
Another problem has developed which may impact the abìlity a certification body has to measure that vendor's 
ability to meet the threat posed by macro viruses. A macro virus which replicates under Office 95 's version of 
Word may be automatically converted by Word to the new Office 97 Word format. This is referred to as 'up-
conversion'. The problem is related to a controversy within the anti-virus community regarding this up-conversion 
of Office 95 Word macro viruses and testing of anti-virus products. Some anti-virus researchers have indicated they 
feel this up-conversion of in the wild Office 95 macro viruses is the création of "new" viruses, and as such, 
represents an unethical act for any anti-virus product tester. Others researchers maintain the opinion that Office 95 
Word macro viruses which are in the wild and able to replicate into Office 97 documents, (via Word), should be 
part of the in the wild test set in both their Office 95 and Office 97 form, as to do otherwise could expose users of 
certified products to unnecessary risk. 
Is such testing required to make sure users are adequately protected [24], as part of an /nfbased certification, or 
would this be an unethical act of irresponsible virus création? No one can argue that the Office 97 viruses are in 
many ways différent from their Office 95 origins. However, we question whether this différence in physical 
structure, form, and language supports the contention that these are in fact totally différent viruses and that 
replicating the Office 95 virus onto an Office 97 document is unethical virus création. It is the opinion of this author 
that such arguments are counterproductive and that certification bodies which perform ITW tests and certifications 
should simply replicate Office 95 macro viruses onto Office °7documents, using due diligence in the care of such 
samples, as part of these ITW tests and certifications. As an industry, the anti-virus industry has long held the 
position that virus création for any reason is unethical. This belief has been somewhat altered by the necessity to 
perform tests of viruses generated by virus création Tcits', and the need to generate multiple polymorphic samples to 
allow for reliable detection and disinfection. The évolution of the virus threat may force us to re-examine our 
beliefs yet again. 
Another serious problem for certification bodies brought about by macro viruses is the vast numbers of variants we 
are observing coupled with the concept of "In the Wild". Virus exchange sites appear to be less prominent for 
macro viruses, than is the case for file and boot sector infecting viruses. The majority of these macro virus variants 
are being discovered already spreading in the wild. We believe that there are a number of reasons for this. First, as 
current macro viruses are written in WordBasic, they essentially carry around with them a complete copy of their 
source code [17]. As the language is both simple to use and powerful, viruses are easily modified and released. 
Second, we have observed seemingly random corruption of macros within the Word environment. While we are as 
yet unable to reliably recreate such corruption in a laboratory environment, we can see that macro viruses seem to 
be more résilient to such corruption than binary viruses. Thus, whereas a corrupted binary virus frequently renders 
a virus non-functional, many Word macro viruses are quite capable of replication even when corrupted, leading to 
création of a new variant. Thus, we have observed certain Word viruses spawn many variants in just a few months -
something which rivais even the most prodigious of "ordinary" viruses. This rapid rise of new strains discovered in 
the wild has further clouded the concept of "In the Wild," as well as reduced the value of certifications carried out 
against The WildList. A more forward-looking approach would appear to be that described earlier as taken by 
ITSEC, which attempts to certify a company's ability to meet the current and future threat. It would appear that in 
terms of protecting the user, the most criticai question is no longer whether a company can detect a spécifie virus, 
but how quickly that company can meet a new threat. 
Some people have argued that ali viruses are effectively "In the Wild", as many virus collections are available via 
virus exchange bulletin boards and web sites. However, a virus which is found on a Bulletin Board System or web 
site may not be viable in the real world. In 1992-1993, we examined the relationship between viruses found on 
virus exchange BBS compared with those known to be causing incidents [18]. It was determined there was little if 
any reason to believe viruses on underground BBS contributed significantly to the population of viruses spreading 
ih the real world. The majority of these viruses simply were not found to be spreading. At the same time, 
individuáis were reporting (and continue to report) infections caused by some of these barely viable viruses; this 
may be a result of the users obtaining the viruses and using them for testing (or reporting) purposes. 
In 1994, we began to observe a change in the nature of virus exchange and distribution. It was concluded that with 
the growth of the Internet, viruses could reasonably be expected to spread using severa] différent models. 
Specifically, Web virus distribution was predicted to make viruses widely available to the general computing 
population should they desire to obtain them; Usenet news was shown to be a potential distribution media for 
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viruses for both the willing and unwilling, and the Internet itself was examined as a potential hotbed for viral 
spreading which could occuralmost instantly and worldwide. 'The system is the perfect medium to host and 
transfer the very programs designed to destroy the functionality of the system itself'[19]. Whether or not the 
increased availability and relative anonymity afforded by the Internet will contribute to in the wild virus population 
remains to be seen. Viruses that have been released via Usenet have not become rampant in the wild. However, 
certification bodies who rely on detection of those viruses "In the Wild" should keep a careful eye on the rôle of 
global inter-networking, lest they be taken unaware by a paradigm shift in the way viruses spread. We are already 
beginning to observe real problems in this area, which we will discuss later in this paper. 
Threat and counter-threat 
The need for a new method of reviewing and certifying anti-virus software becomes more apparent when we 
examine some of the new threats resulting from the increased use of networks and desktop Internet connectivity. 
Although we have yet to see a virus spread in minutes/hours on a global scale via Email, we believe that the 
potential for such a virus exists. There have been several precursors to such a virus; hère we shall discuss two of 
them: CHRISTMA EXEC [20] and ShareFun [21]. 
CHRISTMA EXEC is a well-known "chain letter", which was released on December 9th, 1987. It is a good 
example of how an e-mail worm can impact a network: CHRISTMA EXEC spread across BITNET, EARN and 
IBM s internai network, dramatically slowing the IBM worldwide network on December 1 lth, 1987. The program, 
written in REXX, spread on VM/CMS installations, and displayed a Christmas tree along with a message, before 
sending a copy of itself to ali of the users' correspondents in the user files NAMES and NETLOG. 
ShareFun.A is a macro virus which spreads by infecting Word documents, and as such, opérâtes just like most 
other macro viruses. However, ShareFun.A attempts to spread via desktop e-mail, attempting to send mail 
messages to addresses listed in the users' address book. The message has the subject line "You have GOT to read 
this!", and it carries with it an attachment which contains the infected document. Fortunately, the virus e-mail 
routine is not very effective relying on certain applications being active upon the user's desktop, and so is not 
likely to be spread rapidly via this mechanism. 
A virus, by définition, replicates, and attaches itself to a host program. Although CHRISTMA EXEC did not attach 
itself to a host and therefore was not strictly speaking a virus, and ShareFun.A appears to be flawed in its design, 
thèse examples of malware provide a definite warning of things to corne. Collecting virus samples, extracting 
signatures and distributing cures have traditionally been time-consuming tasks for the anti-virus researcher. The 
upgrade and updating processes have required fréquent action on the part of users. As we have observed more and 
more viruses, some anti-virus vendors have developed automated methods to deal with the analysis of common 
viruses. This has helped cut the workload, but is stili insufficient to deal with the virus problems of the future. In a 
time when viruses can spread worldwide in hours or even minutes, a day or two of waiting could render a company 
impotent. Even automation of the distribution of signature updates via techniques such as push-technology will not 
fully solve the response-time problem; for viruses which spread chiefly by computer-computer interaction, rather 
than human-computer interaction, the interactive and time-consuming élément of isolation, capture, replication, and 
analysis is quite simply too slow. We believe that current levels of protection are not sufficient to défend well 
against an e-mail-aware virus. By the time such a virus could be isolated, sent to researchers, replicated, analyzed, 
a fix provided and that fix disseminated worldwide, the virus may well have already reached epidemie proportions. 
In an attempt to address this problem, IBM Research has developed a biologically inspired anti-virus technique: a 
computer immune system that can automatically identify, analyze and remove the virus from the system [22], The 
immune system provides for autornated collection and analysis of viruses, but does not stop there. It prépares and 
distributes the immunization for the virus automatically. No human intervention is required in most cases. Simply 
put, the immune system monitors activity and filters it for virus-like behaviour. If it is determined that a known 
virus is présent, it deals with the virus appropriately. However, if a known virus is not found, the system then 
automatically transmits a copy of the suspected infection (via a transaction center) to the IBM Research Division 
labs. There, with no danger to the user's machine, the system releases decoy programs, which seduce the virus into 
attacking. The decoys are examined for modification, and when such modification is found, viral signatures are 
extracted, and a repair algorithm is generated. This algorithm is automatically distributed throughout the system, 
curing both the virus which has been found there and on any other machines which have enabled the immune 
system. At the same time, immunity to that virus is provided throughout the system. Ali of this can take place in a 
matter of minutes, making use of secured authenticated transactions between the users PC and the IBM Research 
Division secure lab. Although human input may still be required in some rare situations, it is hoped that the ability 
of the immune System to respond to new threats will far exceed conventional techniques. 
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Certification Challenges 
This immune system model offers obvious benefits to the user and administrator: detection, removal, product 
updating and product distribution to multiple sites are all done immediately and transparently. The benefits to the 
developer include freeing of time for the anti-virus researcher who no longer will spend time analyzing trivial 
viruses, and implementing their detection. However, this protection model offers both technical and administrative 
challenges to the certification body. The challenges are many; here, we will examine several of them. 
Design Criteria and Test Administration 
Currently, central to the test criteria for all anti-virus product certifications are various lists of viruses with obvious 
names. Indeed, as reflected in the ITSEC guidelines, naming compliance and consistency are sometimes important 
parts of the product [23]. The immune system model eliminates the need for developers to decide on names before 
detection and disinfection for new viruses can be implemented. The WildList, being name-based, would be 
unsuitable for use as a minimal detection criteria of these new, rapidly spreading, in the wild (but as yet unnamed) 
viruses. 
The measurement of response times as currently designed into certification schemes such as those used by NCSA, 
and SECURE COMPUTING Checkmark is made to measure for protection models in which immediate response is 
unnecessary or unfeasible. An immune system model can meet the needs of the users in situations where Internet 
connectivity and viral increase will cause a two or three month time lag in documenting certification measurement 
°1 
to be clearly unacceptable; the current certification model cannot effectively measure this response time. 
Automated updates, push technology enabled updates, and updates available via File Transfer Protocol sites and 
Bulletin Board Systems may be documented in the cooperative C¿£F/Developer effort that is part of the ITSEC 
Anti-Virus Working Group model. However, while this current certification model has the potential to provide 
some measurement of vendor response time and reliability using thèse, in the future when new viruses spread 
worldwide in a matter of days, hours, or even minutes, response time problems will render even thèse approaches 
too slow. Indeed, we believe some of thèse approaches are already outdated. 
The testing of an immune system model will a high degree of competency and technical expertise with not only 
anti-virus software and virus sample replication, but with the Internet and networked Systems in general. 
Conclusions 
We have looked briefly at the history of the term "in the Wild" and how this developed iato The WildList, the de 
facto standard for building test-sets made up of those viruses in the wild. We have then examined three certification 
schemes based upon The WildList, and show that only one, ITSEC, appears to be constructed in such a way as to 
measure the ability of a vendor to track and match the current threat: the others are chiefly based upon The 
WildList, and suffer greatly due to the rapidly changing threat. In one case, we illustrated how a certified product 
might not even be able to detect viruses in the wild which were spreading 6 months prior to the current date. 
We considered an alternate way of classifying viruses for certification purposes, and discovered that although the 
number of viruses is rising steadily, the actual threat posed by computer viruses to computers varies as a function 
of time. We have highlighted the importance of measuring a developer's ability to quickly respond to new viruses 
and supply updates in the field. In particular, we note that in the case of an e-mail-aware or Internet-aware virus, 
even automated signature distribution may be too slow to be of much practical help. The computer-computer 
interactions which are becoming more and more the models of the ways in which we conduci business on the 
Internet are rendering manual éléments of viral isolation, sample capture, replication, and analysis too slow - only 
techniques such as IBM's immune system approach offer the type of response time needed to adequately protect 
from such a virus. 
This has serious implications for those involved in the certification of anti-virus software. Tests based upon The 
WildList measure the ability of a product to protect the user far better than Zoo based tests. However, we question 
the long-term usefulness of WildList-based certification schemes, especially in light of the turnaround and 
maintenance time of certification. While we acknowledge The WildList to be much improved with definite 
scientific and practical value, we feel certifications based upon The WildList represent the bare minimum in terms 
of protection - their présence alone is insufficient to guarantee the protection of your company. 
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> Abstract 
The term cyberterrorism is becoming increasingly common in the popular cul ture, yet a solid 
definition of the word seems hard to come by. While the phrase is loosely defined, there is a large 
amount of subjectivity in what exactly constitutes cyberterrorism. In the aftermath of the September 
11th attacks, this is somewhat disconcerting. 
In an attempt to define cyberterrorisrn more logically, a study is made of definitions and attributes of 
terrorism and terrorist events. From these attributes a list of attributes for traditional terrorism is 
developed. This attribute list is then examined in detail with the addition of the computer and the 
Internet considered for each attribute. Using this methodology, the online world and terrorism is 
synthesized to produce a broader but more useful assessment of the potential impact of computer-
savvy terrorists. Most importantly, the concept of ' tradit ional' cyberterrorism, which features the 
computer as the target or the tool is determined to be only a limited part of the true risk faced. 
Finally, the authors discuss the impact this new view of cyberterrorism has on the way in which one 
should build one's defenses. In particular, the breadth of the issue poses significant questions for 
those who argue for vertical solutions to what is certainly a horizontal problem. Thus, the validity of 
special cyberterrorism task forces that are disconnected or loosely connected with other agencies 
responsible for fighting the general problem of terrorism is questioned, and a broader, more inclusive 
method suggested. Keywords: cyberterrorism, terrorism, computer security 
> Introduction 
If you ask 10 people what 'cyberterrorism' is, you will get at least nine different answers! When those 
10 people are computer security experts, whose task it is to create various forms of protection against 
'cyberterrorism', this discrepancy moves from comedie to rather worrisome. When these 10 people 
represent varied factions of the governmental agencies tasked with protecting our national 
infrastructure and assets, it becomes a critical issue. However, given the lack of documented 
scientific support to incorporate various aspects of computer-related cr ime into the genre 
'cyberterrorism', this situation should not be surprising. 
Despite copious media attention, there is no consensus methodology by which various actions may 
be placed under the nomenclature 'cyberterrorism', yet the term clearly exists in common usage. 
The term, first coined in the 1980s by Barry Collin (Collin, 1997), has blossomed in the last several 
years: "Protect yourself from the cyberterrorist"; "Insure yourself against cyberterrorism"; "Funding 
forthcoming to fight cyberterrorism" (Hamblen, 1999; Luening, 2000). 
All of these sound nice, but the reality is that the reader, solution provider, or defender is often left to 
his own devices as to what the term actually means and thus what solutions should be created (or 
implemented). When a government's or corporation's entire infrastructure may be at stake, 
subjectivity is useful but may not be the best evaluative tool. 
At the same time, research of this phenomenon shows that cyberterrorism cannot easily be defined. 
This creates a Catch-22 situation: the thing cannot be defined — yet without defining it, one cannot 
'know' what it is one is fighting and hence come up with a good solution. Furthermore, even when 
there is an operational agreement on terms, if an attack/security event does not fit into one of the 
(often narrowly defined) categories, funding (and consequently investigation or technical remedy) 
may not be forthcoming. 
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For example, recently terrorists used a computer in Delray Beach, Florida to make their travel plans 
and purchase tickets, as well as using public library computers in the same town (Holland, 2001). 
How large the role computers played in the organization and execution of the attacks is, at this point, 
unclear, but the conclusion is obvious: computers and, in particular, the Internet, played a key role in 
the execution of the September 11th attacks. This concept is critical in evaluating the true problem 
we face in the virtual world: the use of computers in terrorist acts. While there are possible technical 
solutions that would have made this particular scenario more difficult, this task does not currently fall 
under the auspices of any government agency tasked with fighting cyberterrorism. Furthermore, as 
each of the actions cited above was not necessarily illegal prior to the attack, detection and 
prevention is made all the more difficult. 
The most widely cited paper on the issue of Cyberterrorism is Denning's Testimony before the Special 
Oversight Panel on Terrorism (Denning, 2000). Here, she makes the following statement: 
Cyberterrorism is the convergence of terrorism and cyberspace. It is generally understood to 
mean unlawful attacks and threats of attack against computers, networks, and the information 
stored therein when done to intimidate or coerce a government or its people in furtherance of 
political or social objectives. Further, to qualify as cyberterrorism, an attack should result in 
violence against persons or property, or at least cause enough harm to generate fear. Attacks 
that lead to death or bodily injury, explosions, plane crashes, water contamination, or severe 
economic loss would be examples. Serious attacks against critical infrastructures could be acts 
of cyberterrorism, depending on their impact. Attacks that disrupt nonessential services or that 
are mainly a costly nuisance would not. 
While Denning's definition is solid, it also raises some interesting issues. First, she points out that this 
definit ion is usually limited to issues where the attack is against "computers, networks, and the 
information storied therein", which we would argue is 'pure Cyberterrorism'. Indeed, we believe that 
the true impact of her opening statement ("the convergence of terrorism and cyberspace") is 
realized not only when the attack is launched against computers, but when many of the other factors 
and abilities of the virtual world are leveraged by the terrorist in order to complete his mission, 
whatever that may be. Thus, only one aspect of this convergence is generally considered in any 
discussion of cyberterrorism — an oversight that could be costly. Second, it is very different from the 
definition that appears to be operationally held by the media and the public at large. 
Given the Augean task of attempting to define cyberterrorism, one way we might approach the task of 
understanding it is to throw away the very idea of defining it at all, and instead begin by breaking it 
down into its fundamental elements — each of which can be examined and used as a foundation for 
developing solutions which may be technical, legal, social, educational, or policy driven. After all, a 
word is meaningless in and of itself — it is only the relational concepts that the word conveys that 
imbue the utterance with meaning. 
As 'cyberterrorism' relates to 'terrorism' a logical first step might be to look at the functional elements 
present in some operational definitions of 'terrorism' 1. 
The United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines terrorism as, "The unlawful use of 
force or violence, committed by a group(s) of two or more individuals, against persons or property, to 
intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of 
political or social objectives." (FBI, 2002). 
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The United States Department of Defense (DOD) defines terrorism using a slightly broader brush, 
calling it "the unlawful use of, or threatened use, of force or violence against individuáis or property, 
to coerce and intimídate governments or societies, often to achieve politicai, religious or ideological 
objectives" (DOD, 2002). 
The United States Department of State (DOS) définition states that terrorism is "premeditated, 
politicala motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub national groups or 
clandestine agents" (DOS, 2002). 
These varied ope rational définitions exist as a function of the individual organizational roles and tasks 
which are assigned to employées/agents. Thus, as thèse roles and tasks vary, the concepts of 
terrorism continue to vary. 
> The terrorism matrix 
When terrorism is examined in viewof thèse définitions, thereare some pervasive éléments: people 
(or groups), locations (of perpetrators, facilitators, victims), methods/modes of action; tools, targets, 
affiliations, and motivations2. Examples are shown in Figure 1, using two groups designated as terrorist 
groups by the United States government: The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Aum. 
ITTE AUM 
Perpetrato r Group Group 
Place Sri Lanka Japan 
Action Threats/Violence Violence 
Tool Kidnapping/Harassment Nerve Gas 
Target Government Officials/Recruits !=AUM 
Affiliation Actual/Claimed Actual/Claimed 
Motivation Social/Politicai Change World Domination 
Figure 1: Terrorism matrix bygroup anoattribuie. 
When we examine the éléments in thèse catégories in terms of the définitions provided by the 
government agencies, we see there is congruence between the terrorism event and the définitions 
used by the various agencies tasked with providing protection. This congruence is a good thing, as it 
results in people tasked with defense being able to determine that certain functional tasks (building 
blocks of modeling solutions) fit within the définitions used within their agencies/organizations. 
For example, as menttoned above, the United States Department of State (DOS) defines terrorism as 
"premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub 
national groups or clandestine agents". Thus, the activities of both of these groups fit the DOS criteria 
for 'terrorism'. 
Integrating the computer into the matrix of their traditional terrorism introduces some interestingeffects 
and problems, as we see when weconsider two groups, the LTTE and Aumreferenced in Figure 2. Note 
how the scope of 'terrorism' changes within each celi due to the addition of the computer. 
1. It is worth noting that there are w e r 100 defmaions; e*amining Ihem an is beyonC the scope ol this paper, 
2 . Note ihal üestreú ana dctual puteóme play a role as vttH. Fu t i ré 'performance - in me théâtre of terrorism B ikefytn be b a s e d t o s o r n e a e g r e e o n 
'audience reacuon'. This is integrai to Ine discussion, bui beyond the scope of this short paper. 
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LTTE AUM 
Perpetrator Group/Individual Group/Individual 
Place Sri Lanka/London/Australia/ 
Worldwide 
Japan/USAVorldwide 
Action Threats/Violence/Recruitment/ 
Education/Strategies 
Violence/Recruitment/ 
Education/Strategies 
Tool Kidnapping/Harassment/ 
Propaganda/Education 
Nerve Gas/Education 
Target Government Officials/Recruits !=AUM 
Affiliation Actual/Claimed Actual/Claimed 
Motivation Social/Political Change World Domination 
Figure 2: Matrix of terrorism with inclusion of the computer. 
In this model, not all of the elements are congruent with functional tasks assigned to given agencies. 
Thus, ' terrorism' can take place within these same groups that is not within the scope of 
investigation, etc. This is clearly a major problem, and one that merits further investigation. 
Therefore, let us look very briefly at the various sorts of issues the inclusion of computers introduce to 
the concept of terrorism. This is obviously an extremely complex task; each area will be considered in 
depth in future research, and as part of the IFIP World Computer Congress workshop on 
Cy be terrorism (WCC, 2002). 
PERPETRATOR 
Interactions between human beings are complex; while the obvious solutions gravitate toward 
monitoring, we are concerned with virtualization of interactions, which can lead to relative anonymity 
and desensitization. Topics of interest include methods to measure and diminish the impact of 
computer-mediated interactions on potential recruits and the ability for defenders to use virtual 
identities to influence intra- and inter-group dynamics (dissension, 'behind the scenes' 
communication and destabilization). 
PLACE 
Location exists as an element, but is not a 'required' element in traditional terrorism in that an event 
does not have to occur in a particular location. Thus, whether an act is virtual/virtual, virtual/real 
world or real world/virtual is of interest only as factor in modeling solutions. In addition, the Internet 
has introduced globalization of the environments. 
Actions that take place in virtual environments have demonstrably had real world consequences. An 
April Fool's Day hoax posted to Usenet demonstrated this when claims of the resignation of Canadian 
Finance Minister Paul Martin resulted in the decrease in value of the Canadian dollar (Reuters, 2002). 
ACTION 
In traditional scenarios, terrorist scenarios typically are violent or involve threats of violence. While 
there have been many studies of violence in the physical world, more research is called for in terms 
of 'violence' as a virtual phenomenon. Violence in virtual environments is a relatively new field, with 
many unanswered questions. These open issues include the psychological effects of traditional 
real-world violence portrayed in virtual environments, possible behavior modification resulting from 
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violence in virtual environments, physical trauma from virtual violence and the use of virtual violence 
in military training (Stone, 1993; Whiteback, 1993). However, despite the prevalence of traditional 
violence portrayed in virtual environments, 'cyberviolence' is still very much an unknown quantity. 
For example, destruction of someone's computer with a hammer constitutes a violent act. Should 
destruction of the data on that machine by a virus also be considered 'violence'? Perhaps violence 
should be considered in terms of hostile action, or threat thereof? 
TOOL 
There are an almost uncountable number of ways that the terrorist can use the computer as a tool. 
Facilitating identity theft, computer viruses, hacking, use of malware, destruction or manipulation of 
data all fall under this category. 
These uses of the computer, when combined with 'computer as target' form the 'traditional' picture 
of cyberterrorism. These will be discussed in more detail later in the section Computers: The Weapon 
of the Cyberterrorist. 
TARGET 
There are a large number of potential targets that involve, either directly or indirectly, computers. 
Consider, for example, the impact of Personal Identity Theft. While the incidence of identity theft is 
comparatively low, the impact of theft upon the unfortunate soul whose ID is stolen can be large: 
terrorists could use the stolen identity to mask their work, carrying out certain operations under their 
target's name, not their own. 
This would help evade detection by authorit ies, as well as potentially acting as a 'signal' that an 
identity or operation had been compromised. The Internet, especially the essentially useless 
authentication provided by email, provides the perfect breeding ground for identity theft. 
Another interesting twist on this scenario is that of'virtual' identity theft. For example, many users have 
multiple online personalities or profiles. Conceptually, there may be reasons why a terrorist would 
benefit from stealing a user's online identity. Attacks could be as trivial as exploiting trust relationships 
with other users when logged in as the stolen identity, to planting of Trojans etc., via 'trusted' email. 
Similarly, the rise of online stock trading and stock message boards has created an environment in 
which it is possible to deliberately manipulate a stock price (perhaps via a stolen identity). A terrorist 
could use such techniques as a funding source, or even attempt to move the markets towards chaos. 
Thus, a well organized virtual attack upon a bank or corporation's stock rather than the bank or 
corporation itself, could in fact prove to be highly effective. 
In the opinion of the authors, all of the attacks mentioned above are more likely to be successful 
when carried out against individual users or corporations rather than governments. However, 
governmental control currently relies heavily on the stability of the overall economy; thus economic 
destabilization is a viable attack against a government as well as the attacked third-party entity. 
Using the terrorism matrix, effective solutions for computer as 'target' can be conceptualized and 
designed — but these will be useless overall unless problems (technical, social, legal) arising from 
the interaction of computer with every cell of the terrorism matrix is addressed. If I can buy a ticket for 
an unknown 'fr iend' in Bulgaria to fly to London and blow up the London Eye, antivirus software on 
the computer controlling the London Eye is of little relevance. 
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AFFILIATION 
lt is possible for a person to read all about a given cause and chat with proponents of the cause 
without ever leaving the safety of his or her own home. New recruits can thus become affiliateci with a 
terrorist group, commit to carrying out given actions, all without ever actually coming into contact 
with another human being. At the same time, thèse loose affiliations can complicate investigations 
and confuse media reports. Additionally, the introduction of comput ing technology facilitâtes 
alliances between groups with similar agendas; this type of affiliation can resuit in strengtheningof 
the individuai organizations as they can immediatelyacquire access to the information resources of 
their allies. 
MOTIVATION 
Politicai, social, and economie changes are the motivations présent in real-world terrorism. 
Combining a dependence on Internet-connected Systems for banking and Ecommerce with the 
ability of anyone with a desire and readily available tool to disrupt thèse areas, results in a situation 
that is ail too clear: unless steps are taken to significantly reduce risks, disaster is inévitable. Even 
with the best risk réduction, there are still likely to be problems. 
> Pure cyberterrorism 
The concept of 'pure' cyberterrorism — that is, terrorism activities that are carried out entirely (or 
primarily) — in the Virtual world is an interesting one. The Internet provides many différent ways of 
anonymously meeting with 'like minded' ind iv idua i in a (corn para ti ve ly) safe way Furthermore, a 
successful cyberterrorism event could require no more prerequisite than knowledge — something 
that is essentially free to the owner once acquired, and an asset that can be used over and over again. 
Thus, it would be possible that such an environ ment could facilitate the création of entirely new 
terrorist groups — no monies would be required for actions, and members could organize 
themselves quickly and easily in the anonymity of cyberspace. This is very différent from certain 
examples given above, where the computer can aid the task of the terrorist, but 'real' resources are 
still required to exécute the plan. It is this pure cyberterrorism that most writers mean when they 
discuss the dangers posed by the cyberterrorist, and this compartmentalization poses a significant 
barrier to our ability to protect ourselves. 
One question that has not been adequately addressed in the literaturę is what might this terrorism 
look like. At this time, there is much confusion, based largely upon lack of agreement in définitions. 
However, using 'traditional' terrorism models should help make the situation more suited to analysis, 
and this is certainly a topie for future research. 
> Terrorism as theater? 
Within the terrorism literaturę, a common metaphor is that of terrorist incidents as theater. Those 
concerned with terrorism and the media frequently find the Staging of incidents, the publicity sought, 
and the manipulation of the audience primary thèmes in their analyses. To this end, WWW sites can 
bring publicity, and this is indeed a growing trend. Additionally, currently almost half of the 30 groups 
on the State Department's listof terrorist organizations have their own websites, which can be used to 
solicit money for their various causes or disseminate coded messages, either explicitly or 
stega nographically. 
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The functional tasks of the group having a WWW presence may be distributed among several sites; it is 
relatively easy for a terrorist organization to solicit funds for operations via the WWW (the ultimate 
penetration of Ecommerce?), promote their cause, as well as recruit would-be operatives while 
maintaining somewhat of a perceptual distance between the tasks. Finally, the relative anonymity 
provided to those accessing information via the WWW also helps distance those sympathetic with the 
cause from those actively fighting for the cause in ways that may be objectionable to the sympathizers. 
> The new terrorism 
New terrorist organizations are highly funded, technologically articulate groups capable of inflicting 
devastating damage to a wide range of targets. While most published work in the computer industry 
has focused on the impact of the computer as target (pure cyberterrorism) it is our belief that the real 
danger posed by the synthesis of computers and terrorism is not only the insertion of computer as 
target in the terrorism matrix, but in many of the other areas, too. 
The current narrowness of focus poses a significant risk to US infrastructure. By being too concerned 
about one particular part of the matrix, we are apt to let our guard down in areas which may be more 
critical. A forward-looking approach to terrorism that involves computers is highly contextual in its 
basis. Traditional antiterrorism defenses must be deployed, but these countermeasures must fully 
take into account many of the virtual factors that we have outlined in this paper. 
If the events of September 11th teach us one thing, it is that we should always consider the 'big 
picture' of the overall terrorist threat, rather than view one aspect in isolation. The 'cyber' aspects of 
the puzzle must be woven throughout the picture, not simply confined to one cell. To view a problem 
with too narrow a perspective is to invite anarchy into our lives. 
> Computers — the weapons of the cyberterrorist 
Following on from the discussions above, it becomes obvious that the most likely 'weapon' of the 
cyberterrorist is the computer. Thus, one might ask, are we arguing that one should restrict access to 
computers, just as access to explosives is restricted? Not quite, but close. We believe that the 
stockpile of connected computers needs to be protected. There are many laws that define how one 
should protect a firearm from illegal/dangerous use. The mandatory use of trigger locks, though 
controversial, has been put forward to prevent danger should the gun end up in the wrong hands. 
Similarly, powerful explosives like C4 are not simply sold over the counter at the corner store. 
Explosives and guns are certainly not entirely analogous to computers. A better analogy might stem 
from the concept of an 'attractive nuisance'. For example, a homeowner shares some responsibility 
for injury caused by a pool on his property — it is deemed an attractive nuisance, and as such, the 
innocent should be prevented from simply being attracted and harmed. 
Thus, there are many instances of laws which already discuss damage done by/to a third party from 
the intentional/unintentional misuse of a piece of corporate/personal property. The application of 
these laws or the definition of'misuse'with respect to computers seems unclear. However, there is a 
need for clear laws and standards which require operators of large networks of Internet-connected 
computers to exercise appropriate due diligence in their upkeep and security. 
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To thisend, we believe that there is an urgent need for définition of a minimum standard of security 
for computer networks. The définition of such a standard has far reaching implications not only for 
the usability of America's technology foundation, but the security of corporations and indeed of the 
nation itself. By formalizing an industry best practice guideline, companies will have a clear 
understanding of what must be carried out. 
Clearfy, such a guideline is a moving target, but its inception would allow the structuring of a valid and 
robust posture against both terrorist threats and other hostile entities. Such a set of m in imum 
standards would have to be easily and affordably supported by the security/application vendors 
themselves, rather than relying on individuai users needs/requirements to drive the best 
practice guidelines. 
This is not exactly a novel concept. International standards have been developed in other areas 
where safety and security are a concern. Consider the airline industry. There are international 
guidelines for airport safety; in cases where thèse standards are not met, conséquences range from 
warnings to prohibited travel. The needs for such changes, and how a due diligence standard could 
be created are subjects of future research. However, it seems clear that such standards are 
urgently needed. 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
Certainly there are many unanswered questions. Most people, governments included, consider 
cyberterrorism primarily as the premeditated, politically motivated attack against information, 
computer Systems, computer programs, and data by sub national groups or clandestine agents. 
However, as we have seen, the real impact of the computer on theterrorism matrix isconsiderably 
wider. By l imit ing our understanding of cyberterrorism to the traditional 'computer as target' 
viewpoint, we leave our nation open to attacks that rely on the computer for other aspects cf 
the opération. 
Even when considering the purely virtual impact of cyberterrorism, the approach is not adequately 
thought out. For example, consider an act that incorporated a desire for politicai change with the 
release of an otherwise benign computer virus within which an antigovernment message is 
embedded. For example, if the Melissa virus had contained the message "The Clinton regime must 
be defeated", would it have been the act of a terrorist instead of a misguided computer programmer 
— and would the ultimate punishment really fit the crime if that programmer were meted out the 
same punishment as the terrorists responsive for blowing up a US embassy? 
What rôle does incitement to violence play? A swastika emblazed on the WWW site of UK politician 
John Major may constitute some violation of a law, but probably does not constitute terrorism. But 
what if swastikas were digitally painted on the WWW sites of every Jewish organization in the country? 
What if a message was included inciting people to violence against their Jewish neighbors? Would 
these acts fall under the domain of 'using violence'? What if thèse images and messages were put 
there by a known terrorist organization? Would the act take on the characteristic of the perpetrator? 
Would these acts be hate crimes or cyberterrorism? Whence falls 'jurisdiction'? 
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Given the lack of physical boundaries in the virtual community, does a group's physical location have 
any bearing on whether or not they may be considered a sub-national group? What is a 'national 
group' in cyberspace anyway? Which government agency deals with that? 
What constitutes combatant targets in virtual environments? Consider the 1998 response by the 
Pentagon to civilian target computers as a response to Floodnet protests {McKay, 1998). Is the 
system that automatically strikes back considered combatant? Are its owners moved from 'non-
combatant ' to 'combatant ' based on an auto-response? Is the response perhaps engaging 
in 'violence'? 
Some claim "terrorists and activists have bombed more than 600 computer facilities". What specific 
components may be considered an element of a cyber system; what differentiates these incidents 
from conventional terrorism? Physical property, civil disorder and economic harm are easily 
understood in the physical wor ld; however, are there virtual equivalents that could lead to a 
broadening of the concept of cyberterrorism? 
> Defending against the new terrorism 
Defending against terrorism where a computer or the Internet plays an important part in the terrorism 
matrix is very similar to defending against terrorism that does not. The regular practices (deterrence, 
law, defense, negotiations, diplomacy, etc.) are still effective, except that the scope of certain 
elements is expanded. For example, traditional strikes against military bases, targeting of key 
leaders, and collective punishment have been effective in traditional terrorism (Whitelaw, 1998) and 
certainly have potential for dealing with some aspects of cyberterrorism. These techniques are often 
presented, and can be to be updated to include their 'virtual ' counterparts. It should be noted, 
however, that differences in international law and culture could make this process a complex task. 
Crenshaw (Crenshaw, 1999) presented here at length, examines a summary of traditional counter-
terrorist techniques: 
DETERRENCE 
Governments can use their coercive capacity to make terrorism too costly for those who seek to use 
it. They can do this by military strikes against terrorist bases, assassinations of key leaders, collective 
punishment, or other methods. There are several drawbacks to this approach, however. On the one 
hand, it can lead to unacceptable human rights violations. In addit ion, groups may not come to 
government attention until movements are so well developed that efforts to contain them through 
deterrent methods are insufficient. 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
Governments can treat terrorism primarily as a cr ime and therefore pursue the extradit ion, 
prosecution, and incarceration of suspects. One drawback to this approach is that the prosecution of 
terrorists in a court of law can compromise government efforts to gather intelligence on terrorist 
organizations. In addition, criminal justice efforts (like deterrent efforts) are deployed mostly after 
terrorists have struck, meaning that significant damage and loss of life may have already occurred. 
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ENHANCED DEFENSE 
Governments can make targets harder to attack, and they can use intelligence capabilities to gain 
advance knowledge of when attacks may take place. As targets are hardened, however, some 
terrorist groups may shift their sights to softer targets. An example is the targeting of US embassies in 
Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998 by truck bombs. Although the attacks are believed to have been 
coordinated by individuals with Middle Eastern ties, targets in Africa were chosen because of their 
relatively lax security compared with targets in the Middle East. 
NEGOTIATIONS 
Governments can elect to enter into negotiations with terrorist groups and make concessions in 
exchange for the groups' renunciation of violence. While governments are often reluctant to doso at the 
beginning of terror campaigns, negotiations may be the only way to resolve some long-standing disputes. 
For example, data gathering and monitoring operations of terrorist communicat ions has typically 
applied to signal intelligence and fieldwork. In a virtual environment, the ability to gather information 
from various sources is eminently achievable in a somewhat automated manner. Specific groups can 
be watched easily, and computers are comparatively simple to 'bug'. All contacts that a particular 
user interacts with could then be tracked, and the network of communication mapped. Furthermore, 
much of this surveillance can be carried out over the very same network that the terrorists intend to 
use to facilitate their plot. 
This extension, however, must be carried out with care. Consider, for example, the original US export 
regulations on the export of 'strong encryption' (ITAR). Under such regulations, certain encryption 
products were classified as munitions. While ITAR has since been replaced, the revamped 'Export 
Administration Regulations' (DOC, 2002) , while somewhat more relaxed, cont inue to blacklist 
several countries from receiving encryption products, despite the fact that strong encryption 
technology is freely available via the Internet. While this law seems to be aimed at preventing the use 
of strong encryption by other potentially hostile governments and terrorist entities, strong encryption 
algorithms and implementations remain trivially available to pretty much anyone. 
This classification of knowledge as munitions seems to be the ultimate (and flawed) extension of 
traditional an ti-terrorist tactics into the virtual realm. Clearly, it is not sufficient to quickly draw 
analogies that are not, in fact, correct. Afar better approach is to carefully consider the impact of the 
computer in the different cells of the terrorism matrix. For example, banning the export of encryption 
from just America is akin to banning the sale of C4 only on weekdays — the asset would be hardly 
even an inconvenience to the would be terrorist. A far better solution is to consider the safeguard in 
the context of the virtual world. When examined in this aspect, for example, it is reasonably clear that 
the original classification of encryption products as munitions is not likely to be effective. Similarly, 
while the use of export grade encryption can (and has) resulted in the ability of officials to read some 
terrorist communiqués, a restrictive "export to here, not here" ban is unlikely to succeed in any 
meaningful way. 
A forward-looking approach to terrorism that involves computers is therefore highly contextual in its 
basis. Traditional antiterrorism defenses must be deployed, but these countermeasures must fully 
take into account the virtual factors that we have outlined in this paper. 
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> Conclusion 
The Internet was developed pnmari ly as an unregulated, open architecture. Not only are we 
observing a predictable backlash to the 'corporatization' of the network, where the tools of 
destruction can easily be placed in the hands of the dissatisfied or malevolent people, we must also 
deal with the fact that the infrastructure is ideally suited to criminal activities. Some of these activities 
are being promoted as cyberterrorism; however, the loose use of the term is actually undermining the 
défense capabilities of the very corporations and governments who are at risk. 
Events can beanalyzed in termsof theircriticai factors, and only if thesefactorsali existcan the event 
legitimately be called terrorism. However, that does not mean if ali these factors do no tex is t tha ta 
corporation is 'safe'. Unfortunately, corporations are built around the premise that people will do the 
right thing. The fact, as we have seen, is that this is not necessarily the case. 
We do not use the term 'ice pick terrorism' to define bombings of ice-pick factories, nor would we use 
it to define terrorism carried out with ice picks. Thus, we question the use of the term cyberterrorism 
to describe just any sort of threat or crime carried out with or against computers in general. At the 
same t ime, those who do insist on treating only 'pure cyberterrorism' as cyberterrorism are 
compîetely missingthe true threat posed by the addition of acts in the virtual world to the terrorists' 
playbook. Finally, the nascent danger in the term cyberterrorism is that cyberterrorism will somehow 
be dealt with separately to regular terrorism. This artificial fragmentation of our défenses is likely to 
provide the terrorist with a significantadvantage in any campaign against a nation state, and is to be 
avoidedatal l costs. 
This brings us to the final point of this study: turning the tables on terrorism. As we have shown, 
computers can play an enormousrole in terrorism. At the same time theycan provide perhaps our 
biggest défense against terrorism if used to our advantage. However, just like as we need to 
understand the integration of computers with terrorism, we must examine how computers can assist 
in défense broadly. 
This begins with the re-examination of basic beliefs about 'cyberterrorism' which must take place 
within academia, ¡ndustry, government and défense sectors. This re-examination is, however, only 
the first step in combating terrorism. 
Information at each level of analysis must be shared, collated and redistributed across federai, state 
and locai government boundaries, as well as amongst ¡ndustry and academia, and in some cases, 
the private citizenry. 
Obviously, this type of endeavor is information technology intensive. In the United States alone there 
are over 87 000 différent j u r i d i c t i ons (HLS, 2002); combined with information from industry, 
academia and the private citizenry, this amount will increase many times over. Fortunately, oneof the 
things computers are good at is processing information. By developing an information technology 
architecture that would sort, correlate and facilitate the most effective use of that information, 
information could be shared in a timely manner amongst these groups, some of which histórically 
have had little, if any, communication. 
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While specification of design or administration of such a project is beyond the scope of this paper, we 
believe that using a publish and subscribe model, with a meta-information standard such as XML, data 
from law enforcement, government, defense and industry could be analyzed, correlated, filtered and 
redistributed quickly to those who need it most.This cross-disciplinary sharing of information could 
help practitioners create complementary defensive solutions and policies, building on shared expertise 
and innovation. 
Additionally, a well-designed technical solution can circumvent some of the cultural problems inherent 
in cross-sector information sharing, by eliminating the need for the actual data to do the correlation. 
Some technologies have been developed which would appear to lend themselves particularly well to 
this sort of implementation, but practical tests are required before any conclusion can be reached 
(Legion, 2002). 
Aside from the role of computers in defense, we must attempt to re-educate policy makers, defusing 
the latent danger of vertical 'cyberterrorism' defenses and replacing them with a wel l-rounded, 
integrated approach to a problem that is extremely broad. From a corporate and governmental 
perspective this requires a careful examination of the 'messaging'that is broadcast. How do we portray 
the fusion of computers with terrorism? Can the messaging be made more productive so that we can 
shape the mindset of our audience to one that is synergistic with a broad view of cyberterrorism? 
Finally, it is impossible to neglect to mention the fact that the rapid increase in connectivity and the 
ultimate frailty of our national IT infrastructure coupled with the astonishing homogeneity of our 
computing base is a matter of grave concern. Continued focus must be put on increasing the public 
demand for computer security as well as the corporate awareness of the issue: whereas security flaws 
in widely used applications were once perceived as personal risks, we must begin to recognize the 
potentially global consequences of such issues in balance with the more general problems posed by 
the integration of computing with terrorism. 
The lack of understandirg of cyberterrorism, and the overall insecurity of America's networks have 
allowed a situation to develop which is not in the best interests of the country or computer users. The 
need to protect comput ing resources, making the job of a cyberterrorist more diff icult is obvious. 
However, this can only be accomplished by re-examining commonly held beliefs about the very nature 
of computer systems and of cyberterrorism itself. 
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> Abstract 
As technology continues to modifythe ways in which information of ail types is stored, analyzed and 
exchanged, concerns related to privacy are growing. At the same lime, the very concept of privacy is 
highly subjective, varying culturally as well as organizationally. In this présentation some of the 
cultural and organizational aspects of privacy will be examined, and some Internet-related threats to 
privacy discussed. Then, new survey data from our study of user behavior and technical facilitators 
of privacy will be presented. The study focuses on users' attitudes toward privacy and their 
responses to some globally applicable privacy-related threats. The data show some unexpected 
results, which will be interpreted by application of several well-known psychological models to the 
user behavior. Finally, the need for further work in the field is highlighted, and suggestions for 
further research provided. 
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> What is Privacy? 
Privacy is a relatively new concept. While the word "privacy" first appeared in the 15* century, the 
meaning most closely related to how the word is used today did not émerge for another four hundred 
years. As shown by the following varied views of privacy, privacy is comprised conceptually of both 
privateand public spaces; it iscontext dépendent and varies from person to person. 
For some, privacy is exercising control over the information about themselves, or their family, that 
others have access to [Chess, 2003; Stefnisson, 2003]. For others, privacy is only doing things that 
have been expressly permitted with personal information [Whalley, 20031. Privacy is sometimes 
seen as extending from information about a person to information about what a person does: for 
example, [Raiu, 2003] states "privacy is ail data l'en workingwith and which shouldn't beavailable to 
just anyone is part of my (personal) privacy, and that includes e-mails, malware collections, or 
program sources." Some believe privacy consists of preventing others from knowîng things which 
they know, but do not wish them to know; thus, it could be related to any type of information - not just 
information about oneself [Shipp, 20031. For some, privacy extends to a right to prevent being 
contacted or approached by parties without consent [Kaminsky, 2003] ; many people's perspective 
on UCE (Unsolicited Commercial Email, or Spam) illustrâtes this viewof privacy. 
In terms of popular usage, dictionaries tend to provide an excellent insight into the way a word is 
commonly used (Websters, 2003] defines privacy as "the quality or state of being apart from 
company or observation; freedom from unauthorized intrusion," and does not specify whether this 
relates to people or data. (OED, 2003] states privacy is "The state or condit ion of being alone, 
undisturbed, or free from public attention, as a matter of choice or right; freedom from interférence 
or intrusion." Given thèse varied définitions of privacy, it is important to define the aspect of privacy 
• that this study attempts to investigate. Based upon the explosion of Internet access, it seems 
meaningful for the purpose of this paper to operationally define privacy as the control over the 
di5dosure of information about one's sell or personal transactions. 
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> Culture, Gender and Privacy 
The concept of privacy is ever evolving; today individualsfacea widevariety of privacy concerns. One 
of thèse concerns is how companies or organizations handle private, or personal, information 
provided by the individual. There are some cultural différences in the amount of trust we put in 
others to handle this type of personal information. For example, a 1999 study by [ IBM, 1999] found 
that Americans slightly placed more confidence in companies handling of their personal information 
thandid people from Germany or the United Kingdom. However, there are also différences in howwe 
perceive what information should be publicly available in the first place. In Sweden, for example, some 
information from tax returns is public information, whereas in some other countries, this would be 
considered a gross violation of privacy "rights" 1 . Many other cultural différences in privacy exist. For 
example, homes in Arabian society are constructed so that the résidents of the house cannot see their 
neighbors from any part of the house, thus insuring the privacy of the neighbors [Al-Sabt, 1995] . 
Interestingly, this cultural expectation for privacy of one's neighbors rests primarily not upon the 
neighbors, but upon the one building the house that might allow for inadvertent viewing of the 
neighbors. [Fullbright, 2003] comments on Japanese privacy norms: "Americans frequently 
comment on the différent sensé of privacy, both physical and psychological, between Japanese and 
Americans.. . . In the bank when conduct ing a transaction or using the cash machine, it may be 
disconcerting to find someone standing right behind you ... in the typical hospital ordentist's office the 
doctor will examine the patient not in an enclosed private office but frequently in a curtained-off area." 
Gender alsoappears to play a raie in some of the issues related to privacy. Many, if not most, studies on 
gender and privacy have focused on behaviors that sexually objectify women such as the use of 
skirt-cams, pretexting, familial abuse and societally imposed modesty [Allen, 2000; Marx, 2003] . A 
récent study by Information Technology Association of America found that women felt half as safe as 
men online, in several areas including the contrai overdisclosureof their private information [ITAA, 
2003], One thing is clear from the existing research: women and men differ in what they believe about 
privacy, what they expect in terms of privacy, and in what they are willing to do to protect their privacy. 
'While in Ihe U.S. the Freedom of Inlormation (1966) and Canada"* Privacy Act 11985) were both estaHished relatively recentty, Swederïs Freedom 
of the Press iavrewereestaMistied Intheearty 1700s. anc* set a précèdent for coneeptua!inng"pnvate information". 
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> Technical Aspects of Privacy 
Aside from the different cultural expectations and definit ions of privacy, one of the reasons why 
the concept of privacy has become so important is the ability of technology to provide for 
massive and fundamental changes in terms of abuses of privacy. As a trivial example, consider the 
"contemporary" issues of privacy from 100 or even 50 years'ago. Many transactions were carried 
out in cash, essentially making them untraceable. Public records, if they existed at all, had to be 
manually searched. The process of inference (determining classified information from a large 
number of unclassified records) was difficult and time-consuming. 
A quick comparison to the interconnected world of today provides an astonishing contrast. While we 
have always offered up personal information about ourselves (for example, when applying for 
insurance or benefits, obtaining medical services, f i l ing tax returns, applying for employment, 
seeking credit, getting a mortgage, etc.), this information was relatively secure. However, the advent 
of large databases maintained by companies that specialize in collecting huge numbers of public 
records allows for the trivial monitoring and investigation of an individual, Data mining makes the 
process of inference cheap and easy, and the move from cash to credit cards, phones to cellular 
phones and paper mail to email make the task of investigating a particular citizen easier. 
Although many facets of the impact technology can have on privacy are well explored by experts 
in law and public policy, there are some gaps in research to date. As we examine some of the 
previously unexplored issues, we will first consider inadvertent disclosure of private information - the 
"leakage" of information that the user either explicitly or implicitly allows whilst using his computer. 
Following this, we will explore maliciousdisclosure of information, via various forms of malicious code. 
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> Inadvertent Disclosure 
There are many différent ways in which a user can inadvertently compromise their privacy. For 
example, even the simple actions of browsing the web, downloading software or purchasing software 
online can impact user privacy. In this section, some of thèse disclosures are examined, in order to 
illustrate the types of risk faced. 
WEB USAGE - COOKIES 
A cookie is a small "b lob" of data stored on the client machine dur ing web browsing in order to 
maintain state [Kristol, 19971. Cookies can be temporary (that is, they are destroyed when the 
browser session exits) or they can be permanent - that is, they persist for a specified unit of t ime, 
possibly indefinitely. Cookies are not universale negative - they are a necessary part of working with 
the WWW. However, cookies can be used to profile a particular user or computer across multiple web 
sites. This problem is far from new [Mayer, 1997], but seems to be increasing both in prominence 
and application as users become more aware of the issues. 
WEB USAGE - PRIVACY P0LIC1ES 
One serious issue regarding use of the World Wide Web is that a user will often volunta ri ly disclose 
information about himself assuming that that information will not compromise his privacy. Users type 
personal information into a compétition or survey without reading the electronic small p r i n t - that is, the 
print that tells them that their data submission is often sold to third parties for the undisclosed or vague 
purposes. Similarly, some legitímate e-commerce transactions are not 100% benign. Several 
well-known web sites en nance revenues by selling private information (such as name and address, 
buying profile, and email address). This fact is disclosed on publicly available Web site privacy policies. 
E M A I L - SPAM TRACKING PIXELS 
The advent of HTML-enabled email has caused several issues for those concerned with privacy. In 
certain popular email clients (such as Outlook), emails can be previewed in a preview pane. In the 
case of an HTML email, however, this preview can show whether the email was opened, indicatingto 
the sender that the email address is " l ive." Some spammers will attempt to send email to 
"predictable" email addresses at domains and use tracking pixels to ascertain opens. These 
addresses of thèse "opened" emails are deemed more valuable; in essence, the spammer knowsa 
live address has been found and that the message was read. 
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DOWNLOADS - END USER LICENSE AGREEMENTS 
Another extremely serious issue for users is that of the End User License Agreement (EULA). When 
downloading software from the internet, users often do not read the EULA. However, the EULA cari 
contain information that is vital for interpreting the impact of the information provided upon the 
privacy of the user. Additionally, there are several examples of Adware (software that displays ads on 
the user's machine randomly, or that target ads based upon user profile) that is "piggybacked" with 
other, useful applications. One controversial piece of adware - and certainly one of the most well 
known - is the Gator Advertising Information Network (GAIN). This software provides several useful 
functions - and also can gather information about surfing habits etc. Gator is given as an example, 
however, because the EULA and privacy poìicy are exemplary; anyone running the current version 
Gator has, at some point, been given the opportunity to read the EULA and privacy policy, in which 
the functionality of the software is clearly described. Thus, the software discloses its behavior and 
opérâtes with the users permission, yet some users complain vehemently about the software once 
they becomeaware of its opération and perceived impact on privacy. 
> Malicious Disclosure 
Aswe nave seen above, there are many cases of inadvertent information disclosure that are not in line 
with the traditional concept of malicious in nature. However, sometirnes there is another avenue 
through which privacy iscompromised: intentionaliyforced disclosure facilitateci by Malicious Code. 
The current status of the Internet provides the perfectenvironmentfor Malicious Code; self-replicating 
code cantake advantage of the high degree of homogeneityand interconnectivityof the Internet, and 
Trojan Horses can be easily and rapidly disseminated via the network. Furthermore, the blurred lines 
between data and code further increa se the opportunity for the exécution of rogue code. 
PASSWORD-STEALING TROJANS 
The concept behind a password-stealing Trojan is far from new; the idea of usinga "trojanized" piece 
of software to grab passwords as they fly by, either directly from the keyboard or in transit over the 
network has been implemented many times on a raftof différent platforms. There are currently many 
différent password-stealing Trojans deployed on unsuspecting users' machines. 
SPYWARE 
As the Internet develops, the value of gathering data on groups of users and individuai users 
behavior for commercial purposes increases. Thus, there is a legitimate desire for online marketers 
and web site creators to tailor content and offers to users for the purposes of cross-selling and 
up-selling, as well as lead generation. However, unlike its legitimate cousin, Adware, Spyware does 
not request permission from the user prior to installation; thus, a computer can silently track 
personally-identifiable information, and use this to modify content. 
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REMOTE ACCESS TROJANS 
A Remote Access Trojan ¡s a computer program that lets a user (or users) access machine resources 
remotely. Here, as is often the case when considering non-viral malware, the classification of such 
programs as Trojans depends s igni f icante upon one's point of view: the tool in the hands of an 
administratorcould be a useful method of remote management. In the hands of a hackerthe same 
too!, silently al lowingan intruder into one's machine, iscertainly a Trojan Horse. A good example of 
this di lemma is the Cult of the Dead Cow's Back Orífice. This tool is a powerful and unobtrusive 
architecture for remote management... yet many users consider it to be a Trojan Horse. While the 
position is arguable (for a counterpoint, see [CDC, 2003]), from the perspective of a user who has 
had B02K installed without his permission on his machine, it certainly fulfills the requirements of a 
Trojan Horse. 
COMPUTER VIRUSES 
Previously, the primary dangerof computer viruses was data modification ordestruct ion. However, 
with email nowcommonplace on the desktop, and connectivity readilyavailable via a standard set of 
system calis, the ability for viruses toexportconfidential data is becoming problematic. For example 
[Symantec, 2002] , toconform with APA style. 
BLENDEDTHREATS 
Blended threats combine the characteristics of viruses, worms, Trojan Horses, and Malicious Code 
with server and Internet vulnerabilities to initiate, transmit, and spread an attack. By using múltiple 
methods and techniques, biended threats can rapidly spread and cause widespread damage; 
just as in the case of viruses, such damage is not limited to simple damage, but can involve the 
dissemination of prívate information or the installatíon of other threats to privacy such as Remote 
Access Trojans or Password-stealing Trojans. 
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> Technical Responses to Privacy Threats 
Perhaps oneof the most interesting aspects of the problems outlined above is that in each case, 
significant réduction of risk can be achieved by modif ication of user behavior. In the case of 
inadvertent compromise, a higher awareness and more active participation in control of user 
information can reduce disclosure, or at least control it. 
In terms of browsing the Internet, there are many controls and configuration settings with web 
browsers that help facilitate privacy. For example, the Platform for Privacy Préférences Project, P3P) 
developed by the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) provides for the création for machine-readable 
privacy policies [Marchior i , 2002 ] . Such policies can be read by browsers, and acted upon 
accordingly. Microsoft's Internet Explorer 6.0 has added support for P3P policies for cookie control, 
allowing cookies to be accepted or rejected based upon the user's privacy préférences [Microsoft, 
2001] . Software exists which can beconfigured to periodically delete unwanted cookies. However, 
user understanding and web site support for P3P is currently sketchy at best. 
Poor acceptance of technologies addressing privacy concerns is a serious problem for those tasked 
with maintaining large numbers of computers, and enforcing departmental or corporate policies (see 
survey data below). Fortunately, there are technological solutions available that allow policy to be 
enforced company-wide; for example, Symantec's Enterprise Security Manager is capable of 
enforcing rule sets for large numbers of computers automatically. Oespite this technological salve, it 
seems that there is a significant disconnect between expressed concern and action; even informed 
users seemto express concern but do not followup with actions. Similarly, protection from unwanted 
but legitimate software functionality is provided by inspecting most EULAs and Privacy Policies -
extension of P3P to create machine-readable EULAs and policies would help automate users 
privacy concerns. However, unti l such a system is produced, reading the EULA should provide 
sufficient protection. 
In terms of malicious privacy compromise, the solution set is yet clearer: anti-virus software protects 
users from the vast majority of threats. For those concerned about Spyware threat mitigation is 
available tothe user... i f theychoose toapply it. This point, however, is the crux of the matter, and the 
primary driver behind this research: do people care about their privacy, and if so, how is this 
reflected (or not) in their actions. 
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> Study Goals 
As outlined above, there exist many différent threats to user privacy online, ranging from tracking 
user actions tocompletely takingover their machines. However, in each case the main concern is 
related to user behavior not technology: often a robust technological solution exists, but the crucial 
élément is user compréhension and action. 
The goal of this study, therefore, was to determine if there was consistency between a stated desire 
for privacy and the day-to-day actions of information security professionals related to privacy-
enhancing behaviors. The hypothesis is that security practitioners believe privacy is important and 
they consistente practice behaviors that are consistent with their beliefs. The null hypothesis is that 
security practit ioners believe privacy is important but their actions are not reconciled with their 
beliefs. If this null hypothesis is true, then the privacy they say they believe is of value is at risk. These 
risksare facilitated by, but are not limited to, the behaviors measured in the study. 
> Methodology 
The preliminary design of the survey involved querying a focus group of 67 ind iv iduai working in the 
computer security field. In orderto measurewhetheror not the participants valued "privacy," and to 
ascertain their behaviors related to certain aspects of privacy, the subjects were asked eight True/False 
questions related to familiarity with Personal Privacy Policy (P3P) and reading of privacy policies (their 
own Organization, and that of sites they visited). In order to lessen possible bìas with subjects determining 
the questions were specificala related to privacy, the question designed to assess their attitude toward 
the study's operational définition of privacy was placed as the Sth question, at the end of survey. 
In initial findings, it was observed that no subjects expressed a familiarity with P3P; however, when 
queried directly using the words "personal privacy policy," a few expressed some familiarity. Thus, 
the survey was revised suchthat itwasadministered using the words "personal privacy policy" rather 
than the acronym "P3P." Several other issues were then added to measure compliance with other 
privacy-enhancing behaviors, such as encrypting sensitive e-mails and deleting unwanted cookies. 
The final revised survey consisted of eight True/False questions designed to measure two things: six 
functional/operational behaviors and the subject's desire to control of information about self and 
transaction. It was administered to randomly selected subjects from attendees at three IT/Security 
Conferences held in the United States, The United Kingdom and the EU. 
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> Responses Summary 
The responses gathered in terms of True/Fatse answers are shown in the following table, keyed by 
the response of the primary question concerning privacy. This was: 
/ like to control the disclosure of information aoout myselfand/or my transactions. 
In the US study, there were a total of 63 respondents; the UK study contained 58; the EU study 
contained 23. Note that despite the small number of responses in the EU study is still statistically 
meaningful, given that the respondent number represented over90% of the target group. The data 
collected is shown below. 
Question Group US True US False UK True UK False EU True EU False 
1 a m f a m i l i a r w i t h 
m y b r o w s e r P 3 P 
i m p o r t a n t 27 36 30 28 17 6 
U n i m p o r t a n t 2 6 2 0 0 0 
1 a l w a y s e n c r y p t 
s e n s i t i v e e m a i l 
m e s s a g e s 
I m p o r t a n t 26 37 21 37 8 15 
U n i m p o r t a n t k k 1 1 0 0 
1 e n c r y p t a l l e m a i l s 
I m p o r t a n t 0 63 3 55 0 23 
U n i m p o r t a n t 0 8 0 2 0 0 
1 a l w a y s d e l e t e 
c o o k i e s 1 d o 
n o t n e e d 
I m p o r t a n t 39 2(+ 30 28 13 10 
U n i m p o r t a n t 2 6 ì 1 0 0 
1 a l w a y s r e a d t h e 
p r i v a c y p o l i c y o f 
w e b s i t e s 1 v i s i t 
I m p o r t a n t 3 6 0 11 « 19 
U n i m p o r t a n t 0 8 1 1 0 0 
1 a lwayi read t h e 
• n t t r e EULAof new 
sof tware before 
agreeir tg t o Instali 
ìt on my computer 
I m p o r t a n t IO 53 5 53 1 22 
U n i m p o r t a n t 2 6 0 2 0 0 
1 a l w a y s e n c r y p t 
d a t a o n m y 
h a r d d i s k 
I m p o r t a n t 10 53 10 t*8 1 22 
U n i m p o r t a n t 0 8 1 1 0 0 
Tabla 1'.- Aggregate datafrom the studyfor US, UK and EU audiences. 
Note the large disparity between concern atout privacy ano actuat behavior. 
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> Analysis 
Analysis of the data is fairly straightforward, as the results are incredibly clear: even a "by eye" 
analysis shows that there isa huge disconnect between belief and action. In the case of each country 
set, the vast majority of users expressed concern over personal information disclosure. However, the 
actions taken (or more frequentiy) not taken show a massive disregard for thèse concerns. 
It is not possible toattr ibutethis disconnect totechnological naiveté. Consider the question regarding 
web site privacy policies. In this case, the US data shows that of the 63 users who expressed that they 
valued privacy, only three always read privacy policies on Web sites. Similarly, on the question 
regarding End User License Agreements, only 10 users claimed to reliably read the policy. The data 
from the UK and EU studies show similar behavioral biases. Given the user demographics (those 
people attending a security conférence or trade show) it is difficult to argue that users were ignorant 
of the dangers inhérent in installing and running exécutable code, yet the overwhelming majority of 
users did not even perform the rudimentary stepof checking the daims of the software supplier. 
Even in cases where there is a good and free technology solution available, such as P3P, our initial 
data showed that while users claimed that they were aware of the technology, further questioning 
revealed that there was a very low understanding of this technology. While approximately 5 0 % of 
respondents stated they were familiär, conversational évidence clearly indicated that this number 
was higher than the realstatistics. Thus, many users are actually unaware of the free and embedded 
technology solutions available to them. 
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> Cognition 
Given the rather surprising nature of the results and the large disconnect between belief and 
response, it behooves us to discuss the underfying mechanism forthis situation. Although further 
research is indicated, it appears unlikely that unwieldiness of technical solutions can be entirely 
blamed for the observed data. Even in cases where technology has been introduced to safeguard 
user privacy, there seems to be an apathy regarding its use or even understanding. 
One model for representing contradictory cognitions is the cognitive dissonance model [Festinger 1957). 
This model applies when one holds two competing thoughts or actions. For example, imagine someone 
has just purchased a new cellular téléphone phone with free WWW access, and signed a two-year 
service contract 2. The nextday, a new offer arrives - upgraded phone {i.e. camera phone), and free 
service for six months, with no contract. The person now has two competing thoughts: the belief that they 
signed up for a good deal, contrasted with new parameters that are, on the surface, more attractive. 
The conflict, or dissonance, could be resolved in a number of différent ways. The buyer could focus on 
the good thingstheygot in theirdeal - t h e strengthsof the offer they accepted (i.e. free WWW access, 
stabiiity of two-year with no price change, etc.). They may focus on the fact it was the "right t ime" to 
make such a pure hase. At the sa me t ime, they may dirnmish the value of the compet ing belief by 
dismissing the extra functionality (camera) as superfluous. The amount of dissonance is affected by 
two factors: the number of beliefs in conflict, and the importance, or strength. of those beliefs3. 
The data gathered in this current study indicate the présence of some type of dissonance between 
the desire to control disclosure and the thinking regarding the actual behaviors engaged in. This 
process certainly threatensthe privacy of users, and, as mostof the individuals invoived in the study 
were décision rnakers or actors in the security process, has the potential for a more wìdespread 
impact. Future research will examine ways in which dissonance can be resolved in which help, 
rather than harm, organizational security. 
> Conclusion 
The results of this study provide interesting food for thought. Despite the fact that there exist many 
ìmpediments to online privacy and that educated users expressed a strong concern for theìr privacy, 
the behaviors claimed by respcndents do not reflect thèse concerns. This result is of little surprise to 
• the security consultant, but may be of some surprise to industry observers: there is a disconnection 
between the risk and the behavior. 
The significance of this result for future work is clear: more research should be done to understand 
why the behavior does not match the concern regarding privacy. As discussed above, when the 
human mind encounters data that is inconsistent with behavior this dissonance must be resolved. 
By understanding the ways in which users are currently resolving this dissonance while continuing to 
engage in "at risk" behaviors, éducation and product design can be modified such that the risk is 
mitigated most effectively. The weakest link in the computer security chain remains the person using 
the computer: research that emphasizes strengthenìng this cruciai l ink will provide the largest 
increase of security and the best possible research benefit. 
'Peopfe tend avoitì input that will increase dissonance, howewr, sometimesthe belieb are fort:ed upon them. 
'One seemingty contiacUctory result noied by Festinger was (hat when a petìon acta against their internal débets, ine smaltef the t ewaia loi doingso. 
me largar the generaled dissonance. Ina classic eipenmentlFestingeriCarlsmith, 1959), Feslinger "rewarded" participants 1er espousinga 
poiilon that they die noi aclualry believe. Interestingly. those who were rewarded leasl showed the greateslshrfl m Dieii own personal belief system. 
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